102 “Yeltsin Interviewed,” 77.
103 Vadim Bakatin, interview with the author (May 29, 2002). Bakatin was to be head of the KGB in the autumn of 1991 and may have had access to files about the incident there. Rumor has long had it that Yeltsin went to see the Bashilovs’ chambermaid. The woman, Yelena Stepanova, denies any relationship and says KGB officers told her he met someone and then ended up in a ditch on the property. Anna Veligzhanina, “Yel’tsin padal s mosta ot lyubvi?” (Did Yeltsin fall from the bridge out of love?), Komsomol’skaya pravda, November 21, 2004. Several persons close to Yeltsin at the time believe he engineered the occasion as a publicity stunt.
104 Mezentsev, “Okruzhentsy,” part 3.
105 At an interview with a journalist on October 21, Yeltsin was “in a fantastic mood.” Andrei Karaulov, Chastushki (Humorous verses) (Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 1998), 169.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1 George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 125. As Breslauer shows, polarization was Gorbachev’s worst fear, because of his personality and his reading of historical experiences such as the destruction of reform communism in Czechoslovakia in 1968. As for Yeltsin, his power-seeking is difficult to comb out from his substantive goals. The study that most accentuates his drive for power is Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997). Even it must concede (340) that Yeltsin also had transformative aims.
2 Lev Sukhanov, Tri goda s Yel’tsinym: zapiski pervogo pomoshchnika (Three years with Yeltsin: notes of his first assistant) (Riga: Vaga, 1992), 241.
3 Yu, M. Baturin et al., Epokha Yel’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin epoch: essays in political history) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 78.
4 Lyudmila Pikhoya, interview with the author (September 26, 2001). Kharin died in 1992, but Il’in stayed with Yeltsin until 1998 and Pikhoya until 1999.
5 Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 81.
6 V. I. Vorotnikov, A bylo eto tak: iz dnevnika chlena Politbyuro TsK KPSS (But this is how it was: from the diary of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) (Moscow: Sovet veteranov knigoizdaniya, 1995), 342–43, 348, 362–63.
7 The book was widely distributed in other Soviet republics. The CPSU first secretary in Ukraine, Vladimir Ivashko, told the Politburo it had made Ukrainian coal miners question their party dues: “The miners say, Why should we pay money so that someone else can live in luxury?” Politburo transcript, April 9, 1990 (Volkogonov Archive, Project on Cold War Studies, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University), 356.
8 “Yeltsin’s RSFSR Election Platform Outlined,” FBIS-SOV-90-045 (March 7, 1990), 108–9; L. N. Dobrokhotov, ed., Gorbachev–Yel’tsin: 1,500 dnei politicheskogo protivostoyaniya (Gorbachev–Yeltsin: 1,500 days of political conflict) (Moscow: TERRA, 1992), 173 (italics added).
9 For example, in January 1990, Yeltsin, building on discussions in the Sverdlovsk years, advocated the creation of seven “Russian republics” within the RSFSR, which apparently would have been controlled by ethnic Russians and would have been equal in powers to, but much larger than, the non-Russian republics. He repudiated this formula for confusion and conflict in August 1990. In an equally problematic statement, he said to the Russian congress in May 1990 that he favored “the sovereignty of the raion [district] soviet,” which would have subjected Russia and its provinces to centrifugal forces at the most local level. He never repeated the phrase. See V. T. Loginov, ed., Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’ (The union could have been saved), rev. ed. (Moscow: AST, 2007), 135, 156, 166.
10 Vyacheslav Terekhov, interview with the author (June 5, 2001). It is a confused comment, for in the Bible Jesus goes to the hill of Golgotha to be crucified. Yeltsin believed that in the forthcoming struggle it was his opponents who would lose out.
11 Politburo transcript, March 7, 1990 (Volkogonov Archive), 356.
12 Polling figures are given in John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 28–29; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 203, 270–71; and Matthew Wyman, Public Opinion in Postcommunist Russia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 85.
13 Politburo transcript, March 22, 1990 (Volkogonov Archive), 219; Sergei Filatov, Sovershenno nesekretno (Top nonsecret) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2000), 40–41.
14 Politburo transcript, March 22, 1990, 207–8.
15 In Loginov, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, 147–48.
16 Boris Yel’tsin, Zapiski prezidenta (Notes of a president) (Moscow: Ogonëk, 1994), 175; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 803–4.
17 Journalist Vladimir Mezentsev, interview with the author (September 26, 2001). Mezentsev had worked for Yeltsin until just before the event and was present at it.
18 Georgii Shakhnazarov, S vozhdyami i bez nikh (With leaders and without them) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 367.
19 Vladimir Mezentsev, “Okruzhentsy” (Encourage), part 9, Rabochaya tribuna, April 7, 1995.
20 Nuisance candidates took thirty-two votes in the first round and eleven in the third. The remaining deputies not included in the totals here crossed off the names of all the candidates entered.
21 Aleksandr Budberg, “Proigravshii pobeditel’: Mikhailu Gorbachevu—75” (Losing victor: Mikhail Gorbachev at 75), Moskovskii komsomolets, March 3, 2006.
22 Korzhakov, Yeltsin’s bodyguard and confidant, had had his wages covered by three business cooperatives. Lantseva, his main press spokesman until July 1991, first received a salary in February 1991. Neither Lantseva nor Bortsov, who wrote speeches for Yeltsin until 1995, had Moscow residency until 1991. Author’s interviews with Lantseva (July 9, 2001), Bortsov (June 11, 2001), and Mezentsev. See also Vladimir Mezentsev, “Okruzhentsy,” part 3, Rabochaya tribuna, March 28, 1995.
23 Mikhail Bocharov, interview with the author (October 19, 2000).
24 The delegates “took into account that if they voted for [Lobov] it would be a kind of linkup between the party and Yeltsin.” Yurii Prokof’ev, Do i posle zapreta KPSS: pervyi sekretar’ MGK KPSS vspominayet (Before and after the ban on the CPSU: a first secretary of the Moscow gorkom remembers) (Moscow: Algoritm, 2005), 218.
25 XXVIII s”ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskii otchët (The 28th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: stenographic record), 2 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), 1:472–75.
26 Author’s interviews with Gavriil Popov (June 1, 2001) and Sergei Stankevich (May 29, 2001).
27 Baturin et al., Epokha, 93. See also Sukhanov, Tri goda, 338–39.
28 An early draft of the announcement called on legislative leaders and President Gorbachev to follow his example. A copy, with corrections in Yeltsin’s handwriting, is in Aleksandr Khinshtein, Yel’tsin, Kreml’, istoriya bolezni (Yeltsin, the Kremlin, the history of an illness) (Moscow: OLMA, 2006), 543; it was obtained from the widow of Lev Sukhanov.
29 Viktor Sheinis, Vzlët i padeniye parlamenta: perelomnyye gody v rossiiskoi politike, 1985–1993 (The rise and fall of parliament: years of change in Russian politics, 1985–93) (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, Fond INDEM, 2005), 357.
30 Naina Yeltsina, personal communication to the author (July 29, 2007).
31 Anatolii Chernyayev, 1991 god: dnevnik pomoshchnika Prezidenta SSSR (The year 1991: diary of an assistant to the president of the USSR) (Moscow: TERRA, 1997), 37.
32 Politburo transcript, May 3, 1990 (Volkogonov Archive), 516, 533.
33 Pervyi s”ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR, 25 maya–9 iyunya 1989 g.: stenograficheskii otchët (The first congress of people’s deputies of the USSR, May 25–June 9, 1989: stenographic record), 6 vols. (Moscow: Izdaniye Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989), 2:48.
34 Hough, Democratization and Revolution, 385. On th
is general issue, see also Edward W. Walker, Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
35 Most accounts leave out this last detail. The congress in fact rejected an amendment that would have had the declaration of primacy click in immediately. Gwendolyn Elizabeth Stewart, “SIC TRANSIT: Democratization, Suverenizatsiia, and Boris Yeltsin in the Breakup of the Soviet Union” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1995), 272–73. Once the provision was in effect, though, it was reminiscent of the theory of nullification put forth to defend states’ rights in the United States by John C. Calhoun in the 1820s and 1830s.
36 Boris Yeltsin, first interview with the author (July 15, 2001).
37 Ivan Silayev, interview with the author (January 25, 2001). Agreements were reached with Lithuania in the Baltic and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, but the general arrangement stayed put.
38 Bill Keller, “Boris Yeltsin Taking Power,” New York Times, September 23, 1990.
39 “Trusy Yel’tsina” (Yeltsin’s trunks), http://www.channel4.ru/content/200205/10/112.trus.html.
40 A. L. Litvin, Yel’tsiny v Kazani (The Yeltsins in Kazan) (Kazan: Aibat, 2004), 70–71; Loginov, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, 165–66.
41 “Yeltsin Continues Russian Tour to Bashkir ASSR,” FBIS-SOV-90-156 (August 13, 1990), 82.
42 Dobrokhotov, Gorbachev–Yel’tsin, 198.
43 Ibid., 194.
44 Shakhnazarov, S vozhdyami i bez nikh, 373; Aleksandr Yakovlev, first interview with the author (June 9, 2000). Yakovlev said that with him Gorbachev was at first somewhat receptive to the vice-presidential initiative, but went solidly against it after discussion with Politburo members.
45 Boris Yeltsin, second interview with the author (February 9, 2002).
46 At the Politburo meeting hours after Yeltsin attacked Gorbachev, the Kremlin chief of staff, Valerii Boldin, said it was time “to part with illusions with relation to Yeltsin. . . . He will never work together with us. He is a not entirely healthy person and sees himself only in confrontation.” Prime Minister Ryzhkov concurred, saying Yeltsin was only interested in power and would not rest until he had Gorbachev’s job. V Politbyuro TsK KPSS . . . (In the Politburo of the CPSU) (Moscow: Gorbachev-Fond, 2006), 618–19.
47 Yelena Bonner, interview with the author (March 13, 2001). Yeltsin made the comment as Bonner stood with him on the balcony of the Russian White House, at the conclusion of the putsch of August 1991. She had told him several months before that Gorbachev had made him look foolish over the Five Hundred Days plan.
48 Vyacheslav Chornovil, “Yel’tsin vnis duzhe konstruktyvnyi moment u politychnu real’nist’ v Ukraini” (Yeltsin injected a very constructive note into Ukrainian political reality), Za vil’nu Ukrainu (Ukrainian-language newspaper, L’viv), November 23, 1990; reference supplied by Roman Szporluk. Despite the implicit recognition of the border, Chornovil did say Yeltsin’s attitude toward the Crimea issue gave him some concern.
49 Chernyayev, 1991 god, 76.
50 Karen Brutents, Nesbyvsheyesya: neravnodushnyye zametki o perestroike (It never came true: engaged notes about perestroika) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2005), 108.
51 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random House, 1995), 488.
52 Yeltsin was invited to Strasbourg by the International Politics Forum, a Parisbased organization linked to European Christian Democratic parties. When he arrived, he mistook dignitaries at the airport, waiting for another visitor, for a welcoming group for him. The city mayor, Cathérine Trautman, recognized the situation for what it was and organized a dinner the next day with local officials and businessmen. “These people were impressed by him for presenting so dignified a face.” Yeltsin flew out of Strasbourg when it became clear he would not be allowed to participate in the assembly’s deliberations. Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, French scholar and parliamentarian, interview with the author (September 11, 2007).
53 John Morrison, Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat (New York: Dutton, 1991), 252.
54 Dmitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 89.
55 Monica Crowley, Nixon in Winter (New York: Random House, 1998), 43. Nixon said to another associate (Simes, After the Collapse, 89) that in American terms Gorbachev was “Wall Street” but Yeltsin was “Main Street.” In his last book (Beyond Peace [New York: Random House, 1994], 45), Nixon said Gorbachev was better suited to “drawing rooms” and Yeltsin to “family rooms.”
56 Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 171.
57 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Yeltsin’s Political Objectives,” SOV 91-10026X (June 1991), 1, 7; declassified version obtained at http://www.foia.cia.gov.browse_docs.asp? On interdependency, the report acknowledged Yeltsin’s “awareness of the multistranded interweaving of goals and analysis.” He understood, for example, that, “One cannot promote Russian welfare without (a) dropping the burden of empire, (b) marketizing the economy, and (c) cutting military expenditures.” He realized that, “One cannot marketize if one does not (a) dismantle the Stalinist system and create a climate of legality, (b) cut back the military-industrial complex, (c) resolve societal problems peacefully, and (d) gain Western economic collaboration.” And it had sunk in that, “One cannot achieve nonviolent solutions to societal problems without (a) eliminating totalitarian structures, (b) gaining voluntary resolution of ethnic conflicts, and (c) improving living standards.”
58 Vladimir Isakov, interview with the author (June 4, 2001). For details, see V. B. Isakov, Predsedatel’ Soveta Respubliki: parlamentskiye dnevniki, 1990–1991 (Chairman of the Council of the Republic: parliamentary diaries, 1990–91) (Moscow: Paleya, 1996).
59 Vladimir Zhirinovskii, interview with the author (January 22, 2002). On CPSU and KGB backing for the formation of Zhirinovskii’s party, and the financial sum provided, see Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Dusk) (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 574—75.
60 “Yeltsin Gives Speech in Moscow,” FBIS-SOV-91-106 (June 3, 1991), 75.
61 On spatial distribution of the vote, see Gavin Helf, “All the Russias: Center, Core, and Periphery in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia” (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1994); and Scott Gehlbach, “Shifting Electoral Geography in Russia’s 1991 and 1996 Presidential Elections,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 5 (July–August 2000), 379–87.
62 Aleksei Yemel’yanov in Dobrokhotov, Gorbachev–Yel’tsin, 339.
63 “My mozhem byt’ tvërdo uvereny: Rossiya vozroditsya” (We can be certain that Russia will be reborn), Izvestiya, July 10, 1991.
64 Filatov, Sovershenno nesekretno, 84–87; Baturin et al., Epokha, 122; Shakhnazarov, S vozhdyami i bez nikh, 377.
65 Of the two main office buildings in the Kremlin, No. 14, dating from the 1930s, when Stalin razed a monastery, a convent, and a small palace to make room for it, was much the inferior, although Brezhnev had his office there. Building No. 1, completed in 1790, housed the imperial Senate before 1917 and was mostly for the USSR Council of Ministers after 1917.
66 Gorbachev at first tried to work on a new union treaty in negotiations within USSR institutions. His switch in April to negotiations among and with the Soviet republics was a sign of how much his position had weakened, and opened him up to pressure for concessions on issue after issue. Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 178–80.
67 Carrère d’Encausse interview. Revisiting the inter-republic negotiations of the winter before, and anticipating the agreement struck in December 1991, Yeltsin specifically raised with Carrère d’Encausse the possibility of a voluntary “commonwealth” of the three Slavic republics of the USSR—Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
68 Baturin et al., Epokha, 135, 137.
69 V. I. Boldin, Krusheniye p’edestala: shtrikhi k portretu M. S
. Gorbacheva (Smashing the pedestal: strokes of a portrait of M. S. Gorbachev) (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), 403.
70 See Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 412–13; Stewart, “SIC TRANSIT,” 361–62; and Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy (Life and reforms), 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 2:308.
71 Boris Yel’tsin, Zapiski prezidenta (Notes of a president) (Moscow: Ogonëk, 1994), 54–56; Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 2:556–57.
72 Yel’tsin, Zapiski, 96.
73 Voshchanov, interviewed in Prezident vseya Rusi (The president of all Russia), documentary film by Yevgenii Kiselëv, 1999–2000 (copy supplied by Kiselëv), 4 parts, part 3. Gorbachev reports the overture in his memoirs (Zhizn’ i reformy, 2:555) and criticizes Yeltsin for not informing him about it. “Most likely he held it in reserve, never knowing when it might come in handy.”
74 Prokof’ev, Do i posle zapreta KPSS, 244. A number of well-informed Muscovites have told me they are sure that Kryuchkov and the plotters briefed Yeltsin on their plan. No evidence has ever been brought forward. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the acting chairman of the Russian parliament at the time, and later to be a blood enemy of Yeltsin’s, was one of the first to see him the morning of August 19, and he reports that Yeltsin was “flabby and prostrate” at the news of the coup, which can only mean that he had been given no warning. R. I. Khasbulatov, Velikaya Rossiiskaya tragediya (Great Russian tragedy), 2 vols. (Moscow: SIMS, 1994), 1:161.
75 Boris Yeltsin, third interview with the author (September 12, 2002), in which he told me about the Kubinka landing. In Zapiski, 73, he wrote that he landed at Vnukovo, not Kubinka. He also stated there (71) that the putschists considered having his plane shot down. Sukhanov, Tri goda, 15, says the same. These details will not be clarified until independent researchers get access to the archives concerned.
76 V. G. Stepankov and Ye. K. Lisov, Kremlëvskii zagovor (Kremlin plot) (Moscow: Ogonëk, 1992), 119–21; “GKChP: protsess, kotoryi ne poshël” (The GKChP: the process which never got going), part 4, Novaya gazeta, August 13, 2001 (italics added).
Yeltsin Page 71