by Craig Murray
The time of Lord and Falconer in Kohat was truncated, as they met mounting threats from the local population, and were forced to ride for their lives with shots ringing out behind them. A rendezvous was abandoned with the indefatigable Lieutenant Wood, who was making his way to Kohat by boat to gauge the prospects of river transport of Kohat coal. But they were only able to find bituminous shale, not suitable for powering steamers. Leech meantime was heading further up the Indus to Swat in full disguise as ‘a fakeer’.12
Burnes was relieved to receive at Peshawar a further, more conciliatory letter from Dost to Auckland. He wrote to Masson, ‘In fact if Dost Mahomed Khan continues to contemplate attacks on the Sikhs and to increase his duties on the merchants then we may very well ask the utility of holding any communication with him.’13
There is no evidence Burnes had any predisposition to favour Dost’s interest. In Peshawar he was forming a clear idea of the diplomatic parameters of a possible settlement which would enable British influence to be pre-eminent, and Russian influence discounted, in Kabul. On 25 July when travelling from Kala Bagh he had written to Masson that the Sikhs were much reducing their troop levels in that region.14 In Peshawar this impression was confirmed. Avitabile told Burnes that Ranjit ‘has every disposition to withdraw from this unprofitable […] place.’15 Crucially Burnes now learnt from Wade that Ranjit Singh had written to Dost offering negotiations over Peshawar, with the possibility of it being given to Sultan as a Sikh tributary.16 Burnes wrote to Macnaghten on 22 August that ‘Peshawar is a complete drain on the finances of the Maharaja from which […] his Highness would now willingly withdraw.’17 The same day Burnes wrote to Masson that the actions of Ranjit Singh:
I really begin to interpret into a disposition to withdraw his troops altogether […] but if it is to end as I anticipate is yet doubtful – If Sooltan Mahomed Khan got Peshawar would Dost Mahomed Khan let him alone – there is the rub – and if Sooltan Mahomed were again installed would he rest without injuring the Ameer?18
Burnes had identified the precise nub of the ensuing crisis. On 22 August he noted: ‘there are difficulties in dealing with this subject […] If the Maharaja would surrender Peshawar to Sooltan Mahomed & his family would they cease to intrigue against Cabool – if not it would be giving fangs to those deprived of them.’19
On 30 August 1837 the mission quit Peshawar surrounded by an escort of 2,000 Sikh troops. They camped at Jamrud on the ground of the recent battle, surrounded by thousands of unburied corpses. Burnes wrote, ‘although some months had elapsed since the battle, the effluvia from the dead bodies […] were quite revolting’. Despite their huge escort, the situation seemed ominous. Some of the mission’s camels were stolen by local Afridi tribesmen, and the headless corpses of two Sikh foragers were brought back into camp.
This was not good for morale just before attempting the notorious Khyber pass. There had been almost continual warfare for four years between the Sikhs and Afghans. The Khyber pass, dangerous at any time, had never been more so. Burnes had been daily expecting the strong escort under Mirza Agha Jan which had been promised by Akbar Khan. When on 1 September there was still no news, Burnes decided, against the strong urging of Avitabile, that the party must push on as news of Persian moves against Herat precluded further delay.20
Burnes reported back to Calcutta:
I entered the defile without any protection but the Khyberees themselves. They escorted us safely and even, in the confusion which ensued in the pass (which runs in the bed of a river) when unexpectedly overflowed by a torrent, they resisted all temptations to plunder.
From enquiries instituted on the spot, I do not doubt that this great commercial road could be thrown open by an arrangement with the different Khyber chiefs. In the time of the Moghul Emperors they were kept in regular pay, and the scale of transit duties, which they now produced to me […] was by no means exorbitant.21
Burnes understood both the necessity and traditional basis of paying the tribes for keeping the passes open. He added that it was Ranjit Singh, not the Afghans, who was most hostile to trade.
As Burnes and his mission – now about 120 people – left behind their Sikh escort at Jamrud, it was not quite true that he had no protection bar the Khyber tribes. He now came in contact with a Scottish deserter from the Company’s service named Rattray, alias Leslie, who had taken service with Ranjit. In 1836 he deserted Ranjit and took service with Dost. He converted to Islam and became Fida Mohammed Khan, to Dost’s annoyance, who commented there were enough Muslim crooks already.22 Appointed Lieutenant Colonel, Rattray’s forces swept all before them at Jamrud, until finally forced back by the disciplined battalions of Allard. Akbar Khan had left Rattray in charge of the garrison of Ali Musjid, in the mouth of the Khyber, but he had taken up residence in a cave overlooking Jamrud. Here he could watch the Sikh forces constructing their new fortress, and he had the ability to cut off their water supply. This he only did intermittently, letting the water flow in exchange for bribes.
Burnes seemed to like this rogue, though Rattray continually tried to fleece the mission. Wood records that Rattray borrowed Burnes’ copy of Elphinstone’s Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and then offered separately to sell to Wood, Leech and Lord ‘intelligence’ culled directly from it. Rattray was evidently no fool as he had identified the division of labour. Wood noted: ‘To Dr Lord he promised an account of the rivers of Khorassan, and the site of all the valuable ores between Indus and Kabul. To Lieut Leech the military resources of kingdoms and states from Lahore to Meshed and from Sindh to Kashmir; to me a map of half the continent of Asia, in which should be delineated every river and mountain chain, and every town and route.’23
Rattray accompanied the mission to Kabul.24 Burnes persuaded him to write his memoirs, and undertook to seek a publisher. In December 1838 he deserted Dost and went to seek employment in Bajour, but vanished forever.
Burnes entered into correspondence with chiefs of the seven major Khyber tribes. On 2 September the mission nervously set off into the pass with a large escort of the local Kaki khail under their chief Ullah Dad Khan. Burnes also had his faithful Arab bodyguard, and they regularly encountered checkpoints at the territory of different khails, where sometimes tense negotiations were undertaken. He was acutely aware that they were carrying trade goods, presents and gold. He noted laconically, in his journal ‘Our march was not without a degree of nervous excitement.’
The flash flood was terrifying. The river rose from a trickle to a devastating torrent in a matter of minutes. These events are frequent in Afghanistan, and are often caused not by precipitation but by strong sunlight hitting snow in high mountains. Alexander the Great’s army had been caught by such a flood with substantial loss. Burnes wrote to Masson that ‘a tremendous storm came on and we only saved our baggage by dragging it bodily up hill where we sat all day wet and shivering gazing at the grandeur of the torrent […]’ He noted that the event had left the mission totally helpless but nothing had been plundered by the faithful Khyberis, who had rescued the party and all of their goods.25
The tribes were not so hostile as reputed. All they requested from traders was the sharia ordained transit toll of two and a half per cent of the value of goods carried. Burnes therefore believed the route viable for trade caravans from the Indus. His report was however despatched to Macnaghten through Wade, who added comments to the effect that there was no possibility of trade resuming through the Khyber in the present state of Sikh–Afghan hostility.26 Wade was routinely hostile to the notion of British trade with Central Asia. He continually tried to cast doubt on the methodology used by Trevelyan and Conolly employing Muhin Shah.27 The truth was that Wade persistently denigrated any initiatives by British officials other than Wade.
The key to the stabilisation of Britain’s north-west frontier was the ending of the conflict over Peshawar. Alexander already had a clear view, and on 8 September he sent back from his camp near Jalalabad an analysis of all thirteen Sikh territories
west of the Indus,28 together with this observation:
The policy of conquest […] has been throughout a source of much anxiety and latterly a cause of disaster […] Peshawar is a drain on the finances of the Lahore state with the additional disadvantage of being so situated as to lead the Sikhs into constant collision with desperate enemies.29
He added that the Sikh hold on all their lands west of the Indus was weak. Their suppression of Muslim religious practice caused resentment, so that the inhabitants were ready to rise up at the first sign of faltering of the Sikh empire.30
Burnes had in place a group of native agents sending him intelligence. He was alarmed at correspondence between the Dil Khan sirdars and Count Simonicz, Russian Ambassador in Tehran, who had sent them presents including guns, cloth, watches and jewellery.31 The British Agent Karamat Ali32 was particularly efficient at procuring all the Dil Khan brothers’ correspondence. This was viewed by Burnes as clearly indicating Russian intent to extend influence through Kandahar after taking Herat.33 The Dil Khans had also received a proposal from Ranjit Singh that he would restore Sultan in Peshawar and they should combine to attack Dost Mohammed.
Burnes’ caravan had swollen and become rowdy. It now included a troupe of Kashmiri musicians, under a leader called Qadirju, in the employ of Mohan Lal,34 and Kashmiri women, presumably dancers, who Lal specifies were hired to cater for the sexual needs of Burnes and his assistants. There were also many unconnected to Burnes who had joined the caravan at Peshawar. Burnes was concerned that some men from Peshawar were Sikh spies, and some loyal to Sultan Mohammed and the Dil Khans. He wanted Masson to explain to Dost that he could not vouch for everybody in his camp.35 It had become an incongruous scene of revelry, with the abundant hospitality of local chiefs being augmented by a small cloud of pedlars, entertainers and prostitutes. Word even reached the religious authorities in Kabul of the sinful practices, as Masson wrote to warn Burnes, who replied on 13 September:
we have I fear a precious set of roues with us […] they have been fed at the public expense ever since we left by the bounty of our hosts and have besides had large pay so that the necessary consequence is debauchery and revel at every place we go to. Punishment, flogging have had no effect […] nor even I hope for amendment till the ‘supplies are stopped’ […] You will think after this that we have a very disorderly suite of persons but such is really not the case – in all we have but 80 mules and 35 camels which in India would be nothing […]36
On 16 September, ‘from Tezin’, Burnes wrote full of optimism to Masson, affirming that the Dil Khans would expel Qambar Ali from Kandahar, and that if Ranjit kept his word there now seemed a definite prospect of settling Peshawar. He also urged Masson to send them some good quality tea.37 The situation did not appear too menacing. Burnes wrote that they were all very much enjoying the change to a cool climate. Masson arrived with the tea at Butkhak, twelve miles out of Kabul, and they discussed the political situation. Among their topics was Eldred Pottinger, who had quit Kabul out of unfounded concern that Dost would detain him.38 He had managed to offend the entire British influence in the city, as Burnes noted:
Sayyid Muhin Shah who behaved so kindly to Conolly came out to meet me here & brought a letter from Eldred Pottinger to whom he has been equally kind – I hope to return this in some way. Pottinger has gone to Herat and never told the Nawab – Mr Masson – Mr Harlan or Hyat Cafila Bashee.39
Burnes told Masson this was a mistake by Eldred, but was comforted that Eldred was accompanied by two of Burnes’ best agents, Alidad Khan and Edul Khan, armed with letters of credit Burnes had provided.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
The Kabul Negotiations
On 20 September 1837, as the party neared Kabul, they were met by a splendid body of Afghan irregular cavalry, preceded on an elephant by Akbar Khan Barakzai, now a fine-looking man of twenty. Greeting Burnes warmly, he mounted him on his elephant and accompanied him back into Kabul. Here the mission was given a fine residence in spacious gardens, just under the great fortress of the Bala Hissar.
The next day the Emir received them. He was warm in his welcome and in his approbation of Lord Auckland’s letter. Told he had been brought ‘some of the rarities of Europe’ as presents, he replied that the rarities which most delighted him were Burnes and his friends.
Unfortunately, the presents from the Company were meagre: a pistol, a telescope, and some pins and needles were viewed by the Court as an insult. Thirty years before, Mountstuart Elphinstone had brought magnificent gifts to Shah Shuja, to the extraordinary value of £29,000. Even these had drawn complaints from the Afghans, which Elphinstone found infuriating. He noted in his journal that the presents were ‘a mark of friendship […] they were the best procurable. Nothing could exceed the meanness of this complaint.’1
That mission had arrived with sixteen British officers escorted by 400 British troops. Elphinstone said, ‘As the court of Kaubul was […] supposed to entertain a mean opinion of the European nations, it was determined that the mission should be in a style of great magnificence.’2 Burnes’ cheap presents were a stark contrast,3 and in Afghan eyes reflected poorly on his status and intentions. Burnes failed to notice that Dost Mohammed’s observation that the visitors delighted him more than the gifts was two-edged. In private the Emir exclaimed, ‘Behold! I have feasted and honoured this Feringee to the extent of six thousand rupees, and have a lot of pins and needles and sundry petty toys to show for my folly!’4
They were warmly received by the people, making a fine show in luxuriously braided dress uniforms as they passed through Kabul with an Afghan cavalry escort. Crowds called out, ‘Take care of Kabul’ and – perhaps with more foresight – ‘Don’t destroy Kabul.’ Burnes was delighted with Dost’s attitude. He recorded in Cabool, ‘Power frequently spoils men, but with Dost Mahomed, neither the increase of it, nor his new title of Ameer, seems to have done him any harm. He seemed even more alert and full of intelligence than when I last saw him.’5
In 1835 Dost’s reaction to his discovery of the letters from Wade urging Afghan chiefs to support Shuja had been, not to quarrel, but rather to try to secure Britain’s friendship, and he had opened correspondence with Lord Auckland to this effect. He reasoned that if the British could deter Ranjit from seizing the riches of Shikarpur, surely they could secure the return of the less wealthy Peshawar to Kabul?
Burnes noted that ‘Dost Mahomed Khan treats me as an old friend.’6 Their first interview was most satisfactory. He met the Emir inside the harem of the Bala Hissar,7 accompanied only by Akbar, and the three talked over dinner. Dost declared himself enthusiastically in favour of opening up trade via the Indus. He said he had protected merchants both from attack and from excessive duties, and that as a result he had seen a large increase in his customs revenues. He was therefore convinced that trade led to prosperity. He seemed just what Britain needed.
Dost now addressed the subject of Peshawar. He said that he had been mortified to discover documents that proved Shuja had turned Peshawar over to the infidel Sikhs. Either the Emir did not mention he had also found Wade’s letters, or Burnes left it out of his report. Dost went on to say that it was his religious duty to recover Peshawar for Islam, and that of course war was detrimental to commerce, both from violence and from the high taxes required. All Asia knew the British had saved Shikarpur from Ranjit – could they not do the same for Peshawar?
Burnes cautioned the Emir against taking on Ranjit Singh’s powerful army, saying that he understood Ranjit intended to devolve more authority in Peshawar to Dost’s brothers there. The well-informed Emir then asked whether Peshawar were not a large drain on the Sikh treasury. With this sketching out of what would be the substance of future negotiations, this first meeting concluded. Burnes reported to Macnaghten in great detail.8 He also remarked that Jabbar Khan had told him that Simonicz was sending offers of Russian money to attack Peshawar in return for assisting Persia to take Herat.
On 11 September 1837 Macnaghten
sent Burnes from Calcutta more detailed, if not internally consistent, instructions. Burnes received them on 21 October.
The quiet and unassuming character given at the outset […] will, owing to recent events, be very much changed […] it is evident that you cannot confine yourself, in the existing state of excitement, to matters of a commercial nature […]
It is not the intention […] to invest you with any direct political power beyond that of transmitting any proposition which may appear to you reasonable through Captain Wade to your own Government.
You are authorised, however […] to communicate without reserve with Dost Mohammed […] that under any circumstances our first feeling must be that of regard for the honour and just wishes of our old and firm ally Runjit Singh […]
You will […] discourage all extravagant pretensions on the part of Dost Mohammed […] His Lordship in Council would be inclined to think that, if Peshawar were restored to any members of the Barukzye family on the condition of tribute to Runjit Singh the terms would be as favourable as any that could be expected; and if Dost Mohammed rejecting all attempts at drawing him into an alliance with Persia should consent to the restoration of permanent tranquillity on this basis […] you are authorised to state that you will recommend to your government the support of such an arrangement […]
You have full authority to proceed to Candahar and Herat should you be of opinion that your presence in those countries would have the effect of counteracting Persian intrigues and of promoting the general tranquility of the countries bordering on the Indus.9