heavy pressure in the south, where the Germans were rushing reinforcements
from Crimea to fight delaying actions at Taganrog and in defensive lines around
Mariupol, 100 miles west of Rostov where the Russian offensive had begun. 1
The fog of war gave rise to prediction and its handmaiden speculation at every
turn. Major General Piotr Kotoff of the Soviet tank army, bald, smiling, and stocky
but radiating confidence, was one of the chief petroleum experts of the Soviet
army. He opined that petroleum supplies for the German and Italian armies in
Russia would be exhausted within two and a half or three months based on cur-
rent operations. The enemy would then be forced to cut back its operations,
especially in the mechanized and air forces. Indeed, General Kotoff thought, the
Germans were already limiting their attacks because of fuel shortages and the dete-
rioration of mechanized equipment due to poor-quality fuel supplies.
In Libya, British air forces were bombing Axis troops trying to open a corridor
to Tobruk. There was sporadic fighting elsewhere in Libya. 2
The Threat of War: Comprehensive Plans
The newspaper Hochi expressed its conviction that the ABCD states were prepar-
ing for an aggressive war in the Pacific. However much Japan might strive for
peace, it would be compelled to stand up and break through its encirclement; in
that case the responsibility would rest solely on America. 3
Australia’s war cabinet studied comprehensive plans to place Australia on an
emergency footing in the event of a Pacific war. The Prime Minister said that his
cabinet had reviewed precautionary measures sufficient to meet any contingency
and that further precautions would be taken as needed. The Australian cabinet
106 Last Week at Peace: December 1–6, 1941
viewed with satisfaction the arrival of the British fleet in Singapore as a reinforce-
ment of Australia’s northern defenses. In Singapore itself, it was thought that the
British fleet would make Japan more hesitant to embark upon a course of aggres-
sion, and that the battleship-led British fleet had deeply affected Japanese policy,
placing it on the defensive. 4
America’s Role: Atlantic Engagement
If the American public were fascinated observers of these far-f lung combats, they
also had an active role to play. In a report soon to be in the hands of President
Roosevelt, it was calculated that the cost to the United States of defeating Ger-
many would be between $120 and $150 billion. This was not in any way con-
nected to the program alleged by the Chicago Tribune for a drafted army of ten
million men and a five million–man expeditionary force for active operations
in Europe. The day’s papers included the furious storm of charges and counter-
charges, all of which were fully and colorfully reported.
There was one theater where the United States was actively engaged. The U.S.
destroyers Kearney and Reuben James had both been the victims of German U-boat attacks while escorting Atlantic convoys. It was now reported that the USS Salinas , an armed tanker, proceeding in convoy about 700 miles off the Newfoundland coast
had been attacked by two torpedoes, one of which had blasted a hole in the tanker’s
side. Following “Shoot on Sight” orders, the gun crew of the Salinas promptly
returned fire and “apparently” scored a hit on the U-boat. Salinas Captain Harley H. Cope showered praise upon his crew in which the nation might well take pride:
The conduct of the personnel during the entire period was exemplary. At
the time of the first explosion there was not the slightest hesitation on the
part of the bridge personnel in carrying out the prescribed instructions
regarding signals to be made, safety to personnel, and saving the ship. 5 , 6
America’s Role: Deadlock in the Far East
The Japanese press of the preceding days and weeks had been full of stories report-
ing the growing tensions between Japan and the United States based upon divergent
policies and philosophies. It is therefore puzzling that on this day the newspaper
Asahi characterized as a “bombshell” the disclosure of the substance of the then-pending Japanese–American discussions. Asahi focused on American insistence
upon Hull’s Statement of American Principles as a basis of further negotiations.
Asahi was not alone. Domei, the Japanese news agency, declared: “It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document, . . .
which cannot serve as a basis of Japanese–American negotiations henceforth.”
The American principles, it said, were “obsolete” and into the bargain, “incom-
patible with the actual Far Eastern conditions even of bygone days.” 7
Finance Minister Kaya told the East Asia Economic Council that “You are
well aware of the fact that both Britain and America now are being compelled to
Friday, December 5, 1941 107
withdraw from East Asia.” Expanding his theme, he lauded the victories achieved
under the Emperor, which were laying the foundation for a new order in East
Asia. He added that American freeze orders and embargos were “acts of economic
war” that could only serve to spur enthusiasm for this new order. But Japanese
Ambassador to the United States Nomura struck a different and more concilia-
tory note, after a twenty-five minute visit to the State Department with his gov-
ernment’s undisclosed reply to President Roosevelt’s inquiry as to the massing of
Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Asked by reporters about the prospects for
continuing negotiations Nomura said, “As far as we are concerned, we are always
willing to talk—after all, we are a friendly nation.” Nor did the Japanese envoy
offer any reply to Secretary Hull’s note of November 25 outlining American prin-
ciples for the settlement of Pacific problems. 8
Another approach to the resolution of the impasse was a Japanese proposal for
a three-month truce that might serve as a cooling-off period and allow a partial
resumption of trans-Pacific trade. But continuing Japanese activity in Indo-China,
and the failure to respond to President Roosevelt’s inquiry there, made such a pro-
posal unacceptable to the United States. The resumption of trade relations while
Japan was expanding its military position in Indo-China made for a one-sided
proposal even if accompanied by Admiral Nomura’s remark that “there must
be wise statesmanship to save the situation.” To The New York Times this seemed almost like sarcasm directed at policy makers in Tokyo. 9
*
Meanwhile the President was busy canvassing congressional leaders about the Far
Eastern situation. They advised Congress to remain in session and to limit recesses to
two or three days during the Christmas holiday period, considering the seriousness
of the impasse in the Far East. The notion was bipartisan. Senator McNary, Repub-
lican of Oregon, promised to block any attempt at a recess longer than three days,
while Democratic House members were advised not to travel beyond an area from
which they could promptly return to the Capitol. The seriousness of the situation
was underlined by Democratic House floor leader John W. McCormack of Mas-
sachusetts, who said that the Far Eastern situation had been thoroughly reviewed
in con
nection with the defense of U.S. territory and its vital interests in the East.
There were about 4,500 natives of Japan in Mexico, of whom probably 2,500
were Japanese subjects. What was the significance of the announcement by Japa-
nese Minister to Mexico Miura that he and his second secretary, Hitoshi Satoh, had
been recalled by Tokyo and would travel home with any other Japanese subjects
who also wished to return? 10
*
As the threat of war mounted, whether in the Far East or elsewhere, military
preparedness was the essential underlayment of any policy. The Congress took
note of this in considering a third supplemental defense appropriation of some $8
billion. The bill, it was said, was “needed to win” and would tell Japan “that we
mean business.” It may well have told more about the state of American opinion
108 Last Week at Peace: December 1–6, 1941
than any number of diplomatic pronouncements. The $8 billion would go to the
Army and would provide materiel for a force of 3,200,000 men.
In this bitter conflict of principles, assets and arms, a straightforward conclusion
could this day be drawn, and it was, on the front page of the Los Angeles Times , in these words:
Foreboding statements at Tokyo and significant developments here tonight
indicated an imminent major break in the Far Eastern crisis—one upon
which may hang the question of peace or war. 11
America’s Role: Deep Distrust at Home
What did the American people think of the clash that had led their country to
the brink of war? What did the American people know? They knew, in Will
Rogers’s celebrated observation, what they read in the papers. We are accustomed
today to lightning polls and instant analysis. The New York Times thought it
important that there was “overwhelming press support” for Washington’s policy.
Curiously, as Walter Lippmann had pointed out, the eyes of the isolationists
were focused solely on Europe while the real danger of a real war loomed on the
Pacific horizon.
The Times thought that the American people were swayed by their long history
of friendship with the Chinese people and their dislike for Japan’s long-standing
aggression. Americans thought perhaps the ultimate hope of avoiding war lay in
collaboration with the other powers—Britain, China, Russia, and the Netherlands—
whose interests in peace were closely aligned with their own. Thus, The Times editorialized: there could not be the slightest doubt that the country was strongly behind
the Administration in this crisis with Japan. 12
Things looked different in Chicago. It was with undisguised satisfaction that
the Chicago Tribune reported on the “unprecedented” response to its report the day before of “The Roosevelt administration’s secret plan for a foreign war.”
Rallying to the attack, Representative George Holden Tinkham, Republican of
Massachusetts, did not hesitate to say that the article was proof of the betrayal of
the American republic by the Roosevelt administration. In the House of Represen-
tatives, “alarmed” representatives had delayed further consideration of the Admin-
istration’s $8 billion request for a supplemental arms appropriation. The possibility
was lofted that the measure would be sent back to the Appropriations Committee.
Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat of Montana, telephoning from Pueblo,
Colorado, said he would sponsor a resolution demanding that the administration
state publicly whether it had plans for “a huge AEF” in Europe. The Tribune was pleased to report that copies of the paper had swiftly disappeared from newsstands
and from the Senate library when that body convened. The Tribune was further
pleased to report that the story had “caused shocked street comment throughout
the nation” and that in London, which showed avid interest in it, the report had
stirred hopes that “the Yanks are coming again.” Readers of the Tribune would not
Friday, December 5, 1941 109
be surprised by the paper’s conclusion that so large an expeditionary force would
be needed to achieve, at immense expense, its fundamental object: “to preserve the
British Empire. ” 13
The London Daily Telegraph considered the story “a smart piece of journalistic
enterprise” but one which “very nearly approached the treasonable.”
Calmer heads tried to explain the report as merely a study of a possible situa-
tion, and not a plan for an actual expeditionary force. In an entertaining colloquy,
Representative Cannon of Missouri opined that the story had been published
to coincide with the introduction of the $8 billion supplemental appropriations
bill. Representative Case, Republican of South Dakota, thought it would be
more truthful to conclude that the publication coincided with the publication
of the new morning paper in Chicago. The reference here was to initial pub-
lication of The Chicago Sun , a daily paper financed by Marshall Field and likely to be a determined supporter of the Administration and a well-funded rival of
the Tribune .
When Representative Cannon argued that the United States could not raise a
15-million-man army because existing law limited the Army to 900,000 men, the
Tribune recounted, at least twenty members leapt to their feet “flourishing their newspapers” (and what newspaper and whose story?) to state that the 900,000-man limitation had been removed in earlier draft extension legislation. 14
On its editorial pages, the Tribune melded pessimism and accusation. It consid-
ered the strategic position of Germany as immensely strong, its army better than in
Col. McCormick’s time, well supplied and able to overcome a blockade. Germany
would not be defeated, the paper said, by tanks in Africa or planes in Turkey and
China. The job could only be done by millions of men landing in Europe and
engaging the German army at its strongest defensive line.
The Army, it said, had been buying socks, sheets and blankets, and much more
for an army of ten million. The Administration denounced those reports as lies.
But the Tribune rejoined that the Administration wanted lies, and that sensible men had known all along what everybody now knew from the documentary evidence:
There can no longer be any doubt as to what the Administration intends.
We can now weigh the probable gains of an adventure in Europe against
the probable cost and the balance will not be obscured by wishful thinking
and downright lying about the limits of our participation. Mr. Roosevelt
and those about him think that the preservation of the British Empire and
the four freedoms for Chinamen are worth the lives of a million American
boys and a couple of hundred million dollars to boot. 15
The President hadn’t talked that way as a 1940 candidate, the Tribune concluded, and if he had, he would surely have been defeated.
Amid the acrimony, a more elevated tone was sounded by Presidential Press
Secretary Stephen T. Early, who observed that the American press was free with its
right to publish “unchallenged. ” 16
110 Last Week at Peace: December 1–6, 1941
FIGURE 9.1 Men waiting to enlist at recruiting headquarters, San Francisco, California.
Photo by John Collier. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-fsa-8c33750.
Economic I
ndicators: “Efficiency That Will
Astonish the World”
Against this background, John H. Jarrett, President of the Aeronautical Cham-
ber of Commerce, predicted that the United States would produce the astound-
ing number of 50,000 planes in 1942 as against production of 20,000 in 1941. If a
ten-million-man army, including a five-million-man expeditionary force, was a
hypothetical, what was happening on the aircraft production lines was a fact that
could be measured month by month.
The purpose and progress of the defense program were summarized in the
platform adopted by the National Association of Manufacturers. As to the why
of the defense program, the platform named those freedoms that it would defend,
giving the government even more powers, if needed.
Among the immediate problems were the pace of defense production, strikes,
and inflation. In a stand unusual, indeed shocking for the association, it proposed
government authority to plan, prioritize and coordinate defense production with,
however, as little hardship as possible to the civilian economy. It was necessary for
industry to work harder, and where there were shortages of materials for defense
production, government must allocate and determine priorities.
Friday, December 5, 1941 111
Every strike, the association platform declared, was a gift to Hitler. But the
right to strike ought not to be used to destroy the right to work or the right to
employ. It recommended that no strike be called without the majority vote of
the workers by secret ballot, forbidding secret strikes or strikes to resolve issues
between competing unions. It called for an open shop and pointed to the dan-
gers of inflation. It was in character that the association platform warned that
taxation could wreck the nation, while at the same time it called for a federal
sales tax.
The more things change, the more they remain the same. The platform called
for holding the public debt down, keeping a sound currency, amending securities
laws, curbing unnecessary red tape and expense, and providing necessary credit for
business expansion without speculation.
To validate its platform the association quoted Abraham Lincoln’s famous state-
Crucible of a Generation Page 18