by Craig Murray
William Hough quotes Burnes’ companion Simpson as saying that they had to leave Kelat precipitately as they had discovered a plot to murder their party.26 Mohan Lal says that ‘apparently’ a group had come to Kelat to murder them, but that Mehrab’s involvement was uncertain.27 A few months later Lieutenant Loveday, Agent at Kelat, had never heard of the incident, and put down Burnes’ repudiation of the treaty to anger that Mehrab Khan had refused to come in to Quetta. Havelock met Burnes immediately on his return and does not mention any actual attack.
The current Khan of Kelat28 has told me that there was an attack made on Burnes’ party, but the Khan was not involved. That accords with Henry Durand that the attack was by plunderers who had heard of the money Simpson was carrying.29 Baluch historians attribute the incident to Wazir Muhammad Hassan as part of his plot to have the British remove Mehrab Khan.30 This was also the final assessment of Masson, and of the British intelligence services.31 If so it worked – the British decided the treaty was a dead letter. They were immediately to break all of its provisions.
In fact Mehrab, though he had reigned for over twenty years, had never enjoyed authority over all his large territories, and had been embroiled in civil war. He had executed or assassinated five cousins, two wazirs and scores of tribal chiefs. He had no effective control of Shawl or Mustung from 1835, and also none over the Murri and Bugti tribes of Brahuis in the north-east, who raided British columns in the hills. Macnaghten was presented with copies of letters from Mehrab Khan to them, but the source, Mehrab’s wazir Muhammad Hussan, was playing a double game. It is impossible to know if the letters were genuine. Baluch tradition is that Hussan wrote the letters himself to incriminate Mehrab.32 As both Hussan’s father and brother were executed by Mehrab, it is not unlikely.
The British consistently overestimated the control chiefs had over their followers, from Mehrab Khan during the advance to Akbar Khan at the retreat. They assumed Afghan tribes were similar to Scottish Highland clans, a comparison first drawn by Mountstuart Elphinstone. In fact a Scottish clan chief had much more control. Afghan Khanships were less simply hereditary. Tribesmen had no sense of unconditional attachment. Allegiances competed with other obligations like blood feuds, and events like pastoral migrations. Sometimes significant groups might disagree with the Khan and withdraw allegiance. In Scotland rebellion against a chief was rare, indeed tragically so in the Clearances. In Afghanistan rebellion was frequent. The British expected Khans to exercise control well beyond their power. As the Khans were happy to accept British subsidies for keeping the peace, they seldom explained their inadequacy.
Burnes achieved one intelligence coup in Kelat, by subverting Abdul Wahhab Khan Popalzai, agent of the Dil Khans of Kandahar. Alex obtained from him copies of the extensive correspondence on resistance between Persia, Russia, Kabul, Kandahar, Kelat and Haidarabad. Having turned him, Burnes then sent him back to Kandahar to convert other senior Dourani nobles to Shuja’s cause.
At Quetta, the British army continued to suffer severe food shortage, exacerbated once Keane, Macnaghten and the Shah’s contingent arrived. Macnaghten wrote, ‘[T]he troops and followers are nearly in a state of mutiny for food.’ He still suspected that Mehrab was hiding food and blamed Burnes for being soft. He was, moreover, frustrated by the pessimism around him, and lacked confidence in the military commanders. On 4 April 1839 he wrote to Auckland, ‘Sir Willoughby is a sad croaker; not content with telling me we must all assuredly be starved, he assured me that Shah Shuja is very unpopular in Afghanistan.’
He did not think through the consequences of what he reported:
The Shah is in good health and spirits; but he says he never had so much trouble and bother in his lifetime […] on previous occasions […] no complaint was ever allowed to reach the sacred person of His Majesty. His opinion of the Afghans as a nation is […] extremely low. He says that they are a pack of dogs.33
A few days later Macnaghten was writing again:
The whole of the force, from Sir W. Cotton downwards, are infected with exaggerated fears relating to the character of the King, and the prospects of the campaign. They fancy they see an enemy in every bush. The Khan of Khelat is our implacable enemy, and Sir J. Keane is burning with revenge. There never was such treatment […] as we have been subjected to in our progress through the Khan’s country. I will say nothing of Burnes’s negociations. His instructions were to conciliate, but I think he adhered too strictly to the letter of them. The Commander in Chief is very angry34
On Macnaghten’s instructions, Leech forced open the grain stores of Quetta and conducted aggressive searches, but the total amount of food they found – from private kitchens – did not amount to a single day’s supply. Shuja announced that he had deposed the qasi, or chief Islamic judge, of Quetta and confiscated his lands. The qasi’s unripe crops were devastated as the army’s animals were sent to graze on them. While this measure saved some of the army’s little carriage, it was also an early sign of Shuja’s alienation of the religious establishment.
To be with a starving army that blames you cannot be pleasant. Army rumour was very much against Burnes, with contemporary reports that, ‘Sir Alexander Burnes had been severely remonstrated with by the Governor-General […] for not making better provision for the army.’35 This must have been mortifying for Burnes, who had made heroic efforts to fulfil the impossible task of feeding the 40,000 who eventually assembled at Quetta in a drought. He had again demonstrated his work rate and endurance on his long rides, covering hundreds more miles than the army, as he scouted for supplies and conducted negotiations in all directions. On return to Quetta from Kelat, one of Burnes’ party, young Lieutenant Pattison, collapsed in ‘a high fever brought on by excessive fatigue’. Burnes just kept on going.
Blame must attach to Burnes, not for failing to work miracles with food, but for failing forcefully to explain to his superiors that Mehrab Khan had very little control and very limited provisions. Perhaps the failures of supply left him feeling vulnerable. He must have been physically tired. For whatever reason, Burnes bowed to Keane and Macnaghten and agreed that Mehrab Khan should be deposed.
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT
A King in Kandahar
With the campaign under way, Auckland wrote to Macnaghten on 8 December 1838 outlining a new treaty to establish Britain’s relations with Shuja. The key provisions were a permanent British Resident in Kabul, and a subsidiary force, paid for by the Shah, under the command of British officers and answerable only to the Resident. Non-British Europeans would be banned, and taxation light. The Resident would approve all policies ‘conducive to peace and commerce’.
Ministers in London were unimpressed. John Cam Hobhouse commented, ‘this is perpetual interference and control’. Melbourne wrote with disapprobation on his copy, ‘Mr Macnaghten is King of Affghanistan.’ On 17 February 1839 Hobhouse wrote warning Auckland that ‘People at home would look upon such an engagement as indicating an intention to extend our actual military control over parts of Central Asia, and would be alarmed lest some scheme of indefinite aggrandizement should result […]’1
On 7 April 1839 the army moved out for Kandahar, preceded by sappers, engineers and the 1st European regiment of the Bengal Army, who carried out the back-breaking work of making the road over the Khojuk pass practicable for wheeled carriage. The entire force was still on half rations. The land through which they were passing produced grain, but the crop was unripe. The British had timed their advance to the period of greatest dearth. There was no opposition, other than the usual plunder of isolated baggage. It took from 11 to 21 April to get through Khojuk, and losses included 27,400 musket rounds and much powder. A peculiar loss was the capture of two of Macnaghten’s elephants.
Macnaghten adopted a munificent style. Aside from his personal elephants, his chaprasis or messengers had caused amusement to the Bombay contingent when they had first arrived with letters:
They were clad in scarlet, well armed, and mounted on camel
s very elegantly caparisoned. Their appearance and appointments gave us some idea of the retinue […] of the envoy and minister; and the liberality with which the Bengal government adorns the tail of its official.2
A few Afghan adherents of Shuja started to come in, the most notable being Haji Khan Kakar, a serial traitor who acted as an agent for Ranjit Singh,3 and had been involved in the desertion of Afghan forces that enabled the Sikhs to take Peshawar. Burnes had got to know him as Governor of Bamian in 1832, and in 1838 had sent him from Simla a bribe of Rs10,000.4 In return the Haji, who Kohan Dil Khan had charged with Kandahar’s forward defence, now defected with his tribesmen and rode into the British camp. Less spectacular but equally effective was Mohan Lal’s subversion of the Dil Khans’ minister, Mullah Nasu, who helped induce them to flee without resistance.
The British marched into Kandahar on 25 April 1839 amidst what Macnaghten believed genuine popular enthusiasm.5 He wrote privately to Auckland that ‘The Shah made a grand public entry in the city this morning, and was received with feelings nearly amounting to adoration.’6 Macnaghten’s account was sent to all Residents and political agents throughout India and beyond, with instructions to impress on local rulers the complete success of British arms.
Lieutenant Fane made a critical observation: ‘[T]he king was surrounded by his loving subjects and ragamuffin soldiers,’ he wrote, ‘but by very few men of rank and consequence.’ Crowds will turn out for victory parades; it might prove prudent. There is also the draw of spectacle in hard lives. Henry Havelock is probably close to the truth: ‘[T]he population, if not in ecstasies of enthusiasm on occasion of the revolution which they had witnessed, were at least tranquil, and disposed to be civil.’7
The royal Saduzai family were part of the Popalzai khail of the Dourani tribe. Originally Pashtun, the tribe emigrated west to the borderlands and became largely Persian speaking. Ahmad Shah, the founder of the royal dynasty, considered it tribal and Kandahar-centred, but his son Shah Timur moved to Kabul in order to try to increase his influence with other key groups, notably the Ghilzais and the Qizilbash. Kandahar remained the revered ancestral home.
Shuja immediately processed to the Friday mosque, escorted by Macnaghten, Burnes and Keane, to drape himself in the reputed gown of the Prophet. He was following in the footsteps of Ahmad Shah, but also of Dost Mohammed after his victory five years earlier. In 1995 Mullah Omar of the Taliban donned the same gown.8
While Macnaghten felt triumphant, he had seen enough of Afghanistan. He complained to Auckland of overwork – he was not getting breakfast until three in the afternoon. He was indignant that the Dil Khans had retreated on his own stolen elephants. He suggested that he now needed urgently to return to Lahore and then Simla, for policy consultations. Alexander Burnes could take over as Envoy to Kabul. ‘In case of my return’ Burnes could be posted to Kandahar, but it was plain Macnaghten preferred not to return.
The army had reached Kandahar with only two days’ half rations left, and the cavalry non-functional; fifty-eight of their horses had died in a single day (22 April 1839) and hundreds over the course of the march. At Kandahar several horses drowned in the river as they rushed to drink and fell exhausted. The draught animals fared still worse. The army lost 33,000 animals on its march to Kabul. The infantry was exhausted. Diarrhoea was rife. The British troops were in somewhat better shape than the mostly vegetarian sepoys, as some mutton had been available, whereas grain was almost non-existent. But the British soon started dying in numbers as grain and meat remained scarce but abundant fruit exacerbated diarrhoea. The army needed more tailors to take in uniforms, and soldiers were having to make extra holes in their belts.9 The Dil Khans were allowed to flee to their castle at Girishk because the British were too debilitated to pursue.
The arrival of the army caused a steep rise in food prices, for everybody, and any enthusiasm for Shuja soon waned under the pressure of occupation. On 27 April Burnes moved into a grand mansion built by a Dourani noble for his wife. ‘It has an air of magnificence and grandeur. The walls had a novelty of decoration never so well done […] the chunan or plaster being […] worked into a pattern over which a varnish of powdered talc is spread, which […] resembles the […] hue of new and unfrosted silver plate […]’10 In his polished rooms the maximum temperature averaged 84°F and the minimum 74°F, compared to 104°F and 64°F in the tents.
On 5 May the Bombay contingent under Wilshire finally marched into Kandahar. Alex immediately invited his friend Dr Kennedy to breakfast: ‘Sir Alexander Burnes received me […] with all that unaffected goodness, simplicity of manner, and warmth of heart which mark his character.’ Kennedy was to publish: ‘Of the great minds which I have been allowed to study, the distinguishing characteristic was their simplicity and naked truth; and in this essentiality of greatness Sir Alexander is most especially modelled.’ Robert Leech and D’Arcy Todd were also at breakfast and Kennedy was startled that Burnes, Leech and Todd had all grown ‘bushy beards’.
The Army of the Indus was for the first time united, bar the brigade left under General Nott to hold Quetta, and detachments garrisoning Baikhar, Shikarpur and Dadur. Those posts remained British for 107 years, as did Karachi and Mithankot, whose garrisons were not officially part of the Army of the Indus.
The precariousness of British supply lines became obvious. A convoy of 2,000 camels carrying grain was sent from Shikarpur: less than a quarter got through the Bolan and Khojuk passes to Kandahar. The attempt to set up a regular dak service from Kandahar to Dera Ismael Khan failed.11
Yar Mohammed Khan sent a Herati Envoy to Kandahar to do homage to Shuja and assure the British of his support, and also sent an Envoy to Persia to canvass an anti-British alliance. Eldred Pottinger had been seeking to reduce the misrule of Yar Mohammed, who made income from enslaving local Shias, and by extortion under torture from wealthy citizens. Pottinger also insisted on British control of Herat’s foreign policy, and in return for much money was permitted to farm Herat’s taxes. Auckland was horrified by the British involvement in the government of Herat this implied, but the cash advance had already been given. Tax revenue raised never exceeded 10 per cent of the yield Yar Mohammed had indicated.
In truth Prince Kamran and Yar had ruined Herat by bad government. Their looting and enslaving had reduced the population from 100,000 in 1819 to 50,000 in 1840. Minorities, including Hindu bankers vital to the city’s trade, had been driven out by relentless exactions. Pottinger tried to make British money conditional on reform. But the view in Simla was that the attempt to enforce good governance was mistaken, and Colvin wrote to Burnes on 17 January 1839: ‘Why is it that Englishmen everywhere are […] without tact and address and more disliked by foreigners than any other people?’ Auckland decided that Eldred had to be replaced.
Macnaghten asked Burnes to replace Eldred in Herat. Burnes refused. Both he and Macnaghten supported annexing fertile Herat to Kabul to make the state more economically viable; Auckland turned down the idea. Burnes reasoned there was only trouble in Herat now. He would face the same problems as Pottinger in dealing with Yar, and would be away from Kabul where he hoped to succeed Macnaghten as Envoy.
Instead, Major D’Arcy Todd was appointed. Having been Military Secretary to McNeill in Persia, he had then been part of the invasion planning group in Simla with Burnes, who liked and respected Todd. Macnaghten still regarded Herat as the great bastion against Russian advance and therefore agreed Todd would be accompanied by a party of engineers to repair and strengthen Herat’s defences, and Britain would pay a regular subsidy to Kamran.
Percival Lord was impatient in Peshawar, where the Sikh and irregular forces had still not set off through the Khyber pass. He was again living in the beautiful gardens of the Wazir Bagh where the mission had stayed in August 1837. Now he converted it into an armaments workshop, where Lieutenant Barr visited him: ‘It is indeed better known to us as “Lord’s workshop” than by its proper name. Cannon, rifles, bullets […] were progressing towards co
mpletion […] in a place evidently dedicated to peace, and where all ought to have been lovely, soft and beautiful.’12
Lord was receiving messengers from the agents recruited in Kunduz. It was he who in March 1839 first heard that Stoddart was effectively under arrest.13 Lord connected this to news that Bokhara was in discussions with the Russians; it all fuelled continued anxiety about an imminent Russian advance.14
On 14 May 1839, Macnaghten forwarded to Auckland a letter received from Stoddart, got out through Nazir Hyraldghir, one of Burnes’ Bokhara agents.15 Stoddart had written on 14 March 1839 that he had been imprisoned for eighty-four days in the zindan or state jail, but was in good health.16 He had been arrested on orders of the Kush-Begi who alleged that he had ‘come to seize the country’. Macnaghten was sanguine; he sought Auckland’s advice on measures to ‘chastise’ Bokhara, and suggested that they might subsidise an attack by Murad Beg.17 The reply from Auckland dated 17 June – Stoddart had now been imprisoned six months – cautioned Macnaghten to await developments, but to send an Envoy to Murad Beg.18
On 8 May a coronation was held for Shuja in Kandahar in an attempt to use pageantry to garner support. It did not work. British officers made fun of the programme’s provision of a stand for ‘the populace restrained by the Shah’s troops’, which remained virtually empty. It was a great spectacle, with cannon roaring and cavalry galloping. The citizenry displayed ‘mortifying indifference’.19 The one person still enamoured of Shuja was Macnaghten. He reported to Hobhouse that ‘he is a mild, humane, just and intelligent man – not deficient in energy or resolution. His faults are pride and parsimony.’20