by Ian Grey
At this point, Brooke asked whether the Trans-Siberian railways could maintain the necessary supplies for the sixty Red Army divisions. Antonov looked to Stalin for the answer, although Brooke felt sure that he knew it. Stalin did not respond, and Antonov explained that the railway could meet the supply needs of the Red forces. Then Stalin intervened and gave what Brooke called “an astonishing presentation of technical railway detail” with the conclusion that the Trans-Siberian Railway would not be able to maintain adequate supplies. Brooke observed that more than ever before, he was impressed by Stalin’s military ability.
The third military meeting was confined to the Soviet and U.S. representatives. Stalin outlined the strategy which would be followed by his forces in the Far East. He then presented a list of the supplies, amounting to more than 1 million tons in bulk, which the United States was to provide. These supplies comprised food, transport, and fuel for two months for 1.5 million troops, 3,000 tanks, 5,000 aircraft, and 75,000 vehicles. Stalin obviously considered that, since the United States was so eager for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, he was entitled to exact all he could in supplies. His approach was rooted in the feeling that the immensely wealthy United States had endured none of the devastation and suffering of war on its own territory; Soviet Russia had made all the sacrifices and was entitled to demand maximum support. In their political talks, Churchill and Eden felt they had reached general agreement on the partitioning of Germany, the treatment of war criminals, and other matters. Churchill did not raise the points in dispute with the Soviet government concerning the United Nations organization, which was under active consideration by the three powers. At Roosevelt’s request, he left this subject for discussion at a meeting of the three leaders to take place later in November. Apparently bypassing Churchill completely, Roosevelt had dealt directly with Stalin in arranging this meeting, and Churchill learned about it from Stalin.
Departing from Moscow, Churchill and Eden considered their visit worthwhile. They had been received with an impressive display of goodwill, and, while there were still unresolved problems, they had reached a general understanding and felt that they could count on Stalin’s will to cooperate.
By the end of 1944, preparations had been completed for a massive advance from the Vistula. Stalin had directed the planning, which had as its primary objective the capture of the important industrial region of Upper Silesia. This called for an advance of over 100 miles from the Russian positions. But Stalin was looking beyond this goal to the Oder River and to Berlin, involving an advance of nearly 300 miles.
In preparation for this winter campaign, he had reorganized the main fronts, ensuring that his three most outstanding offensive generals held the key commands. Konev remained with the First Ukrainian Front, but Zhukov took over the First Belorussian Front in the center, and Rokossovsky was transferred to command of the Second Belorussian Front. Farther to the north, Cherniakhovsky, commanding the Third Belorussian Front, was to advance into East Prussia. Zhukov and Konev were thus leading the main offensive. But Stalin decided that as supreme commander, he personally would coordinate the operations of the four main fronts.
The buildup of troops and equipment for this offensive was stupendous in scale. The two fronts, commanded by Zhukov and Konev, had 2.2 million troops with 32,143 guns and mortars, 6,460 tanks and self-propelling guns, and they were supported by 4,772 aircraft. The tanks included a large number of the latest “Joseph Stalin” tank, described as a monster heavily armored and carrying a 122-mm gun.
On the Western Front in December, the Anglo-American forces found themselves seriously threatened by Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt’s counteroffensive in the Ardennes. On January 6, 1945, Churchill sent a message to Stalin asking whether the Allies could “count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or elsewhere during January.” Stalin responded promptly. Preparations had been made, but the offensive had been delayed until the weather conditions were favorable. “Nevertheless, taking into account the position of our Allies on the Western front, GHQ of the Supreme Command has decided to accelerate the completion of our preparations and, regardless of the weather, to start large-scale offensive operations against the Germans along the whole of the central front not later than the second half of January.”
Eisenhower, the supreme allied commander, decided to send his deputy, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, to Moscow to explain the Allied predicament. Tedder arrived in Moscow early in January. Simple in manner, concise in speech, experienced and professional, Tedder was a man after Stalin’s heart. At the end of his detailed description of the Allied operations and the battle of the Ardennes, Stalin exclaimed: “That’s what I like. A clear, businesslike statement without diplomatic reservations.” Birse noted that “throughout the talk Stalin was like a boy listening to and enjoying a tale of military adventure.”
The Russian offensive was launched at 10:00 a.m. on January 12, 1945. Konev’s force of ten armies advanced so rapidly that within ten days they were sweeping through Upper Silesia and fighting on the banks of the Oder River. Two days later Zhukov opened his offensive, and the advance of his First Belorussian Front was even more spectacular. He liberated Warsaw, and by January 29, his forces had encircled Poznan and had reached the outskirts of Frankfurt. Rokossovsky’s Second Belorussian Front had swept across northern Poland, while farther north, Cherniakhovsky’s front had advanced deep into East Prussia and by the end of the month was poised to strike at Königsberg.
Early in February 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill met in conference at Yalta on the Black Sea coast. At this time, the Russians were making spectacular advances on all fronts and had reached the Oder. In the West, however, the Allied armies were recovering from the Battle of the Bulge and had yet to cross the Rhine. But nothing in the discussions as reported by Churchill and U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius suggested that Stalin’s attitude toward his Allies was influenced by Russian military successes. He was in no way overbearing, nor did he attempt to take a strong line. Indeed, the three leaders talked frankly and achieved a wide measure of understanding and agreement, except on Poland.
The American delegation stayed at the Livadia Palace, which had been the Black Sea residence of the tsars. Here the plenary sessions were held every afternoon. The British delegation was housed in the Vorontsov Palace. Military talks and meetings of the three foreign ministers took place in the Yusupov Palace, a large villa higher up the mountainside. In addition to the formal sessions, there were private talks among the three leaders and the customary informal and formal lunches and dinners. The Yalta Conference was described as a “high-speed, high-powered conference,” and for none was it more arduous than for the interpreters.
Birse, the British interpreter, related that at the final dinner, Stalin stood up, glass in hand, and said, “Tonight and on other occasions, we three leaders have got together. We talk, we eat and drink, and we enjoy ourselves. But meanwhile our three interpreters have to work and their work is not easy. They have no time to eat or drink. We rely on them to transmit our ideas to each other. I propose a toast to our interpreters!” Then he walked around the table, clinking glasses with each of them. In raising his glass, Churchill declared, “Interpreters of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your audience!” This parody on the communist slogan appealed to Stalin, and it was some minutes before he could stop laughing.
On another occasion, Stalin was affronted by what he considered disrespect, and an incident was avoided only by an appeal to his sense of humor. This happened at a luncheon when Roosevelt, although advised by Churchill to refrain, told Stalin and the whole company that he and Churchill referred to him in their secret telegrams as “Uncle Joe.” Stalin took offense. “When can I leave this table?” he said angrily. Byrnes saved the occasion by reminding him that everyone spoke of Uncle Sam and that Uncle Joe was not offensive. Accepting the name as a term of affection, Stalin calmed down.
At the first plenary session on F
ebruary 5, the future of Germany was discussed. All agreed that Germany should be dismembered after unconditional surrender. On Roosevelt’s proposal, the foreign ministers were directed to produce a plan within a month for the division and control of the country. Earlier, Stalin had objected to France sharing in this process, but now he yielded to Churchill’s pleas and agreed that France should administer an occupation zone and have a place on the control commission. A special committee was set up to meet in secret in Moscow to examine the complex problem of German reparations.
The second session considered the world organization for peace. At Dumbarton Oaks, discussion of the question of voting rights in the Security Council had ended in deadlock. A compromise proposal, put forward by Roosevelt, was now discussed. His proposal was that each member of the council should have one vote. Conflicts would be divided into two categories, one requiring economic, political, or military sanctions, and the other for disputes which could be settled by peaceful means. Sanctions could be applied only if the permanent members of the council were unanimous. Herein lay the right of veto which was to become a crucial factor in the functioning of the council.
Stalin took a keen interest in this proposal and sought with blunt honesty to clarify the position. “The greatest danger,” he said, “is conflict among ourselves, because if we remain united the German menace is not important. Therefore we must now think how to secure our unity in the future and how to guarantee that the three great powers (and possibly China and France) will maintain a united front.” He then spoke of the Russo-Finnish War and the fact that Britain and France had managed to expel Russia from the League of Nations. He wanted guarantees against a repetition of such a situation. When the conference resumed the following day, Stalin announced that the Soviet government accepted the new voting procedures, requiring the unanimity of the three powers.
At Dumbarton Oaks, the Soviet government had demanded that the republics of the Soviet Union should be founder members, each with a vote. Britain and the United States had questioned this demand as excessive. Now in Yalta, Molotov announced that the Soviet government would be content if three of the republics - namely, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania - or at any rate, two became founder members. On these and several other major issues, Stalin showed his readiness to compromise. Churchill wrote in a report to London on February 8 that “in spite of our gloomy warnings and forebodings, Yalta has turned out very well so far.”
The Polish problem brought discord into the conference. Roosevelt observed that Poland “has been a source of trouble for over five hundred years” and Churchill was to record that Poland “was the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance.”
Stalin explained his policy on Poland clearly. Throughout history, Poland had attacked Russia or had served as a corridor through which enemies had invaded, Germany had used this corridor twice in the past thirty years. Russia wanted a strong Poland who could itself guard this corridor. He did not add expressly, but it was obvious, that he would not tolerate a revival of the old regime, now represented by the London government, comprised of men who were the sworn enemies of Russia. On this problem, a fundamental difference divided the Allies. Stalin was concerned for Russian security. Churchill and Roosevelt maintained they were upholding democratic principles.
In seven of the eight plenary sessions, Poland was discussed. Preliminary agreement was reached on Poland’s frontiers; the final delimitation of the western frontier was to await the peace conference. But argument continued about the composition of the Polish government. Finally, it was agreed that the Lublin committee provisional government should be “reorganized on a broader democratic basis, with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.” A further provision was that Molotov and the United States and British ambassadors should consult with all Polish leaders with a view to reorganizing the government on these lines. It was agreed also that “the Polish provisional government of National Unity shall be pledged on the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.”
The war in the Far East had not been included on the agenda. The Americans, however, fearing that it might last a further two years, were eager for Russian participation. Roosevelt raised the subject with Stalin on February 8. Stalin confirmed that Russia would enter the war against Japan two to three months after Germany’s surrender. His terms were the preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia and the restoration of Russia’s position in the Far East, as it had been before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. These terms were agreed, and Roosevelt undertook to obtain the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek.
In the course of informal meetings, the three leaders achieved closer understanding of each other’s outlook and problems. Stalin attached great importance to these informal relations. He went out of his way to express his faith in their alliance and his anxiety “that it should not lose its character of intimacy, of its free expression of views. In the history of diplomacy, I know of no such close alliance of three great powers as this, when allies had the opportunity of so frankly expressing their views.” He believed fervently that the alliance of the great powers and the United Nations were the foundations upon which future world peace could be built. But when on February 11 the three leaders parted, they realized that they would not all meet again. Roosevelt was frail and ill and was clearly nearing death. Stalin and the Russian people as a whole held him in high respect, seeing in him a statesman and a friend. For Churchill, too, they had respect and even affection, acknowledging that he was a great war leader, but they had also an abiding mistrust of him and the British.
The advance of the Red Army westward continued, but the Germans were defending their ground with fanatic bravery. Stalin was angered by the failure to take Königsberg. Between Zhukov and Rokossovsky there was a brief failure in coordination, which called for Stalin’s intervention, and he sent Vasilevsky to the fronts as his representative. He demanded the prompt destruction of the enemy so that the Russian forces there could be available for the advance on Berlin. He also told Vasilevsky that he should prepare to serve as commander in chief in the Far East in the near future. But on the evening of February 18, he telephoned to tell him that Cherniakhovsky, the gallant young commander of the Third Belorussian Front, had been killed in action and that he was to take over his command. The fighting in East Prussia continued to be exceptionally savage, and it was not until mid-April that the Germans were cleared from the region.
In Hungary, the fighting was also severe. Budapest was taken on February 13. The Russians then swept northward into Austria and on April 13 occupied Vienna. While preparing for the advance into Austria, however, Tolbukhin, commanding the Third Ukrainian Front, had realized that the enemy Army Group South was preparing an offensive against his front. He was particularly disturbed by reports that the Sixth SS Panzer Army had been transferred from the west to strengthen the offensive.
On March 6, the Germans attacked with “exceptional ferocity.” Tolbukhin asked permission to withdraw his front to the east of the Danube if necessary. He was, according to Shtemenko, in poor health and in any case not as ruthless and determined as the other marshals. Shtemenko was in Stalin’s office when Tolbukhin telephoned. Stalin thought for a minute about his request, and then, speaking calmly, he said: “Comrade Tolbukhin! If you are thinking of extending the war by five or six months, then please do withdraw your troops behind the Danube. It will, of course, be quieter there. But I doubt whether that is your intention. Therefore you must defend the right bank and stay there yourself with your headquarters. I am sure that the troops will do their duty and fulfil their difficult task. All that is necessary is that they should be commanded properly.” Tolbukhin stood his ground, crushed the enemy offensive, and advanced to Vienna.
Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had angry exchanges during the first months of 1945. They revealed Stalin’s unresting suspicion and his readiness
to challenge the good faith of his allies with insulting frankness. The first incident concerned an approach made by General Karl Wolff, commander of the SS in Italy, to the American intelligence service in Switzerland. Two “exploratory meetings” with him took place, and he was told that negotiations for a separate peace could not be considered. The Soviet government was informed, and it at once charged the Allies with denying facilities for a Soviet representative to be present.
On the basis of reports from his own intelligence service, Stalin became convinced that the British and the Americans were negotiating a separate surrender in southern Europe. Bluntly he accused Roosevelt and Churchill of breach of faith and falsehood. Both leaders were angered by this attack on their integrity, and they responded vigorously. Stalin was clearly shaken to find that his accusations had caused such deep offense. He ended his letter on April 7 to Churchill with the explanatory words: “My messages are personal and strictly confidential. This makes it possible to speak one’s mind clearly and frankly. This is the advantage of confidential communications. If, however, you are going to regard every frank statement of mine as offensive, it will make this kind of communication very difficult. I can assure you that I had and have no intention of offending anyone.” This was, so Churchill remarked in a note to Roosevelt, “as near as they can get to an apology.”
When, in April, Heinrich Himmler, the Nazi leader, offered through Count Folke Bernadotte, the head of the Swedish Red Cross, to surrender the German forces in Norway and Denmark to British, American, or Swedish troops, the British ambassador in Stockholm reported the offer promptly to London. Churchill informed Stalin at once by cable and stated that his proposed reply to Himmler was that nothing less than unconditional surrender to the three major powers would be acceptable. Stalin cabled his agreement, adding the words: “Knowing you, I had no doubt that you would act in this way.” Churchill felt that, at last, he had gained a degree of trust from Stalin, and he replied, “I am extremely pleased to know that you had no doubt how I would act and always will act toward your glorious country and yourself.” But the goodwill and trust were to be short-lived.