[73.1] The choice appearing to all of them difficult and hard to decide upon by reason of the evils attendant upon each form of government, Brutus took up the discussion as the final speaker and said: “It is my opinion, Lucretius, Collatinus, and all of you here present, good men yourselves and descended from good men, that we ought not in the present situation to establish any new form of government. For the time to which we are limited by the circumstances is short, so that it is not easy to reform the constitution of the state, and the very attempt to change it, even though we should happen to be guided by the very best counsels, is precarious and not without danger. And besides, it will be possible later, when we are rid of the tyranny, to deliberate with greater freedom and at leisure and thus choose a better form of government in place of a poorer one — if, indeed, there is any constitution better than the one which Romulus, Pompilius and all the succeeding kings instituted and handed down to us, by means of which our commonwealth has continued to be great and prosperous and to rule over many subjects.
[2] ἃ δὲ παρακολουθεῖν εἴωθε ταῖς μοναρχίαις χαλεπά, ἐξ ὧν εἰς τυραννικὴν ὠμότητα περιίστανται καὶ δι᾽ ἃ δυσχεραίνουσιν ἅπαντες αὐτάς, ταῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπανορθώσασθαί τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἵνα μηδ᾽ ἐξ ὑστέρου γένηταί
[2] But as for the evils which generally attend monarchies and because of which they degenerate into a tyrannical cruelty and are abhorred by all mankind, I advise you to correct these now and at the same time to take precautions that they shall never again occur hereafter.
[3] ποτε φυλάξασθαι παραινῶ. τίνα δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα; πρῶτον μὲν ἐπειδὴ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ [p. 120] σκοποῦσι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἢ προσίενταί τινα τῶν βλαβερῶν ἢ φεύγουσι τῶν ὠφελίμων, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὴν μοναρχίαν εἶναι συμβέβηκε, μεταθέσθαι τοὔνομα τῆς πολιτείας ὑμῖν παραινῶ καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἕξειν τὴν ἁπάντων ἐξουσίαν μήτε βασιλεῖς ἔτι μήτε μονάρχους καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ μετριωτέραν τινὰ καὶ φιλανθρωποτέραν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς θέσθαι προσηγορίαν.
[3] And what are these evils? In the first place, since most people look at the names of things and, influenced by them, either admit some that are hurtful or shrink from others that are useful, of which monarchy happens to be one, I advise you to change the name of the government and no longer to call those who shall have the supreme power either kings or monarchs, but to give them a more modest and humane title.
[4] ἔπειτα μὴ ποιεῖν μίαν γνώμην ἁπάντων κυρίαν, ἀλλὰ δυσὶν ἐπιτρέπειν ἀνδράσι τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀρχήν, ὡς Λακεδαιμονίους πυνθάνομαι ποιεῖν ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἤδη γενεάς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐνομεῖσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν: ἧττον γὰρ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ βαρεῖς ἔσονται διαιρεθείσης τῆς ἐξουσίας διχῇ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντος ἰσχὺν ἑκατέρου: αἰδώς τ᾽ ἀλλήλων καὶ κώλυσις τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ζῆν φιλοτιμία τε πρὸς ἀρετῆς δόκησιν ἐκ ταύτης γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἰσοτίμου δυναστείας μάλιστα.
[4] In the next place, I advise you not to make one man’s judgment the supreme authority over all, but to entrust the royal power to two men, as I am informed the Lacedaemonians have been doing now for many generations, in consequence of which form of government they are said to be the best governed and the most prosperous people among the Greeks. For the rulers will be less arrogant and vexatious when the power is divided between two and each has the same authority; moreover, mutual respect, the ability of each to prevent the other from living as suits his pleasure, and a rivalry between them for the attainment of a reputation for virtue would be most likely to result from such equality of power and honour.
[1] τῶν τε παρασήμων, ἃ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀποδέδοται, πολλῶν ὄντων εἴ τινα λυπηρὰς ὄψεις καὶ ἐπιφθόνους τοῖς πολλοῖς παρέχεται, τὰ μὲν μειῶσαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἀφελεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴομαι δεῖν: τὰ σκῆπτρα ταυτὶ λέγω καὶ τοὺς χρυσοῦς στεφάνους καὶ τὰς ἁλουργεῖς καὶ χρυσοσήμους ἀμπεχόνας, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ καιρούς τινας ἑορταίους καὶ ἐν πομπαῖς θριάμβων, ὅτε αὐτὰ τιμῆς θεῶν ἕνεκα λήψονται: λυπήσει γὰρ οὐδέν᾽, ἐὰν γένηται σπάνια: θρόνον δὲ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐλεφάντινον, [p. 121] ἐν ᾧ καθεζόμενοι δικάσουσι, καὶ λευκὴν ἐσθῆτα περιπόρφυρον καὶ τοὺς προηγουμένους ἐν ταῖς ἐξόδοις δώδεκα πελέκεις καταλιπεῖν.
[74.1] “And inasmuch as the insignia which have been granted to the kings are numerous, I believe that if any of these are grievous and invidious in the eyes of the multitude we ought to modify some of them and abolish others — I mean these sceptres and golden crowns, the purple and gold-embroidered robes — unless it be upon certain festal occasions and in triumphal processions, when the rulers will assume them in honour of the gods; for they will offend no one if they are seldom used. But I think we ought to leave to the men the ivory chair, in which they will sit in judgment, and also the white robe bordered with purple, together with the twelve axes to be carried before them when they appear in public.
[2] ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, ὃ πάντων οἴομαι τῶν εἰρημένων χρησιμώτατον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μὴ πολλὰ ἐξαμαρτάνειν τοὺς παραληψομένους τὴν ἀρχὴν αἰτιώτατον, μὴ διὰ βίου τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐᾶν ἄρχειν: χαλεπὴ γὰρ ἅπασιν ἀόριστος ἀρχὴ καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐξέτασιν διδοῦσα τῶν πραττομένων, ἐξ ἧς φύεται τυραννίς: ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἐνιαύσιον χρόνον, ὡς παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις γίνεται, τὸ κράτος τῆς ἀρχῆς συνάγειν.
[2] There is one thing more which in my opinion will be of greater advantage than all that I have mentioned and the most effectual means of preventing those who shall receive this magistracy from committing many errors, and that is, not to permit the same persons to hold office for life (for a magistracy unlimited in time and not obliged to give any account of its actions is grievous to all and productive of tyranny), but to limit the power of the magistracy to a year, as the Athenians do.
[3] τὸ γὰρ ἐν μέρει τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ διαφθαρῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ἐξουσίας συστέλλει τὰς αὐθάδεις φύσεις καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ μεθύσκεσθαι ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὰ ἤθη. ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν καταστησαμένοις ὑπάρξει τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καρποῦσθαι τῆς βασιλικῆς πολιτείας, τῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων αὐτῇ κακῶν ἀπηλλάχθαι.
[3] For this principle, by which the same person both rules and is ruled in turn and surrenders his authority before his mind has been corrupted, restrains arrogant dispositions and does not permit men’s natures to grow intoxicated with power. If we establish these regulations
we should be able to enjoy all the benefits that flow from monarchy and at the same time to be rid of the evils that attend it.
[4] ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας πάτριον ὑπάρχον ἡμῖν καὶ σὺν οἰωνοῖς αἰσίοις θεῶν ἐπικυρωσάντων παρεληλυθὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ὁσίας φυλάττηται, ἱερῶν ἀποδεικνύσθω τις ἀεὶ βασιλεύς, ὁ τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην ἕξων διὰ βίου, πάσης ἀπολελυμένος πολεμικῆς καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀσχολίας, ἓν τοῦτο μόνον ἔχων ἔργον ὥσπερ ὁ βασιλεύς, τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῶν θυηπολιῶν, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδέν. [p. 122]
[4] But to the end that the name, too, of the kingly power, which is traditional with us and made its way into our commonwealth with favourable auguries that manifested the approbation of the gods, may be preserved for form’s sake, let there always be appointed a king of sacred rites, who shall enjoy the honour for life exempt from all military and civil duties and, like the “king” at Athens, exercising this single function, the superintendence of the sacrifices, and no other.
[1] ὃν δὲ τρόπον ἔσται τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀκούσατέ μου: συνάξω μὲν ἐγὼ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ὥσπερ ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ συγκεχώρηταί μοι κατὰ νόμον καὶ γνώμην εἰσηγήσομαι: φεύγειν Ταρκύνιον ἅμα τοῖς παισὶ καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ πόλεώς τε καὶ χώρας τῆς Ῥωμαίων εἰργομένους τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον καὶ γένος τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν: ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπιψηφίσωσι τὴν γνώμην οἱ πολῖται, δηλώσας αὐτοῖς ἣν διανοούμεθα καταστήσασθαι πολιτείαν μεσοβασιλέα ἑλοῦμαι τὸν ἀποδείξοντα τοὺς παραληψομένους τὰ κοινά, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποθήσομαι τὴν τῶν Κελερίων ἀρχήν.
[75.1] “In what manner each of these measures shall be effected I will now tell you. I will summon the assembly, as I said, since this power is accorded me by law, and will propose this resolution: That Tarquinius be banished with his wife and children, and that they and their posterity as well be forever debarred both from the city and from the Roman territory. After the citizens have passed this vote I will explain to them the form of government we propose to establish; next, I will choose an interrex to appoint the magistrates who are to take over the administration of public affairs, and I will then resign the command of the celeres.
[2] ὁ δὲ κατασταθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μεσοβασιλεὺς συναγαγὼν τὴν λοχῖτιν ἐκκλησίαν ὀνομασάτω τε τοὺς μέλλοντας ἕξειν τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἡγεμονίαν καὶ ψῆφον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τοῖς πολίταις δότω: ἐὰν δὲ τοῖς πλείοσι δόξῃ λόχοις κυρίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὰ μαντεύματα γένηται περὶ αὐτῶν καλά, τοὺς πελέκεις οὗτοι παραλαβόντες καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας σύμβολα πραττέτωσαν, ὅπως ἐλευθέραν οἰκήσομεν τὴν πατρίδα καὶ μηκέτι κάθοδον ἕξουσιν εἰς αὐτὴν Ταρκύνιοι: πειράσονται γάρ, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ πειθοῖ καὶ βίᾳ καὶ δόλῳ καὶ παντὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ παρελθεῖν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν δυναστείαν, ἐὰν μὴ φυλαττώμεθα αὐτούς.
[2] Let the interrex appointed by me call together the centuriate assembly, and having nominated the persons who are to hold the annual magistracy, let him permit the citizens to vote upon them; and if the majority of the centuries are in favour of ratifying his choice of men and the auguries concerning them are favourable, let these men assume the axes and the other insignia of royalty and see to it that our country shall enjoy its liberty and that the Tarquinii shall nevermore return. For they will endeavour, be assured, by persuasion, violence, fraud and every other means to get back into power unless we are upon our guard against them.
[3] ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι λέγειν ἔχω καὶ παραινεῖν: τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος πολλὰ ὄντα καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδια νῦν δι᾽ ἀκριβείας ἐξετασθῆναι: συνήγμεθα γὰρ εἰς καιρὸν ὀξύν: [p. 123] ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οἴομαι δεῖν ποιῆσαι τοῖς παραληψομένοις τὴν ἀρχήν.
[3] “These are the most important and essential measures that I have to propose to you at present and to advise you to adopt. As for the details, which are many and not easy to examine with precision at the present time (for we are brought to an acute crisis), I think we leave them to the men themselves who are to take over the magistracy.
[4] σκοπεῖσθαι μέντοι φημὶ χρῆναι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἅπαντα μετὰ τοῦ συνεδρίου τῆς βουλῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐποίουν, καὶ μηδὲν πράττειν δίχα ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ δόξαντα τῇ βουλῇ φέρειν εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὡς τοῖς προγόνοις ἡμῶν ποιεῖν ἔθος ἦν, μηδενὸς ἀφαιρουμένους αὐτὸν ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καιροῖς κύριος ἦν. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλέστατα καὶ κάλλιστα ἕξει τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς.
[4] But I do say that these magistrates ought to consult with the senate in everything, as the kings formerly did, and to do nothing without your advice, and that they ought to lay before the people the decrees of the senate, according to the practice of our ancestors, depriving them of none of the privileges which they possessed in earlier times. For thus their magistracy will be most secure and most excellent.”
[1] ταύτην ἀποδειξαμένου τὴν γνώμην Ἰουνίου Βρούτου πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν καὶ αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν παραληψομένων τὰς ἡγεμονίας ἀνδρῶν βουλευόμενοι μεσοβασιλέα μὲν ἔκριναν ἀποδειχθῆναι Σπόριον Λουκρήτιον τὸν πατέρα τῆς διαχρησαμένης ἑαυτήν: ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου δὲ τοὺς ἕξοντας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων ἐξουσίαν ὀνομασθῆναι Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον Βροῦτον καὶ Λεύκιον Ταρκύνιον Κολλατῖνον.
[76] After Junius Brutus had delivered this opinion they all approved it, and straightway consulting about the persons who were to take over the magistracies, they decided that Spurius Lucretius, the father of the woman who had killed herself, will be appointed interrex, and that Lucius Junius Brutus and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus should be nominated by him to exercise the power of the kings.
[2] τοὺς δ᾽ ἄρχοντας τούτους ἔταξαν καλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν διάλεκτον κωνσούλας: τοῦτο μεθερμηνευόμενον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν τοὔνομα συμβούλους ἢ προβούλους δύναται δηλοῦν, κωνσίλια γὰρ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς συμβουλὰς καλοῦσιν: ὕπατοι δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων ἀνὰ χρόνον ὠνομάσθησαν ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς ἐξουσίας, ὅτι πάντων τ᾽ ἄρχουσι καὶ τὴν ἀνωτάτω χώραν ἔχουσι. τὸ γὰρ ὑπερέχον καὶ
[2] And they ordered that these magistrates should be called in their language consules; this, translated into the Greek language, may signify symb
ouloi (“counsellors”) or probouloi (“pre-counsellors”), for the Romans call our symboulai (“counsels”) consilia. But in the course of time they came to be called by the Greeks hypatoi (“supreme”) from the greatness of their power, because they command all the citizens and have the highest rank; for the ancients called that which was outstanding and superlative hypaton.
[3] ἄκρον ὕπατον ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοί. ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοί τε καὶ καταστησάμενοι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχαῖς [p. 124] λιτανεύσαντες συλλαβέσθαι σφίσιν ὁσίων καὶ δικαίων ἔργων ἐφιεμένοις ἐξῄεσαν εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν. ἠκολούθουν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς οἱ θεράποντες ἐπὶ κλίνης μέλασιν ἀμφίοις ἐστρωμένης κομίζοντες ἀθεράπευτόν τε καὶ πεφυρμένην αἵματι τὴν νεκράν: ἣν πρὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου τεθῆναι κελεύσαντες ὑψηλὴν καὶ περιφανῆ συνεκάλουν τὸν δῆμον εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 521