Perhaps the most useful outcome of the Grenville-Lane colonization effort was the realization that the inlets near Roanoke were inadequate for a permanent, thriving settlement. The inlets there were too shallow or narrow to allow access to the sounds by vessels any larger than a pinnace, making it difficult and time-consuming to transport supplies and material to and from larger ships which had to remain anchored offshore. Lane made several complaints about “our bad harborow” and the need for “a better harborough then yet there is.” He also concluded that the better harbor “must be to the Northward.”29
Based on the reports of the 1585–86 Grenville/Lane expedition, therefore, future colonization plans shifted northward to the Chesapeake Bay. Once again Raleigh sought the advice of his friend, Richard Hakluyt, who replied, “If yow proceed, which I longe much to knowe, in yor enterprise of Virginia, yor best planting wilbe about the bay of Chesepians.”30
The stage was now set for Raleigh’s 1587 colonization venture.
2
Planning the Cittie of Ralegh
July 27, 1586–July 22, 1587
For all the expense and effort Raleigh had committed to colonization over the previous two years, the results were rather disappointing. Roanoke proved to be an inadequate location for either a thriving colony or a base for exploration, which had turned up neither any precious metals nor a passage to the Orient. The Indians were now openly hostile to the English, and the first colony, established with great expectations, had been unexpectedly abandoned. Grenville’s resupply ships, with additional settlers intended to expand the colony, had gotten a late start and arrived at Roanoke only to find that the entire colony had already left, and so they returned to England. All that remained of Raleigh’s grand plan at Roanoke was the small contingent Grenville had left to preserve Raleigh’s claim. To make matters worse, on July 27 Ralph Lane and the first colonists arrived back in England, and they brought with them troubling stories about their difficult experiences in Virginia. The spread of these pessimistic accounts, particularly by those who had actually been to Virginia, could only dissuade prospective investors and dampen future colonist enlistment.
Harriot had apparently already started work on “a discourse by it selfe in maner of a Chronicle” concerning “the naturall inhabitants, their natures and maners.” This work, he wrote, “when time shall be thought conuenient, shall be also published,”1 but no copies of this earlier “Chronicle” are known to exist. Instead Harriot turned his attention to the publication of his A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia, probably written in large part to dispel the negative stories being circulated at the time. Although A brief and true report is considered today to be the first and most influential work about North America, it still can easily be read, at least in part, as damage control for Raleigh.
Harriot tells his readers that the report was undertaken at the request of “some [of] my particular friends,” Raleigh no doubt the most prominent and eager among them. After addressing his report “To the Aduenturers, Fauourers, and Welwillers of the enterprise for the inhabiting and planting in Virginia,” he moved quickly to deflect the rumors and “diuers and variable reports with some slanderous and shameful speeches bruted abroad by many that returned from thence: especially of that discouery which was made by the Colony transported by Sir Richard Grinuile in the yere 1585.” Those reports, he continued, “haue not done a little wrong to many that otherwise would haue also fauoured and aduentured in the action.”2
Harriot’s brief and true report, however, was neither very brief—some 13,000 words—nor completely true, particularly in his portrayal of “the nature and maners of the people,” especially considering the state of affairs that existed by the summer of 1586. Harriot assured prospective colonists that if they were worried about the natives resisting “our inhabiting and planting, [they] are not to be feared, but that they shall haue cause both to feare and loue vs, that shall inhabite with them.” Besides, he wrote,
neither haue they any thing to defend themselues but targets made of barkes, and some armours made of sticks wickered together with thread…. If there fall out any warres betweene vs and them…, the turning vp of their heeles against vs in running away was their best defence … it is probable that they should desire our friendship and loue, and haue the greater respect for pleasing and obeying vs.3
Harriot mentioned Wingina twice, but in sharp contrast with Lane’s assessment of him. To Lane, Wingina/Pemisapan was a scheming savage who continually plotted to destroy the English, but for Harriot, Wingina was submissive to the English and was in awe of their god-like powers. He wrote, “Twise this Wiroans [Wingina] was so grieuously sicke … and thinking hee was in such danger for offending vs and thereby our God, sent for some of vs to pray and bee a meanes to our God that it would please him either that he might liue, or after death dwell with him in blisse.” And then again, “some of the inhabitants which were our friends, and especially the Wiroans Wingina,” believed, as previously mentioned, that the sickness which struck several villages “was the worke of our God through our meanes, and that we by him might kill and slay whom we would without weapons, and not come neere them.”4
Harriot neglected to mention the fact that Wingina/Pemisapan had been beheaded by one of Lane’s men, or the events that led up to it, but he did admit that “some of our company … shewed themselues too fierce in slaying some of the people in some Townes, vpon causes that on our part might easily ynough haue bene borne withall.” However, he wrote, the killing was “iustly deserued…. And whatsoever els they [the Indians] may be, by carefulnesse of our selues neede nothing at all to be feared.”
Harriot concluded his report with more encouragement to prospective colonists and Raleigh’s generous promise of vast acreage for every man who enlisted in the venture:
Seeing therefore the aire there is so temperate and holsome, the soyle so fertile, and yeelding such commodities, as I haue before mentioned, the also thither to and fro being sufficiently experimented to be performed twise a yeere with ease, and at any season thereof: And the dealing of Sir Walter Ralegh so liberall in large giuing and granting land there, as is already knowen, with many helpes and furtherances else: (The least that he hath granted hath bene fiue hundreth acres to a man onely for the aduenture of his person) I hope there remaines no cause whereby the action should be misliked.5
Whether or not Harriot’s brief and true report had an immediate effect or any at all is not known, but plans were certainly under way towards the end of 1586 to send out another colony the following year. Recruitments for the new colony seem to have come mostly from densely populated London,6 where the prospect of 500 acres would have been particularly enticing. The promised acreage also affirms Raleigh’s intent that the main industry of the new colony would be agriculture. Harriot had listed the wide variety of “merchantable commodities” which could be grown in abundance in Virginia. Unlike the earlier 1585–86 colony, made up mostly of military men who became dependent upon the native Indians for sustenance, which in turn added to the friction between them, the new colony would have a completely different composition and purpose. The 1587 colony was designed and planned for agricultural self-sufficiency, and for the first time included women and children, essential elements for a permanent colony.
As mentioned previously, by 1586 it was clear that Roanoke itself was not only ill-suited for a large, permanent colony, but that the inlets at the Outer Banks at Roanoke did not provide adequate access by anything larger than a pinnace. Lane’s colony did not accomplish much, but it had at least determined that a far “better harborough” was to be found “to the Northward.” The new 1587 colony, therefore, was intended to be situated on the mainland somewhere beyond the broad and deep-channel entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Lane had also indicated, however, that lacking the availability of precious metals or access to the Orient, there was no justification for establishing a colony anywhere. A healthy climate and fertile soil were not enough. A
viable colony, according to Lane and certainly investors, required monetary justification and the likelihood of profit. An agricultural-based colony would provide self-sufficiency, but not enough profit potential.
It is probable, then, that Raleigh saw the 1587 colony as just the first step in an expanding enterprise which would eventually include a base for the most profitable of all enterprises: privateering. As Quinn noted, Sir George Carey’s unexplained association with the 1587 colony may have originated from his hope to use the Chesapeake as a future safe harbor for his privateering ventures. Cary, a well-known promoter of privateering ventures, sent out a small three-vessel fleet in early 1587 and, as Quinn suggested, may have intended to stop at the new settlement at the Chesapeake and test its viability as a base for privateering.7
As unsuitable as Roanoke was, however, it does not seem to have been eliminated from Raleigh’s future plans. His directions for the 1587 voyage included a stop at Roanoke, “to finde those fifteene Englishmen, which Sir Richard Grinuile had left there the yeere before, with whom he meant to haue conference, concerning the state of the Countrey, and Sauages.” Furthermore, a ceremony was to occur at Roanoke whereby the loyal Croatoan, Manteo, “by the commandement of Sir Walter Ralegh, was [to be] christened in Roanoak, and called Lord thereof, and of Dasamonguepeuk, in reward of his faithfull seruices.”8 There would be no need to consult with the fifteen Englishmen “about the state of the Countrey, and Sauages” if Roanoke had no place in Raleigh’s future plans. Manteo’s christening and title conferral are also significant. Manteo would become the first native Indian to have an official English title, and would oversee both Roanoke and Dasamonguepeuk, the previous realm of Wingina/Pemisapan. Manteo, therefore, would hold the status of Raleigh’s assignee, as sanctioned by the 1583 royal charter. It is clear that the primary colony was to be located at the Chesapeake, and it seems that Roanoke was intended to be a unique satellite entity of sorts, perhaps a protectorate of the Chesapeake colony, which, if all went according to plan, would eventually have the military presence of privateers. The Roanoke-Dasamonguepeuk “colony” was to be ruled by a thoroughly anglicized Indian, who, it was hoped, could consolidate the neighboring tribes in Raleigh’s name and thereby tighten Raleigh’s grip on the New World.
The primary colony at the Chesapeake was to be named the “Cittie of Ralegh” and would be governed by John White, the artist and cartographer, a seemingly odd choice, and whose leadership qualities would not be particularly evident in the months ahead. White, though, had at least explored the Chesapeake with Harriot the previous year and was enthusiastic enough about the new venture to include his pregnant daughter Elyoner and son-in-law Ananias Dare. A group of twelve “Assistants” would help White in the organization and governance of the colony, although several of them would remain in England presumably to represent the colony’s interests. Very little is known about these assistants. One of them was White’s son-in law, Ananias Dare, and another was Dyonis Harvie, who was probably the husband of the pregnant Margery Harvie, who would give birth to a child the day after White’s daughter. It seems that the Assistants had invested more heavily, at least on a personal level, in the 1587 venture. Simon Fernandez, the well-known master pilot who had guided the previous Roanoke voyages, was also one of the Assistants.
Hakluyt wrote that Raleigh “prepared a newe Colonie of one hundred and fiftie men to be sent thither,” but his list of “The names of all the men, women and children, which safely arriued in Virginia, and remained to inhabite there” totals just 117, made up of ninety-one men, seventeen women, and nine children. Hakluyt’s list, however, contains a few names like Simon Fernandez and John White, both of whom certainly did not remain “to inhabite there.” It is possible that the rest of the 150 either changed their minds or would have been among the additional colonists who were scheduled to join the original settlers once the colony had been established.
The 1587 fleet consisted of three ships. The flagship was the 120 tun Lyon commanded by John White, with Simon Fernandez as master pilot. The two other vessels were an unnamed “flyboat” under the command of Edward Spicer, and an unnamed pinnace with Edward Stafford in command. Flyboats were generally used to transport cargo and could have a capacity of up to 150 tuns.9 The unnamed pinnace was a smaller vessel, probably about 30 tuns, as will be seen in a later chapter, with a shallow draft barely capable of navigating the main inlet at Roanoke. The fleet departed from England most likely with 11810 settlers, and the native Croatoan, Manteo, on May 8, 1587, with high hopes of establishing the Cittie of Ralegh on Chesapeake Bay.
By June 19 the Lyon arrived at the island of Dominica, the first landfall in the Caribbean after crossing the Atlantic and a traditional rendezvous location. On July 22 they arrived at the Hatorask inlet off Roanoke, where they anchored and sent the pinnace on to the island in order to confer with the contingent of men Grenville had left the year before, after which—according to White—they meant “to returne againe to the fleete, and passe along the coast, to the Bay of Chesepiok where we intended to make our seate and forte, according to the charge giuen us among other directions in writing, vnder the hande of Sir Walter Ralegh.”11
That last short leg of the voyage from Roanoke to the Chesapeake would never happen.
3
Simon Fernandez and the Aborted Chesapeake Plan
July 22–August 27, 1587
The First Institutionalized Assumption
The only version we have of what happened on July 22, or for that matter the two months preceding the arrival of the Lyon and the pinnace at Roanoke, is John White’s problematic account of the voyage. What is certain is that at some point during the voyage ship’s master Simon Fernandez1 aborted the original plan and decided to deposit the colony at Roanoke instead of proceeding to the originally intended destination at the Chesapeake Bay. Because of this decision, Fernandez has emerged as the most reviled of all the principal characters who participated in the Roanoke voyages. It is generally held today that Simon Fernandez was at best a thoroughly incompetent master pilot and at worst a villainous character who either plotted to sabotage the voyage or simply abandoned the colony at Roanoke in order to pursue his own selfish interests. Such critical views of Fernandez have been readily adopted by authors and historians, more recently by Lee Miller, who proposed that Fernandez was the key player in a grand scheme designed by Sir Francis Walsingham, the queen’s Principal Secretary of State, to sabotage Raleigh’s 1587 colonization effort.2
The long-standing view of Fernandez as villain is based entirely on the aforementioned account of John White, who displayed a deep, personal dislike for the man. White’s account—composed and edited after his return to England and clearly biased—rarely missed an opportunity to complain about Fernandez’s activities during the voyage, accusing him of incompetence, deceit, negligence, and even blasphemy when “he suddenly began to sweare, and teare God in pieces.”3
Simon Fernandez was certainly not without his faults. He was apparently arrogant and headstrong, but so were most of the leading adventurers of his day. Fernandez had also been a pirate, but so were virtually all the English sea captains who engaged—as Fernandez did—in piracy under the guise of privateering. His rough language and manner may have alienated some with more refined sensibilities, like the artist John White, but rough language and factionalism aboard ships on extended voyages were commonplace. Furthermore, such divided loyalties were not just confined to the coarser sort. It was very evident during the 1585 voyage, during which Grenville and Lane were often at odds and each had his own followers and supporters. As mentioned, between 1578 and 1579 dissention aboard Gilbert’s ships had constantly plagued his efforts to reach Newfoundland.
White’s derogatory depiction of Fernandez has not only persisted to this day, but has also inadvertently contributed to many of the misinformed theories which have been promoted concerning the relocation and fate of the 1587 “lost” colony. It is proposed here that the view of master pi
lot Simon Fernandez as a villain, who, through intention or neglect, was directly responsible for the failure of the 1587 colony is a myth. And because that negative view of Fernandez has been taken for granted for so long, it represents the first of the four flawed institutionalized assumptions identified in the Introduction. The body of evidence presented below will suggest that the universal condemnation of Simon Fernandez has been fundamentally mistaken, and that he had, in fact, good reason to alter the colony’s destination. If that is the case, all the traditional assumptions about the condition, activities, and location of the 1587 colonists—based on the false narrative about Fernandez—must be reevaluated.
First, then, who was this supposedly villainous character, Simon Fernandez, and what was his involvement in the English colonization effort?
Fernandez, a Portuguese by birth, was first recorded in English service in 1574 as pilot of the Elephant, a ship owned in part by Queen Elizabeth’s cousin, Henry Knollys, and commanded by the well-known pirate, John Challice. The following year Fernandez purchased a small vessel and joined Challice in attacking both Spanish and Portuguese shipping in the Atlantic. Although Queen Elizabeth unofficially approved of these privateering activities, Fernandez was arrested for piracy as a result of strenuous protests by the Portuguese ambassador and brought to London for trial. Possibly due to political influence exerted on his behalf, Fernandez was acquitted and released in 1577.4
Fernandez soon entered the service of Sir Francis Walsingham, the queen’s Principal Secretary of State and an ardent proponent of English colonization in America. Walsingham knew that Fernandez would be an extremely valuable asset to the English colonization effort. Prior to severing relations with Spain, Fernandez had piloted Spanish ships to America between 1561 and 1573, and probably discovered the inlet near Roanoke Island originally called Port Fernando, which bore his name. He may also have been the pilot on the unsuccessful 1566 expedition, when Florida Governor Pedro Menéndez de Aviles first attempted to send the captive Indian Paquiquineo and two Dominican friars to the Bahia de Santa Maria (Chesapeake Bay).5 The pilot and master of the ship La Trinidad on that voyage was a Domingo Fernandez, who “was considered one of the two most knowledgeable pilots for the east coast of North America.”6 It is possible that, when Fernandez later cut his ties with Spain, he may have left his given name behind as well. During this time Fernandez would have had detailed information about the Padrón Real, a confidential map used by Spanish pilots on ocean-going ships. Walsingham understood that Fernandez not only had first-hand knowledge of Spanish charts and shipping routes, but was also more familiar with the North American Atlantic coast than any other pilot in England at that time. His only known surviving map is one dated 1580 that he lent to mathematician-astrologer John Dee, an advisor to Queen Elizabeth and proponent of England’s colonization of the New World.7
The Lost Colony of Roanoke Page 4