To resolve the problem at Bermuda it was finally agreed that they would build two pinnaces, the aptly named Deliverance and Patience, which eventually transported about 140 of the castaways to Jamestown (several had died at Bermuda and a few were intentionally left behind). The construction of the Deliverance in particular was an extraordinary feat. She was reported to have a capacity of 70 to 80 tuns and, with a keel of 40 feet and a beam of 19 feet, was nearly half the length of the Sea Venture. The Patience was smaller, with a keel of 29 feet and a beam of about 15 feet.13 Both vessels made the 600 mile voyage to Jamestown in about three weeks without incident. Fortunately for the castaways at Bermuda, they had access to the wrecked Sea Venture, which they dismantled. The oak beams, sails, rigging, and some of the oak boards from the Sea Venture were all salvaged and reused for the construction of the Deliverance. Ropes from the wreck were shredded, pounded into the seams, and covered with the pitch and tar from the barrels which were also recovered. The smaller Patience was constructed entirely of native wood, mostly cedar, using wooden pegs and perhaps part of the rigging and sails from the Sea Venture.
Were the 1587 colonists capable of building a similar sea-worthy vessel? On the plus side timber was plentiful, and we know from White’s accounts that there must have been carpenters and sawyers among the colonists, because the dwellings left by Lane’s colony the previous year were repaired by the colonists in 1587 and new ones were constructed. We also know that they subsequently erected “a high palisado of great trees, with cortynes and flankers very Fortlike” around the settlement at Roanoke. It is not known for certain whether the colonists had a shipwright among them, a specialized carpenter with shipbuilding and repair capabilities. However, in addition to the “expert seamen” listed by Hakluyt in his 1584 Discourse of Western Planting, he also instructed that colonization voyages be equipped with “shipwrights in some number to be employed on the timber. Oarmakers, and makers of cable and cordage.” Given the fact that a seaworthy pinnace and crew were left with the 1587 colony, it is more than likely that a shipwright was among them as well.
Somewhat more problematic would have been the availability of essential shipbuilding materials—cables, lines, and sails for the rigging as well as oakum, tar, and pitch for caulking—which were available to both Grenville’s fleet and, to some extent, the castaways at Bermuda. The pinnace that was left with the colony was intended to be utilized for local navigation and exploration, but a solo trans-ocean voyage was probably not anticipated. Nevertheless, the pinnace would have been supplied with some spare rigging and maintenance material, and they probably had the “makers of cable and cordage” whom Hakluyt had recommended. Oak and cedar were certainly plentiful, as was pine, from which a tar-resin could be made. The inexperienced Frenchmen at Charlesfort had sealed the seams of their clumsy vessel with pine resin and Spanish moss. As mentioned, the Patience was constructed entirely of native Bermudian lumber and held together with wood pegs.
There was another important factor to consider: the route. When White failed to return in 1588, the colonists understood, of course, that they were now isolated and cut off from England, but their most pressing objective would have been to reestablish contact with English ships, not necessarily with England per se. A return Roanoke-to-England voyage following the circuitous southern route across the Atlantic by way of the Caribbean would not only be long and arduous, but it would also risk exposure to the Spanish, whom the colonists likely blamed for White’s failure to return. Direct voyages to the east across the Atlantic were not yet commonplace, and a 3,500 mile voyage due east would have been seen as extremely risky. There was a shorter and safer way to contact English ships. About 1,200 miles to the north of Croatoan were England’s long-established cod fishing waters. A pinnace—or two—could reach those fishing routes in perhaps six weeks.
A northern heading to the cod fisheries would have had a number of advantages. In the first place it would keep the vessel or vessels close enough to the Atlantic coast to search out a safe harbor in case of bad weather and also provide access to fresh water and provisions. Secondly, it would virtually eliminate any chance of discovery by Spanish ships on patrol from St. Augustine, and also preclude a dangerous trip through the Spanish Caribbean. Thirdly, English ships had been frequenting the well-known and well-established fishing routes near Newfoundland for many decades. The English had been engaged in North Atlantic cod fishing since shortly after Cabot’s discovery of “new founde land” in 1497, and that territory had become an English possession in 1583 when Raleigh’s half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, claimed the land in the name of Queen Elizabeth. The colonists would have been well aware of the annual English activity to the north. Finally, the shorter voyage along the accessible coast would require less cargo space for provisions and correspondingly more room for colonists. A single 30 to 35 tun pinnace could carry more than forty persons and limited provisions on such a voyage.
Bideford was the primary English port engaged in fishing the Newfoundland waters from the 16th to the mid–18th centuries.14 This is particularly noteworthy because from 1585 to 1588 both Bideford and its renowned resident, Sir Richard Grenville, were deeply involved with the Roanoke voyages. Grenville, of course, led the 1585 voyage to Roanoke and in 1586 sailed from Bideford to resupply the colony. Grenville also had a hand in recruiting colonists both in London and Bideford for the 1587 voyage. Given Bideford’s strong association with the Newfoundland fisheries as well as Grenville’s prominent role in the colonization effort, it seems certain that a great many of the 1587 colonists, and certainly the Bideford crew members among them, would have been very familiar with these Newfoundland fisheries to the north.
Furthermore, a number of voyages had already been made from the vicinity of Roanoke to Newfoundland. George Raymond, captain of the Red Lion and part of the Grenville-Lane expedition to Roanoke, had sailed from Croatoan to Newfoundland in the summer of 1585. In June of 1586 several of Drake’s ships sailed on to Newfoundland after the evacuation of Lane’s colony from Roanoke. Later in 1586 some of Grenville’s belated supply ships, intended for Lane’s colony at Roanoke, headed to Newfoundland after learning from a native Indian that Lane’s colony had departed with Drake.15
Two decades later the disgruntled Jamestown colonists would also try to sail to Newfoundland, as the colony’s prospects appeared dim. The Jamestown colony was failing for a variety of reasons and a number of settlers were planning to escape to Newfoundland in the pinnace. John Smith became president of the council in September of 1608, and he instituted a strict work policy—his “order for the drones” as he called it—aimed at the laziest of the colonists.
But dreame no longer of this vaine hope [for food] from Powhatan, not that I will longer forbeare to force you, from your Idlenesse, and punish you if you rayle. But if I finde any more runners for Newfoundland with the Pinnace, let him assuredly looke to ariue at the Gallows.16
When the Bermuda castaways finally arrived at Jamestown aboard the Deliverance and Patience, they found only sixty pitiful colonists left alive after the previous winter’s “starving time.” It was decided to abandon Jamestown and sail to Newfoundland. William Strachey wrote about the decision:
It soon then appeared most fit, by a general approbation, that to preserve and save all from starving, there could be no readier course thought on than to abandon the country, and accommodating themselves the best that they might in the present pinnaces then in the road, namely in the Discovery and the Virginia, and in the two brought from and builded at the Bermudas, the Deliverance and the Patience, with all speed convenient to make for the New found Land, where, being the fishing time, they might meet with many English ships into which happily they might disperse most of the company.17
The four vessels were loaded up and had actually sailed down the James River to Point Comfort on their way to Newfoundland, when the newly appointed Governor Lord De La Warr arrived with more colonists and supplies, and everyone returned to Jamestown.
Newfoundland would have been the most logical destination for the abandoned colonists in 1588. In the 16th century “New-found-land” was used to describe the shoreline from Labrador as far south as the present-day Gulf of Maine.18 English fishing fleets would naturally follow the codfish migrations, which would range from the polar current at Labrador during the summer southward to the Gulf of Maine in the fall,19 putting the potential contact with English ships less than 1,200 miles north of Croatoan.
There would have been some debate about the timing of the voyage, and this would have had a direct bearing on the Lost Colonists’ decision about building a second pinnace. Since the Newfoundland cod fishing season generally ran from May through October, by the time they had given up all hope of White’s return—perhaps by late August—it would probably have been too late to attempt a voyage that year. A voyage to Newfoundland would take well over a month, and they could not risk arriving at Newfoundland after the English fishing fleet had already headed back to England. In addition it would have taken a considerable amount of time to properly outfit the pinnace and gather all the necessary stores and supplies for the voyage. Consequently, they most likely could not sail until the following spring, in which case contact with the fishing fleet could be expected by early summer.
That being the case, there is an even greater likelihood that an additional vessel would have been built during the six or seven month delay until spring. They had the time and probably the means, and certainly the widespread fear of permanent abandonment was incentive enough to build another pinnace. The colonists stranded at Bermuda started work on the 70–80 tun Deliverance on August 28 and the ship was finished in March. She remained at anchor until the second pinnace was completed. The construction of the smaller Patience was probably started by October, and was certainly finished in April. Using the construction of the Patience as a guide, then, it would conceivably have taken the Lost Colonists six months to build a similar vessel. Both the original pinnace and the newly-built vessel would have been ready to sail for Newfoundland in the spring of 1589.
The probability of a second vessel necessitates a reassessment of the number of Lost Colonists who could have attempted the voyage to Newfoundland. The two ships built at Bermuda had a combined capacity of about 105 tuns, the stated 70–80 tun Deliverance and an estimated 30 tun Patience. Since nearly 140 colonists were transported to Jamestown on the two vessels, the result was a one person per .75 tun ratio, very close to the fairly crowded one person per .76 tun ratio of the previously mentioned Godspeed. As mentioned, an excursion northward along the coast would require less cargo space than a transatlantic voyage. Using the passenger per tun ratio of the Bermuda colonists (one person per.75 tun), two 30 tun pinnaces would be capable of transporting eighty persons. Two 35 tun vessels could carry about ninety-two people, nearly all of the estimated 100 remaining Lost Colonists in 1588–89. Although these numbers and estimates are largely hypothetical, they present the strong possibility that by the early summer of 1589 only a small handful of Lost Colonists at most may have been left in “Virginia.” If all went well, the vessel or vessels would have hoped to make contact with the English ships at Newfoundland during the summer of 1589.
Of course, all apparently did not go well. The pinnace or pinnaces were not seen again, nor were any of the colonists who may have been left behind.
9
The Great Hurricane and the Final Collapse of the Colony
September 1589
It is not uncommon for important clues about the Lost Colony to turn up in Spanish documents rather than English sources, where they would normally be expected. It was the Spanish letters cited earlier, for example, that revealed Spain’s awareness of Raleigh’s plans to colonize the Chesapeake, which led in turn to Simon Fernandez’s likely decision to alter the colony’s original destination. The Spanish account of the Vincente Gonzalez voyage, also discussed previously, provided the evidence that the 1587 English colony had vacated Roanoke prior to June of 1588, and that they had not relocated to the Chesapeake.
Similarly, nothing is known from English sources about turbulent storm events that could have affected the 1587 colonists during the three-year span from August of 1587, when John White left Roanoke, through August of 1590, when he was finally able to return. What little is known about Atlantic storms during all the Roanoke voyages comes from the few references in the accounts of 1586, 1587, and 1590: In 1586 an early season storm of June 13–16 prevented the evacuation of Ralph Lane’s colony from Roanoke by Sir Francis Drake, who, according to Lane, “had in that storme sustained more perill of wracke than in all his former most honourable actions against the Spanyards.”1 On August 21, 1587, a storm forced Simon Fernandez to cut the ship’s cables and delayed John White’s departure from Roanoke for six days.2 Again, in August of 1590 a storm broke anchor cables and apparently prevented White and Captain Cooke from sailing the short distance from Roanoke to Croatoan.3
Although storms certainly occur frequently along the coast of present-day North Carolina, most of them are not “hurricanes” per se, which must attain sustained winds of between 74 to 95 mph to be classified even as a minor Category 1 hurricane.4 The weather events in the aforementioned Roanoke accounts may have been tropical depressions, having sustained winds of less than 39 mph, or tropical storms, with winds higher than 39 mph,5 which occur more frequently than hurricanes. Nevertheless, both minor (Category 1–2) and major (Category 3–5) hurricanes do strike the Carolinas regularly. Based on an analysis of 126 years of hurricane data and storm paths, AccuWeather recently reported that Cape Hatteras is one of the most vulnerable U.S. locations, with a 15 percent probability of a hurricane strike in any given year.6 According to the Hurricane Research Division of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), fifty hurricanes affected North Carolina between 1851 and 2014,7 averaging one every 3.26 years. Based on probabilities alone, there is a good chance that a hurricane could have struck during the three year period during which the 1587 colony seems to have disappeared.
Other than the Lost Colonists themselves, there was no English presence in “Virginia” between 1587 and 1590, but the Spanish maintained a continual presence farther south, and detailed records of their activities are preserved at the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain. The Archivo General contains 44,000 bundles, each with 1,500–2,000 manuscript pages, and continues to reveal new information about the Spanish colonial period. Fortunately, some of that information contains references and notations about Atlantic hurricanes, and weather researchers have been sorting through the Spanish documents for half a century. In 2005 a meteorological research team reported seventy previously unrecorded references to hurricanes occurring between the 16th and the 19th centuries.8 Although this research was undertaken to complete preexisting storm chronologies and cyclone tracks, several of their 16th century discoveries will prove relevant here.
It should be noted, though, that there are a few problems with the original manuscript records in the Archivo General. Some are incomplete or fragmentary while others may not yet have been examined. Another factor is the geographic origin of the Spanish reports. The northernmost Spanish settlement in the 1580s was located at Santa Elena on what is now Parris Island, South Carolina (built on the site of Ribault’s 1562 Charlesfort), but that settlement was abandoned in 1587 after Drake’s raid convinced the Spanish to consolidate their strength farther south. Consequently, the Spanish colonial storm references from mid–1587 through 1590 describe hurricanes reported farther south in St. Augustine and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, since several of the reports—particularly in 1589—are probably separate accounts of the same storm event obtained from various Spanish sources at different locations, it is possible to “track” the path of that particular hurricane as it moved across the Caribbean and then turned northward up the Florida coast.
The following is a summary of all the meteorological research conducted at the Archivo General concerning reports of
hurricanes that occurred between 1587 and 1590.9 Asterisks represent hurricanes that either could have, or—in the case of the September 1589, hurricane—did turn north towards the Carolinas:
Two of the above hurricane accounts can be safely eliminated from consideration here because it is highly improbable that they could have affected the Carolinas: The November 1588, hurricane made landfall near Cartagena de Indias in Colombia, South America, probably too far south to be a likely factor. The November 1590 hurricane can be excluded for two reasons: Its location was Vera Cruz, too far west into the Gulf of Mexico, and it also occurred three months too late for the August 1587–August 1590 timeframe during which the colony disappeared.
The Lost Colony of Roanoke Page 13