[3] ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτῶν βουλευομένων ἧκεν ἐκ Ῥώμης ὁ ἕτερος τῶν ὑπάτων Τῖτος Οὐεργίνιος ἔχων τὴν σὺν ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν αἰφνίδιος ἐν τῇ κατόπιν νυκτὶ τὴν ὁδὸν διανύσας καὶ στρατοπεδεύεται δίχα τοῦ δικτάτορος ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρας ῥάχεως ὀρεινῆς πάνυ καὶ ἐχυρᾶς: ὥστ᾽ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀποκεκλεῖσθαι τοὺς Λατίνους τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν πολεμίαν ἐξόδων, τοῦ μὲν ὑπάτου τῶν ἀριστερῶν προκαθημένου μερῶν, τοῦ δὲ δικτάτορος τῶν δεξιῶν.
[3] While they were still debating, the other consul, Titus Verginius, suddenly arrived from Rome with his army, after making the march during the very next night, and encamped apart from the dictator upon another ridge that was exceeding craggy and strongly situated. Thus the Latins were cut off on both sides from the roads leading into the enemy’s country, the consul encamping on the left-hand side and the dictator on the right. This still further increased the confusion of their commanders, who had chosen safety in preference to every other consideration, and also their fear that by delaying they should be forced to use up their supplies of food, which were not plentiful.
[4] ἔτι δὲ πλείονος ταραχῆς κατασχούσης τοὺς οὐδὲν πλεῖον τῶν ἀσφαλῶν προελομένους ἡγεμόνας καὶ δέους, μὴ τὰ οἰκεῖα οὐ πολλὰ ὄντα δαπανᾶν ἀναγκάζωνται βραδύνοντες, μαθὼν ὁ Ποστόμιος, ὅσον ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἄπειρον στρατηγίας, πέμπει τὸν ἱππάρχην [p. 265] Τῖτον Αἰβούτιον ἄγοντα τοὺς ἀκμαιοτάτους ἱππεῖς τε καὶ ψιλούς, καταλαβέσθαι κελεύσας ὄρος τι καλῶς ἐν παρόδῳ κείμενον ταῖς παρακομιζομέναις Λατίνοις ἀγοραῖς οἴκοθεν: καὶ φθάνει πρὶν αἰσθέσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἡ σὺν τῷ ἱππάρχῃ πεμφθεῖσα δύναμις νύκτωρ παρενεχθεῖσα καὶ δι᾽ ὕλης ἀτριβοῦς διελθοῦσα καὶ γενομένη ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ λόφου.
[4] When Postumius observed the inexperience of these commanders, he sent the Master of the Horse, Titus Aebutius, with the flower both of the horse and light-armed troops with orders to occupy a hill which lay close beside the road by which provisions were brought to the Latins from home; and before the enemy was aware of it, the forces sent with the Master of the Horse passed by their camp in the night, and marching through a pathless wood, gained possession of the hill.
[1] μαθόντες δ᾽ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν πολεμίων καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ τὰ κατὰ νώτου σφῶν ἐρυμνὰ καὶ οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς οἴκοθεν ἀγορᾶς χρηστὰς ἔτι ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες ὡς ἀσφαλῶς σφίσι παρακομισθησομένης, ἀπαράξαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἔγνωσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου, πρὶν ἢ χάρακι καὶ τάφρῳ κρατύνασθαι.
[5.1] The generals of the enemy, finding that the strong places which lay in their rear were also being occupied, and no longer feeling any confident hopes that even their provisions from home would get through to them safely, resolved to drive the Romans from the hill before they could fortify it with a palisade and ditch.
[2] ἀναλαβὼν δὲ τὴν ἵππον ἅτερος αὐτῶν Σέξτος ἤλαυνεν ἀνὰ κράτος αὐτήν, ὡς οὐ δεξομένης αὐτὸν τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἵππου. γενναίως δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππέων τοὺς ἐπιόντας ὑπομεινάντων μέχρι μέν τινος ἀντεῖχεν ὑποστρέφων τε καὶ αὖθις ἐπάγων: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἥ τε φύσις τοῦ χωρίου τοῖς μὲν ἤδη κρατοῦσι τῶν ἄκρων μεγάλα πλεονεκτήματα παρεῖχε, τοῖς δὲ κάτωθεν ἐπιοῦσιν οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ πολλὰς πάνυ πληγὰς καὶ πόνους ἀνηνύτους ἔφερε, καὶ αὖθις ἑτέρα παρῆν δύναμις τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιλέκτων ἀνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς πεζικῆς φάλαγγος ἐπίκουρος, ἣν ὁ Ποστόμιος κατὰ πόδας ἀπέστειλεν, οὐδὲν ἔτι πράττειν δυνάμενος ἀπῆγε τὴν ἵππον ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα: καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι βεβαίως κρατοῦντες τὸ χωρίον προφανῶς κρατύνονται τὴν φυλακήν.
[2] And Sextus, one of the two generals, taking the horse with him, rode up to them full speed in the expectation that the Roman horse would not await his attack. But when these bravely withstood their charge, he maintained the fight for some time, alternately retiring and renewing the attack; and then, since the nature of the ground offered great advantages to those who were already in possession of the heights, while bringing to those who attacked from below nothing but many blows and ineffectual hardships, and since, moreover, a fresh force of chosen legionaries, sent by Postumius to follow close upon the heels of the first detachment, came to the assistance of the Romans, he found himself unable to accomplish anything further and led the horse back to the camp; and the Romans, now secure in the possession of the place, openly strengthened the garrison there.
[3] μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ [p. 266] ἔργον τοῖς περὶ Μαμίλιον καὶ Σέξτον ἐδόκει μὴ πολὺν διὰ μέσου ποιεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὀξείᾳ κρῖναι τὰ πράγματα μάχῃ. τῷ δὲ δικτάτορι τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταρχὰς οὕτως ἔχοντι προαιρέσεως, ὡς ἀμαχητὶ καταλύσεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον καὶ παντὸς μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν ἀντιστρατήγων τοῦτο ποιήσειν ἐλπίσαντι, τότ᾽ ἐφάνη χωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα. ἑάλωσαν γάρ τινες ὑπὸ τῶν φρουρούντων τὰς ὁδοὺς ἱππέων ἄγγελοι γράμματα φέροντες παρ᾽ Οὐολούσκων πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Λατίνων δηλοῦντα, ὅτι πολλαὶ δυνάμεις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν ἥξουσιν εἰς ἡμέραν τρίτην μάλιστα καὶ αὖθις ἕτεραι παρ᾽ Ἑρνίκων.
[3] After this action Mamilius and Sextus determined not to let much time intervene, but to decide the issue by an early battle. The Roman dictator, who at first had not been of this mind, but had hoped to end the war without a battle, founding his hopes of doing so chiefly on the inexperience of the opposing generals, now resolved to engage. For some couriers had been captured by the horse that patrolled the roads, bearing letters from the Volscians to the Latin generals to inform them that numerous forces would come to their assistance in about two days, and still other forces from the Hernicans.
[4] τὰ μὲν δὴ παρασχόντα τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν αὐτῶν ταχεῖαν παρατάξεως ἀνάγκην τέως οὐ προαιρουμένοις ταῦτ᾽ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα ἤρθη παρ᾽ ἑκατέρων τῆς μάχης, προῄεσαν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ χωρίον ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἐξέτασσον τὰς δυνάμεις κατὰ τάδε: Σέξτος μὲν Ταρκύνιος ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ τῶν Λατίνων ἐτάχθη κέρατος, Ὀκταούιος δὲ Μαμίλιος ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ, τὴν δὲ κατὰ μέσον στάσιν εἶχεν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Ταρκυνίου παίδων Τῖτος, ἔνθα καὶ Ῥωμαίων οἵ τε αὐτόμολοι καὶ οἱ φυγάδες ἐτάχ�
�ησαν. ἡ δ᾽ ἵππος ἅπασα τριχῇ διαιρεθεῖσα τοῖς κέρασιν ἀμφοτέροις προσενεμήθη καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέσην τεταγμένοις
[4] These were the considerations that reduced their commanders to an immediate necessity of fighting, though until then they had not been of this mind. After the signals for battle had been raised on both sides, the two armies advanced into the space between their camps and drew up in the following manner: Sextus Tarquinius was posted on the left wing of the Latins and Octavius Mamilius on the right; Titus, the other son of Tarquinius, held the centre, where also the Roman deserters and exiles were posted. And, all their horse being divided into three bodies, two of these were placed on the wings and one in the centre of the battle-line.
[5] τὴν φάλαγγα. τῆς δὲ Ῥωμαίων στρατιᾶς τὸ μὲν ἀριστερὸν κέρας εἶχεν ὁ ἱππάρχης Τῖτος Αἰβούτιος ἐναντίος [p. 267] Ὀκταουΐῳ Μαμιλίῳ, τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν Τῖτος Οὐεργίνιος ὁ ὕπατος Σέξτῳ Ταρκυνίῳ στάσιν ἐναντίαν ἐπέχων: τὰ δὲ μέσα τῆς φάλαγγος αὐτὸς ὁ δικτάτωρ Ποστόμιος ἐξεπλήρου Τίτῳ Ταρκυνίῳ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν φυγάσι χωρήσων ὁμόσε: πλῆθος δὲ τῆς συνελθούσης δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν παράταξιν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρου στρατεύματος ἦν Ῥωμαίων μὲν ἐπὶ δισμυρίοις τε καὶ τετρακισχιλίοις πεζοὶ τριακοσίων δέοντες, χίλιοι δ᾽ ἱππεῖς: Λατίνων δὲ σὺν τοῖς συμμάχοις τετρακισμύριοι μάλιστα πεζοὶ καὶ τρισχίλιοι ἱππεῖς.
[5] The left of the Roman army was commanded by Titus Aebutius, the Master of the Horse, who stood opposite to Octavius Mamilius; the right by Titus Verginius, the consul, facing Sextus Tarquinius; the centre of the line was commanded by the dictator Postumius in person, who proposed to encounter Titus Tarquinius and the exiles with him. The number of the forces of each army which drew up for battle was: on the side of the Romans 23,700 foot and 1000 horse, and on that of the Latins and their allies about 40,000 foot and 3000 horse.
[1] ὡς δ᾽ εἰς χεῖρας ἥξειν ἔμελλον, οἵ τε τῶν Λατίνων στρατηγοὶ συγκαλέσαντες τοὺς σφετέρους πολλὰ εἰς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ δεήσεις τῶν στρατιωτῶν μακρὰς διεξῆλθον, ὅ τε Ῥωμαῖος ὀρρωδοῦντας ὁρῶν τοὺς σφετέρους, ὅτι πλήθει συνοίσονται μακρῷ προὔχοντι τοῦ σφετέρου, ἐξελέσθαι τὸ δέος αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς διανοίας βουλόμενος συνεκάλεσεν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν: καὶ παραστησάμενος τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τῶν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τιμιωτάτους ἔλεξε τοιάδε:
[6.1] When they were on the point of engaging, the Latin generals called their men together and said many things calculated to incite them to valour, and addressed long appeals to the soldiers. And the Roman dictator, seeing his troops alarmed because they were going to encounter an army greatly superior in number to their own, and desiring to dispel that fear from their minds, called them to an assembly, and placing near him the oldest and most honoured members of the senate, addressed them as follows:
[2] θεοὶ μὲν ἡμῖν ὑπισχνοῦνται δι᾽ οἰωνῶν τε καὶ σφαγίων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης μαντικῆς ἐλευθερίαν τῇ πόλει παρέξειν καὶ νίκην εὐτυχῆ, ἀμοιβάς τε ἡμῖν ἀποδιδόντες ἀγαθάς, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν αὐτοὺς σέβοντες καὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀσκοῦντες ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ἡμῶν διετελέσαμεν, καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν νεμεσῶντες κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πεπονθότες ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀγαθὰ συγγενεῖς τε [p. 268] ὄντες καὶ φίλοι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ὀμωμοκότες ἕξειν ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους, ἁπάντων ὑπεριδόντες τούτων πόλεμον ἐπιφέρουσιν ἡμῖν ἄδικον, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας, ὁποτέρους ἡμῶν μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἔχειν προσῆκεν: ἧττον γὰρ ἂν ἦν δεινόν: ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ταρκυνίων τυραννίδος, ἵνα δούλην ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρας τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς ποιήσωσι.
[2] “The gods by omens, sacrifices, and other auguries promise to grant to our commonwealth liberty and a happy victory, both by way of rewarding us for the piety we have shown toward them and the justice we have practised during the whole course of our lives, and also from resentment, we may reasonably suppose, against our enemies. For these, after having received many great benefits from us, being both our kinsmen and friends, and after having sworn to look upon all our enemies and friends as their own, have scorned all these obligations and are bringing an unjust war upon us, not for the sake of supremacy and dominion, to determine which of us ought more rightly to possess it, — that, indeed, would not be so terrible, — but in support of the tyranny of the Tarquinii, in order to make our commonwealth enslaved once more instead of free.
[3] χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες λοχαγοί τε καὶ στρατιῶται, μαθόντας, ὅτι συμμάχους ἔχετε τοὺς θεούς, οἵπερ αἰεὶ τὴν πόλιν σώζουσιν, ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι περὶ τόνδε τὸν ἀγῶνα: ἐπισταμένους, ὅτι τῆς παρὰ θεῶν βοηθείας ὑπάρχει τυγχάνειν τοῖς γενναίως ἀγωνιζομένοις καὶ πάντα τὰ παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τὸ νικᾶν πρόθυμα παρεχομένοις, οὐ τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς βουλομένοις ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν ταλαιπωρεῖν. ὑπάρχει δ᾽ ἡμῖν πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα πλεονεκτήματα πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης παρεσκευασμένα, τρία δὲ πάντων κάλλιστα καὶ φανερώτατα.
[3] But it is necessary that you too, both officers and men, knowing that you have for allies the gods, who have always preserved our city, should acquit yourselves as brave men in this battle, remembering that the assistance of the gods is given to those who fight nobly and eagerly contribute everything in their power toward victory, not to those who fly from dangers, but to those who are willing to undergo hardships in their own behalf. We have many other advantages conducive to victory prepared for us by Fortune, but three in particular, which are the greatest and the most obvious of all.
[1] πρῶτον μὲν τὸ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων πιστόν, οὗ μάλιστα δεῖ τοῖς μέλλουσι τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρατήσειν. οὐ γὰρ ἀρξαμένους ὑμᾶς τήμερον ἀλλήλοις εἶναι βεβαίους φίλους δεῖ καὶ πιστοὺς συμμάχους, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πατρὶς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦθ᾽ ἅπασι παρεσκεύακε τἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ [p. 269] ἐτράφητε ὁμοῦ καὶ παιδείας ἐτύχετε κοινῆς καὶ θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βωμῶν ἐθύετε καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀπολελαύκατε, πολλῶν δὲ κακῶν πεπείρασθε κοινῇ, ἐξ ὧν ἰσχυραὶ καὶ ἀδιάλυτοι πεφύκασι συγκεράννυσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις φιλίαι: ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὁ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κοινὸς ἅπασιν ὑπάρχων ἀγών.
; [7.1] “First, there is the confidence you have in one another, which is the thing most needed by men who are going to conquer their foes; for you do not need to begin to-day to be firm friends and faithful allies to one another, but your country has long since prepared this boon for you all. For you have been brought up together and have received the same education; you were wont to sacrifice to the gods upon the same altars; and you have both enjoyed many advantages and experienced many evils in common, by the sharing of which strong and indissoluble friendships are wont to be formed among all men.
[2] εἰ γὰρ ὑποχείριοι γενήσεσθε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, οὐχὶ τοῖς μὲν ὑμῶν ὑπάρξει μηδενὸς πειραθῆναι δεινοῦ, τοῖς δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα παθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως ἀπολωλεκέναι, καὶ μήτε γυναικῶν μήτε παίδων μήτ᾽ οὐσίας μήτ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἔχετε ἀπολαύσειν ἀγαθῶν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἡγουμένοις τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διοικοῦσι τὸν οἴκτιστον μόρον ἀποθανεῖν σὺν αἰκίαις καὶ βασάνοις.
[2] Secondly, the struggle, in which your highest interests are at stake, is common to you all alike. For if you fall into the enemy’s power it will not mean that some of you will meet with no severity while others suffer the worst of fates, but all of you alike will have lost your proud position, your sovereignty and your liberty, and will no longer have the enjoyment of your wives, your children, your property, or any other blessing you now have; and those who are at the head of the commonwealth and direct the public affairs will die the most miserable death accompanied by indignities and tortures.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 550