by Adrian Levy
13. Declan Walsh, “CIA Chief in Pakistan Leaves after Drone Trial Blows His Cover,” Guardian, December 17, 2010.
14. Greg Miller, “After Presiding over bin Laden Raid, CIA Chief in Pakistan Came Home Suspecting He Was Poisoned by ISI,” Washington Post, May 5, 2016.
15. Peter Bergen, Manhunt (London: Bodley Head, 2012); Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo’ ”; and Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden.”
16. Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Spy, Military Ties Aided bin Laden Raid,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011.
17. Press Statement, Sean McCormack, “Rewards for Justice: The Bali Bombings,” U.S. Department of State, October 6, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/54377.htm.
18. Author interviews with General Athar Abbas, Rawalpindi, 2014–2015.
19. Miller, “After Presiding over Bin Laden Raid, CIA Chief in Pakistan Came Home Suspecting He Was Poisoned by ISI.”
20. Raymond Davis was not linked to any of the cases lodged against the company.
21. Steve Inskeep, Morning Edition interview with Admiral Mike Mullen, National Public Radio, September 28, 2011.
22. Author telephone interviews in July 2016 with Mansoor Ijaz, a former friend of Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani, who as ambassador was accused of issuing up to two thousand visas without authorization from Islamabad. Ijaz was well known by National Security Advisor James L. Jones and senior U.S. military, political, and intelligence figures. Ijaz claimed that a flood of U.S. contractors had entered the country before May 2011 with all their visas processed by Ambassador Haqqani.
23. General Pasha expressed this sentiment to the Abbottabad Commission. Abbottabad Commission report, Al Jazeera Investigation Unit, “Document: Pakistan’s Bin Laden Dossier,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/.
24. Kamran Bokhari e-mail to Fred Burton at Stratfor in which he describes detailed conversation with General Pasha around this time; see “The Global Intelligence Files,” Wikileaks, wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/16/1664671_re-alpha-insight-afghanistan-pakistan-isi-chief-not-for.html.
25. His comments about the police and legal system of Pakistan are from the Abbottabad Commission report.
26. Mark Mazzetti, “How a Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States,” New York Times Magazine, April 9, 2013.
27. Declan Walsh and Ewen MacAskill, “American Who Sparked Diplomatic Crisis over Shooting Was CIA Spy,” Guardian, February 20, 2011.
28. Osama to Khairiah, February 1, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016. Also another letter from Osama to Khairiah dated February 5, 2011, released in March 2016.
29. Ibid.
30. She gave this date in a letter to Umm Abd al-Rahman, February 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
31. Osama to Khairiah, February 1, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
32. Author interviews with bin Laden family members.
33. Khairiah to Umm Abd al-Rahman, February 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
34. Seham invited Khairiah to take up residence in the best bedroom on the second floor overlooking the fields beyond the compound. To make room, Seham moved her clothes into a wardrobe in the Sheikh’s media studio on the third floor. The ISI claimed Seham collected her clothes from this room when the family was taken into ISI custody on the morning of May 2, 2011.
35. Atiyah confirmed he had sent it in a letter to Osama that was declassified in preparation for Anas al-Libi’s trial, Govt Exhibit 431, reference 10-CR-019 (S-4) (RJD).
36. A letter from Osama to Hamzah claimed that Mohammed was to enroll in a course in Qatar to study strategic sciences, sociology, and psychology. However, according to author interviews with bin Laden family members, none of the sons took up degree courses. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in May 2015.
37. Osama to Hamzah, January/February 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
38. Hamzah (Abu Ma’adh) to “Father,” January 8, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
39. Ibid. Two days after his mother left for Abbottabad.
40. Ibid. There was also Daood’s silver ring that had been set aside for Khadija’s oldest son, Abdallah, along with two iPods, one of which was to go to Abdallah’s younger brother, Osama. Saad’s last possessions—a few clothes, family photographs, and his most recent pictures, taken after he arrived in Waziristan—were also there.
41. Undated draft speech that referenced the Arab Spring of 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
42. Atiyah to Osama, April 5, 2011, declassified for the Anas al-Libi trial: Govt exhibit 431, 10-CR-019 (S-4) (RJD).
43. This attack would take place on May 22 in retribution for Osama’s killing.
44. Hamzah (Abu Ma’adh) to “Father,” January 8, 2011.
45. “It isn’t a good thing for us to remain fully occupied with the Afghanistan front.” Instead, Al Qaeda should respond to the “Muslim nation’s revolution.” To that end Atiyah should be getting packing. Undated letter from Osama to Atiyah, but it is clear from the content that it was written during the spring of 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in May 2015.
46. Bergen, Manhunt; and Bowden, The Finish (New York: Grove Press, 2012).
47. Ibid. “To develop courses of action to bring justice to Osama bin Laden.”
48. Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden”; and Bergen, Manhunt.
49. General Pasha allegedly spoke to Kamran Bokhari about the Davis affair, telling him: “Once it became a media issue we were really worried that Davis might be killed by people from within the police service.” See Bokhari’s e-mail to Fred Burton at Stratfor in Wikileaks, “The Global Intelligence Files.”
50. Author interviews with former close colleagues of General Pasha.
51. Husain Haqqani came up with the blood money idea and suggested it to Pasha after first running it past the U.S. State Department, per author telephone interview with Haqqani, August 2016.
52. M. Ilyas Khan, “CIA Contractor Ray Davis Free over Pakistan Killings,” BBC News, March 16, 2011.
53. Mazzetti, “How a Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States.” Also Pasha to Bokhari: “We wanted Davis gone and as soon as possible and thankfully we were able to pull it off.” He also wanted to set the record straight when it came to the men Davis had killed. “They were not ISI sleuths as some suspect,” he told Bokhari. “Rather, low-level thugs who had a lot of cash on them and in different currencies.” Bokhari e-mail to Fred Burton at Stratfor in Wikileaks, “The Global Intelligence Files.”
54. Extracted from General Pasha’s statement to the Abbottabad Commission.
55. Bokhari e-mail to Fred Burton at Stratfor in Wikileaks, “The Global Intelligence Files.”
56. “ISI Chief Visits Washington in Patch-up Trip,” Reuters, April 11, 2011.
57. Miller, “After Presiding over Bin Laden Raid, CIA Chief in Pakistan Came Home Suspecting He Was Poisoned by ISI.” Dexter Filkins said the quote was a “slap in the face” in his piece for the New Yorker on the killing of Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Journalist and the Spies,” September 19, 2011.
58. Salman Masood and Pir Zubair Shah, “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan,” New York Times, March 17, 2011.
59. AFP, “White House Report: Pakistan Has No Clear Plans to Defeat Militants,” Express Tribune (Pakistan), April 7, 2011.
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�60. For details of General Pasha’s and Kayani’s movements in the weeks preceeding the raid, see Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US Broke Deal with Osama Hit,” Asia Times Online, May 12, 2011. General Kayani held a meeting with General David Petraeus, the U.S. top commander in Afghanistan. Pasha flew on to Paris, where he held talks with the Agha Khan, the spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaili community of Pakistan, and then to Turkey, where he met President Zardari, who was on an official visit.
61. Munter was addressing a meeting at the Institute of Strategic Studies, a Pakistani think tank. “We can’t afford to cut and run,” he said, addressing fears that the United States would abandon the region. Munter said a new era was coming. “If we agree that there is a terrorist threat to the mainstream life in this country, we need to talk more openly and more freely about the ways in which we can cooperate together to address that threat,” he said. “ISI Chief Visits Washington in Patch-up Trip.”
62. Osama watched all comings and goings from the upstairs windows of the house, according to bin Laden family members.
63. Atiyah to Osama, April 5, 2011, declassified for the Anas al-Libi trial: Govt exhibit 431, 10-CR-019 (S-4) (RJD).
64. Ibid. Atiyah had been unable to stop Hamzah but had spoken to him briefly: “I emphasized the need to be safe, to avoid going out, moving around, or doing anything that might expose him to danger.”
65. Ibid. He was referring to the trusted brother Abdullah al-Sindi, who was named as a terrorist by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2013, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2144.aspx. Al-Sindi, whose real name was Umar Siddique Kathio Azmarai, was a linchpin for Al Qaeda in Balochistan and Sindh. He had worked for Khalid Shaikh Mohammad as far back as 1999 and had helped secure arrangements for Osama’s family when they fled to Karachi after 9/11. He and Saad had become close around this time, and in 2008 when Saad finally crossed the border into Balochistan, he had sought out al-Sindi once again. In more recent times, al-Sindi had helped Khairiah and then Hamzah and his family, securing their passage through Balochistan. As soon as Atiyah received al-Sindi’s new cell phone numbers he planned to send Hamzah into his care. Al-Sindi’s brother-in-law had recently been arrested in Karachi by the ISI, but Atiyah saw that only as a remote problem. Over more than a decade, al-Sindi had demonstrated his dedication to Sheikh Osama’s family. He was currently looking after Hamzah’s brother-in-law, a son of Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, who was married to one of Abu Mohammed al-Masri’s daughters and who had recently arrived in Balochistan with his family from Iran. Hamzah’s wife, Maryam, was another of Abu Mohammed al-Masri’s daughters. Also released from Iran at this time were Abu al-Samah al-Masri, Abdullah Rajab (formerly Abu al-Ward), and Abu Malik al-Libi.
66. Khairiah to Umm Mu’ad (Hamzah’s wife, Maryam), undated but almost certainly March or April 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
67. Ibid. “I yearn for the beautiful days I spent with you, especially during travel,” Khairiah said, describing her daughter-in-law as “the best companion” and asking for news of Maryam’s two small children. Now that the prospect of being reunited with them was taking shape, everyone in Abbottabad was excited.
68. This account is based on multiple sources, including author interviews with Afridi’s lawyers, interviews with the nurses who accompanied him, telephone interviews with former ambassador Husain Haqqani, contemporary news reports, and the unpublished findings of the Abbottabad Commission.
69. While Dr. Afridi must have suspected some skulduggery and was probably told the bare bones of the operation, he almost certainly had no idea that the actual target of his surveillance was Osama bin Laden.
70. Miss Shaheena was the supervisor.
71. Matthieu Aikens, “The Doctor, the CIA, and the Blood of Bin Laden,” GQ, December 19, 2012.
72. Press Trust of India, “Osama bin Laden’s Neighbour Released after Questioning,” NDTV, May 8, 2011.
73. Osama to Mohammed Aslam, April 22, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
74. Gina Bennett’s website gives links to all her interviews: www.nationalsecuritymom.com/media.html.
75. Maureen Dowd, “Good Riddance, Carrie Mathison,” New York Times, April 4, 2015.
76. Author copy of SSE booklet, recovered from the compound by neighbors after the raid.
77. Despite a claim by the ISI that they had one as far back as 2003, supposedly showing him with long hair and a beard. This claim is made by Shaukat Qadir in Operation Geronimo: The Betrayal and Execution of Osama bin Laden and Its Aftermath (Islamabad: HA Publications, 2012).
78. Ibrahim’s father, Ahmad Said, was listed as deceased, while Hamida, his mother, was listed as living in Kuwait.
79. NSC meetings were on March 14, March 29, April 12, April 19, and April 28. Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo’ ”; and Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden.”
80. Bronstein, “The Shooter.”
81. From Mark Owen [pen name of Matthew Bissonnette] and Kevin Maurer, No Easy Day (New York: Dutton, 2012).
82. Ibid.
83. Robert O’Neill interview on Fox News, November 2014.
84. “Military Has Broken Taliban’s Back: Kayani,” Express Tribune (Pakistan), April 24, 2011.
85. Osama to Atiyah, April 26, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in May 2015. This approach was to Libyan Fighting Group brothers in London, almost certainly including Noman Benotman, and Atiyah had previously written about it in a letter to Osama dated April 5, 2011, declassified for the Anas al-Libi trial: Govt exhibit 431, 10-CR-019 (S-4) (RJD).
86. There was also a message for Mohammed, his son who had crossed over from Iran around the same time. Before going to Qatar, he should meet up with his mother, Najwa, and siblings and take them along “until the situation is resolved.” If they could not get into Qatar, they should try Saudi Arabia.
87. Abdullah al-Sindi.
88. Khalid to Hamzah, April 26, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
89. Khalid to Abdullah al-Sindi, April 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
90. Seham to Umm Abd al-Rahman, April 26, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
91. Osama to Atiyah, April 26, 2011. ODNI documents, Abbottabad, released in March 2016.
92. Author interviews with Maryam’s family members.
93. They were being taken to Peshawar, where they were to lodge with Mohammed Aslam.
94. Thomas Donilon, John Brennan, and Denis McDonough, and chief of staff Bill Daley.
95. Mark Bowden, The Finish.
96. This time frame was based on fuel consumption and the possible response time from the Pakistanis.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
1. From the Twitter account of Abbottabad resident Sohaib Athar, twitter.com/ReallyVirtual?ref_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author.
2. This account of the killing takes in multiple sources: Amal’s testimony to the Abbottabad Commission, Al Jazeera Investigation Unit, “Document: Pakistan’s Bin Laden Dossier,” Al Jazeera, July 8, 2013, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/. Also Maryam’s testimony to the Abbottabad Commission; author interviews with Ibrahim Saeed Ahmad’s family members, Samirah Abdullah (widow of Abdullah Azzam who later visited Osama’s widows), and bin Laden family members; Robert O’Neill’s account in Phil Bronstein, “The Shooter,” Esquire, March 2013; Matt Bissonnette’s version in No Easy Day (New York: Dutton, 2012); the ISI version as told to Shaukat Qadir in Operation Geronimo: The Betrayal and Execution of Osama bin Laden and Its Aftermath (Islamabad: HA Publications, 2012);
and eyewitness statements from those who went into the house on that night.
3. Mark Bowden and Nicholas Schmidle say CIA operatives on the ground arranged this. @ReallyVirtual says electricity didn’t come back on until six A.M on May 2.
4. Admiral McRaven had estimated that the Black Hawk’s rotors would become audible about two minutes before their arrival, so his estimation matched Amal’s recall.
5. Author interviews with Amal’s brother Zakariya al-Sadeh, Islamabad, February 2012, plus description given by Bissonnette, who was in the helicopter.
6. As can be seen in the photograph taken at that very moment by White House photographer Pete Souza.
7. Several firsthand accounts are given in Mark Bowden, The Finish (New York: Grove Press, 2012), and Peter Bergen, Manhunt (London: Bodley Head, 2012).
8. Mark Bowden, “The Hunt for ‘Geronimo,’ ” Vanity Fair, November 2012.
9. Phil Bronstein, “The Shooter,” Esquire, March 2013. Also Robert O’Neill’s multiple TV interviews and speeches, many available at www.robertjoneill.com/RobertJONeill_News.html.
10. Harry McCracken, “SXSW: The Man Who Live-Tweeted the Bin Laden Raid,” Time, March 11, 2012.
11. Author interviews with bin Laden family members, plus accounts given by Robert O’Neill and Matthew Bissonnette.
12. A Delta Force: Extreme 2 video game guide was found by the SEALs in the compound. See “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf, Documents Probably Used by Other Compound Residents,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov/index.php/resources/bin-laden-bookshelf?start=12.
13. Mark Owen [pen name of Matthew Bissonnette] and Kevin Maurer, No Easy Day (New York: Dutton, 2012).
14. Ibid.
15. This account was drawn from the recollections of O’Neill and Bissonnette.
16. Owen and Maurer, No Easy Day; also “SEAL’s Firsthand Account of bin Laden Killing,” 60 Minutes, September 24, 2012.