[2] οὐ μὴν πολὺν κατέσχε χρόνον, ὅπερ αἴτιον ἐγένετο τοῦ μὴ σύμπασαν διαφθαρῆναι τὴν πόλιν: ἀλλὰ ποταμοῦ δίκην ἢ πυρὸς ἀθρόα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμπεσοῦσα τήν τε προσβολὴν ὀξεῖαν καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν ταχεῖαν ἔλαβεν. ὡς δὲ τὸ δεινὸν ἐλώφησεν, ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὢν ὁ Πόπλιος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο κυρῶσαι τὸν νόμον ἐν τῷ περιόντι χρόνῳ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ἐπιστάντων, μετῄει πάλιν τὴν δημαρχίαν εἰς τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐνιαυτόν, πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα τοῖς δημόταις ὑπισχνούμενος: καὶ ἀποδείκνυται πάλιν δήμαρχος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ δύο τῶν συναρχόντων.
[2] However, it did not last long — a circumstance which saved the city from utter destruction; but, like a river in flood or a conflagration, falling upon the people with full force, it made a sharp attack and a speedy departure. As soon as the calamity abated, Publius, whose magistracy was near expiring, since he could not get the law confirmed during the remainder of his term, as the election of magistrates was at hand, stood again for the tribuneship for the following year, making many big promises to the plebeians; and he was again chosen tribune by them, together with two of his colleagues.
[3] οἱ δὲ πατρίκιοι πρὸς τοῦτ᾽ ἀντεμηχανήσαντο πικρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ μισόδημον καὶ μηδὲν ἐλαττώσοντα τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπατείαν προαγαγεῖν, Ἄππιον Κλαύδιον, υἱὸν Ἀππίου, τοῦ πλεῖστα τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τὴν κάθοδον ἐναντιωθέντος. καὶ αὐτὸν πολλὰ ἀντειπόντα καὶ οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὸ πεδίον ἐλθεῖν βουληθέντα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων, οὐδὲν ἧττον προὐβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἐψηφίσαντ᾽ ἀπόντα ὕπατον.
[3] The patricians, to meet this situation, contrived to advance to the consulship a man of stern disposition and an enemy of the populace, one who would not diminish in any respect the power of the aristocracy, namely, Appius Claudius, the son of that Appius who had most strongly opposed the populace in the matter of their return. And though he protested much and even refused to go to the field for the election, they nevertheless passed the preliminary vote and appointed him consul in his absence.
[1] τελεσθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων κατὰ [p. 349] πολλὴν εὐπέτειαν — οἱ γὰρ πένητες ἐξέλιπον τὸ πεδίον, ἐπειδὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τόνδε ὀνομασθέντα ἤκουσαν — παραλαμβάνουσι τὴν ὑπατείαν Τῖτος Κοίντιος Καπιτωλῖνος καὶ Ἄππιος Κλαύδιος Σαβῖνος, οὔτε τὰς φύσεις οὔτε τὰς προαιρέσεις ἔχοντες ὁμοίας.
[43.1] After the election had been carried through quite easily — for the poorer people left the field as soon as they heard Appius named — Titus Quintius Capitolinus and Appius Claudius Sabinus succeeded to the consulship, men alike neither in their dispositions nor in their principles.
[2] Ἀππίου μὲν γὰρ ἦν γνώμη περισπᾶν περὶ τὰς ἔξω στρατείας τὸν ἀργὸν καὶ πένητα δῆμον, ἵνα τῶν τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίων ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας εὐπορῶν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πόνοις, ὧν ἐν χρείᾳ μάλιστα ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα τῇ πόλει διαπραττόμενος, ἥκιστα τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου διοικοῦσι τὰ κοινὰ δυσμενής τε καὶ χαλεπὸς ᾖ: πολέμου δὲ πᾶσαν ἔσεσθαι πρόφασιν εὔλογον ἀπέφαινεν ἡγεμονίας ἀντιποιουμένῃ πόλει καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἐπιφθονουμένῃ, κατά τε τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἤδη τὰ μέλλοντα εἰκάζειν ἠξίου, ἐπιλεγόμενος, ὅσαι ἤδη κινήσεις ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὅτι πᾶσαι κατὰ τὰς ἀναπαύλας ἐγένοντο τῶν πολέμων.
[2] For it was the opinion of Appius that the idle and needy populace should be kept employed in military expeditions abroad, in order that, while supplying themselves from the enemy’s country by their own toils with an abundance of the daily necessaries of which they were in the greatest need and at the same time accomplishing results advantageous to the commonwealth, they might be least likely to be hostile and troublesome to the senators who were administering public affairs. He declared that any excuse for making war would be justifiable for a state that laid claim to supremacy and was envied by all; and he asked them, applying the principle of probability, to judge what was to happen in the future by what had already taken place in the past, adding that all the commotions which had occurred in the commonwealth in the past had happened during the respites from war.
[3] Κοιντίῳ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐδόκει πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν οὐδένα, ἀγαπητὸν ἀποφαίνοντι, εἰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγκαίους τε καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένους κινδύνους καλούμενος ὁ δῆμος εὐπειθὴς γένοιτο, καὶ διδάσκοντι, ὡς εἰ βίαν προσάξουσι τοῖς μὴ πειθομένοις εἰς ἀπόνοιαν ἀναγκάσουσιν ἐλθεῖν τὸ δημοτικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐποίησαν ὕπατοι: ἐξ ὧν κινδυνεύσειν αὐτοὺς δυεῖν θάτερον, ἢ δι᾽ αἵματος καὶ φόνων καταπαῦσαι τὴν στάσιν, ἢ θεραπεύειν αἰσχρῶς ὑπομεῖναι [p. 350]
[3] Quintius, on the other hand, thought they ought not to wage any war. He declared they ought to be satisfied if the populace, when called upon to face the inevitable dangers brought upon them from outside, yielded ready obedience; and he showed that if they attempted to use force with the disobedient they would drive the plebeians to desperation, as the consuls before them had done. As a result, they would run the risk either of putting down the sedition with bloodshed and slaughter or of submitting to a shameful courting of the plebeians.
[4] τὸ δημοτικόν. ἦν δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκείνου ἡγεμονία τῷ Κοιντίῳ προσήκουσα, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ὑπάτων μηδὲν ἄκοντος ἐκείνου ποιεῖν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον δήμαρχοι οὐθὲν ἔτι διαμελλήσαντες τὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐνιαυτῷ οὐ δυνηθέντα νόμον ἐπικυρωθῆναι πάλιν εἰσέφερον, προσγράψαντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγορανόμων ἀρχεῖον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ψηφοφορεῖσθαι ἐκκλησίαις, καὶ πάντα τἆλλα, ὅσα ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πράττεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικυροῦσθαι δεήσει, ὑπὸ τῶν φυλετῶν ἐπιψηφίζεσθαι κατὰ ταὐτόν: ὅπερ ἦν ἄρα τῆς μὲν βουλῆς κατάλυσις φανερά, τοῦ δὲ δήμου δυναστεία.
[4] In that month the command belonged to Quintius, so that the other consul was bound to do nothing without his consent. In the meantime Publius and the other two tribunes without further delay were again proposing the law which they had been unable to get ratified the year before, with this additional provision that the college of aediles should also be chosen in the same assemblies, and that everything else that was to be done and ratified by the populace should be voted on in like manner by the members of the tribes. This, now, cl
early meant the overthrow of the senate and the dominance of the populace.
[1] τοῦτο μαθοῦσι τοῖς ὑπάτοις φροντὶς εἰσῄει καὶ λογισμός, ὅπως ἂν ἐν τάχει καὶ σὺν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ τὸ παρακινοῦν καὶ στασιάζον ἐξαιρεθῇ. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄππιος ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα καλεῖν γνώμην ἐδίδου τοὺς βουλομένους σώζεσθαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν: εἰ δέ τινες ἐνατία θήσονται σφίσι τὰ ὅπλα, τούτους ἐν πολεμίων ποιεῖσθαι μοίρᾳ.
[44.1] When the consuls were informed of this, they grew anxious and considered by what means the commotion and sedition might speedily and safely be removed. Appius advised summoning to arms all who wished the constitution of their fathers to be preserved, and if any opposed them, to look upon them as enemies.
[2] ὁ δὲ Κοίντιος λόγῳ πείθειν ᾤετο δεῖν τοὺς δημοτικοὺς καὶ μεταδιδάσκειν ὡς δἰ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς ὀλέθρια βουλεύματα φερομένους: ἐσχάτης μανίας ἔργον εἶναι λέγων, ἃ παρ᾽ ἑκόντων ἔξεστι φέρεσθαι τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, ταῦτα παρ᾽ ἀκόντων βούλεσθαι λαμβάνειν.
[2] But Quintius thought they ought to use persuasion with the plebeians and convince them that through ignorance of their own interest they were being led into pernicious counsels. He said that it was the extreme of folly to wish to obtain from their fellow citizens against their will the things which they might receive by their consent.
[3] ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συμπαραληφθέντων εἰς τὸ συνέδριον [p. 351] τὴν Κοιντίου γνώμην παρελθόντες εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν οἱ ὕπατοι λόγον ᾐτοῦντο παρὰ τῶν δημάρχων καὶ χρόνον. μόλις δ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τυχόντες, ἐπειδὴ καθῆκεν ἣν ᾐτήσαντο παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡμέραν, ὄχλου παντοδαποῦ συνεληλυθότος εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, ὃν ἀμφότεραι παρεσκευάσαντο σύμμαχον ἑαυταῖς ἐκ παρακλήσεως αἱ
[3] The advice of Quintius being approved of by the other members of the senate, the consuls went to the Forum and asked the tribunes to give them a hearing and to appoint a time for it. And having obtained both requests with difficulty, when the day they had asked of them had come, the Forum being filled with a great concourse of people of all sorts, which the magistrates on both sides had got together under instructions to support them, the consuls presented themselves with the intention of speaking against the law.
[4] ἀρχαί, παρῆσαν ὡς κατηγορήσοντες τοῦ νόμου. ὁ μὲν οὖν Κοίντιος, τά τ᾽ ἄλλα ἐπιεικὴς ὢν ἀνὴρ καὶ δῆμον οἰκειώσασθαι λόγῳ πιθανώτατος, πρῶτος αἰτησάμενος τὸν λόγον, ἐπιδέξιόν τινα καὶ κεχαρισμένην ἅπασι διεξῆλθε δημηγορίαν, ὥστε τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ νόμου λέγοντας εἰς πολλὴν ἐλθεῖν ἀμηχανίαν, οὔτε δικαιότερα λέγειν ἔχοντας οὔτ᾽ ἐπιεικέστερα.
[4] Quintius, accordingly, who was a fair-minded man in all respects and most capable of winning over the populace by his eloquence, first desired leave to speak, and then made an adroit speech that was acceptable to everybody, with the result that those who spoke in favour of the law were reduced to great embarrassment, finding nothing to say that was more just or more reasonable.
[5] καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονεῖν ὁ συνύπατος αὐτοῦ προείλετο, συγγνοὺς ἂν ὁ δῆμος, ὡς οὔτε δίκαια οὔθ᾽ ὅσια ἀξιῶν ἔλυσε τὸν νόμον: νῦν δ᾽ ἐκείνου λόγον διελθόντος ὑπερήφανον καὶ βαρὺν ἀκουσθῆναι πένησι χαλεπὸς εἰς ὀργὴν ἐγένετο καὶ ἀμείλικτος καὶ εἰς ἔριν ἦλθεν ὅσην οὔπω πρότερον.
[5] And if his colleague had not chosen to continue his officiousness, the populace, being fully aware that their demands were neither just nor right, would have rejected the law. But as it was, he delivered a speech that was haughty and offensive to the ears of the poor, so that they became exasperated and implacable and fell into greater strife than before.
[6] οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ πολίταις ὁ ἀνὴρ διαλεγόμενος, οἳ τοῦ θεῖναι τὸν νόμον ἢ λῦσαι κύριοι ἦσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ἀτίμοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ μὴ βεβαίως ἔχουσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσιάζων, πικρὰς καὶ ἀνυπομονήτους ἐποιήσατο κατηγορίας, τῶν τε χρεῶν τὰς ἀποκοπὰς αὐτοῖς ὀνειδίζων καὶ τῶν ὑπάτων τὴν ἀπόστασιν προφέρων, ὅτε τὰ ἱερὰ σημεῖα ἁρπάσαντες ᾤχοντο ἐκ [p. 352] τοῦ στρατοπέδου φυγὴν ἐπιβάλλοντες ἑαυτοῖς ἑκούσιον: τούς θ᾽ ὅρκους ἀνακαλούμενος, οὓς ὤμοσαν τὰ ὅπλα περὶ τῆς γειναμένης αὐτοὺς γῆς ἀναλαμβάνοντες, οἷς κατ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐκείνης ἐχρήσαντο.
[6] For he did not talk to them as if they were free men and his fellow citizens who had power to confirm or reject the law, but domineering over them as if they were outcasts or foreigners or men whose liberty was precarious, he uttered bitter and intolerable reproaches, upbraiding them with the abolition of their debts and with their desertion of the consuls when they snatched up the consuls and quit the camp, imposing voluntary banishment upon themselves; and he appealed to the oaths they had sworn when they took up arms in defence of the country which had given them birth, only to turn them against that very country.
[7] τοιγάρτοι θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἔφησεν αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, εἰ θεοὺς μὲν ἐπιορκήσαντες, ἡγεμόνας δὲ καταλιπόντες, πόλιν δ᾽ ἔρημον τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι μέρος ἀφέντες, ἐπὶ δὲ πίστεως συγχύσει καὶ νόμων ἀνατροπῇ καὶ πολιτεύματος πατρίου φθορᾷ ποιησάμενοι τὴν κάθοδον, οὐ μετριάζουσιν οὐδὲ χρηστοὺς δύνανται πολίτας ἑαυτοὺς παρασχεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεί τινος ὀρέγονται πλεονεξίας καὶ παρανομίας, τοτὲ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐξεῖναι σφίσιν ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ ταύτας ἀνυπευθύνους ποιοῦντες καὶ παναγεῖς: τοτὲ δ᾽ εἰς ἀγῶνας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων καθιστάντες οὓς αὐτοῖς δόξειε τῶν πατρικίων, καὶ τὰ νόμιμα δικαστήρια, οἷς περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς ἡ πόλις πρότερον ἔδωκε κρίνειν, μεταφέροντες ἐκ τῆς καθαρωτάτης φυλῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ῥυπαρώτατον ὄχλον: τοτὲ δὲ νόμους εἰσφέροντες οἱ θῆτες καὶ ἀνέστιοι κατὰ τῶν εὐπατριδῶν τυραννικοὺς καὶ ἀνίσους, καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ προβουλεῦσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν τῇ βουλῇ καταλείποντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφαιρούμενοι καὶ ταύτην αὐτῆς τὴν [p. 353] τιμήν, ἣν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἶχεν ἀναμφίλεκτον χρόνου,
[7] Therefore their conduct was not at all stran
ge, he said, if, after being guilty of perjury to the gods, deserting their generals, leaving the city undefended as far as in them lay, and returning home in order to violate the public faith, subvert the laws and overthrow the constitution of their fathers, they showed no moderation and could not behave themselves like good citizens, but were always aiming at some selfish encroachment and violation of the laws. At one time they were demanding the right to choose for themselves their own magistrates and making these unaccountable for their actions and sacrosanct; again, they were putting on trial for their lives such of the patricians as they saw fit, and transferring the legitimate courts, to which the commonwealth had formerly entrusted the trial of causes involving death or banishment, from the most incorruptible senate to the vilest mob; and yet again, the labourers for hire and the homeless were introducing tyrannical and unfair laws against the men of noble birth, without leaving to the senate the power even of passing the preliminary decree concerning those laws, but depriving that body of this honour also, which it had always enjoyed undisputed under both kings and tyrants.
[8] βασιλευομένης τε καὶ τυραννουμένης τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια προσθεὶς καὶ οὐδενὸς οὔτε πικροῦ πράγματος οὔτε βλασφήμου ὀνόματος φεισάμενος, τελευτῶν ἐκεῖνον ἔτι προσέθηκεν τὸν λόγον, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μάλιστα ἡ πληθὺς ἠγανάκτησεν, ὅτι χρόνον οὐδένα παύσεται στασιάζουσα περὶ παντὸς χρήματος ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεί τινα καινὴν ἐπὶ παλαιᾷ νοσήσει νόσον, ἕως ἂν ἡ τῶν δημάρχων ἐξουσία διαμένῃ: διδάσκων, ὅτι πράγματος παντὸς πολιτικοῦ καὶ κοινοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς προσήκει σκοπεῖν, ὅπως εὐσεβεῖς ἔσονται καὶ δίκαιοι. φιλεῖν γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν σπερμάτων χρηστοὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ εὐτυχεῖς τοὺς καρπούς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κακοὺς καὶ ὀλεθρίους.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 649