If Yeltsin was a social democrat at all, it was more in the stamp of Tony Blair of Britain, Felipe González of Spain, or Gerhard Schröder of Germany than of the left-wing statists of interwar and postwar Europe. He took it as uncontroversial that Russia could get by only with a just and effective state, but that its state would have the ability to rule and popular support only if it did something to cure Russia’s economic disease.
Yeltsin was able to anchor enthusiasm for capsizing Soviet ways in halfburied pieces of his past. In the chapter of Notes of a President where he eulogizes Ignatii and Nikolai Yeltsin, he speaks of the windmill, smithy, and land leases they gathered by the sweat of their brow and of the injustice and social disutility of the state expropriating them. He was aware of how Vasilii Starygin fended in exile by selling homemade furniture to local buyers. These kin’s only crime was that they held property, were hardworking, and “took many things upon themselves.” With its zero-sum thinking, “The Soviet regime liked modest, ordinary folk, people who did not stand out. It did not like and it showed no mercy to the strong, the ingenious, and the lively.” Yeltsin’s felt mandate, as someone who did stand out, was to undo this mistake and foster an enterprising society in which the writ of the state was circumscribed. For throwing off lassitude, he offered autobiographical role models: the sportsman who trains and betters a rival, as he had on the volleyball court; the public figure who survives after taking an independent stand, as he did in his secret speech in 1987; and the hospital patient who takes the first tottering steps after an operation, as he had after his back surgery in Barcelona in 1990. Russians, he said, needed to cast off their “slavish psychology” and open up space for “people without hangups, intrepid people, of the kind who earlier [in the Soviet period] were simply squelched.” The idealized historical reference most on Yeltsin’s mind was his thrifty Urals forebears. Russia was giving signs, he wrote, of reemergence of the outlook “of independent peasants [muzhiki] who do not wait for another’s help, who do not pin their hopes on anyone else . . . [who] scold everyone and stubbornly tend to their own business.”45
After the 1991 coup, Yeltsin was in no shape psychologically or politically to move into decision gear. He fled Moscow on August 29 for two weeks of sunbathing, swimming, and tennis in the Latvian playground of Jurmala. He was back in town briefly twice, did a peacemaking errand in Armenia, and was then off again to Sochi for another couple of weeks. On September 18, in Moscow, Yeltsin was drained and experienced coronary pain. But on September 25, the day he left for Sochi, Pavel Voshchanov said he “has taken a timeout . . . not for relaxation but so he can in calm surroundings work at his further plans and also on a new book.”46 Yeltsin supporters were stupefied that he had dropped out of sight and at such a juncture could be dabbling in authorship. It was as if Napoleon had repaired to the Riviera to compose poetry after routing the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz, one Democratic Russia parliamentary deputy later said. Gorbachev’s advisers thought the Russian leader was playing “a cat-and-mouse game with us,” and Gorbachev refused to consider traveling to Sochi to see him (“We have to protect our honor”).47 Yeltsin at Bocharov Ruchei dictated a few paragraphs only of the manuscript, which was to grow into Notes of a President, the second volume of his memoirs, and had no interest in playing games with Gorbachev. But his “further plans” could not be put off and were the subject of searing interchanges with members of his team until his return to the capital on October 10.
As the Soviet Union was in extremis and Yeltsin composed himself, Russia’s government found itself in turmoil. In July he had asked Gennadii Burbulis, the scholar from Sverdlovsk who had just managed his election campaign, and whom he passed over for Aleksandr Rutskoi as vice president, to be his chief of staff and set up a Presidential Executive Office (Administratsiya Prezidenta) for him. Burbulis balked: He pined to be a grand strategist and not “to work twenty-four hours a day with a card file.”48 Yeltsin contrived the position of state secretary for him, with undefined duties. Rutskoi, elected without a job description, then exhorted Yeltsin to unite the office of vice president with headship of the executive office and to let him be the president’s channel to the state apparatus. Yeltsin, saying he had no need of “a commissar,” declined.49 On August 5 he selected as chief of staff his old friend from the Sverdlovsk obkom, Yurii Petrov, who had been Soviet ambassador to Cuba since 1988; Yeltsin had to ask Gorbachev to release him from the post. Petrov reported for duty around noon on August 19, just as the tanks chugged up to the Russian White House. He had no time to introduce himself to Rutskoi, Burbulis, and staff before rushing downstairs to catch Yeltsin making his immortal speech on Tank No. 110.50
The ministerial bureaucracy was the main mechanism for carrying out decisions. At its head as prime minister was Ivan Silayev, a “red director”—a widely used term in Russia for the Soviet-era industrial manager, serving at the pleasure of the Communist Party. Silayev, who was Yeltsin’s age and had left the besieged White House for his family in August, was in the president’s estimation an unsuitable sparkplug for a serious salvage and reform effort. He quit on September 27 to chair an interrepublic economic committee, leaving Oleg Lobov of Sverdlovsk as caretaker Russian premier. The cabinet was rife with jockeying for position; agreements were being signed and disowned and resignations tendered in disgust. The seclusion of the president, one reporter observed, “has produced a crisis of power” and “a conflict of all against all.”51
For the prime minister’s post, Yeltsin looked at first for a “miracle worker” unattached to any program. He offered it in September to Svyatoslav Fëdorov, the proprietor of the USSR’s first commercial eye-surgery clinic, who turned it down flat. He had no better luck with Yurii Ryzhov, the rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute, or Mikhail Poltoranin, the editor to whom he had been so close in the Moscow party committee. He then auditioned Yurii Skokov, a conservative industrialist from the military sector, and Grigorii Yavlinskii.52 In dialogue on beach chairs in Sochi, Burbulis got Yeltsin to look at less familiar names and to link his personnel decision to the reform conundrum. After three days, “Yeltsin understood very well the backlog of problems, the frightening inheritance that had come his way. And so our conversation came down to the hopelessness of surmounting all of this by conventional methods.” “It is going to be very sticky,” Yeltsin said to him. Burbulis felt “emaciated” by the conversation.53
As crafter of the unconventional methods, Burbulis prevailed on the president to turn to Yegor Gaidar, an urbane, moon-faced economist and publicist from the Soviet baby boom—at thirty-five, he was but one year older than Yeltsin’s first daughter, Yelena. Born into an establishment family (his father was a navy admiral and both of his grandfathers were famed writers), Gaidar had two graduate degrees in economics, had written for Pravda and Kommunist (the CPSU’s theoretical journal), and directed a research institute. He also had a connection to the city of Sverdlovsk, which had just been renamed Yekaterinburg.54 Working out of an Arkhangel’skoye-2 dacha, Gaidar and colleagues had drawn up a liberalization proposal more radical than Five Hundred Days and executable in Russia rather than in an undivided Soviet Union.55 He was asked in the last week of October to return from a lecture booking at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, to meet with Yeltsin. Their interview took all of twenty minutes. The chief “grasped the breathtaking risk connected with the beginning of reforms,” yet also “that passivity and dallying would be suicidal.” “He seemed geared up to take upon himself political accountability for reforms that would inevitably be punishing, knowing this would add nothing to his popularity.”56 Gaidar agreed to serve in some capacity, although he and his confederates at the dacha rubbed their eyes and “felt as if it were not for real.”57
Yeltsin tipped his hand publicly on October 28 in a wide-ranging address to the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies and the population. “The period of movement by small steps is over,” he declared. “We now need a reformist breakthrough. . . . We shall begin
, in deeds and not just in words, to pull ourselves out of the morass that is sucking us in deeper and deeper.”58 On November 1 the congress gave him carte blanche to make reforms by decree for twelve months. He was authorized to issue edicts contravening existing laws, reorganize the cabinet without checking with parliament, and appoint heads of provincial administrations. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, shepherded the motion through the assembly. The composition of a reform government was revealed on November 6, the day Yeltsin consigned the CPSU to oblivion. On Burbulis’s advice, Yeltsin did the constitutional somersault of naming himself prime minister, averting the need to have anyone else confirmed by parliament. Burbulis was made first deputy premier and Gaidar finance minister and deputy premier for economic policy.59 To their surprise, Yeltsin left Gaidar and Burbulis alone to nominate the holders of key portfolios. Most were thirtysomethings, up to twenty-five years younger than Yeltsin and Gavriil Popov and the reformists he had known in the Interregional Deputies Group. “Fresh faces were needed to cope with the job. I selected people with a minimum of Soviet baggage, people without mental and ideological blinkers, without a bureaucratic mentality.”60 They passed with flying colors the test he had set in the Moscow party committee in the mid-1980s: readiness to put in insanely long hours at work. Gaidar’s days that fall and winter ended at three or four A.M.; eager beavers in his office snatched some slumber on cots or on pillows and blankets spread on the floor.
Political blowups heightened the pressure. One of them led Yeltsin on November 7 to impose martial law in Chechnya, a minority republic in the North Caucasus area of Russia. An air force general, Djokhar Dudayev, had been elected president in the Chechen capital of Grozny and peremptorily declared independence. Yeltsin’s show of force, promoted by Vice President Rutskoi, only fanned the flames, and Gorbachev, who still controlled Soviet troops, was opposed. On November 11 the Russian Supreme Soviet voted not to recognize Yeltsin’s decree, making it unenforceable. Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, an ethnic Chechen, sided with the anti-Yeltsin forces.
For one week of all this Yeltsin was inaccessible to his staff and ministers. Gorbachev, the unsympathetic witness, claims Yeltsin was drunk when they spoke about Chechnya by telephone on November 10. Associates were unsure how much alcohol had to do with it but were disturbed by their leader’s unavailability. Either way, the stress of office was giving rise to insalubrious behavior.61
The October reform package went under the marquee “shock therapy” (shokoterapiya in Russian). The phrase applied to a wider field of action than its original meaning in Latin America and post-communist Eastern Europe, which was the lifting of price controls to halt an inflationary spiral and jumpstart economic growth.62 Yeltsin, he stated unsentimentally in retirement, aimed at a double-barreled modernizing revolution in economy and by extension in society: “to unloose prices, that is to introduce a real market forcefully and toughly, the way [Russian landlords and peasants] were ordered to plant potatoes under Peter the Great; and, second, to create private property . . . to create a class of owners.”63 Peter had been his paladin since grade school, and Yeltsin was mesmerized by the tsar as enlightened reformator—a Russian noun, borrowed from the German, that connotes the likelihood of greater dislocations than the English “reformer.” Here was his chance to play Peter, although in a protodemocratic nation: His lords and peasants had the franchise and could topple him at the next election. He knew of Peter’s maniacal tendencies, he would concede in 1993 to an interviewer who pointed out that Peter “personally cut off the heads” of his enemies. It was true, Yeltsin said, “but we also have to keep in mind all the things he did for Russia.”64
Much as summaries—including Yeltsin’s wistful retirement speech in December 1999—often refer to the assault as one fast-flying leap, his thinking at the time showed flexibility and realism. Concerning Peter the Great, he writes level-headedly in Notes of a President that turning Russians into good Europeans was “an ambitious goal unattainable in one generation.” “In a certain sense,” the Petrine reforms “have not been completed to this day.” “Although we have become Europeans, we have remained ourselves.” Every flurry of reform in Russia’s past, he said, was followed by a backlash and a rollback. This mold he was determined to break. “The goal I posed for myself was to make reform irrevocable.” If there were economic restructuring and “grandiose political changes,” the process would be unstoppable and a return of the communists inconceivable: “After us, other people will come who will finish the job off and move the country toward prosperity.”65
Yeltsin wanted the path chosen to outlive the first burst of change and to outlive him. What he did not want was to take the time to ask the population’s approval of his project or to spell out what awaited them. Perhaps, as Yurii Burtin said in 1992, he tended to patronize the people “as one would a child who does not understand his own interests and cannot be allowed to participate in affairs of state.”66 I doubt Yeltsin was as misanthropic as that. As Burtin wrote, condescension toward the population coexisted in the minds of Yeltsin and his men with fear of disorder, a yen to please, and a catering to “the prejudices and the far from admirable feelings of the less conscious strata.”67 Society itself, after generations of communism, was not organized to protect or promote the shared interests of its members, particularly when the patrimonial idols lay broken on the temple floor. The historian Yurii Afanas’ev, formerly co-chairman with Yeltsin of the Interregional group, noted in an essay in the same volume as Burtin’s how underdeveloped Russia’s civil society was and that political parties, which could now be legally formed, were insubstantial startups: “The absence of large-scale social groups tutored in their own distinct group interests allows the administration of Boris Yeltsin to forget about our current anemic ‘multipartyness.’”68 Most citizens waited for their leader to act and hoped for the best.
Yeltsin’s words and his taking on of the premiership left no doubt about who had willed the turnabout in policy. But he held open an escape route. In mid-1992 he was to raise Gaidar in rank to acting prime minister. By the end of 1992, Gaidar and his benefactor from 1991, Burbulis, were both out of government. Yeltsin professed that he always saw the Gaidar-Burbulis grouping as “a kamikaze crew that would step into the line of fire and forge ahead . . . that would go up in flames but remain in history.”69 Did the warriors know they were taking to the sky on a suicide mission? Yeltsin says he never discussed it with them; the head kamikaze says he did. In their getacquainted meeting, asserts Gaidar in his memoir of the 1990s, he warned Yeltsin that once the most unsavory decisions were behind them the president might have to dismiss the government. Yeltsin “gave me a skeptical smile and waved his arm, as if to say it would not come to that.”70 Either the president was holding his cards close to his vest or, more likely, he was not yet certain how it would all play out.
The decisive break in Yeltsin’s October manifesto on reforming the economy, as announced to the Congress of Deputies, was in the realm of prices. Ninety percent of retail prices in Russia, and 80 percent of wholesale prices, were to be freed from state dictate and left to the impersonal forces of supply and demand. Yeltsin dressed down aides when the draft of the speech, in a typing screw-up, omitted the section on price deregulation.71 Another priority was macroeconomic stabilization through slashing the budget deficit and cutting back on the emission of money and credit. Still another was privatization of state property, to forge “a healthy mixed economy with a strong private sector.” Half of all small and medium-sized firms were to be turned over to nonstate owners within six months; large enterprises were going to be refashioned as joint stock corporations, shares in which would later be distributed and sold at supply-and-demand prices. Yeltsin described these actions as proactive and equally as reactive to developments. Members of the nomenklatura had already been sidestepping price controls, trafficking on the black market, and speculating in currency. And they were furtively amassing money and unofficial rights over
, and rents from, state property: “Privatization has been going on in Russia for some time, but in a wild . . . and often criminal fashion. Today we need to seize the initiative, and we are intent on doing so.”
Yeltsin tended most meticulously in the speech to the politics of the breakthrough. “The experience of global civilization” showed that Russia’s plight was “difficult but not hopeless.” The nation that overcame Napoleon and Hitler had special reserves that would see it through: “Russia has more than once in its rich history shown that a crucible period is when it is able to mobilize its will and its many powers, talents, and resources in order to lift up and strengthen itself.” All could pull together, he said, in the knowledge that relief was in sight. “The uncertainty will be gone and the prognosis will be clear.”
When Yeltsin got around to owning up to and distributing the costs of his changes, he was on thin ice. He had been claiming since the 1990 election campaign that he could move Russia toward the market—he did not apply the word kapitalizm, so unmusical to Soviet ears, until his second term—without people of ordinary means losing out. In the 1991 presidential campaign, he flailed at Gorbachev for the administered increases in consumer and food prices that April: “They ought not to have begun economic reform by unscrupulously laying all the hardships on the population.”72 Now that he answered for policy, he had to sell belt-tightening. “It will be worse for everyone for approximately a half-year. Then prices will go down, the consumer market will fill with goods, and by the autumn of 1992 . . . the economy will stabilize and living standards will slowly improve.”73 The one round year seems to have been mostly a figment of his imagination, and was more optimistic than Five Hundred Days, which had posited a two-year stabilization period. Gaidar maintains that two or three years were the minimum needed for growth to return and denies that he misled Yeltsin as to the time needed.74
Yeltsin Page 31