by Ian Grey
Casualties at the fronts and in German-occupied territory had been horrifying in scale. Few Russians were without bereavements. Stalin stated that 7 million Soviet citizens had lost their lives in the war, but the losses were probably closer to 20 million. Most of the people were living in grim conditions, still severely rationed for food, clothing, and housing, and working long hours. Many had died from overwork and undernourishment. By 1945, more than half of all workers in industry were women, and agriculture depended almost entirely on female labor. The Russian people were now hoping that life would become easier, that food and other goods would be more plentiful, and that somehow the victory for which they had labored and suffered would bring rewards.
The economy was near collapse. At least a quarter of all Soviet property had been destroyed. Nearly 2,000 towns and 70,000 villages had been razed, and 25 million people were homeless. Soviet industry had achieved a prodigious output of tanks, guns, aircraft, and other materials, but this obscured the fact that industry as a whole had suffered disastrously. Some 31,000 factories, including the major industries in Kharkov, Krivoi Rog, Zaporozhie, Rostov, Odessa, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, had been destroyed.
As early as 1943, Stalin had begun thinking about the reconstruction of the country after the war. Russia could, of course, rebuild its industries and revive agriculture, depending wholly on its own resources. This would mean that the people would continue living in the same harsh conditions. He was counting on massive reparation payments from Germany and its allies to compensate in some degree for the destruction they had caused. He had exacted from the Finns an undertaking to repay $300 million in reparations over six years. But when, at the Yalta conference, he had raised the subject of German reparations, Churchill, in particular, had objected.
Stalin gave close thought to the possibility of substantial long-term credits from the United States to assist in financing Soviet reconstruction. By this means, the Russian people would be spared the pressures and hardships they had endured in the industrialization campaign and during the war. Many communists were horrified by the thought of such dependence on a capitalist power; others saw it as a threat to Soviet security. Stalin evidently considered that the value of such assistance would outweigh these and other objections. He was concerned with the recovery and security of Russia rather than with ideology.
Early in 1945, Molotov discussed with Harriman the possibility of financial aid, and on being told that it would require an act of Congress, he asked that Congress might deal with it before the end of the war. Again on February 5, 1945, Molotov, in conversation with Stettinius, “expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would receive long-term credits from the United States.” Earlier in the war, several prominent American industrialists, and especially Donald M. Nelson, had discussed in Moscow the possibility of a large loan. Stalin had expressed keen interest and had given Nelson a list of Soviet priorities. A strong body of opinion in Washington favored financial aid to Soviet Russia. Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, discussed Soviet credits several times with Harriman and wrote to the president on January 1, 1945: “We are not thinking of more lend-lease or any form of relief but rather of an arrangement that will have definite and long-range benefits for the United States as well as for Russia. I am convinced that if we were to come forward now and present to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period it would contribute a great deal toward ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies.”
Other counsels prevailed, however, and no U.S. credits were provided. On succeeding to the presidency after Roosevelt’s death, Truman, in fact, cut off lend-lease supplies. Stalin already had misgivings about Truman, who in 1942 had seriously proposed in the Senate that the United States alternate aid to Hitler and to Stalin in such a way as to ensure that Russia emerged as the exhausted victor. Indeed, promptly after May 8, 1945, celebrated in the West as Victory in Europe Day, lend-lease supplies were abruptly halted, although the Soviet Union was committed to joining in the war against Japan. This act, and particularly the manner in which it was done, caused deep offense in Moscow.
When, however, on May 26 Truman sent a personal representative to Moscow with assurances that he intended to pursue Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation, Stalin extended a warm welcome to him and all the more because the envoy was Harry Hopkins, whom he trusted. The chief purpose of Hopkins’ mission, lasting from May 26 to June 6, was to seek some solution to the Polish question. In the United States and Britain, the Poles were active propagandists who exercised a strong and insidious influence. Impassioned and unshakable in their hatred of Russia, they would never concede that Poland had to come to terms and learn to live with its mighty neighbor. They worked indefatigably in promoting anti-Russian and anticommunist feeling in the West, and their contribution to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and to the ensuing cold war was considerable.
In January 1945, the Armija Krajowa was converted into an underground army on the orders of the Polish government in London. General L. Okulicki headed this Polish underground which waged guerrilla war against Russians in Poland. The London government and the church in Poland worked to intensify anti-Russian feeling. In the early postwar months, the Polish underground assassinated more than 100 Red Army officers and men. Indeed, Alexander Werth, who was one of a large group of Western press correspondents who visited Poland at this time, witnessed a special anti-Russian demonstration, staged for their benefit by the underground, in which two unfortunate Russian soldiers were shot outside their hotel. In March, Okulicki and fifteen other underground leaders were arrested and taken to Moscow. An outcry was aroused in the West.
On his arrival in Moscow, Hopkins interceded with Stalin on behalf of the Polish underground leaders. In June 1945, they were tried in Moscow for assassinating Red Army personnel and were given lenient sentences. Churchill evidently regarded them as brave patriots and had proposed making their release a condition before further discussions could take place with the Soviet government. Hopkins ignored this proposal. He persuaded Stalin to invite Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and two London Poles, as well as prominent Poles in Poland who did not support the Lublin Committee, to come to Moscow for talks. As a result, a new Polish provisional government was set up, and on July 5, 1945, the United States and Britain formally recognized it. They were not satisfied with this compromise government but realized that Stalin had come far to meet their objections and they must accept it, pending their meetings in Berlin.
While in Moscow, Hopkins received instructions from Stettinius to raise directly with Stalin a matter which had brought to a standstill discussions at the San Francisco conference on the United Nations organization. Molotov had instructed Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, to insist that a matter in dispute could not even be discussed by the Security Council except with the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members, unless the dispute was one that could be settled by peaceful means. This new proviso extended the power of veto beyond the limits agreed at Yalta. At Hopkins’s meeting with Stalin, Molotov attempted to justify his instructions to Gromyko. Stalin told him not to be ridiculous and at once accepted the American position.
As the date of the Potsdam meeting approached, Stalin became more concerned about Russia’s security. His fear remained that Germany would recover rapidly and, thirsting for revenge, would strike in a third attempt to conquer Russia. Roosevelt had told him in Yalta that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Europe in two or three years. This left Britain as the only ally against a resurgent Germany, for he did not count France. But the war had seriously weakened Britain, and it remained to be seen how quickly it would recover. Moreover, he still had a deep mistrust of the British.
Stalin believed firmly in the need to maintain the alliance with the United States, but saw that this might prove impossible. American expansionist policy, promoted by the fear that the American economy would suffer a disastrous depression if expansion of over
seas markets did not continue, would surely lead to conflicts. Another threat was the assumption, held by most Americans as an article of faith, that the United States with its free capitalist system was the epitome of all that was progressive in the world, while Soviet communism was a menacing evil. This national outlook could become dangerous because it was backed by the knowledge that the United States was without rival in might, while Soviet Russia was ravaged and weak.
Stalin had no doubts that communism was superior to capitalism and that Soviet Russia would overtake the capitalist world by peaceful competition. He needed peace and stability for reconstruction and development of the Soviet economy. The greatest threat to Soviet growth was war. Russia had suffered too much from wars, and another war, especially with modern weapons, might destroy the Soviet regime and retard Russian development for 100 years or more. Nevertheless, Marxist dogma proclaimed that war was inevitable between the socialist and capitalist camps, and he gave every priority to making his country strong and secure.
Long before the end of the war, Stalin had adopted the policy of ensuring Soviet domination over Eastern Europe to provide a barrier against aggression from the West. Communist parties and pro-Soviet elements were promoted in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Poland was the weak link in this defense chain, but with time, a pro-Soviet communist regime could be built up there. The disturbing factor was that the Western allies refused to accept that Eastern Europe was a zone of Soviet influence and that Russia had a legitimate interest in creating a defense barrier in the west.
Churchill, in particular, was disturbed by the spread of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. He saw it as the prelude to a bid to dominate the whole of Europe. He refused to accept that Stalin was concerned to build only a defense barrier. To Truman, who was not knowledgeable in international relations, he wrote on May 12, 1945, that an “iron curtain” had been drawn down upon Russian-occupied Europe and that he envisaged the advance of the Russians “to the water of the North Sea and the Atlantic.” Two months later, on July 18, he was assuring Stalin in conversation that he wanted to see Russian ships passing through the Dardanelles and the Kiel canal and sailing the oceans of the world. On another occasion, he remarked to Stalin that “it looked as if Russia was rolling westwards.” Stalin firmly rejected the allegation, stating that he had no such intention and was on the contrary withdrawing his troops from the west, starting with 2 million men within the next four months.
The Potsdam conference began on July 17, 1945, with signs that the spirit of goodwill and cooperation, forged at Teheran and Yalta, would continue. Stalin appeared to be in a genial and relaxed mood. He gave a private dinner for Churchill, who wrote that “his easy friendliness was most agreeable.” Churchill himself appeared untroubled about the outcome of the British general election and reveled in the exchanges and private talks that such high-level conferences afforded him. Truman was the newcomer. Churchill called on him on the morning after his arrival and “was impressed with his gay, precise, sparkling manner and obvious powers of decision.”
The momentous news of the explosion in the Mexican desert of an atom bomb, developed by a team of American and British scientists, was given privately to Churchill on the first day of the conference. His immediate reaction was that the might of the Western powers had been enormously enhanced and that of Soviet Russia correspondingly reduced, and further, that Soviet participation in the war in the Far East was no longer necessary or desirable. The Far East would become a region of Western, predominantly American, influence, from which Soviet Russia, notwithstanding its Pacific coastline and its long historical interest in the region, could be excluded. It was this basic attitude which Stalin sensed and which seemed to justify his mistrust of Churchill.
Truman and his staff reacted in the same way. The Americans had pressed Stalin to assist in bringing the Japanese war to an early end. At Yalta, they had expressed relief and pleasure when Stalin had promised to enter the war within three months of the defeat of Germany and had readily agreed to his terms. As late as May 8, 1945, Hopkins on his mission to Moscow had sought and obtained Stalin’s reassurance that the Red Army would assist in defeating Japan.
Suddenly, two months later, with the atom bomb at their disposal, the Allies were rejecting Russian aid and furiously planning to bring about Japan’s defeat before Russia could declare war. In this way, they could evade Stalin’s terms, which included the return to Russia of the territories lost to Japan in the war of 1904–5, a matter of great national pride to Stalin and his generation.
Truman asked Churchill’s advice on the best way to break the news of the new weapon to Stalin. Churchill wrote that Stalin had been “a magnificent ally in the war against Hitler and we both felt that he must be informed of the New Fact which now dominated the scene, but not of any particulars.” It was decided that the president would mention it informally after one of the sessions.
A week later, Truman with his interpreter approached Stalin after the plenary meeting and told him about the new bomb of extraordinary power. Churchill was about five yards away, watching intently. Stalin appeared delighted, and he asked no questions. It seemed that he had no idea of the significance of the new weapon.
Stalin may not have understood immediately from Truman’s informal statement the dramatic importance of the event, but he was quick to sense the change in the Allies’ attitude toward Russia. One American general wrote that “we were in a position to be tough and indifferent.” It was not a reasoned approach on the part of the British and Americans, but an attitude bred of exasperation with Russian secretiveness, suspicion, and demands, and also of arrogant confidence that they now possessed power far exceeding that of Soviet Russia and could do and say what they pleased. The possibility that the Russians would develop atomic weapons of their own and “get tough” was not considered, or was considered to be remote, for it was assumed they were too backward in technology to make such a sophisticated weapon.
The change in the attitude of his allies disturbed Stalin. It confirmed his worst fears and suspicions, and it offended him deeply as an act of ingratitude and rejection. Russia had, he believed, saved the West from Nazi barbarism just as in the thirteenth century Russia had shielded Europe against the Mongol horde of Genghis Khan. To him and to all Russians it was clear that, if Russia had not destroyed German armed might, Hitler would have conquered Britain and have carried the war into North America. Russia deserved the gratitude and respect of the Allies, not their arrogance and condescension. No one was more sensitive about affronts to Russian national pride than Stalin, and at Potsdam, the Allies caused deep and abiding offense.
Discussions ranged widely during the thirteen plenary sessions of the conference. Many matters were held over for decision at the peace conference or by the council of foreign ministers. The Americans and British expressed strong criticism of Soviet policy in the liberated countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria. The Russians replied with criticism of British conduct in Greece. Accusations were made that Russia was violating the terms of the Yalta agreement. But it was on Germany and Poland that disagreement was most serious.
The three powers had recognized the Polish provisional government. Dispute now concerned Poland’s western frontier. The Poles had to be compensated for territory lost along the frontier with Russia. Churchill vigorously opposed the extension of the western frontier, as proposed by Stalin, to the Oder and Western Neisse. But after the British general elections in which Churchill and his party were defeated, Clement Attlee, the new British prime minister, supported Truman and accepted Stalin’s proposal.
The Allies had agreed earlier that Germany should be divided into four zones, administered respectively by the United States, Britain, Soviet Russia, and France, and that all four would share control over Berlin as a fifth zone. Germany would not have a central government, and matters affecting the country as a whole would be decided by the Allied Control Commission. This was in accord with Stalin’s policy of in
sisting that Germany should not be dismembered, but should remain united under the strict control of the four powers.
The Russian demand for reparations had been accepted in principle at Yalta. The special commission set up to examine the subject failed to reach agreement. At Potsdam, Stalin pressed constantly for acceptance of a figure for reparations. The Allies refused to be committed. They were incensed by reports that the Russians were already removing from occupied territories machinery and other property which were not accepted as booty of war. Various practical difficulties forced the Western Allies to abandon their policy of treating the German economy as a whole. New U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes finally proposed that each power should satisfy its reparations claims from its own zone. Some 40 percent of the value of German industrial equipment deemed unnecessary for a peace economy was in the Soviet zone. Byrnes proposed further that 10 percent of such industrial equipment in the western zones should be given to Soviet Russia, who could also request additional equipment from the U.S. and British zones in exchange for food or coal.
Stalin and Molotov argued against this arrangement, although in some ways it was favorable to them because it would lead to the breakup of Germany. In the end, they accepted it as part of a package in which they were conceded the right to collect German assets throughout Eastern Europe, as well as other demands. But their proposal for joint administration of the Ruhr was rejected, and the Western Allies excluded them from their occupation zones. The policy of maintaining Germany as a unit under Allied control collapsed. Germany was divided between east and west.