Yeltsin

by Timothy J. Colton

  Paradoxes proliferated in the new Russia. Gorbachev in charge had distended cherished institutions and identities; Yeltsin shattered them and devised substitutes. While the changes he instituted were revolutionary in their scope and consequences, he recoiled from pronouncing them that. “The quintessential anti-revolutionary revolutionary,”18 he was as bent on moderating the revolution as on making it, and inducted into his administration a battalion of the functionaries from the party elite, the nomenklatura, he had been busy attacking as hoary reactionaries. Having catapulted to power as a populist critic of official privilege and arrogance did not deter Yeltsin from building a grossly unequal capitalist economy or ordering his conscript army to wage war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. And his seasoning in the Communist Party apparatus predisposed him to construct a Russian “superpresidency” that fit uneasily with the democratic way.

  All that said, Yeltsin refused to set up a disciplined post-communist party allegiant to him and in the parting act of his presidency he voluntarily relinquished power. In decisions like the privatization of industry, territorial devolution, and support for autonomous communications media, he frequently employed power to disperse power. In 1999, withal, the person to whom he ceded his position was a product of an organization that was an embodiment of Soviet values as staunch as the defunct CPSU: the KGB, the secret police that in Yeltsin’s youth had oppressed his kinfolk. As if that were not mystifying enough, Yeltsin, baptized Orthodox at birth and having been responsible in the 1970s for demolishing the house in which the Romanovs, Russia’s last royal family, were executed, gave them a Christian burial as president in 1998, and, in retirement, rediscovered religion and was interred amid full church rites in 2007.

  Looking back at this dialectic with all the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, it is far from obvious what to take from it. And it is far from easy to escape the impression that one is chasing a slippery and constantly moving quarry.

  Likewise, Yeltsin the man teemed with inner complexities. Bill Clinton, who saw him at close quarters in eighteen negotiating sessions, likened him to “an Irish poet” or an artist who “sees politics as a novel he’s writing or a symphony he’s composing.”19 Clinton, a person of some complexity himself, and also given to reinvention and to questioning general frameworks, is an approving observer. In researching this volume, I have heard an earful of other similes, and not all are as appreciative of Yeltsin. A sampling would be those drawn to:

  • Roles and occupations: aerialist, architect, boss, builder, chef, chess master, chieftain, Cossack, criminal, crusader, deceiver, demagogue, democrat, diva, drummer, foreman, godfather, grandpa, hedonist, hermit, jester, knight, lord of the manor, magus, man on a white horse, martyr, mutineer, neo-Bolshevik, patriarch, pied piper, prizefighter, reformer, revolutionary, roughneck, shock worker, sorcerer’s apprentice, sultan, surgeon, thespian, tsar, Viking;

  • Historical personages: Alexander the Great, Muhammad Ali, Julius Caesar, Fidel Castro, Cincinnatus, Christopher Columbus, Deng Xiaoping, Galileo, Charles de Gaulle, Boris Godunov, Harry Houdini, Ivan the Terrible, Andrew Jackson, Jesus, Lyndon Johnson, Judas, Nikita Khrushchev, Lenin, Abraham Lincoln, Huey Long, Mao Zedong, Napoleon, Richard Nixon, Peter the Great, Augusto Pinochet, Vidkun Quisling, Franklin Roosevelt, Pëtr Stolypin, Margaret Thatcher;

  • Characters from literature and folklore: King David, Faust, Gulliver, Hamlet, Haroun al-Rashid, Hercules, Robin Hood, Icarus, Ivanushka, Lazarus, King Lear, Il’ya Muromets, Oedipus, Don Quixote, Samson, Tom Sawyer, Leonard Zelig, Zeus;

  • Physical objects and forces: battering ram, cyborg, electric shock, false-bottom suitcase, hurricane, mannequin, puppet, sledgehammer;

  • Animal species: bear, boa constrictor, bull, bulldog, chameleon, crocodile, eagle, elephant, phoenix, tiger, tortoise, wolf.

  Many of these will be discussed in the chapters that follow. It can be said here that no one image captures the whole man. As those who worked closely with him can confirm, the qualities that made Yeltsin tick always eluded others: “Much about him is arcane and under figurative lock and key.”20 The ideological doyen of perestroika, Aleksandr Yakovlev, noted that Yeltsin had “not a little of the extravagant” to him and regularly incorporated polar opposites. “He was too credulous and too suspicious, too daring and too careful, too open and too inclined to crawl back into his shell.”21 The same politico who at incandescent moments, especially of risk and crisis, could move mountains, could on other days be maddeningly indecisive or self-indulgent. In demotic memory, unfair as it is, the snapshot of Yeltsin on the tank in Moscow in August 1991, the valiant defender of democracy, collides with the Yeltsin of August 1994, when he tipsily conducted a German band alfresco at Berlin’s city hall. He could be “both a very big man and a very bad boy,” in the breezy epigram of Strobe Talbott, a fly on the wall at all of President Clinton’s summits with Yeltsin.22

  The biography of this singular person provides an interpretive prism for the decline and fall of Soviet communism, the grandest of the past century’s failed social experiments, and for the harrowing genesis of post-communism.23 Yeltsin leaves nobody indifferent. He needs to be understood if we are to understand the age we inhabit and how we got here.

  When Yeltsin made his debut in high Soviet politics in 1985, many onlookers, in the West in particular, misconstrued him as a bumpkin, or at best as a cat’s paw in a game controlled by others more gifted than he. When he parted ways with Gorbachev in 1987, they were overhasty to write his political obituary.24 There were those who saw him as a flash in the pan in his recusant phase and who thought he was fading out as Gorbachev and the USSR were sidelined in 1991.25 When these prognoses were refuted, the tenor changed to flattery, and Yeltsin as president was valorized as a veritable archangel of reform. At first at home and then abroad, this vision segued into one of haplessness and aloofness. His growing unpopularity, a deadly altercation with parliament in 1993, and health issues in 1995 prompted predictions of an imminent cessation of Yeltsin’s reign. Most cognoscenti foresaw an ignominious defeat in the 1996 presidential election, were he to hazard it—but he ran for re-election, won a dazzling victory, and was saluted as a political maestro. After 1996 the pendulum swung yet again. With political and economic crises peaking in 1998–99 and the hourglass running out on his second term, he was pilloried as a national embarrassment and his Russia as “a disastrous failure . . . threatening other countries with multiple contagions.”26

  On the personal and moral level, there were those who maintained early on that Yeltsin did not hold a candle to his great rival, Gorbachev. President George H. W. Bush, underwhelmed when he first met Yeltsin in 1989, was incensed by Yeltsin’s demand in February 1991 that Gorbachev leave office. “This guy Yeltsin,” he muttered to staffers, “is really a wild man, isn’t he?”27 Bush came around on Yeltsin, but in the middle and late 1990s two other character leitmotifs gained currency. One brought to the forefront Yeltsin’s frailties and foibles and depicted him as someone “at the mercy of the pettiest passions,”28 notably his fondness for strong drink. The other latched onto what Russian wordsmiths titled “the Family” (with a capital “F”): supposedly a camarilla of advisers, officials, and big-business oligarchs associated with his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko and the plutocrat Boris Berezovskii, and, it was said, the force behind the throne in the twilight years of the Yeltsin presidency.

  While these pictures are all overblown, some fudge the truth worse than others. For example, although he overindulged in alcohol, the habit must be seen in perspective and most of the time was not central to his public activities. And although the nexus between wealth and power in the Yeltsin period has to be of concern, he was no marionette of the oligarchs, whom he invented sociologically, and the idea of the late Yeltsin fronting for a palace-cum-business consortium has little relation to reality.

  In the 1980s and 1990s, acting in spurts and out of intuition more than a panoramic master plan, Yeltsin made fateful decisions that put his societ
y on a much more promising road than it had been on since 1917. He did so under arduous circumstances and avoided the apocalyptic scenarios—anarchy, nuclear blackmail, famine and industrial collapse, ethnic strife—that had haunted forecasts about the demise of one-party rule. For what he wrought, and for pulling it off in the main by ballots rather than bullets, he belongs with the instigators of the global trend away from authoritarianism and statism and toward democratic politics and market-based economics. As a democratizer, he is in the company of Nelson Mandela, Lech Wałesa, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Václav Havel. It is his due even when allowance is made for his blind spots and mistakes. As against those who would shrug him off as an oddball or an antihero, or who cannot get beyond his welter of contradictions to come to a summary judgment, my net assessment of Yeltsin is as a hero in history—enigmatic and flawed, to be sure, yet worthy of our respect and sympathy.29

  I initially intended to restrict myself to a portrait of Yeltsin’s leadership of Russia as its elected president and to treat everything before that as preface. The further I got, however, the more I asked myself what those tumultuous years had to do with precedent, what molded the man and his instincts, and how the new Yeltsin, if that is what he was, ever emerged from the chrysalis of the old. It is anything but self-evident how the virtuoso product and agent of a dictatorship could end up as its hangman.

  A 1995 skit in Kukly (Puppets), the political satire on Russian television, lampooned Yeltsin’s shifting loyalties. “Boriska,” the Yeltsin doll, plays Faust, situated in a medieval scholar’s laboratory thick with books and test tubes. Tongue in cheek, he intones:

  Once I was a communist

  Faithful to the marrow of my bones:

  From all three deities [Marx, Engels, and Lenin] I drank

  And ate of the constituent parts.

  I kept watch at the [party] congresses,

  But really I was a democrat in spirit,

  I was brother to the wind and sun

  And godmother to the people of Sverdlovsk.

  Lo and behold, when the clock struck and the moment came—

  I was president of Russia!30

  In real life, the tale was not nearly so simple—not with Yeltsin’s abilities, not with his relationship to the ancien régime, not with his scorpions-in-a-bottle fight with Gorbachev or his conquest of power, and assuredly not with his use of power to make a new beginning.

  My overarching aim in this “history made personal”31 is to submit Boris Yeltsin and his career to a textured scrutiny that does justice to their many-sided humanity. Years of fieldwork that afforded eye-opening interviews with Yeltsin, with family members, and with about 150 other principals, declassified files from the Soviet archives, and new memoirs shed fresh light on the extended drama of his life. It is necessary to explain why the lunge toward a better tomorrow did not cross the chasm with finality, as by his admission it did not. Indivisible from that, we must see why it was mounted, why by Boris Yeltsin, and why it took him and the former Soviet Union as far as it did.

  CHAPTER ONE

  Self-Reliance

  The Urals, among the most ancient mountain ranges in the world, are the physiographic frontier between Europe and Asia. They rise 1,500 miles from the grasslands above the inland Caspian Sea, in present-day Kazakhstan, to the icebound coastal plain of the Arctic Ocean. Their creases push gelid northern air, and with it northern flora and fauna, southward. They are highest in the upper segment; in the lower segment, the Urals comprise parallel folds of hills and stony crests. The middle segment, which by convention runs from 55° 30’ to 61° north, consists largely of low plateaus trenched by ravines. Here are located most of the mountain belt’s deposits of ferrous and nonferrous metals, salt, gemstones, and bauxite. It was this subterranean bounty that, beginning in the 1550s, drew Russians in from the west and north. Metallurgy dominated the Urals economy by the eighteenth century—three-quarters of the Russian Empire’s iron and almost 100 percent of its copper were smelted there at century’s end—but regressed in the nineteenth under competition from the mills of the Donbass and Dnieper Valley, in southern Ukraine, where coal rather than wood was used for heat. Agrarian migrants also flocked to the mid-Urals’ lowlands, most of which bear a load of rich humus that responds well to the plow.

  The sleepy community of Butka nestles just inside the southern and the eastern, Asiatic, margin of the middle Urals in undulating countryside mantled in birch, larch, red pine, and poplar. It lies at 56° 43’ north, the same line of latitude as the Alaska panhandle and Dundee, Scotland, and at 63° 46’ east, the approximate longitude of Herat, Afghanistan. It is 1,100 miles (two time zones) to the east of Moscow, 170 miles east of the continental divide, and 150 miles east of the largest Urals city, Yekaterinburg, known from 1924 to 1991 as Sverdlovsk. Butka is not as well-endowed agriculturally as many corners of the Urals, and there are few minerals nearby. The name means “porridge” in the languages of the Tatars and Bashkirs, the Turkic groups whose tribes, before their subjugation to the Russian crown, held sway in the swath of territory straddling the southern and central Urals. The reference is to the swampiness of the site, on the Belyakovka River.1 The shallow and silty Belyakovka, less than fifty miles in length, curls southwest to northeast through Butka, where it was fifty feet wide in 1900; it is twenty or thirty feet wide there today. Through the Pyshma, it drains lazily into the Tobol, Irtysh, and Ob Rivers in west Siberia (the Irtysh and Ob form the world’s fourth longest river system) and on to tidewater at the Arctic 700 miles away.

  Legend has it that the Russians who initially settled at Butka were deserters from the host of Yermak Timofeyevich, the Cossack buccaneer who carried Ivan the Terrible’s writ over the Urals in the 1580s. Be that as it may, we know from the state chronicle that on November 1, 1676, the governor of Tobol’sk, the Russian fort at the junction of the Tobol and the Irtysh, granted a petition by the peasants Ivashka Sylvenets and Tereshka Ivanov for leave to found a sloboda, a government-chartered village, at Butka. They were to survey the spot, construct a palisade against raiders, and “invite free and unattached people” to move there.2 Built to secure Russia’s borderlands, villages of this type offered peasants arable land, tax exemptions, and a measure of self-government. Butka had expanded bit by bit to a hundred souls when the German naturalist and explorer Johann Georg Gmelin came upon it in 1746, and to 825 in the imperial census of 1897. The nearest towns of any size were Shadrinsk, the district seat, fifty miles to the south on the Iset River, and Talitsa, on the Pyshma, twenty miles north of Butka and astride the highway and railroad to Siberia. Transport to and from the village was either by water or, if by land, along a horse trail to Talitsa, which it took ten or eleven hours to cover most seasons of the year and twice as long during the vernal and autumnal muddy seasons.3

  Unpretentious Butka in 1900 shared much with the habitat of most of the tsar’s subjects. It was now a regular village (selo), a category for a relatively large settlement with a parish church and some government offices. There was no trace of the palisade. One-story wood cabins, thatched and with hand-carved window frames, and heated by tiled clay stoves, hugged several main streets and the rutted byways that meandered off from them. Everyone kept a dairy cow and tilled the fields rimming the village and the potato and vegetable patches out their back doors. The average growing season in Butka being 150 days and the soil being saline, seldom did the surfeit for the market amount to much. The young and strong cut timber or worked in the sawmill opened in 1914, which had 100 employees. Handicraftsmen made barrels, pottery, coal-tar soap, boots, and fur hats and put together sledges, carts, and spinning wheels. Amenities were sparse. The Orthodox Church of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin, built in stone around 1800, had a wood attic and a belfry adjacent. Water was taken from wells and roadside pumps, and women did their laundry by hand in the river. There was a small library as of 1908 but no school and no doctor. A few clerks were the only representation from government.

  In other res
pects, Butka was uncharacteristic of Russian rural society. People in it and its rustic surroundings, going back to the order of 1676 and the welcome mat to the free and unattached, had been spared the serfdom that stultified most of European Russia from the sixteenth century until abolition in 1861. Like most agriculturalists in the Urals and Siberia, they were classified as “state peasants,” who were at liberty to change abode and marry as they wished, were judged in the civil courts, and owed a fixed rent to the government, not manorial service to a landlord’s estate. In mentality, they were more like pioneers than like the serfs, whose status differed little from the black slaves in the United States.4 Two pre-1914 ethnographic portraits of the Russians in these parts were fully applicable. “Our peasant,” wrote one, “is sturdy beyond belief,” toiling in the fields sunup to sundown, rain or shine, and “will not complain until things have become completely unbearable.” 5 Said the other, “The population is bright and clear of mind and possesses accuracy of speech and an unflappable, playful sense of humor. While not devoid of the widely known [peasant] slyness, it is keen and imitative. It masters its favorite tasks and is good at accommodating itself to any kind of labor.”6 The asperity of the climate, rugged topography, isolation from central Russia, and low population density bred the virtue encapsulated in a noun resonant in Urals lore: samostoyatel’nost’, or self-reliance (self-rule in the group context), literally the ability to stand on one’s own feet. At river fords and crossroads that were the merest specks of light in a vacuity, nothing except gumption and hardiness under adversity stood between the colonists and extinction.