by Ian Grey
The letter was marked “Strictly secret” and “Personal,” but copies were sent to Zinoviev and Kamenev. Lenin had asked his secretary to take the letter personally to Stalin and to wait for his reply. But then he delayed until Krupskaya had read it. She was so alarmed that she begged Volodicheva not to deliver it. But Volodicheva felt she could not disobey Lenin and took the letter to Stalin on March 7, 1923. He wrote an immediate apology, but the wording is not known.
The reason for Lenin’s ultimatum to Stalin is difficult to understand. Almost certainly he learned of the incident of Stalin’s rudeness to Krupskaya soon after it happened, and had added the postscript to his notes. The reason for his writing in this spleenful vein two months later is not known. Possibly some subsequent incident sparked off his anger, and he was ready to misinterpret and take offense at anything Stalin did at this time.
To Stalin, the letter from the leader of the party with whom he had worked closely for so many years, and for whom he had felt both respect and affection, was probably personally distressing, but it hardly threatened him politically. He had been carrying out the function of guardian of the invalid at the request of the Politburo. Krupskaya was known to be a fussy woman, possessive about her husband, and the fact that Stalin had been angry with her would not have caused undue surprise among old Bolsheviks. Although he did not feel apologetic, Stalin at once wrote an apology, for it was the only thing to do.
On March 10, 1923, Lenin suffered a massive stroke which completely paralyzed his right side and deprived him of speech. He took no further part in politics.
Trotsky remained silent about his copy of Lenin’s memorandum on the nationality question. At a meeting of the Politburo on March 28, 1923, he criticized Ordzhonikidze and proposed his recall from the Caucasus. But he did not refer to the memorandum. On April 16, 1923, the eve of the Twelfth Party Congress, Fotyeva, Lenin’s secretary, wrote to Kamenev, chairman of the Politburo, about the memorandum and about Lenin’s appeal to Trotsky to present his views. Stalin knew the memorandum would be critical of his handling of Georgian affairs, and he might have been expected to seek some understanding with Trotsky. But he brought the matter into the open, writing to all members of the Central Committee, indicting Trotsky for keeping Lenin’s notes secret for over a month and making them known only one day before the opening of the congress.
Trotsky was now on the defensive. He explained that he had copied the memorandum because he was writing an article for Pravda and wanted to comment on Stalin’s nationality policy. He said also he had been reluctant to release the memorandum in view of its critical comments on three members of the Central Committee. His explanation was unconvincing. He nevertheless went on to ask the Central Committee to endorse his conduct as correct.
The incident, showing him in such poor light, made him uneasy. On April 18, 1923, he wrote to Stalin, stating that on the previous day, Stalin had undertaken to write to members of the committee, confirming that Trotsky had behaved properly. No letter had been sent. He threatened that if they did not do this, he would ask for a special commission to clear his name. The threat was unlikely to disturb Stalin, but he evidently decided to save Trotsky further embarrassment at this stage. On his instigation, the Central Committee recorded that the memorandum had been delayed “not because of dereliction on the part of any member of the Central Committee, but because of Lenin’s directives and the course of his illness.” The Central Committee statement also declared that Lenin had been misinformed about the ill treatment and humiliation of national minorities, but being confined to his sickbed, he had believed this information and naturally had expressed anger. The statement and the memorandum were shown only to heads of delegations.
The Twelfth Party Congress, which met from April 15 to 17, 1923, was a major success for Stalin. He deflected Lenin’s criticisms skillfully and handled the problems of the national minorities with authority. He also advanced his own policies in such a way as to increase his appeal as a leader of moderation and ability and of unimpeachable orthodoxy.
One of the main subjects discussed was the organization of the Central Committee and of Rabkrin and the Central Control Commission. Stalin promoted Lenin’s proposals to enlarge the Central Committee and to increase its control over the Politburo. This allowed him to strengthen his own position. Of the seven members of the Politburo, elected after the previous Congress, Lenin had been removed by illness, Trotsky was isolated, and Tomsky had no influence. Stalin depended on the support of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Rykov, and they were uneasy allies. Of the Central Committee’s twenty-seven members, fifteen were Zinoviev’s supporters. By increasing the committee’s membership to forty members and nineteen candidates, which, as he emphasized, was in accordance with Lenin’s proposals, he was able to bring in party officials whom he had promoted and who were his supporters. The changes in Rabkrin and the Central Control Commission, which were merged, also allowed him to bring in party workers whom he could trust. In both bodies and at plenary meetings when the enlarged Central Committee and the commission debated and voted together, he could be sure of majority support. Lenin had, of course, emphasized that the new members of these organs must be workers and not members of the party apparatus with their “notorious habits and biases,” but this part of his proposal was ignored.
The Congress accepted these changes without real opposition. A few voices were raised against the suppression of criticism and the decline of party democracy, and the continued practice of appointing instead of electing party officials. Zinoviev, who already saw himself as the leader in succession to Lenin, responded to such criticisms with bombast. He warned oppositionists to watch their step, threatening that the party might well act against them as it had acted against the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries.
In contrast with Zinoviev’s bluster, Stalin responded with an appearance of good-humored common sense. Did the pleas for more democracy mean that crucial decisions should be made not by the Politburo, but on the basis of discussions in 20,000 primary party committees? Everyone recognized it was essential that decisions be made swiftly and with secrecy, and he warned: “You must remember that you are surrounded by enemies. Salvation may be in the ability to strike a sudden blow, to execute an unexpected maneuver with speed.”
He answered other criticisms with the same dexterity, deflecting the main points or reducing them to absurdity. Freedom of speech and of criticism were well protected, he declared, as all delegates could hear with their own ears at the Congress. He spoke, too, of the need for new blood in the governing organs of the party. A department of instruction was needed in the Secretariat. It could train 200 or 300 workers who could be distributed to assist local committees. His remarks sounded so reasonable that no one hearing him could doubt he was opposed to power being vested in a few hands. “We need men with an independent viewpoint on the Central Committee, independent to be sure not from Leninism, not from the party line, no, God save us from that, but free from personal cliques, from those habits and traditions of strife within the Central Committee, which have caught on, alas, and which alarm us so much at times.”
On the thorny question of the nationalities, Stalin was at his most skillful. He had to recognize that the strictures, especially against himself, in Lenin’s memorandum were widely known among the delegates. When the memorandum was mentioned, he evaded its comments, saying that he would not quote from “teacher Lenin” in case he misquoted him. He added that he deeply regretted that Lenin could not be with them at the Congress. It was a bold performance which left critics nonplussed.
In explaining his own approach, however, Stalin was forthright, and he made it plain that he could not follow Lenin’s theses: “For us, as communists, it is clear that the basis of all our work is the work of strengthening the rule of the workers, and only after this comes the question - an important question, but subordinated to the first - the national question. We are told that one should not offend the nationalities. This is entirely correct
. I agree with this - they should not be offended. But to create from this a new theory that it is necessary to place the Great Russian proletariat in a position of inferiority in regard to the once oppressed nations is an absurdity. That which Comrade Lenin uses as a metaphor in his well-known article, Bukharin transforms into a whole slogan. It is clear, however, that the political basis of the proletarian dictatorship is in the first place and above all in the central industrial regions and not in the borderlands, which represent peasant countries. If we should lean too far in the direction of the peasant borderlands at the expense of the proletarian region, then a crack may develop in the system of proletarian dictatorship. This, Comrades, is dangerous.”
Stalin then referred to Lenin’s earlier writings on the subject, emphasizing the unity and supremacy of the party, the hegemony of the industrial proletariat over the peasantry, and the priority of the class over the national principle. All delegates appreciated that in speaking of the hegemony of the “proletarian region,” he meant the hegemony of Great Russia. Adroitly he drew attention to the inconsistencies of Lenin’s new thesis on the nationalities. At the same time, by basing his arguments on the fundamental dogma of the party, he outmaneuvered the opposition, since to attack his policy, they would have to challenge the dogma, which was unthinkable. They criticized the practical application of the policy, complaining of injustice and discrimination suffered in the borderlands, but in effect conceded the basic correctness of Stalin’s policies. The congress thus rejected Lenin’s proposals, vindicated Stalin, and endorsed his policy of Russian hegemony.
Trotsky took no part in the discussions on the nationality question, pleading that he had to prepare his report on industrial affairs. It was a brilliant report, and at its conclusion, Trotsky received a standing ovation. The country was facing an economic crisis, and his dramatic presentation of what he called the “scissors crisis” was convincing to the delegates.
Economic policy was beginning to dominate discussion in the party meetings. Trotsky’s theses proposing more effective planning were endorsed by the Congress and then forgotten. The need for capital for industrial development was the pressing concern. Zinoviev had declared that foreign trade and loans in the forms of concessions would yield the necessary capital, but few shared his optimism. Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Bukharin were agreed that everything must be done to promote the prosperity of the peasants, for their purchasing power would generate capital. Another view, strongly argued by Preobrazhensky, made heavy industry the first priority. This argument appealed to members who were critical of NEP because it favored the peasants at the expense of the workers. He proposed compulsory savings as the means of extracting capital from the peasants to develop heavy industry. Trotsky largely supported this position, taking a stand, like Preobrazhensky, on the dogma that “only the development of industry creates an unshakeable foundation for the dictatorship of the proletariat.” This was the start of a debate which continued until the end of 1927.
The Twelfth Congress had given an impression of party unity, but this was deceptive. The decline of party democracy and the dictatorial rule of the top party bureaucrats were still sources of strong resentment, and economic problems were arousing angry debate. At the time of the Congress, however, most members restrained themselves in the interest of party unity, for a Menshevik and two communist underground movements, the Workers’ Truth and the Workers’ Group, were active. They succeeded in organizing strikes during the summer, but in September 1922, the GPU, as the Cheka had been renamed, eradicated them.
Against this unsettled background, the struggle for power between the party leaders was delayed. The alliance of Stalin and Zinoviev continued, but it was fragile. Zinoviev was uneasy, especially after Stalin had managed to pack the Central Committee with his own supporters. At a meeting of a group of party leaders in the Caucasus, Zinoviev spoke of the need to guard against the Secretariat becoming too powerful. When Stalin learned of this speech, he at once offered to resign. The offer was refused, for they could not manage without him. An agreement was reached, however, whereby Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin would serve in the Orgburo, where they could exercise some supervision over the Secretariat. But this experiment served no purpose. All three were, strangely enough, unfamiliar with the working of the party apparatus; they made no attempt to interfere and soon stopped attending Orgburo meetings.
Suddenly, on October 5, 1922, Trotsky joined battle with the party leaders. He wrote to the Central Committee and to the Central Control Commission strongly criticizing the Secretariat for causing unrest in the party and declared his intention of making his views on this and other causes of discontent known to all members. A week later, probably encouraged by Trotsky’s challenge, the Declaration of the Forty-six was sent to the Politburo. It condemned “the inadequacy of the leadership” in coping with the economic crisis and criticized the “completely intolerable” management of the party. The majority of the forty-six belonged to the left wing of the party and were engaged in the higher economic organs of the state. Moreover, they had been aligned with Trotsky in the past and, although not directly connected, the two challenges were considered together.
A joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission was convened at the end of October 1922. Stalin handled the matter. A resolution, passed by a large majority, censured Trotsky for making a “grave political mistake” and condemned the Declaration of the Forty-six as a “factional” move, endangering the unity of the party. It was, however, a serious challenge, which could not be brushed aside by a censure resolution, Stalin readily agreed that there was a need to develop democracy in the party. The Central Committee called for free discussion of the subject, and throughout the country during November 1922, party organizations and local newspapers debated it. This national debate culminated on December 5 in a Politburo resolution drafted by Stalin, Trotsky, and Kamenev, which acknowledged the demand to make the party more democratic and appeared to meet the criticisms advanced by the opposition.
Stalin, like Lenin, had no real confidence in democratic methods and no intention of introducing them in this early formative stage of the party’s development. He explained his views frankly to delegates to the Thirteenth Party Congress. “I say only this, that there clearly cannot be developed democracy, full democracy . . . some comrades and organisations make a fetish of the democratic question, treating it as something absolute, outside time and space. I want to say to them that democracy is not something fixed for all times and conditions, for there are times when there is no possibility or sense in introducing democracy.” He went on to explain the essential conditions for full democracy: a developed industry and economy, a working class raised in quality and culture, and military strength, securing the country against attack by foreign powers. The party had to overcome many obstacles before it could attain these conditions.”
Trotsky had helped in drafting the Politburo resolution of December 5, and all believed it had his full support. It was of crucial importance because it seemed to resolve the internal party crisis and the threatened split in the leadership. There was general astonishment and alarm when, three days later, he published a letter in Pravda headed “The New Course.” The letter, while appearing to endorse the terms of the resolution, was in effect a renewed attack on the party apparatus and the powerful secretaries. The party itself, he stated, must bring the apparatus under its control and develop truly democratic methods. It sounded good, but was unrealistic. Moreover, Trotsky himself was known for his autocratic ways. His pleas for more democracy did not ring true, and members recognized that he was using it as a weapon against the party leaders. His attack was bound to fail, especially against Stalin.
Trotsky’s letter was widely discussed, and at the Thirteenth Party Conference, meeting from January 16 to 18, 1924, he and the opposition group were condemned by an overwhelming majority. Stalin mounted a devastating attack against them. He also caused a sensation by quoting a secret clause f
rom a resolution of the Tenth Party Congress concerning expulsion from the party for factional activity, and he asked the conference to reaffirm this clause. He threatened “decisive measures” against those who circulated “forbidden documents.” The economic policy endorsed in the resolution laid emphasis not on heavy industry, as proposed by the left-wing group, but on the promotion of agricultural prosperity and on price controls. Trotsky and the forty-six were defeated and warned.
Since his stroke in March 1923, Lenin, unable to speak or write, had been removed from politics. Throughout these months he was fully rational but helpless. On January 19 and 20, 1924, Krupskaya read aloud to him the Pravda reports of the Thirteenth Party Conference. She noticed that he became excited. He had a further stroke on the morning of January 21 and died in the evening.
On that same night, Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev, Kalinin, and Tomsky drove in sledges through the freezing night to Gorki. Lenin’s body lay on a table around which fir branches had been banked. They paid their respects to the dead leader and then hastened back to Moscow to attend a formal meeting of the Central Committee. Two days later, they returned to Gorki to escort the body to Moscow. There it lay in the Hall of Columns, known now as the House of the Trade Unions. During the following four days, people lined up for hours in the icy cold of that exceptionally severe winter and more than 700,000 people filed past the bier, paying their last respects just as their forebears had done in other years when the tsars had lain in state.
An extraordinary wave of emotion swept through the country. The deep religious feeling of the Russians found expression in their threnodies, and spontaneously the cult of Lenin was born. Among the hundreds of delegates gathered for the Congress of Soviets, there was mass weeping after Kalinin announced the news of Lenin’s death. A spate of decrees from the Central Committee reflected the popular mood. The anniversary of his death would be observed as a day of mourning; Petrograd was renamed Leningrad; the “Lenin Institute” was established to produce editions of his writings in all languages of the world; monuments to Lenin were to be raised in Moscow and other cities. The most remarkable, and to some Bolsheviks bizarre and distressing, decision was that Lenin’s body should be embalmed and displayed under glass in a mausoleum by the wall of the Kremlin on Red Square. People unable to attend the funeral would be able to pay their respects, and future generations could come as pilgrims to gaze upon their leader.