GORBACHEV: I am the one who thought it best to say perestroika would take fifteen to twenty years, but the report has a line about it taking a generation . . . and a generation is longer than fifteen or twenty years. Thank you. It is good that you paid attention to this. The question about time frame is worth thinking about, because it is very important. You are right, people are watching this. . . .
YELTSIN: The last thing I would say is, we have a ton of experience on all these matters. So what have these seventy years brought us? What suggests itself is a section that sums things up. GORBACHEV: We took the correct road, that is what I would conclude.
Gorbachev’s greater attachment to the road taken, and to theories of socialism, rings out. Yeltsin’s emphasis was on how effectively or ineffectively systems worked. If they did not, he implied, society would have to find ones that did.
An antagonism with Yegor Ligachëv, the second-in-command to Gorbachev, also ballooned. The two already differed on minor patronage and organizational issues. In late 1986, for example, Yeltsin walked out of a Politburo session when Ligachëv presented his choice for president of the Urals branch of the Academy of Sciences, located in Sverdlovsk. Yeltsin had not been asked his opinion, and the appointee, physicist Gennadii Mesyats, was from Tomsk, where Ligachëv had been party leader, and was given the job over the Sverdlovsker whom Yeltsin had in mind.25 So far as the Moscow first secretaryship went, Ligachëv was resolved not to let Yeltsin evade Kremlin scrutiny and control, as he was persuaded Viktor Grishin had done under Brezhnev. Once Ligachëv and his operatives had determined to keep a close eye, physical propinquity on Old Square allowed them to do so.26 As the organizational vicar of the CPSU, Ligachëv disliked what he saw as Yeltsin’s smears of the party apparatus on issues such as privilege, corruption, and dogmatism. Yeltsin in turn felt Ligachëv was braking progress and using his staff to undercut him.
For Yeltsin, it especially rankled that he had far less autonomy in the Moscow position than in Sverdlovsk and less, for that matter, than when he served as a Central Committee department head in 1985. At the Central Committee plenum in June 1987, he blasted Ligachëv: “We know, Yegor Kuz’mich, that the Secretariat is working hard. But still [we see] a profusion of petty questions, no letup in the volume of paper, undue tutelage, administration by command, over-regulation of the party organs, and continual visits by commissions chiefly to dig up negative examples.” “Practically nothing” had changed here since 1985 and nothing would until the party center gave local leaders room to exercise that distinctive Urals quality, self-reliance. 27 Things were such, he told Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov in a chat, that Ligachëv had phoned him to complain that the lawn in front of Luzhniki, the city’s main soccer stadium, was poorly mowed.28 To Moskovskaya pravda’s Mikhail Poltoranin, Yeltsin said that Ligachëv had him “account for every pencil and scrap of paper” and “put him in the shoes of a little boy.”29
The tiebreaker for Yeltsin was a microissue in political reform. Gorbachev being away on summer vacation in the south, Ligachëv chaired the Politburo session of September 10, 1987. In the Politburo in early August, following rallies by the Pamyat nationalists and by representatives of the Crimean Tatars, a Turkic minority exiled to Central Asia by Stalin, Yeltsin had promised Gorbachev to consider how to regulate street demonstrations. In a memorandum, he proposed to take a permissive approach to citizens who wished to march and congregate but to limit meetings to Izmailovo Park in the east end, which would become a Moscow Hyde Park. Some guidelines had since been promulgated in the city press.30 On September 10 Ligachëv and other standpat members criticized Yeltsin for not checking back with the Kremlin, and said the document was unnecessary and would invalidate police controls. Yeltsin replied that he had made an effort to clear the decision and that such matters were best left to Moscow and other city councils to legislate. Ligachëv waved him off pedantically. The old, centrally run system, which banned meetings other than official rallies, prevented “harm to society, the state, and other citizens.” “There is no need to pass other ‘rules,’” he stated, “and the document adopted in Moscow is to be repealed.”31 A Politburo commission merely tweaked the USSR-wide regulations. They would be redone in a much more liberal direction only in 1988–89.
The rigors of the Moscow party position, and the tugging and hauling with Gorbachev and Ligachëv, wore Yeltsin down. Toward the end of 1986, he checked into a Kremlin clinic with a hypertensive attack and symptoms of anxiety. The doctors concluded that he was overworked and that a principal health issue was that in reaction to the nervous tension he “had begun to abuse sedatives and sleeping pills and to be enamored of alcohol.” The patient reacted cantankerously: He had no intention of curbing his workload and “no need of moral lectures.”32 It is to be noted that individuals who worked closely with Yeltsin in those years, and whom I interviewed, seem to have seen few or no effects of psychological dislocation, overmedication, or overconsumption of alcohol. For instance, Valerii Saikin, the mayor of Moscow from 1986 to 1990 and not well disposed toward Yeltsin, said the first secretary never ran out of energy. He might plead a headache at their planning meetings on Monday mornings and refer jocularly to staying up late to work on his weekly report. Beyond that, Saikin saw nothing out of the ordinary.33
It was on September 10, the day of the Politburo brouhaha over street marches, that Yeltsin decided to fire off a letter to Gorbachev. He came home late to the Usovo dacha and sat with Naina in his study. He told her he intended to write the general secretary and to get out of the CPSU leadership: “I am not going to work with this band [s etoi bandoi] any longer. They are ruining the country” (the country at this time still being the Soviet Union). She was not surprised at his anger, as she had felt it for months, but was taken aback by the solution he proposed. Where would he work? she asked. Yeltsin said it was possible that Gorbachev would let him continue to run the Moscow party committee, without a Politburo seat, although his formal request was to give up both positions. If not, he would go back to the construction industry, perhaps as chief of a building trust. The party would never let him do that, she replied. Then he would work as a foreman, as he had in the 1950s, or perhaps they would move to the far north and start a new life there. Maybe it would be simpler to go on pension, Naina thought, and let their grown-up children feed them. Then came a pause: “He sat and sat and finally said, ‘No.’ I [Naina Yeltsina] thought the continuation of his thought would be, ‘I am not going to write it.’ But he said, ‘No, I am going to write my statement. And we will just see about work later.’ He did not say a thing after that.”34 He drafted the letter that night and sent it to Gorbachev on Saturday, September 12, after what one must assume was further introspection.
Half of the missive was a swipe at Ligachëv, whom Yeltsin painted as a boor and a hat-throwing partisan of Tomsk. Party committees like Yeltsin’s in Moscow, restrained by Ligachëv and his minions, “are losing their self-reliance [samostoyatel’nost’],” even as the leadership was beginning to ease up on factory and farm directors.35 Yeltsin also underlined “the disparity between revolutionary words and [unrevolutionary] deeds,” as had been a theme of his all year, and notified Gorbachev that people felt the inconsistency but were reticent to talk about it.
The novelty of the September document was not the compendium of allegations but the quandary it laid before the Soviet leader. Yeltsin’s undiplomatic request to quit his official posts was certain to cause consternation. The letter only magnified it by telling the general secretary that unnamed officials were shamming agreement with his reforms and blocking them on the sly. Gorbachev, Yeltsin said, had grown inured to the pseudo reformers’ game and was an accomplice in it: “This suits them and, if you will pardon me, Mikhail Sergeyevich, it seems to me [these people] are coming to suit you.” The author was not good at stroking his boss’s ego: “I am an infelicitous person and I know it. I realize it is hard for you to know what to do about me.” If he were to stay in place and nothing else chang
ed, he would be a nuisance, and the problems “will grow and will hobble you in your work.” Most striking for the member of a collective leadership, Yeltsin raised the possibility of taking unilateral action. It was best if Gorbachev dealt with Ligachëv’s obstinacy, one way or the other: “To ‘decode’ all of this would be deleterious if it went public. Only you personally can make a change in the interests of the party.” Between the lines, Yeltsin was asking Gorbachev to throw overboard his second secretary and not Yeltsin, and to speed up reform. The closing sentence of the memorandum was a saber-rattling ultimatum about a widening of the arena of internecine conflict: “I do not think I will find it necessary to turn directly to the plenum of the Central Committee.”
Gorbachev was troubled enough by the letter to dial Yeltsin from his seaside villa in Pitsunda, Georgia. He agreed to discuss it with Yeltsin in Moscow but wanted the meeting to wait almost two months, until after the November 7 holiday break. Gorbachev’s hauteur was strange. One would have thought he would hasten to fix the problem. It was not every day that a candidate member of the Politburo resigned his position. Gorbachev has maintained that Yeltsin accepted his timing. Yeltsin says they agreed to confer “later,” and he assumed that meant in one or two weeks.36 Yeltsin stewed when Gorbachev did not contact him. He feared that the planned October plenum of the Central Committee, the third of the year, was where Gorbachev was going to take up the question, and that he would be confronted there by a motion from Gorbachev and the voting members of the Politburo to purge him.37 He got intelligence from Poltoranin of Moskovskaya pravda and others that Ligachëv was stockpiling data and poised for a preemptive strike against him. On injunction from Ligachëv, Yurii Sklyarov, the head of the Central Committee propaganda department, instructed Poltoranin to write a memorandum “showing that Yeltsin was a populist, that he got in the way of normal work, and so on.” Poltoranin turned him down and took the news to Yeltsin.38
As Yeltsin gave his letter to the courier on September 12, he was to recall, he foresaw two options: “If they ousted me, . . . I would take up independent political activity. . . . If they did not oust me, I would appeal to the plenum of the Central Committee.”39 His upbeat attitude is hard to fathom. Basmanovo or Butka homesteaders and maybe Sverdlovsk civil engineers could forage on their own—the word Yeltsin used for “independent” (samostoyatel’nyi) is the adjectival form of “self-reliance.” What, however, would political independence be in a country where one centralized party still controlled government and its means of violence, the media, and the economy? As for the Central Committee as a court of appeal, Yeltsin did not know if he would be afforded the floor. If he were able to speak, he might find some committee backing, but to suborn members would have been “sacrilegious,” as he was to say to the plenum, and would not have gone undetected.40 He mulled over a third course and mentioned it to Naina: to write a special letter to the members of the Politburo. He rejected it; a letter could influence no one except possibly for Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Central Committee secretary who was the most change-acceptant of Gorbachev’s wards.41
The Central Committee met two or three times a year in Sverdlov Hall, in the eighteenth-century Building No. 1 of the Kremlin. The hall was a magnificent rotunda, ninety feet high and ringed in light Corinthian pillars and pilasters and a narrow gallery above. The plenum of Wednesday, October 21, was billed as a sedate affair. It was to consist of hearing out the Politburo-approved text of Gorbachev’s report commemorating the revolution, which was scheduled for delivery on November 2, and party etiquette prescribed early adjournment without discussion, followed by a pleasant luncheon together. Yeltsin was seated in the front row; only the full members of the Politburo were on the presidium, or presiding panel, which looked down on the Central Committee members, alternates, and guests across a skirted desk. He was unsure until the last about whether to try to speak. At about eleven A.M., as Gorbachev finished up, Yeltsin scribbled a few “theses” on one of the red cards used to register votes at Soviet committees and assemblies. He raised his good, right hand shakily in the air. Stage fright hit and he took it down. Gorbachev pointed him out to Ligachëv, who was chairing. Ligachëv asked the members if they wanted to open discussion of the report; when several said they did not, he motioned to Yeltsin that he would not get to speak. Yeltsin took to his feet and was again repelled by Ligachëv. Gorbachev interjected a second time: “Comrade Yeltsin has some kind of announcement.” Only then did Ligachëv surrender the microphone.
Why ever did Gorbachev override Ligachëv? He had to know Yeltsin was up to no good. The circumstances prompt the surmise that the general secretary thought he would kill two birds with one stone by letting the Moscow boss have the floor. One benefit would be to apply pressure on the party to get with the program of reform, on the rationale that incremental change was to be preferred to the shocks favored by Yeltsin. The other potential advantage was the chance for Gorbachev and his followers in the Central Committee to reply to and chasten the hotheadedness of Yeltsin, which could have led to further sanctions.42 Like Yeltsin’s decision to speak out, Gorbachev’s decision to allow him to speak carried its own heavy risks.
No drumroll announced Yeltsin’s cri de coeur. In Vitalii Vorotnikov’s words, he “strode up onto the dais. Clearly agitated, he took a pause and began to speak. He talked at first confusedly and then with more assurance, but without his usual force. Somehow, he was semi-apologetic and semiaccusatory, trying continuously to contain his passions.”43 Gorbachev remembers in his memoirs a similarly “strange composite” of feelings on Yeltsin’s face. The combination, he says in one of his off-the-shelf digs at Yeltsin, was what you got from “an unbalanced nature.”44
Yeltsin’s nine hundred words—his secret speech—lasted all of six or seven minutes.45 In form, they will not put anyone in mind of Pericles’ Funeral Oration or the Gettysburg Address or even of the original secret speech by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, with its gripping, four-hour narrative of arrest, torture, and gore under Stalin. Yeltsin gave mostly a rambling rerun of the letter of September 12 and of oral statements at meetings, open and closed.46 Items about Ligachëv and hidebound Soviet bureaucracy tripped out pell-mell. The only concrete anecdote Yeltsin gave of messed-up reform was the workaday one of his inability to cut back on the number of research institutes in Moscow, as he had promised to do in 1986.47
What was lacking in fluency and lawyer’s points Yeltsin made up for in audacity and heat. He wanted “to say everything that is in my soul, what is in my heart, and what is in me as a communist.” He unloaded three bombshells. The first was a sharpened position on how the mass of the population was tuning out the reform process. “People’s faith has begun to ebb.” Unless results were hewed to match promises, “we may well find that the authority of the party as a whole will diminish in the people’s eyes.” Yeltsin made the point clumsily, pushing both a stronger effort to make good on promises and a move away from the two- or three-year period he had spoken of in the Politburo on October 15. The second point was a call for “democratic forms” in Soviet politics, especially in the Communist Party, and disapproval of the growing sycophancy toward Gorbachev, which he said had the ring of a Stalin- or Brezhnev-like personality cult. Political deformations of this sort, Yeltsin asserted, accounted for the failures of the seventy years reviewed in Gorbachev’s report:
I must say that the lessons that come out of these seventy years are painful lessons. Yes, there have been victories, as Mikhail Sergeyevich has said, but there also have been . . . harsh lessons, serious defeats. These defeats took shape gradually. They happened because there was no collegiality [in the party], because cliques were formed, because the party’s power was delivered into a single pair of hands, because this one man was protected from all criticism.
Myself, I am disturbed that there is still not a good situation within the Politburo and that recently there has been a noticeable growth in what I can only call adulation of the general secretary on the part of certain mem
bers of the Politburo, certain members of long standing. This is impermissible now, at a time when we are introducing properly democratic and honorable relations toward one another, true comradely relations. . . . This is impermissible. I am all for criticizing people to their faces, eye-toeye, but not for being carried away by adulation, which can again become the norm, a cult of personality.48
These broadsides landed, Yeltsin’s peroration made his third point—repetition of the request to get him off the Politburo that he had initially made in writing on September 12. It was offered with an addendum that was not in the letter to Gorbachev but was part of his September 10 conversation with Naina: the afterthought that his position as Moscow first secretary should be considered by the city committee of the party and not solely by the Central Committee, which would have made it possible for him to remain Moscow party boss after departing the Politburo. Catcalls rang out when he made the last statement. As he took his seat again, “My heart was pounding and seemed ready to burst out of my chest.”49
Looked at in the sweep of Yeltsin’s life, the soliloquy was an instant of truth. He reflected on it in an interview fifteen years later as lonely and intimidating : “It was an expression of protest. . . . I had a venturesome attitude but no support. . . . I was all alone against this armada, this bulky and cumbersome communist thing, their KGB system.”50 There is some self-dramatization here, and not for the only time, but there is no denying that Yeltsin was tempting fate. Irrespective of the cries from the hall after he spoke that he was consumed by vainglory, the eruption was not the result of naked power-seeking, for, absent something to defuse the situation, retribution was foreordained as soon as he had gone through with it. As Anatolii Chernyayev dryly put it to Gorbachev in early November, Yeltsin “was not aiming for the top spot: He was smart enough not to count on it.”51
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