He was in almost as big a rush to tackle policy problems. Often it came down to what Yeltsin had tried out in Sverdlovsk, such as youth housing complexes, the City Day festival (the first in September 1987), and street fairs. On other issues, his preferred remedy was an action bundle linked to numbered targets and deadlines, to emphasize the urgency: twenty-six “multipurpose programs” for socioeconomic issues; letters to forty-two central agencies laying down the law on industrial automation and manufacture of consumer goods; thirty-nine superfluous research institutes and laboratories he wanted closed down forthwith; retrenchment in the residency permits issued to rural and small-town migrants (limitchiki, persons admitted on governmental “limits”) who were overloading the Moscow housing supply. Yeltsin pestered the Politburo and the Soviet cabinet for tons of meat, fish, and produce; on city hall, he foisted heavier burdens and tauter plans.52 There was some clucking at the highest level at his demands but nothing to indicate a deep split.53 When Saikin shared with the gorkom bureau a plan to expand the subway and, under a Politburo directive, provide every Moscow family with an apartment by the year 2000, Yeltsin whipped out his pen, drew a line through Saikin’s numbers, and superimposed more demanding ones: apartments for all by 1995 and a third more metro track than projected. Saikin could not believe his eyes.54 Objectives such as these would have been hard to attain under the best of circumstances. Most of them were to remain on paper as the Soviet and then Russian economy went into free fall, and not to be feasible until after Yeltsin’s retirement in 1999.
Yeltsinesque populism, a nascent motif in Sverdlovsk, found its way onto the front burner in Moscow. While he continued with impromptu gifts of wristwatches—bodyguard Korzhakov had to keep a spare in his overcoat pocket—the focus shifted to rides on public transit and visitations to trouble spots. The rides were well-rehearsed trips of two or three stops on a subway car, bus, or tramcar. On a fixed destination such as a retail store, workers’ or students’ dining hall, or apartment house basement, Yeltsin would swoop down in his limousine; he bantered with the crowd; if corruption or skullduggery was uncovered, the wrongdoers were chewed out and in the direst cases fired. Managers of food stores on main boulevards learned to keep an attractive assortment of produce in their glass cases. Tipped off to that, Yeltsin had his guards look for places to be audited off the beaten track, which required the KGB to allot extra conveyances to steer the first secretary through the traffic.55 As the columnist Vitalii Tret’yakov was to write as an early champion of Yeltsin in 1989, these field trips were in the manner of Haroun al-Rashid, the caliph from Arabian Nights who roamed Baghdad in the dress of a commoner, spreading assurance that he knew what to do about the people’s problems.56
In the Moscow media, Mikhail Poltoranin, the new Moskovskaya pravda editor-in-chief who was moved at Yeltsin’s behest from Pravda, printed titillating, dirt-digging exposés of the illicit benefits of the nomenklatura—of the spouses of party secretaries being chauffeured to stores, of nepotism in august universities and institutes, and of fat-cat buffets, order desks, dachas, and clinics. In his question-and-answer meeting with the agitprop staff in April 1986, Yeltsin related how he had removed a raion second secretary, I. V. Danilov, for illegally converting his apartment into “a palace” with a fireplace that blew smoke into his neighbors’ flats. Officers of the city party committee had out of their own free will waived their limos and chauffeurs. “See,” Yeltsin deadpanned, “the [six] gorkom secretaries are smiling. Today they came here together in one car.”57 That July Yeltsin initiated the ouster of Nikolai Lebedev, the rector of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, the undergraduate training school for the Soviet diplomatic service. Lebedev’s offense had been to show preference in admissions to the children of nomenklatura officials.
In the age of glasnost, the homespun and pungent locutions of Yeltsin made him the darling of journalists. An interview with him guaranteed splashy copy and a cruise along the frontier of permissible speech. During his first year in the Moscow hot seat, Yeltsin the gadfly and moralist concentrated on the capital city; in year two, he generalized from its experience and went farther afield. Vladimir Mezentsev, a correspondent for Ostankino, the primary Soviet television studio, collared him at a youth league meeting at ZIL in April 1987. Yeltsin expostulated for the camera that the time had come for young workers to be “unfettered” and granted “creative freedom” to dance or listen to music as they liked. He castigated the Komsomol for being “covered in bureaucratic moss and cobwebs” and for hackneyed methods, like organizing forty-six overtime shifts before the branch’s forty-sixth conference. Mezentsev was agog: “He was saying words no one was then saying about the canonized Komsomol and by extension about the party. He was saying what they didn’t let me say at Ostankino. He was speaking for all of us who wept at the hypocrisies of the communist way of life.”58 As sympathetic Muscovites saw it, he was taking the discussion of the nomenklatura and its incompetence out of their kitchens and onto the streets of the novostroiki, the tracts of cookie-cutter, high-rise housing where most of them lived and raised their children. Yeltsin further pushed the envelope by meeting with foreign newspapermen. In May 1987 he gave his first interview on non-Soviet television. He was filmed in action and then in a long conversation in his office with Diane Sawyer of CBS News, for the news special “The Soviet Union—Seven Days in May.” He was won over to scheduling it by seeing a photograph of the winsome Sawyer.59
Yeltsin’s policies in 1985–87 were not always iconoclastic. He cautioned that cultural activity had to observe some limits of propriety. Despite the abuse of his family in the Stalin years, he was against “throwing stones into the garden of the past,” though he was for unfreezing debate and calmly reassessing errors and crimes.60 He continued for some time to tout remedies within the old paradigm over ones that might disturb it. In July 1986, with him in the chair, the party caucus in the Moscow Soviet, the city’s municipal council, gave the newly chosen chief of its trade directorate, Nikolai Zav’yalov, fourteen days to make a “turnaround” in the supply of vegetables; when he did not achieve the impossible, he was sent packing.61 At a symposium on mass transit in 1987—to which, as a good showman, he rode a trolley bus—Yeltsin charted a plan to mark off the city into sectors and lay down hard passenger quotas in them all. The dean of economics at Moscow State University, Gavriil Popov, retorted that this evaded the core problem: In a planned economy, there was no housing market that would let Muscovites lessen their daily commutes by moving closer to work; the only way to fix the problem was to create a market. Yeltsin harrumphed and had Popov—who several years later would be an important supporter of his—struck from the guest list for future meetings.62 Asked at his consultation with the propagandists whether restraints on migration into Moscow would spawn a labor shortage, Yeltsin shot back, “We need not to bring in new people but to force Muscovites to work” through a police dragnet to roust out “spongers.” He defended the decree shuttering some research institutes as a wakeup call to laggards: “Closing down the first ten or fifteen . . . will have quite an effect in activating the others.”63
Two years after losing the Moscow post, Yeltsin was to explain his hamhanded techniques as determined by education, situational needs, and necessity:
In Moscow, there was no alternative. This is a bewildering city, I had a difficult legacy to deal with. And you have to take into account that all of us who today are over fifty grew up in the time of administrative-command methods. You can’t get away from this. Thus far we have no other methods. We educate ourselves and try to find something different, but it all goes very slowly. When I worked in the gorkom, 90 percent of the problems that arose had to be dealt with immediately and decisively. The situation demanded it.64
Some years later, Vitalii Tret’yakov, by then a critic of Yeltsin’s, was to deprecate the latter’s experience as Moscow boss as the flailing of a gung-ho but dim-witted Soviet udarnik—the “shock worker” or Stakhanovite of Stalini
st mythology.65 There was something of the norm-busting shock worker to the Yeltsin of 1985–87, but to pigeonhole him as that is to lose sight of the tactility that was opening him up to new viewpoints and to flushing out new allies of change. Even in Sverdlovsk, he had leavened command methods with understanding of the Soviet economy’s residual private sector. As inhospitable as ever to blatantly illegal activities, such as the sale of scarce goods under the counter at inflated prices, Yeltsin in Moscow referred with increased respect to what nonstate producers and distributors could bring to the table. At the 1986 meeting with propaganda workers, he sympathized with the charge that prices in the farmers’ bazaars were sky-high, yet went on to make different points:
I have been to many Moscow bazaars. I have never seen such prices. . . . A pathetic sprig of parsley costs fifty kopeks or maybe a ruble. A kilogram of meat goes for eight rubles. [Note: The average monthly salary in the USSR in 1985 was 190 rubles.] But we mustn’t put a ceiling on prices, since this method has been tried before and gave no results. The vendors will just move on to other cities and provinces. The way to apply pressure on the marketplace is through trade. What we need to do is build a cooperative store at every bazaar. It doesn’t matter if sausage is sold in those stores for eight rubles. I have a list of people who can pay a high price. At the very least, they will be purchasing sausage that actually smells like meat.66
If the only case Yeltsin made for free commerce in the Urals had been that it would keep food prices down, he now hinted that it might meet demand from comparatively well-off consumers, boost supply, and improve quality.
The same explorative mood came through on political topics. Most Soviet officials held their noses and tolerated the liberalizing measures the party espoused under the rubric of demokratizatsiya, democratization, at the Central Committee plenum of January 27–28, 1987; to Yeltsin, they were yeast for reform. In September 1987 he was at his seat in the Moscow Soviet when a young deputy named Arkadii Murashov, a physicist by profession, stood up to announce that he was planning to do something never before done in Soviet legislatures for the past sixty years: He was breaking unanimity to vote against a resolution sponsored by the executive. Yeltsin balled the chamber over by defending Murashov’s freedom to differ and calling for the draft motion to be referred back to committee.67 Another example would be his warming to environmental and urban-conservation issues. Hearing voices from below, Yeltsin halted construction of an eyesore World War II memorial on Poklonnaya Hill, evicted about thirty unhealthful factories from Moscow, and had a batch of pre-Soviet street names restored and pre-Revolution mansions saved from the wrecking ball. Ecopolitics brought him into contact with the neformaly (informals), the extra-governmental organizations that sprouted as curbs on grassroots activity slackened. The Moscow informals advocated a variety of causes, everything from free speech to arms control and animal rights, but not every group was progressive or liberal. On May 6, 1987, Yeltsin and Mayor Saikin met with a delegation from Pamyat, an ultranationalist, anti-Semitic organization illegally created in the 1970s. Five hundred Pamyat activists had been waving placards on Manezh Square, in Moscow’s first wildcat demonstration since the 1920s. In August, representatives of fifty Soviet informals, most of them liberal in orientation, gathered in a Moscow hall under the protection of the gorkom.68
The city of Moscow was a far tougher nut than Sverdlovsk for Yeltsin to crack as leader. Its economy was less militarized, its intellectual and expert classes were more influential, and it was home to the bloated central bureaucracy. At a time of ferment, it was being tugged to and fro. That is, it was both a hotbed of reformism and a stronghold for the old ways. Yeltsin’s problem was the latter and what, in an unpublished speech to the Central Committee, he decried as the snobbery of “pampered people who think they are bigwigs.”69 With rare empathy, Gorbachev said afterward, in the mid-1990s, that he understood “it was not easy to work in Moscow and Yeltsin very likely felt more acutely than others the resistance of the party and economic nomenklatura to perestroika. . . . Yeltsin happened upon obstacles that in Sverdlovsk he did not suspect existed.”70
To light his path through the Moscow labyrinth, the new maestro had neither the local knowledge nor the cohesive team he had in the Urals. The Sverdlovsk factotums in tow to Yeltsin were few; many of the Muscovites with whom he worked saw him as a hick. As in Sverdlovsk, he strategized Monday mornings with a kitchen cabinet, which by the end of 1986 included Valerii Saikin, Mikhail Poltoranin, his second secretary (the Sverdlovsker Yurii Belyakov) and secretary for ideological questions (Yurii Karabasov), and the head of the Moscow KGB (Nikolai Chelnokov). The official bureau of the gorkom congregated on Wednesdays. To keep it on its toes, Yeltsin again resorted to criticism and self-criticism, with the difference that he now shared his associates’ inadequacies with the press. The shared recreation that pumped up élan in Sverdlovsk would have been out of place in Moscow. Spinal and foot problems kept Yeltsin from playing volleyball after May 1986, when he scrimmaged at a Georgian vacation spot.71 His dacha was far from the cottages of gorkom staffers. There was no hunting range at which he could dish out quotas for fowl and game.
Yeltsin’s sense of responsibility to the regime and to the project of reforming communism spurred him on. And he craved personal success as ardently as he ever had, seeing no inconsistency between it and the reform cause. The Moscow assignment also elicited the testing script, as we have called it. As never before in his political work, Yeltsin after December 1985 felt the compulsion to show strength and proficiency. He recalls in Notes of a President how he “began to breathe in an utterly different way,” energized by the demands his new post made on him.72 In Confession on an Assigned Theme, he lays it on thick in describing the close of his workday. Arriving home, rarely before midnight, he would sit five or ten minutes in the limousine: “I was so worn out that I did not have the strength to raise my arm.”73 His sleep budget, he declared to underlings, was four hours a night; he was up at the crack of dawn to exercise, read, and prepare for work. (Aleksandr Korzhakov confirms the schedule.)74 Yeltsin, Korzhakov states, put great effort into memorizing names, facts, and figures: “Yeltsin came from the wilds and felt the need when he got the chance to underscore that there are people there who are as good as Muscovites.”75 Symptomatic of the testing mode was the puffing up of the objects of his wrath into extra-large beings. Thus the district secretary drummed out for his apartment renovations was cast as comporting himself like “a prince”; others were preening “princelings” or “his majesty the worker of the apparatus.”76
Yeltsin drew a connection between his efforts on behalf of reform and the determination of opponents to scotch them and even to do him in. In the Q&A at the House of Political Enlightenment in 1986, he selected for off-the-cuff reply questions that highlighted the point,77 and hammered it home by quoting from an incendiary memorandum from another file:
[I have been asked] what privileges of officials of the Moscow city committee of the party we have abolished. . . . The question is incorrectly put. Why only abolish? We have added certain things—we have increased the amount of work and the number of bureau sessions, for instance. Gorkom officials no longer work from 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. but until 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. and sometimes until midnight. So far as abolition is concerned, for a start we have closed the [gorkom’s] commissary for manufactured goods. I think this is very useful. Gorkom workers will have a better feeling for our problems. . . .
I get letters like this, for example: “Khrushchev long ago tried to dress us in [inmates’] padded jackets. Nothing came of it, and nothing will come of you. We have been stealing and we will go on stealing.” Comrades, we can break up this cycle only through common efforts. . . .
I am being reminded that in three years I will have to give an account and answer for the promises I have made. I am ready for this and intend to devote these years entirely to the struggle.
And here I see a note of this sort: “Your plans are Napoleonesque
. You are in over your head. . . . Go back to Sverdlovsk while you can.” (Cries of “Shame” from the audience.) Stay calm, comrades, I think the question did not come from this audience and that a note I received earlier has gotten mixed in. Looks like it was written by someone sick. . . .
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