by Ian Grey
Churchill busily sought ways of increasing aid to the Warsaw Poles. Supported by Roosevelt, he tried to bring further pressure to bear on Stalin referring to the impact on world opinion of their abandoning the anti-Nazi Poles. Stalin was angered by Churchill’s activities, which he interpreted as an attempt to promote anti-Soviet forces on Russia’s frontier. He was concerned to build a strong buffer zone in Eastern Europe. An essential element in the plan was a friendly Poland, closely allied with Russia, and to him, this meant a communist Poland. This buffer zone was to him a matter of crucial importance, for he was obsessively concerned with the possibility of a revival of German militarism and a new invasion of Russia in twenty to thirty years.
Toward the end of July, Stalin called a meeting of the Stavka to consider future strategy. One point raised by Stalin was the role of the Stavka representatives at the fronts. Commanders had complained about them taking operations out of their hands. Zhukov said that the Stavka representatives should have the right to assume full responsibility. Shtemenko observed later that “Zhukov with his powerful personality did so anyway.” After discussion, it was agreed that Zhukov and Vasilevsky alone should have the power to take control over operations at the fronts, and this decision was embodied in a decree.
Stalin had been awaiting the opportunity to strike against Germany’s remaining allies. Indeed, at the beginning of the year when the Finns had first opened negotiations, he had hoped that the Romanians would soon break free of their ally, but the Germans kept a firm grip on the country. On August 20, however, Red forces advanced from Moldavia and Bessarabia into Romania, and quickly overwhelmed the two German and two Romanian armies. Romanian troops no longer offered resistance, and in places, they turned their guns on their German allies. The King dismissed the two Antonescus, Ion and Mihai, who were responsible for the pro-Axis policy, and accepted the Soviet armistice terms. On August 31, the Romanians, supported by Russian troops, liberated Bucharest.
Toward Bulgaria, Stalin had acted with restraint. Recognizing the weakness of the regime and the widespread pro-Russian feeling, he had not declared war on Bulgaria, even when the Germans established a military and naval base there. But, as the Red Army swept into Romania, he was provoked, especially when the Bulgarians allowed German ships to escape from their ports on the Black Sea. On September 5, the Soviet government declared war, and three days later, Tolbukhin’s armies invaded the country. They were welcomed by the Bulgarians, and a new government promptly declared war on Germany.
Meanwhile the Finns, too, had come to terms. The Russian offensive along the Karelian Isthmus early in June had pushed them back to their own frontier. The Red Army made no attempt, however, to invade Finland. Stalin wanted an armistice with Finland and the expulsion of German troops from the country. He did not envisage Finland as part of his western defense zone. It was his policy to treat the whole of Scandinavia as a neutral bloc with which Russia would maintain cordial relations. On August 25, the Finns proposed an armistice, which was finally signed in Moscow on September 15. The terms were severe, but not punitive.
Late in September, an offensive against Warsaw, now held by strong German forces, aroused Stalin’s anger. It was an incident, demonstrating his absolute command over all Russian forces and especially over the top commanders. He had given orders for troops of the First Belorussian Front to outflank Warsaw to the north. The Russians met with heavy artillery fire and suffered many casualties. Rokossovsky related that he called off the offensive and reported by telephone to Stalin, who confirmed the decision. According to Zhukov’s memoirs, however, it was he who telephoned Stalin, requesting permission to halt the offensive and go over to the defensive in order to give the troops a respite and to allow time for reinforcement. Stalin was displeased. “You and Rokossovsky will please fly to General Headquarters tomorrow for face-to-face discussion,” he said abruptly.
On the afternoon of the following day, Zhukov and Rokossovsky reported to the supreme commander. Antonov and Molotov were also present. Zhukov wrote, “I spread out my map and began explaining the situation. I noticed that Stalin was restless. He would come up to look at the map, then would step back, then approach again, eyeing me and Rokossovsky in turn. He even put his pipe aside which was a sure sign that his composure was slipping, and that he was displeased with something.”
“Comrade Zhukov,” Molotov interrupted, “you are suggesting that the offensive be stopped now when the defeated enemy is unable to stand up to our pressure. Is that sensible?”
Zhukov explained that the enemy had organized his defenses and brought up reserves and was holding the Russian offensive.
Stalin asked Rokossovsky’s opinion.
“I’d say the troops need a respite to organize themselves after a long and strenuous period of fighting,” he answered.
“I suppose the enemy could use a respite to no less advantage than we would,” Stalin observed. He then asked Zhukov for his proposals for an offensive on Warsaw.
Zhukov asserted that the present offensive would yield nothing but casualties. He proposed that the city should be taken by encircling it from the southwest. Stalin was growing angry. He interrupted Zhukov and told him and Rokossovsky to go to the waiting room “and think some more.”
Twenty minutes later, he recalled them to his office and told them that the front could go over to the defensive, as they had proposed. “As for future plans, we’ll discuss them later. You may go now,” he said curtly.
Zhukov observed, “Rokossovsky and I parted silently, each preoccupied with his own thoughts.”
On the following day, Stalin telephoned Zhukov. “What would you say to General Headquarters taking control over all fronts in future?”
Zhukov took this to mean the abolition of the post of Stavka representative and expressed the view that it would be practicable since there were now fewer fronts.
“You’re saying that without feeling offended?”
“What is there to be offended about? I hope neither Vasilevsky nor I will find ourselves unemployed,” Zhukov replied.
Stalin then told him that he was to take command of the First Belorussian Front, operating in the Berlin strategic zone, and continue as deputy supreme commander in chief. He proposed to transfer Rokossovsky to command of the Second Belorussian Front.
Stalin valued Zhukov as the ablest of the Soviet commanders. At the same time, he recognized that he was an extremely powerful personality, often stubborn in pressing his views. Between them, a strong relationship existed with periods of tension, in which Stalin was always dominant. Though at times he appeared hard on Zhukov, he took pains to do him justice and make full use of his abilities.
On July 29, Stalin himself telephoned to congratulate him on the award of his second Gold Medal of Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest and most coveted award. Kalinin, president of the Soviet Union, also telephoned to congratulate him and advise him that “yesterday the State Committee for Defence, acting on Stalin’s proposal, decided to decorate you for the Belorussian operation and the liberation of the Ukraine.”
A few months later, however, Zhukov was again in trouble with the supreme commander. The incident revealed Stalin’s concern to assert his authority and the command structure, while maintaining the standing and dignity of senior officers.
The Stavka published a regular bulletin, setting out “the lessons learned at the front in the course of the fighting.” Stalin found time to study each issue as soon as it was published. During the autumn of 1944, he noted that Voronov had issued two army regulations, both countersigned by Zhukov, without his knowledge or, as he stated it, “without the knowledge of the Stavka.” Antonov knew nothing about it and was given two days to investigate. Stalin became more incensed when it emerged that the two marshals did not appreciate the difference between an Ustav (Regulation) and a Prizak (Order).
The Politburo was summoned. “Since it would be improper for the general staff to do this to two generals of such rank,” the Politburo must
issue an appropriate order. Thereupon he dictated the order, stating:
One. Marshal Zhukov, without sufficient checking, without summoning or consulting the people at the front and without notifying the Stavka, confirmed and enacted the Ustav.
Two. I reprove Chief Marshal of Artillery Comrade Voronov for his light-hearted attitude to artillery regulations.
Three. I make it encumbent upon Marshal Zhukov to display circumspection in deciding serious questions.
As under the tsars, no one from the highest to the lowest in the land was immune from reprimand, removal, and severe punishment by the supreme ruler.
The surrender of Finland made it possible to plan the major offensive to clear the Baltic region. The German Army Group North presented a threat to the flank of the Russian armies when they advanced on the final drive on the Warsaw-Berlin axis. Stalin took an especially close interest in directing these operations. Early in July, the Red Army forces were about to envelop Army Group North, and he issued a series of directives for the operation. But the Germans skillfully avoided encirclement and prepared strong defenses in depth.
To the south early in October, Tolbukhin’s armies advanced through Romania and joined with the Yugoslav partisans of Tito’s committee of national liberation. On October 20, they entered Belgrade. The plan now was to mount an offensive from the south against the German and Hungarian forces concentrated in the region of Budapest and to advance northward into Germany. Although threatened more immediately from the east, Hitler was determined to halt the Russian advance through Hungary, and he reinforced his armies at Budapest.
On October 30, Malinovsky’s Second Ukrainian Front launched a powerful drive on Budapest. By November 4, advance columns had reached the suburbs of the city. There they were halted. Stalin had been of the opinion that Budapest could be taken quickly. In forming this opinion, he was influenced by a personal telegram, sent by the malign Mekhlis from the Fourth Ukrainian Front, stating that the Hungarians were completely demoralized. He had approved plans, drawn up hurriedly by the general staff, which he himself passed to Malinovsky by telephone, and he ordered the immediate capture of the city. Malinovsky repeatedly asked for more time to make essential preparations. Stalin was adamant. Only when he received a report from Timoshenko on the strength of the enemy positions did he agree to call off the offensive. At the same time, he adopted a new plan to encircle Budapest from the north. But the city had still not fallen at the end of the year.
As the Russians swept westward in a victorious horde, Churchill became increasingly worried about the spread of Soviet influence. Romania and Bulgaria were already under Soviet domination, and he was concerned about the future of Poland, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Adding to his anxiety was the fact that, as he wrote, the United States was “very slow in realising the upsurge of communist influence which slid on before, as well as followed, the onward march of the mighty armies, directed from the Kremlin.” Churchill proposed visiting Moscow in October 1944, for preliminary discussions. Stalin at once extended a warm invitation. Churchill had written to him earlier about Roosevelt’s plans to visit Western Europe and had suggested a meeting in The Hague. Stalin was not prepared, however, to leave Moscow. In conversation with the British and American ambassadors, he had “grumbled about his health,” saying that he never kept well except in Moscow and that even his visits to the front did him harm; his doctors were averse to his flying, and it had taken him a fortnight to recover from Teheran.
Accompanied by Eden and service chiefs, Churchill arrived in Moscow on October 9 and received a tremendous welcome. Stalin had never been more charming and friendly. Churchill and his colleagues noted, too, that all the Russians appeared to be friendlier than at the time of his visit two years earlier. Then the terrible defeats and losses suffered in the German advance and doubts about the Second Front had darkened their attitude toward the Allies. Now pride in the victories of the Red Army had wrought a dramatic change. The deep, vigilant suspicion of Russians toward the West appeared to have been allayed.
At the Bolshoi Theater, a gala performance of ballet and the Red Army choir was arranged. Churchill was moved, as he stood in the box, by the prolonged ovation that greeted him from the enormous audience. Stalin’s entry into the box gave rise to an “almost passionate demonstation.”
The British ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, had at an earlier meeting persuaded Stalin to dine at the embassy, the building standing across the river from the Kremlin, which Stalin must have seen countless times from the windows of his office. The dinner was to be one of the highlights of Churchill’s visit. Several days before the dinner, the NKVD descended on the embassy in force, searched every corner, and posted guards inside and outside the grounds. The streets from the Kremlin to the embassy were closed to traffic on the night of the dinner and troops lined the route.
Stalin arrived wearing a long gray military overcoat and a peaked cap with a red band. Underneath he was wearing a marshal’s uniform with a single decoration on his chest. Molotov, wearing an ornate diplomatic uniform, went upstairs with Stalin, accompanied by the ambassador. Vyshinsky arrived and quipped to Birse as he pointed to the guards: “I see the Red Army has had another victory. It has occupied the British Embassy.”
Stalin was in a relaxed mood and evidently looking forward to the English-style dinner, which he had first experienced at the embassy in Teheran. At one point, he stared incredulously at the life-size portraits of the Royal Family on the walls of the dining room, which included a portrait of George V. Turning to Birse, who was sitting next to him, he said, “Isn’t that our Nicholas II?” Birse had to remind him that the two monarchs had been cousins and that the resemblance between them had been striking. After dinner, as they withdrew to another room, the guns of Moscow began firing a salute in honor of the capture of Cluj in Romania, and the embassy was lit up by celebratory fireworks from the walls of the Kremlin.
The talks between Stalin and Molotov and Churchill and Eden produced only limited results. The Polish problem was intractable. Seeking to avoid upsetting his ally, Stalin made some gestures toward a compromise, but he remained adamant that the Soviet government could not tolerate in Poland a government that was actively hostile to Soviet Russia. He agreed nevertheless at their first meeting that Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, head of the London Poles, with two of his ministers, should be invited to Moscow at once for discussions with representatives of the Lublin Committee. Their meetings were fruitless. They could not agree on the division of powers between them in a future government, and on other points both sides were unyielding.
At this first meeting, judging that Stalin was in a sympathetic mood, Churchill said: “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways.”
Churchill records:
While this was being translated I wrote out on half a sheet of paper: Romania-Russia 90%, the others 10%; Greece-Great Britain 90% (in accord with the U.S.A.), Russia 10%; Yugoslavia 50–50%; Hungary 50–50%; Bulgaria-Russia 75%, the others 25%.
I pushed this across the table to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down. . . . The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.” “No, you keep it,” said Stalin.
In preparation for the military meetings with the British, Stalin had instructed Antonov to produce a brief and present it himself. Stalin was not satisfied, however, with the draft, sent to him at Kuntsevo, and began rewriting parts of it. He laid stress on the Soviet interest in holding Hungary as the center of Europe. For this reason, he wrote, they must convince the Allies that Soviet strength on the
Balkan flank was stronger than it was and that their main strategy in this theater was to smash Hungary and invade Germany from the south.
Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the imperial general staff, found Antonov friendly and ready to talk except in the presence of Stalin when he appeared to lose his confidence and to be unsure how much to say. At a meeting on October 14, after Brooke had reported on Allied operations in Burma and Europe and General Deane had spoken on U.S. strategy in the Pacific, Antonov described Soviet operations. Eden found his report clear and fluent but noted that he continually looked to Stalin for confirmation. Stalin interrupted him frequently and answered questions. Finally, losing patience with Antonov’s hesitance, Stalin took over.
The next evening, the discussion was on the war in the Pacific. General Deane and U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman were attending the talks on behalf of their president. They reiterated American concern that Russia should join in the war against Japan as soon as possible. Stalin at once gave the assurance that Russia would begin hostilities within three months after the defeat of Germany, and that for this purpose, the thirty Red Army divisions there would be raised to sixty divisions. This was subject, however, to the United States providing reserve supplies and to the clarification of “the political aspects of the Soviet Union’s participation.” He agreed also that U.S. forces would be able to use the naval base and airfields at Petropavlovsk, but they would have to use the Pacific, not the Trans-Siberian route.