by Adrian Levy
3. Osama correspondence with Atiyah Abd al-Rahman in 2010 details the complaint from Abu al-Khayr al-Masri and others in Iran to Abu Walid al-Masri, who wrote in an online pamphlet that Al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain fissile and radioactive material ahead of 9/11 had not been serious. Documents recovered from Abbottabad, declassified and released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence [hereafter ODNI] in May 2015, www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf.
4. Abu Zubaydah was referring to his friend, the former emir of Khaldan camp who had been arrested with thirty Arab fighters in Parachinar on December 16, 2001. “The Abu Zubaydah Diaries.”
5. Martinez was identified by Scott Shane, “Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation,” New York Times, June 22, 2008. John Kiriakou, another CIA case officer briefly posted to Pakistan in 2002, was subsequently identified as Shane’s source and convicted for passing classified information to a reporter.
6. “Transcript: bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” CNN International, April 10, 2004.
7. Jason Leopold, “Exclusive: From Hopeful Immigrant to FBI Informant—the Inside Story of the Other Abu Zubaidah,” Truthout, May 29, 2012. Author interviews with Hesham Abu Zubaydah.
8. Author telephone interview with Robert Grenier, March 2015.
9. “I had watched with growing frustration as this master terrorist logistician traveled repeatedly through Pakistan to and from Al Qaeda’s Afghan training camps.” Robert Grenier, 88 Days to Kandahar (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015).
10. Author interview with Shafiq Ghani, Faisalabad, February 2015. Also author interviews with Tajik Sohail Habib, deputy inspector general of police, Faisalabad, February 2015.
11. Author interview with Constable Mubashir, Faisalabad, February 2015.
12. Steve Coll, “The Spy Who Said Too Much,” New Yorker, April 1, 2013.
13. Author interview with Ali Soufan, New York, October 2014.
14. Author interviews in Virginia and Washington, D.C., in October 2014 and February 2015, with five sources who were contracted to work on the renditions program for the CIA, as well as with two serving special agents deputed by the FBI to work with the CIA in those years.
15. “PM Denies Knowledge of Torture: Thailand ‘Didn’t Do It and Was Not Involved,’ ” Bangkok Post, December 19, 2014. The code name Cat’s Eye is mentioned on page 90 of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, July 24, 2014.
16. Ali Soufan, The Black Banners (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
17. This account from author interview with Ali Soufan.
18. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), The Official Senate Report on CIA Torture (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015), 25 [hereafter Senate Torture Report].
19. Section 497 provides, “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case, the wife shall be punishable as an abettor.”
20. Author telephone interviews with Hesham Abu Zubaydah, October 2016.
21. On the basis of Zubaydah’s information, Ghul became a “First Priority Raid Target” with the CIA describing him as a “major support player within the Al Qaeda network.” Senate Torture Report.
22. According to many who served under him and were later interrogated at Guantánamo. Also, Yosri Fouda, who interviewed KSM in Karachi in April 2002; and the second shoe-bomber, Saajid Badat, who gave evidence in a terrorism trial in New York in 2012.
23. See “Gitmo Files: Ramzi bin al-Shibh,” Wikileaks, wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10013. KSM admitted to many plots in his submission to a legal panel at Guantánamo Bay in March 2007. See “Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024,” March 10, 2007, Unclassified: i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/03/14/transcript_ISN10024.pdf.
24. Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, The Hunt for KSM (New York: Little, Brown, 2012).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. Ramzi al-Shibh spoke in beautiful Arabic, extolling the hijackers and quoting liberally from the Koran. Fouda filmed a suitcase of what al-Shibh described as “souvenirs” of the 9/11 attacks, including an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, flight simulator CD-Roms, and a flight instruction book containing hijacker Mohamed Atta’s handwritten notes.
27. Author telephone interviews with Hesham Abu Zubaydah, October 2016. Also Leopold, “Exclusive: From Hopeful Immigrant to FBI Informant—the Inside Story of the Other Abu Zubaidah.”
28. Remarks by the president at Connecticut Republican Committee Luncheon, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Greenwich, Connecticut, April 2002. See georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020409-8.html.
29. Mark Mazzetti, “Bush Aides Linked to Talks on Interrogations,” New York Times, September 24, 2008.
30. Jose A. Rodriguez with Bill Harlow, Hard Measures (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013).
31. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
32. Author interview with Ali Soufan. Also Soufan, The Black Banners.
33. Dr. James Mitchell is referred to by the pseudonym Dr. Grayson Swigert throughout the Senate Torture Report. His report on developing new countermeasures to resistance training is detailed on page 21. Mitchell later confirmed that he was Swigert and that in 2002 he had carried out enhanced interrogations on Abu Zubaydah in an article by Jason Leopold for Vice News, “Psychologist James Mitchell Admits He Waterboarded Al Qaeda Suspects,” December 14, 2014. In Ali Soufan’s book The Black Banners, the psychologist is referred to as Boris. In late 2016, Mitchell published his own account of the program: James E. Mitchell, Ph.D., with Bill Harlow, Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America (New York: Crown, 2016).
34. Author interviews with Dr. James Mitchell, Florida, February 2017.
35. This research took place in the laboratories of Richard Solomon at the University of Pennsylvania and was conducted by graduate students Martin Seligman and Steven Maier. Dr. James Mitchell met Seligman shortly after 9/11. See Maria Konnikova, “Trying to Cure Depression, but Inspiring Torture,” New Yorker, January 14, 2015.
36. Shawn Vestal, “ ‘New Age of Terror’ Has Spokane Link,” Spokesman-Review, December 21, 2014.
37. Soufan, The Black Banners, 394.
38. Jose Rodriguez later told the Office of the Inspector General that “CTC subject matter experts” pointed to intelligence that they said indicated Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting and thus disagreed with the assessment from Detention Site Green that Abu Zubaydah was “compliant.” Senate Torture Report, 41.
39. Soufan, The Black Banners, 394. Mitchell, Enhanced Interrogation.
40. Soufan, The Black Banners, 394.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 396.
44. The Senate Torture Report concluded: “Neither psychologist had any experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa’ida, a background in counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.”
45. Jason Leopold, “I’m Just a Guy Who Got Asked to Do Something for His Country,” Guardian, April 18, 2014. In Leopold’s second article for Vice News, “Psychologi
st James Mitchell Admits He Waterboarded Al Qaeda Suspects,” Mitchell provided “voluminous military evaluation records, dating back decades, that show how he has an extensive background in special operations, hostage negotiations and interrogation training.” See also Mitchell, Enhanced Interrogation.
46. Senate Torture Report, 27.
47. Leopold, “I’m Just a Guy Who Got Asked to Do Something for His Country.” See also Mitchell, Enhanced Interrogation.
48. Wilson Andrews and Alicia Parlapiano, “A History of the CIA’s Secret Interrogation Program,” New York Times, December 9, 2014.
49. Senate Torture Report, 27.
50. Ibid., 27.
51. Ibid., 28.
52. Author interviews with Dr. James Mitchell, Florida, February 2017.
53. Abu Zubaydah’s prison diary was obtained from his lawyer Joseph Margulies, for whom it was declassified. It amplifies the Red Cross file on the prisoner’s treatment and is excerpted here with his full authorization. Author copies.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Senate Torture Report, 29.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Soufan, The Black Banners, 397.
62. Abu Zubaydah’s prison diary.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Soufan, The Black Banners, 400. See also Mitchell, Enhanced Interrogation.
66. Author interview with Ali Soufan.
67. Senate Torture Report, 30.
68. Abu Zubaydah’s prison diary.
69. Dr. Mitchell confirmed to the author that he was the only one not to cover his face. Author interviews, Florida, February 2017.
70. Author interview with General Javed Alam Khan, Rawalpindi, March 2015.
71. Ibid.
72. Grenier left Pakistan in June 2002.
73. Kasra Naji, “Canada Train Plot: Iran’s al-Qaeda Problem,” BBC Persian, April 23, 2013.
74. According to Mahfouz, who visited and assisted the new arrivals.
75. Author interview with Abu Soufiyan, former Jordanian jihadi who fought with Zarqawi and then relocated to Malaysia. Amman, Jordan, December 2016.
76. According to FBI testimony of Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, author copy.
77. Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan,” New Yorker, September 11, 2006.
78. Author interviews with Mahfouz and the online writings of Saif al-Adel.
79. Bill Roggio, “Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, al-Qaeda and Iran,” Long War Journal, June 16, 2005.
80. Author interviews with bin Laden family members.
81. Author interviews with Mahfouz.
82. Abu Walid al-Masri (Mustafa Hamid).
83. Author interviews with bin Laden family members.
84. Hamzah bin Laden letter to his father June 2009. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in May 2015.
85. In June 2002, this heartfelt message appeared on an Al Qaeda supporting website. Quoted in Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
86. Ibid.
87. Author interviews with Mahfouz, who kept in touch with events daily from his Quds Force compound.
88. Five letters of Saif al-Adel, published online and available at www.jihadica.com/al-qa%E2%80%99ida-revisions-the-five-letters-of-sayf-al-%E2%80%98adl/.
89. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Great Terror,” New Yorker, March 25, 2005; Micah Zenko, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 2009. Also see Joel Wing, “Why Didn’t Bush Strike Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam in 2002?” August 30, 2009, musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/why-didnt-bush-strike-zarqawi-and-ansar.html. Author interview with Abu Soufiyan, former Jordanian jihadi who was based with Zarqawi at Khurmal. Amman, Jordan, December 2016.
90. Patrice Taddonio, “The Secret History of ISIS,” Frontline, May 12, 2016.
91. The Iraq war plan was influenced by Goldberg’s piece in the New Yorker, “The Great Terror,” which suggested Saddam and Ansar ul-Islam were cooperating.
92. Author interviews with former CIA analyst Nada Bakos, Seattle, 2014.
93. Saif al-Adel online biography on Zarqawi. Jordanian journalist Fuad Hussein claimed to have been sent this biography of Zarqawi by Saif al-Adel in 2004. He said that over a course of weeks he received forty-two densely handwritten pages of yellow greaseproof paper that were rolled up like cigarettes and smuggled into Jordan via a system of messengers. He incorporated them into a film about Zarqawi called The Next Generation of Al Qaeda that was broadcast by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). Author interviews with Fuad Hussein, Jordan, October 2014. Author copy of the book in English translation and of the LBC documentary.
94. Saif al-Adel, five letters.
95. Author interview in Amman, November 2014, with Yousuf Rabbaba, who was held in prison with Zarqawi in Jordan in the late 1990s and continued to follow his path through mutual friends. Also author interview with Hassan Abu Haniya, Amman, November 2014.
96. Osama letter to Karim (pseudonym for Al Qaeda leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi in Yemen) dated October 18, 2007, castigates him for criticizing Iran, saying it had provided main artery for funds, personnel, and communication. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016. In a passage in his memoir, At the Center of the Storm, former CIA director George Tenet wrote, “In mid-2002 we learned that portions of al Qaeda’s leadership structure had relocated to Iran. This became much more problematic, leading to overtures to Iran and eventually face-to-face discussions with Iranian officials in December 2002 and early 2003. Ultimately, the al Qaeda leaders in Iran were placed under some form of house arrest, although the Iranians refused to deport them to their countries of origin, as we had requested.”
97. Similar sentiments about being an Arab dealing with Iranians were voiced by Nouri al-Malaki, Iraqi prime minister, to Ryan Crocker: “You can’t know what arrogance is until you are an Iraqi Arab forced to take refuge with the Iranians.” Quoted in Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, September 30, 2013.
98. Author interviews with Mahfouz, October 2014.
99. The letter can be read here: www.theblackvault.com/documents/capturediraq/al.pdf.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Author interviews in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, 2014–2015, with Brigadier (Ret.) Shaukat Qadir, who published an account of the Abbottabad operation endorsed by the ISI. The ISI said that it had a photo of Ibrahim Saeed Ahmad before he changed his appearance. See also Shaukat Qadir, Operation Geronimo: The Betrayal and Execution of Osama bin Laden and Its Aftermath (Islamabad: HA Publications, 2012).
103. Author interviews with bin Laden family members, Maryam’s relatives, and Abbottabad Commission report. Al Jazeera Investigation Unit, “Document: Pakistan’s Bin Laden Dossier,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/.
104. Author interview with Clive Stafford Smith, London, January 2017.
105. Olga Craig, “CIA Holds Young Sons of Captured al-Qaeda Chief,”Daily Telegraph, March 9, 2003.
106. According to eyewitness Parvez Rehman. Jason Burke, “Brutal Gunbattle That Crushed 9/11 Terrorists,” Guardian, September 15, 2002.
107. Three days later, the Sunday Times carried a front-page story co-written by Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding that named Khalid Shaikh
Mohammad and Ramzi bin al-Shibh as the masterminds of 9/11. The crucial Part Two of the documentary would be screened on September 12, 2002.
108. Publicly, the Pakistanis tried to seize the upper hand, with the inspector general of Sindh police claiming that one of the dead Arabs had been involved in the murder of Daniel Pearl and that one of the two women taken for questioning was Khalid’s wife. She was now in custody with her young daughter.
109. After studying the pictures of the arrested man, who bore little resemblance to Ramzi al-Shibh, some in the media raised suspicions that he in fact had been captured much earlier. But irrespective of whether the DHA raid had been staged, al-Shibh was now a condemned man. Author interviews with senior Pakistani police official Tariq Pervez, Lahore and Islamabad, 2014–2015.
110. Author interview with Rashid Quereshi, Islamabad, February 2015.
111. Craig, “CIA Holds Young Sons of Captured al-Qaeda Chief.”
112. Spencer Ackerman, “CIA Medical Staff Gave Specifications on How to Torture Post-9/11 Detainees,” Guardian, June 15, 2016.
113. “Newly Released DOJ Memos Offer Support for Account of Torture of KSM’s Children Using Insects,” History Commons Groups, April 17, 2009, hcgroups.wordpress.com/2009/04/17/newly-released-doj-memos-offer-support-for-account-of-torture-of-ksm%E2%80%99s-children-using-insects/.
114. McDermott and Meyer, The Hunt for KSM, 236.
115. Kim Barker, “From Hot Seat to One That’s Even Hotter,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 2005.
116. He was at this time senior director for Southwest Asia, Near East, and North African affairs.
117. Author telephone interviews with Khalilzad, October 2014.
118. Author telephone interviews with Khalilzad, October 2014, and Crocker, December 2014.
119. Ibid.
120. Author interviews with Mahfouz.
121. Mahfouz was assisted by Abd al-Aziz al-Masri and Abu Dujana al-Masri, two explosives experts serving with Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Dujana was a son-in-law of al-Zawahiri.
122. In 1997, Shihata had traveled to Dagestan to secure the release of Dr. al-Zawahiri from Russian detention, an episode during which some claim al-Zawahiri had been recruited by the Russian security services to direct Al Qaeda’s future attacks against America.