by Craig Murray
Arthur Conolly was William Hay Macnaghten’s nephew. Macnaghten took his nephew’s line in every respect, and particularly that the Afghans were eager to welcome a Saduzai restoration, on which an official paper by Conolly and Trevelyan of 15 March 1831 had concluded:
It is gratifying to reflect that while we shall consolidate the Afghan empire for our own interests we shall […] establish a lasting claim upon the gratitude of that people and our name will become associated with all the blessings […] from the restoration of security and good order.13
Macaulay was another key influence behind the armed restoration of Shuja. In an Edinburgh Review justification of the invasion he quoted Conolly at length,14 and argued that advances by Persia had ‘combined to unsettle the mind and resuscitate the dormant enmity, of the Mahomedan population throughout the Peninsula. Their hopes of recovered dominion were strengthened by the expectation that our power would be simultaneously assailed in other quarters.’ An offensive move was the only way to counter the dangerous perception of British vulnerability.
Auckland shared Macaulay’s concern about internal unrest. The Company’s most recent martial performances – in Burma and Nepal – had been less than glorious, and rumours and portents abounded. As the Calcutta Review later recalled:
The year 1838 was marked by a deplorable change in the feelings of our own subjects, and of the princes of India, towards our authority. The confidence […] in the permanence of our supremacy was displaced by a feverish anxiety […] A general opinion began to be formed in the minds of our own subjects that the empire was about to be assailed […]15
Crucially this mood affected the Company’s own sepoys. Naik Sita Ram recollected:
The Mahommedans said that a large army was coming to invade India and tried […] to excite the feelings of the people. They gave out that this invading army was supported by a large force of Russians; when it made its appearance on this side of the passes, it would be a signal for the entire Mahommedan population to rise against the Sirkar and drive the foreigners out of India. These reports daily gathered strength until fear filled the mind of the whole Native Army.16
There was nothing unusual in the replacement of an existing ruler by British military force, installing a rival family member as a puppet. This was the standard EIC mode of operation from its displacement of Chanda Sahib by Muhammad Ali as Nawab of the Carnatic in 1752. Some of the worst imperialist aggressions, such as the destruction of Tipu Sultan and his Court at Mysore, are still written of by historians as though they were desirable steps on the road to progress, and as though a very rich and complex culture were barbarian. Indeed, had the British occupation of Afghanistan been a military success, condemnation of Auckland by historians would have been muted. Immorality was clearest perceived when it failed to advance British interests.
Sir Penderel Moon’s monumental The British Conquest and Dominion of India details twenty-seven usurpations by the British in India before we get to Dost Mohammed. The most recent had been the annexation of Oudh in 1837, involving the installation by armed force of a puppet monarch. During the occupation of Kabul, the British also deposed the ruler of Kurnal and took Aden. Historians of the First Afghan War have in general neglected the connected usurpation of Mehrab Khan of the vast territory of Kelat.
In short, the invasion of Afghanistan was no more morally reprehensible than general British policy in India, merely less successful.
On 29 May Burnes received a letter asking him to report to Macnaghten at Adinagar. Macnaghten also asked Burnes to produce a paper of options for policy in Afghanistan. On 2 June 1838 Burnes replied with a 3,000-word study.17 This stated that the problem was not Afghanistan, but Persia and Russia. The best thing Auckland could do was to write strongly to the Shah of Persia threatening severe consequences if he persisted in attacking Herat or other parts of Afghanistan. A divided and weak Afghanistan was not in British interests; a strong, united buffer state was.
He continued, ‘If it is the object of government to destroy the present chief of Caubul’, then the options were to replace him with Sikh rule, with Sultan Mohammed, or with Shah Shuja. The Afghans would never accept Sikh rule, Ranjit Singh would not live long, and his empire would implode. Sultan Mohammed did not have the ability to rule Kabul. That left Shuja.
Burnes started his analysis of the Shuja option by saying that he had ‘no very high opinion’ of Shuja, but then crossed this out. He had already published that unequivocally in a bestselling book. He continued:
As for Shah Shuja the British Government has only to send him to Peshawar with an agent and two of its own regiments as an honorary escort, with an avowal to the Afghans that we have taken up his cause, to ensure his being fixed forever on his throne. The present time is perhaps better […] for the Afghans, as a nation, detest Persia; and Dost Muhammed Khan’s having gone over to the Court of Teheran, though he believes it to be from dire necessity, converts many a doubting Afghan into a bitter enemy. The Maharaja’s permission has only to be asked for the ex-King’s advance to Peshawar, granting him […] some four or five of his regiments which have no Sikhs in their ranks, and Shuja becomes King. He need not move from Peshawar, but […] [announce] from that city, that he has the co-operation of the British and the Maharaja; and with but a little distribution of ready money […] he will find himself the real king of the Afghans in a couple of months.18
It was this option which Macnaghten seized upon. But Burnes ended that his preferred option was still to support Dost. His conclusion was a plea to Macnaghten:
But it remains to be considered why we cannot act with Dost Muhammad. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart high opinions of the British nation: and if half what you must do for others were done for him […] he would abandon Persia and Russia tomorrow […] opportunity has been given to him, but I would rather discuss this in person with you, for I think there is much to be said for him. […] it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held out a great deal […] The man has something in him.19
Burnes then yet again displayed the remarkable multi-faceted nature of his intellect. He immediately wrote to Masson in Peshawar, giving detailed instructions on particular samples of skulls and horns he wished to send on to Hugh Falconer.20 He also that day wrote a paper for the Bombay Geographical Society, giving a brief account of the Kabul mission and the various studies which would be forthcoming. He modestly claimed he had simply co-ordinated the excellent work of Lord, Leech and Wood.21 Burnes then set off to join Macnaghten.
Even now Auckland was still prevaricating; as his sister Emily noted in her journal on 14 June, he changed his mind from morning to afternoon, depending on who was with him.22 His dilemma was further increased by a letter from Thoby Prinsep, Secretary to the Supreme Council in Calcutta, warning him Shuja was believed incapable of governing Kabul.
On 1 June 1838 Macnaghten entered Ranjit Singh’s magnificent audience chamber at the summer palace of Adinagar, dressed in cravat, yellow waistcoat, striped trousers and tails, leaving his top hat with the doorkeeper. As for his hosts, as Ranjit’s court circular put it, ‘the troops of the Maharajah, covered from head to foot with silver, jewels and all manner of beautiful clothes, were drawn up before his doors, and such was their appearance that the jewel-mine, out of envy, drew a stone upon its head, the river sat upon the sand of shame, and the manufacturers of the handsome cloth of Rum [Istanbul] pulled down their workshops.’
Ranjit Singh, on his last legs, tottered the entire length of the audience chamber to hug Macnaghten. The British delegation included Wade, Mackeson, William Osborne (Auckland’s nephew and Military Secretary), Captains Murray and MacGregor and Dr Drummond. The Maharaja delightedly examined for some time the trays of jewellery and clocks Macnaghten had brought. This habit was often interpreted by his British guests as cupidity. In fact Ranjit was paying them a compliment. Indian princely etiquette was that tribute gifts should not even be looked at; those from equals and supe
riors should be ostensibly appreciated.
After an exchange of lavish compliments, Ranjit asked Macnaghten about his capacity for drinking strong alcohol and his hunting exploits. Neither was Macnaghten’s strong suit. Ranjit resisted Macnaghten’s attempts to move on to business, but suggested they meet again the next day. So on 2 June a business meeting took place. Ranjit was flanked by Dhian Singh, who had led the mission to Auckland at Simla, and his minister Aziz al Din. With Macnaghten were Wade and Osborne.
Macnaghten explained that Burnes’ mission to Kabul had failed to reach a commercial agreement because Dost Mohammed was deviously negotiating with other powers. Britain had no fear of Russia or Persia as 200,000 professional troops could be mobilised at short notice. But unrest and rumour could ‘unsettle the minds of men’, and it would be better to concert measures for a more stable situation in Afghanistan. Macnaghten suggested Ranjit Singh’s treaty of 1833 with Shah Shuja be revived, with Britain added as an extra party.
‘That,’ replied Ranjit, ‘would be adding sugar to milk.’ However the large majority of the Sikh court, led by Dhian Singh, were strenuously opposed to any alliance with the British. Only Aziz al Din was in favour. The outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion. Ranjit had been secretly negotiating a potential anti-British alliance with Nepal.
In March 1837 General Allard, returning from leave, had presented Ranjit credentials as Agent of France. Palmerston asked the French government to revoke this, and illegally intercepted French diplomatic bags for Lahore. Burnes had noted with regret he was no longer allowed to communicate with Allard.23 France had retaliated against British diplomatic bags traversing France.24 The British forces on the Sutlej had long had instructions to prevent potential mercenaries from crossing to join Ranjit Singh; Calcutta now issued specific orders to arrest any suspected Frenchmen, and British missions in Alexandria and Bushire were ordered to intercept French officers. Ventura was refused a passport to travel through British India on his way to leave in France. So relationships were strained.
Auckland’s instructions to Macnaghten were clear. Kabul could be taken directly by the Sikhs or by Shuja. In neither case would British troops be used. Finance, supplies, trainers and advisers yes; boots on the ground no. Macnaghten, Wade and Mackeson believed this policy mistaken, that Sikh aggrandisement was also a danger to British India, and that Britain should restore Shuja directly. If the Sikhs were involved, it must only be as junior partners to a major British force. In three weeks Macnaghten wrote no fewer than thirteen letters to Auckland putting forward this view, but Auckland resisted sending a British force which might come into conflict with Russia, with unknown ramifications in Europe.
Adinagar in June was oppressively hot, and both Macnaghten and Murray became so ill that Dr Drummond wanted to evacuate them. Soon Wade too was sick, so seriously that he did not expect to survive. Given Ranjit Singh’s health, there can never have been such a vital diplomatic conference of invalids. Much of the negotiation was carried out by Mackeson and Aziz al Din. Ranjit pressed his claims to Sind and settled for an agreement that the Amirs would again be made to pay tribute to Shuja, and half of that tribute would go to Ranjit. He also made an entirely speculative claim to Jalalabad, which Macnaghten bought off with another two lakhs of rupees per year from Shuja.
On 4 June Burnes wrote to Masson that Auckland had made it plain that Shuja was to be imposed, and that Burnes would be expected to take part. Lord Auckland declared himself ‘perfectly assured also that you will now apply yourself to the fulfilment of any new post […] with the same assiduity […] which you have always manifested […]’25
Burnes had lost the policy battle, but was excited at the prospect of action. On 8 June he described ‘stirring times […] It is all settled that Shooja is to be set up, the Maharaja having agreed to every thing’. He was still in daily communication with Masson at Peshawar and actively lobbying for his employment, telling him, ‘The feeling towards you I have got hold of is decidedly good and I hope at Simla to have your mind set at rest.’26 In the meantime Burnes succeeded in getting Macnaghten to double Masson’s salary as newswriter to Rs500 monthly. Burnes was also receiving direct reports from Eldred Pottinger. He found the Indian newspapers full of the British expedition to Kharg in the Persian Gulf, and a general cry for war set up in in the press.27
Ranjit Singh had moved his court from Adinagar to Lahore, and Macnaghten was forced to follow. On 17 June Burnes arrived, paid a call on Ranjit Singh in the Shalimar Gardens, and had an enthusiastic social reception, but was excluded by Macnaghten from the negotiations. However Sikh sources credit Burnes at Shalimar with finally goading Ranjit to commit to the invasion, by repeating insults he claimed Dost Mohammed had uttered.28 Ranjit valued Burnes’ opinion, and although he could not include Burnes if Macnaghten did not, he sent Aziz al Din to have three lengthy meetings with him. Aziz had been with Ranjit for over thirty years and was integral to his rule. He asked Burnes for his candid opinion as to whether it would advantage Ranjit to set up Shuja. Burnes replied that it would benefit Ranjit, but whether it would benefit Afghanistan was a different question.
Alex spent his time otherwise writing up his recent mission. A selection of this material, concentrating on the commercial and ethnographic and excluding the military and political, was published by government.29 On 18 June he wrote a further paper for Macnaghten on the modalities of installing Shuja. In this he argued that, as Dost Mohammed had never claimed the Kingship, installing Shuja did not mean deposing the Emir. The original mistake of Shuja’s Kingship had been not to conciliate the Barakzai, whose support he needed to be secure. A position of honour and responsibility should therefore be found for Dost ‘and we escape the odium of being privy to his entire destruction’.30
Reading the full eighteen articles of the treaty Macnaghten eventually agreed with Ranjit, it is remarkably lopsided. Ten operative points place a burthen exclusively on Shuja, while the British and Ranjit are put under exclusive obligation by only two each. There are six operative points where obligations are mutual. Among the exclusive obligations on Shuja are the acknowledgement of Sikh sovereignty over no fewer than thirty-two of his own former territories, including Kashmir, Attock and Peshawar. Not only must he pay twenty-two lakhs upfront plus two lakhs annually to Ranjit, but also agree to joint Sikh and British control of Afghan foreign policy. The major Sikh obligation was to provide Muslim troops to assist Shah Shuja’s British-financed forces.
On 21 June Burnes wrote to Masson from Lahore that all was virtually settled:
I feel our relationship with the Punjab on the verge of being materially altered and Shooja ool Moolk close to ascending the throne of his ancestors – You may remember the treaty between the Shah and Runjeet – that is the basis of everything and it only now remains to decide whether he is to go by Peshawar or by Candahar to his throne […] The Shah is to have an Agent on our part with him – English officers and English money but it is not yet settled whether he is to have any of our troops – I am keen for a Regiment or two but there seems to be some form of objections to the thing on the part of Runjeet Sing – the treaty to be formed is tripartite.31
Burnes asked Masson which he wished canvassed with Auckland for his employment – a roving commission throughout Afghanistan, or Assistant to the Resident in Kabul. Masson was with Allard in Peshawar, and Burnes told him he might as well inform the Frenchman what was happening, as the network of munshis on all sides shared everything anyway. As usual Burnes sent money to Masson, and also gave details of money he was managing with the Bombay banks on behalf of Avitabile. A few days later Burnes was writing to Masson again, urging him to forward on some of Wood’s collection of Central Asian trade goods, including wool samples and tea-cups.32
The tripartite agreement to restore Shuja was signed by Macnaghten and sealed in wax with Ranjit’s signet ring on 26 June. There was no provision for the British to send troops to Afghanistan, but they were to supply a division to garrison Shikarpur
as an advance base – which Ranjit Singh saw as a further move to block him in that direction. On 13 July Macnaghten left Lahore with Burnes, Mackeson and Wade and rode on to Amritsar, from where on 14 July Burnes wrote to Masson how lopsided the treaty was: ‘Runjeet we left greatly delighted – Never was a man so pleased and so he may be […] all its articles are in his favor – To this we are a guarantee and also to 2 lacs of rupees a year.’33
On 15 July they rode on to Ludhiana where Macnaghten met Shuja and communicated that Britain was to restore him to his throne. Shuja – who had not been consulted – would not immediately agree to the annual payment of two lakhs for Jalalabad, but was cajoled by Macnaghten. Shuja also baulked at the stipulation that he would pay over to Ranjit Singh twenty-two lakhs of the alleged tribute arrears from the Amirs of Sind, and eventually this was reduced to fifteen – but the remainder was to go to the British, and none to Shuja.
The Shah was unhappy at the territories to be annexed by Ranjit, stressing that he had received assurances from Ranjit that Peshawar would be returned if he were restored in Kabul. But Shuja’s Minister, Mullah Shukhr, pointed out that the territorial concessions merely repeated the 1833 treaty, and the Sikh held the land already. Shuja conceded. He also wished to increase the force under his own name, though raised, paid and officered by the British. To this Macnaghten agreed. Shuja emphasised that the revenues of Kabul and Kandahar could not support a central government, but agreed to add his seal. At the last moment he produced a new objection – the British must not free slave girls and must hand back runaways. Macnaghten was taken aback by this, but replied he was sure the Governor-General wished to honour local customs. Shuja added his seal, and Macnaghten left Ludhiana.