by Craig Murray
As reports filtered back, opinion among the British in India became increasingly alarmed. At the forefront of campaigning was George Buist of the Bombay Times, who was getting information from Alexander through James. On 16 July 1840 the Bombay Times printed that:
the accounts of the conduct and condition of Shah Shoojah, continue the same as formerly; that his habits are those of a haughty, silly, sensual, confirmed reprobate, totally unworthy of British […] protection; who, the moment that our forces were withdrawn […] would become the deserved victim of his own outraged subjects, by whom he is held in equal hatred and derision.
Opinion in the UK was not behind the invasion. The Edinburgh Review, house journal of the ruling Whigs, supported the invasion but explicitly admitted that this was a minority opinion.37 The Monthly Review saw one bright spot of hope: ‘so long as Alexander Burnes is actively employed at Kandahar, or at any other residency in the East, we have a most vigilant and influential representative’.38
CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE
Dost Mohammed
In Kabul, Burnes had become steadily more worried as the British position deteriorated. He saw resistance flaring up throughout the country, and believed it stemmed directly from bad government.
Burnes was not alone. The military command were increasingly alarmed by the spirit of Afghan resistance. Willoughby Cotton sent reports to Auckland critical of Shuja and contradicted the optimistic picture painted by Macnaghten. Brigadier Simpson, Commander of the Shah’s forces, was even more outspoken. As he was supposed to remain in military command once British forces withdrew, his opinions had weight, and he viewed the situation as untenable.
Macnaghten was furious that Auckland would not agree to annex Peshawar and occupy the Punjab, where since Ranjit Singh’s death the British had been much harassed, writing to Auckland, ‘I have perceived […] lately, a want of confidence in my proceedings, and a disposition to listen to every unfavourable report regarding proceedings in this quarter; whilst I do not receive the support to which the overwhelming difficulties of my position entitle me.’ He was shocked at Auckland’s reply strongly supporting Simpson: ‘His Lordship can only express his approbation of the care which is exhibited by the Brigadier.’ Macnaghten now responded, asking to resign, in favour of Burnes: ‘I never yet have served in an office where I had not the confidence of my superiors.’1
His resignation was not accepted. It was in these circumstances that Macnaghten received Burnes’ long formal memorandum, dated 7 August 1840,2 making a fundamental critique of the occupation policies. His was not an isolated voice. Macnaghten had to pass this document up to Auckland, but took a much more optimistic view, rebutting Burnes’ opinions, before sending on the memo. This is a vital document as it defines the divisions at the top, exonerates Burnes from the major mistakes of the occupation, and shows Macnaghten at once highly optimistic and extremely defensive.
Burnes’ opening is combative:
when you have deemed my opinion […] worthy of being called for, I have conscientiously given it […] where my own views differed from your own I have made it a point to give way […] I have resolutely resisted being drawn into any kind of correspondence regarding this country with my official superiors tho’ I have been repeatedly invited even by the highest authority to do so […] had I acted otherwise [I] […] would have largely added to the embarrassments both of yourself and Government by letting forth opinions on things different from your own […]
Burnes then referred to his expectation of taking over Macnaghten’s job, an arrangement frequently mentioned in correspondence by both men.
It would be an easy task for me to sit down and do only what Government or yourself directed me to do till the time should come when the direction of this country fell to myself
Burnes felt Afghanistan was in such a parlous state he must now give his candid advice. He started with the loss of Kelat. Macnaghten annotated:
too much has been made of the misfortune which elicited this paper. Similar misfortunes have very generally occurred to us in the first establishment of our influence in other parts of the East. W.M.
Alex details discontent among the Dourani nobles at Kandahar over Shah Shuja’s tax impositions, and criticises the giving of large sums of money to Yar Mohammed at Herat. Here, Macnaghten makes no specific riposte. Burnes then elaborates on his attempts to ensure good governance for the Kohistanis in the spring, and his frustration by Shuja, concluding:
At this time the feeling in Kohistan is feverish in the extreme […] an insurrection may break out at a moment’s warning
Macnaghten simply negates this:
The Kohistanees certainly did flock in great numbers to Cabul, and were well received. I have no reason to believe that they are generally not well affected, though they are proverbial for their love of turbulence and rapine […] W.M.
Burnes then notes similar discord in Jalalabad and the Khyber, and writes of the economic non-viability of Afghanistan minus Herat, Peshawar and Kashmir. Of Shuja:
To me it would be very astonishing if any Afghan king who had allied himself to the Sikhs and English would be popular; it is not in the nature of things.
Macnaghten denies even this. It is worth reminding ourselves that Macnaghten’s comments are written for Auckland:
The present system is not popular with some classes. The causes of this feeling I have repeatedly enumerated. The Shah himself is, I believe, personally popular with all, though he may not be able, with his limited resources, to satisfy unreasonable representations. W.M.
Burnes then describes the incapacity of Mullah Shukhr as Vizier, and regrets that Usman Khan Bamizai, whom Burnes had sought to force on Shuja to improve the administration, had been given nothing to do but sort through old revenue records. Macnaghten again negates Burnes:
the picture of Moolah Shikore is rather a caricature. His only fault […] lies in his age. He is thoroughly honest, and devoted to his majesty’s interests […] he will not allow his majesty to be cheated by others. This is the secret of much of his unpopularity. W.M.
Alex addresses the expense and inefficiency of the royal household, the worthlessness of many of the royal troops, the iniquities of the tax system and of quartering troops on districts to enforce collection, and the popular discontent among the Muslim population from stationing Sikh troops in central Kabul, even guarding the entrance to the Bala Hissar. All these points are discounted by Macnaghten, the last with the impractical observation that the British should not give way to religious intolerance.
Burnes had produced a damning critique of Shuja, and of Macnaghten’s governance of Afghanistan. He was correct not just in his perception of what was going wrong, but of why. His letter concluded:
It is better I think to meet these boldly than to shut our eyes to them. - I cannot expect you to accept all my opinions […] but if I have […] discharged a conscientious duty in laying before you the conclusions at which I have arrived, I shall have gained the end I had in view Believe me yours sincerely, Sgd. Lt Col Alex. Burnes
Having annotated all over the margins, Macnaghten also added a covering letter arguing that Burnes was wrong:
His Majesty is merciful and kind-hearted in the extreme, and if the personal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity, Shah Shoojah could not fail to obtain it. My longer experience of his majesty’s character more thoroughly convinces me of the truth […] that there is not an abler or better man than himself in all his dominions.
Macnaghten met with Burnes and opined he was ‘too gloomy’. The situation went from bad to worse. Burnes had evidently put a lot of effort into his memorandum, and it had been a big decision to set down his criticisms. He must have been disappointed at Macnaghten’s brusque refusal to move towards his views. Macnaghten also wrote separately to Auckland:
we are in as prosperous condition as could have been expected. Sir A. of course wishes to prove the contrary, since by doing so, when he succeeds me, his failures would thus fi
nd excuse and his success additional credit.3
Burnes sent a copy of his paper to James on 20 August, adding a postscript in which he appeared, falsely, to exult in British disasters. We should remember this PS was only to his brother:
PS 22 August 1840
The above paper was written on the 7th August […] it has been deemed too gloomy. The following events have occurred since, and if the facts enumerated were insufficient, they may serve to indicate where the truth lies.
1.Captain Hay, beyond Bameean, where all was indeed quiet, was invited to occupy some forts ahead of his position, he accepted the offer; 29 of his 100 men were wounded, and 9 killed, the party only saved from destruction by Lieutenant Hart leading two companies to the rescue!
2.Captain Macgregor sent 1500 Afghans against a place north of Jellalabad; they were defeated, lost their gun, and 100 men – 200 went over to the enemy!!
3.The Shah was going to Koh-i-Duman, thirty miles from his capital; the chiefs objected to it; he is obliged to give up his trip, and return his tents into store!!!
4.Kelat has no sooner fallen, than Beloochees have moved against Shawl again, and troops have gone down to Candahar to the rescue!!!!
5.The chiefs of Khooloom and Khoondooz have joined in a confederacy against us, and prevented Dost Mahomed coming in!!!!!
6.A conspiracy has been discovered by myself, and believed by the king and the envoy, implicating almost all the first men in Cabul and the surrounding countries in a plan to subvert the country!!!!!!
7.Letters from the Sikhs to Dost Mahomed have been intercepted, sending money!!!!!!!
With seven points of wonder I close the result of twice seven days. A.B.
Dost Mohammed had escaped from captivity in Bokhara and boldly ridden into the Uzbek lands across the Oxus. Mir Wali immediately switched allegiance to him, and on 30 August the two led an attack which caused the precipitate withdrawal of the Gurkha and Afghan irregular force holding Bajgah for the British. A recently raised Afghan infantry regiment under Captain Hopkins at Saigan deserted to Dost, causing the officers and a few remaining men to fall back on Lord’s force at Bamian.
However, Lord, through his local agents, had received intelligence of Dost’s approach and already sent for reinforcements: Dennie had arrived with the 35th NI, and Gurkhas from the Shah’s contingent. On the morning of 15 September Lord told Dennie that an advance party of Mir Wali’s forces were capturing forts at the head of the Bamian valley. Dennie rode out with a third of the garrison, about 700 men. He sent Gurkha detachments to drive the enemy from the heights on either side, while Dennie led several charges up the valley head, despite being surprised to discover not merely an advance guard but Dost Mohammed, Afzal Khan and Mir Wali, with an army of 6,000. It was the small artillery force under Lieutenant Mackenzie that scattered the enemy, which Dennie followed up with his customary ferocity. Unaccustomed to effective artillery, with 500 killed and over 1,000 wounded, Mir Wali and the Uzbeks fled. Hopkins’ former men were ridden down by the Shah’s new janbaz cavalry and by Anderson’s horse, with whom Arthur Conolly charged. The British lost 100 killed. Dost himself was wounded by a howitzer shell.
Dennie was now offered the Order of the Dourani Empire (Second Class), which he again refused. Macnaghten responded by stopping Dennie’s allowance as an acting brigadier. Burnes and Dennie had become close during their winter in charge at Kabul, and Alex sympathised.
Cabool, 20 September 1840
My Dear Colonel
Accept the […] heart-felt congratulations of a friend and admirer of your […] most glorious success against Dost Mahomed Khan […] A victory over a man of the stamp of Dost Mahomed is no small honour; and it will […] fully prove, that the man they so unjustly injured at Ghuznee, deserved other things; and, forgetting all past slights and injuries, did in the hour of duty gloriously maintain the arms and honour of his country.
Farewell to-day, and believe me always very sincerely yours,
Alexander Burnes
After Bamian, Lord immediately arranged honourable terms of surrender for Dost, who was offered a comfortable exile and pension for himself and family. Dost Mohammed’s reply was memorable:
I am but a wooden spoon which can be thrown hither and thither without injury, but the British are a glass which, once broken, cannot be mended.4
Burnes had lost confidence in both Shuja and Macnaghten. On 6 September 1840 he wrote to James Holland that ‘there is nothing here but downright imbecility’. But suddenly Macnaghten was much less sure that Burnes was an alarmist. On 12 September 1840 he wrote to Auckland ‘Affairs in this quarter have the worst possible appearance. The whole Kohistan is reported to be ripe for revolt, though possibly in this there may be some exaggeration: and we hear of resolutions to rise in other parts of the country.’
He endorsed a request from Cotton that another full brigade be urgently sent from Bengal. Macnaghten was still urging Auckland to annex Herat and to act against the Sikhs, who were encouraging and funding Afghan resistance. The British reaction to Dennie’s victory at Bamian is telling. They abandoned Bamian, handed back his lands to the defeated Mir Wali, and pulled back until their most advanced post was at Charikar, just forty miles north of Kabul. Akbar Khan, Dost Mohammed’s favoured son, immediately established himself at Khulm.
The British were losing belief. Living conditions hardly helped. In their second freezing Afghan winter, most of the Kabul garrison in cantonment were still under canvas. As for their officers, Colonel Dennie was living in a self-built mud hut, ‘like most of my neighbours’.5 Kabul was rife with intrigue as Afghan factions vied for power. Edward Conolly was brought correspondence purported to be between the Sikh Durbar, Sultan Mohammed and Jabbar Khan planning harassment and sabotage. Jabbar was held as a broadly neutral figure; the other two were supposed to be allies. After investigation, Burnes and Mohan Lal declared the letters forgeries..
Macnaghten had ordered guns mounted in the Bala Hissar and was preparing the contingency of moving into the citadel. He wrote to Auckland that they may need to ‘submit to the disgrace of being shut up in Kabul for a time’.6 Burnes had intercepted more letters in Kabul between disaffected Kohistani chiefs. Nobles were disgruntled by the abolition of old privileges and the creation of a central standing army, the janbaz and hazirbaz. In these policies the British were in fact following Dost’s lead, who had created a 3,000 strong royal ‘umlai’ cavalry, to great resentment.7 Whoever ruled Afghanistan faced the same resistance to central authority.
The Emir was attempting to consolidate Kohistani resistance, but Burnes now moved to Charikar and used a classic secret service ruse to disrupt him. Afghan chiefs used nishans (facts only the receiver and sender would know) for communications security. They had long been in use due to the constant intrigue in Afghan politics: in 1832 Ata Mohammed sent Dost one: ‘When the late Wazir Futth Khan left you at Kandahar with Shazadah Kamran, our friendship was sealed by a secret oath.’8 Ever since the Emir had fled Kabul, Burnes had been collecting nishans from chiefs by initiating correspondence with them, claiming to be from Dost Mohammed, and collating the replies.9 He now used these to forge letters from key chiefs to the Emir, warning him that the people of their district supported Shah Shuja and powerful British forces were roaming, so Dost should not approach Kabul.10 Dost himself was extremely experienced in employing forged letters, a commonplace of Afghan politics, so whether he was taken in is doubtful.
Sending and receiving of secret messages was Burnes’ stock-in-trade. These were written on small squares of paper, often hidden in plain sight, for example as a prayer amulet. At the other extreme these could be rolled up in a section of quill pushed into the anus. Other common methods were to bake the message in a chapati, which could be swallowed, or scrunch it into a pistol wad which could be quickly fired away. The messengers or chaprasis adopted various disguises ‘beautifully’, including as naked holy men.11
On 29 September 1840 Burnes, Robert Sale and Shahzada Timur rode
out from the fort of Charikar at the head of HM 13th Infantry, two companies each of the 27th and 37th NI, two squadrons of the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry and five guns. Their object was to subdue Kohistan, viewed as an easy task; there was talk of British ladies joining them as an excursion.12 Edward Conolly volunteered for fun.
Climbing into the highlands, unopposed except by sporadic sniping, they established a base camp at Karabagh. On 29 September they captured the fortified hill village of Tutundera, the stronghold of Ali Khan, whose correspondence with the Emir Burnes had intercepted. The villagers put up some resistance. Edward Conolly died instantly, shot through the heart. Six privates were also killed, with many more deaths on the Afghan side. Ali Khan escaped. At Burnes’ prompting, the entire defences of the village and surrounding countryside were levelled.
After the destruction of Tutundera, the force moved back to Charikar, where they received more reinforcements of janbaz and irregular cavalry and three more guns. On the night of 1 October, the cavalry were despatched to overwhelm Julga. This was against Burnes’ advice, as he believed the local chief, Mir Masjidi Khan, was about to surrender. The rest of the force arrived two days later after dragging the guns over hills. The fort refusing to surrender, Sale opened fire with six cannon. However the ramparts were protected by wide turf banks, and the shot made little impact. The infantry then made three attempts to escalade the walls, all of which failed as the ladders were too short.
In frustration, the British force took to levelling the whole town. After nightfall, the janbaz assisted the garrison of, it transpired, only fifty men to escape. The attackers had taken fifty casualties in the failed escalade. The next day the fort too was razed. Burnes reported to Macnaghten that ‘the country is in a very unsettled state’.