by Terry Lovell
Later that day Ferrari and Renault held a press conference during which they claimed that they had had no alternative but to withdraw. As major manufacturers with responsibilities to all areas of motor sport, they believed that they couldn’t run the risk of competing in an illegal race and lose their entrants’ licences. Following an FISA executive committee meeting in Athens the following week, Balestre, attempting to restore some authority, declared that the race would not count towards the World Championship series. The FOCA, which had reputedly put aside a £500,000 war chest to mount any necessary legal challenges to the FISA in similar future situations, believed it would. In fact, it did not. But, in addition to scoring an important political win, the constructors made also another turning point: with the absence of the turbos, the race at Jarama was described by commentators as one of the most exciting races of the season for lead changes and competitiveness.
An attempt by the teams to get the drivers’ fines quashed by the FIA Court of Appeal failed on a technicality. Britain’s Royal Automobile Club, which was representing the drivers, had not, in accordance with FIA rules, lodged the appeal with both the FIA and Belgium’s national sporting authority, the Royal Automobile Club de Belgique. The embittered constructors, who believed they would win the day, were ordered to pay the fines on behalf of their drivers. The rapidly deteriorating relationship between the FOCA and the FISA was causing increasing concern to sponsors. Goodyear’s head of racing, Leo Mehl, believed that the issue over the drivers’ licences should have been resolved before the Spanish Grand Prix, or suspended until it was over. If their public wranglings continued, he warned, Goodyear would need to consider whether it should continue in Formula One.
It was such concerns that led, a few days after the Spanish Grand Prix, to Philip Morris hosting a meeting in Lausanne between Ecclestone, Max Mosley and Colin Chapman, and three FISA vice-presidents, Tom Binford, of the Automobile Competition Committee for the United States; Ron Frost, of Motorsport, New Zealand; and Joachim Springer, of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club, Germany. Held in Balestre’s absence, the day-long meeting went well enough for an 11-point agreement to be reached, which, principally, proposed a review of the ban on ‘skirts’ and a reinstatement of the two years’ notice rule in cases of changes to regulations. From the telex room at Geneva Airport Mosley faxed the agreement to every member of the FISA’s executive committee. He wanted it to be seen as a fait accompli in order to make it very difficult for Balestre to attempt to reverse it. But the ploy backfired – it was leaked to the press, for which Balestre blamed Mosley. The backwash threatened the rapprochement almost before it had begun. Philip Morris and the FISA claimed that the agreement was supposed to have been confidential. In any event, it all turned out to be academic.
It was not possible, insisted Balestre, for him to rescind the ban because it had been approved by the FISA’s executive committee, a claim which, according to Tye and Mosley, wasn’t true. Balestre added that the committee would first have to meet to discuss the proposals and then any decision would have to go for approval to the FISA’s plenary conference that October – a little more than two months before the ban was due to be implemented. This was Balestre mischievously allowing procedural technicalities to obstruct a possible settlement of differences, an indication of little enthusiasm for a settlement not of his proposal or approval. He also insisted that his right to issue short-notice changes to regulations was non-negotiable. Finally, he refused to agree to a request from the FOCA that the issues be referred to an independent arbiter.
At the same time, Balestre revealed that he had been busy with a meeting of his own. It had taken place in Paris on 12 June, about a week after the Lausanne gathering, to which, he said, he had invited representatives of the FIA’s leading national sporting authorities. Apart from Britain, Brazil and the Automobile Competition Committee for the United States, which had yet to decide, he announced, they had all – that is, Argentina, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, South Africa, France, Holland, Italy, Monaco, Portugal and Mexico – put their signatures to a statement supporting the FISA. It would therefore prove impossible, he said, for the FOCA to stage a breakaway World Championship series. The national sporting authorities of the French, German, Dutch, Austrian and Italian Grands Prix, he added, had gone a step further by offering to run races only for teams endorsed by the FISA, with their number being supplemented by Formula Two cars.
Balestre believed that, in one move, he had cleverly outmanoeuvred Ecclestone. With 12 races the minimum number to constitute a legal World Championship series, he appeared to have a strong hand, at least in theory. In practice, it was not necessarily so. As Balestre had been made humiliatingly aware at the Spanish Grand Prix, the national sporting authority did not have the final word on whether a Grand Prix would be held. The FOCA also had a further considerable factor in its favour. Ecclestone had sewn up contracts with every circuit bar one, and he had made it clear that he wouldn’t hesitate to enforce their legality. Who then, in such an uncertain situation and under the threat of litigation, would stand four-square to the death with Balestre?
Balestre’s peremptory rejection of the proposed agreement drawn up at Lausanne caused Sir Clive Bossom, the president of the British Royal Automobile Club, to express the RAC’s ‘deep concern’ to the FIA’s president, Prince Paul Metternich. ‘We cannot emphasise too strongly,’ he said in a statement, ‘that if these [the 11 points listed] are not agreed, the permanent damage and harm that will be caused to motor sport in general throughout the world will be disastrous.’7
The constructors made a further attempt to resolve the differences with the FISA by proposing a meeting with the manufacturers – Renault, Ferrari and Alfa Romeo – and Balestre. Adopting a tone of compromise, Ecclestone made it clear that the constructors no longer had a problem with a ban on ‘skirts’ per se but with the way in which Balestre had attempted to impose it without consulting the constructors, and by ignoring the statutory two years’ notice. Balestre agreed to attend the proposed meeting – but on one condition. He insisted that Ecclestone withdrew a threat to boycott the French Grand Prix, a tactic which he had used to focus Balestre’s thoughts. He would not, he said, attend a meeting under the duress of a boycott. He agreed to attend a meeting therefore on 30 June – the day after the race.
Of all Grands Prix, Balestre wanted the French race to run smoothly. A repeat of the Jarama fracas was the last thing he wanted in his own country. There was a further, important imperative. Ligier was being sponsored to the tune of £333,000 by the manufacturers of Gitanes, which conflicted with the French government’s policy on tobacco advertising. Balestre had thrown his weight behind lobbying efforts to persuade the government to grant Ligier an exemption, which, amidst much controversy, it finally agreed to do. For the French Grand Prix to be staged without the presence of such major players as Williams, Lotus, McLaren, Tyrrell and Brabham would cause him great personal embarrassment. As confirmation of his good intentions, Balestre gave his word of honour that if all the FOCA teams, including Ferrari, Renault and Alfa Romeo, were in agreement at the end of the meeting then the decision endorsed at the FISA’s plenary spring congress in Rio de Janeiro to ban ‘skirts’ would be reviewed in favour of an acceptable period of transition. Ecclestone took Balestre at his word and the boycott was lifted.
The French Grand Prix – won by Williams’s Alan Jones but with Ligier and Renault taking three of the first five places – came and went without incident. Balestre had had his trouble-free Grand Prix, and now it was time for a coming together of the warring factions, which took place at the Paul Ricard circuit, near Marseilles. Representing the FOCA were Ecclestone, Max Mosley, and Colin Chapman of Lotus; for the manufacturers, Carlo Chiti of Alfa Romeo, Marco Piccinini of Ferrari, Gérard Larrousse of Renault and Gérard Ducarouge of Ligier; and for the FISA, Balestre, Baron Fritz Huschke von Hanstein, Curt Schild, and three of its senior members – Enrico Benzing, Paul Frère and Gérard ‘Jabby’ Cromb
ac, chairman of the Technical Commission of the Fédération Française du Sport Automobile.
The meeting quickly got down to business with Ecclestone’s presentation of a series of proposals that came as part of a package, which had already been unanimously agreed by the constructors and the manufacturers during a 12-hour meeting at the Excelsior Hotel at London’s Heathrow Airport a few days before the French Grand Prix. The proposals included a five-year postponement of the ban on ‘skirts’; that cornering speeds – the central concern of the anti-‘skirts’ lobby – should be reduced by the use of less efficient tyres, possibly treaded or narrower tyres; that the constructors should have a greater say on whether a fuel flow system for turbos should be introduced; that the constructors should have more seats on the Formula One Commission, which had been formed in September 1979 following Ecclestone’s rejection of Balestre’s Formula One Working Group; and that there should be greater stability of regulations. Perhaps to Ecclestone’s surprise, the package, which was put forward as an all-or-nothing basis, received the enthusiastic support of Balestre and his colleagues. He publicly described the meeting as ‘very constructive and very positive’. For the first time, it seemed there was good reason to believe that at last a peace formula had been found. It promised much, but, due to Balestre’s duplicity, delivered little.
During the British Grand Prix at Brands Hatch, the tyre manufacturers Michelin and Goodyear met with representatives of the FISA’s Technical Commission and voiced firm opposition to the proposed tyre changes: Michelin was not prepared to accept any tyre limitations, including tread design or reduction in tyre width, while Goodyear had proposed a reduction in tyre width and diameter, with treaded tyres being introduced at a later date. Balestre insisted that, due to their response, the all-or-nothing condition imposed by the FOCA on the package could not be maintained; it could not, therefore, be adopted. The ban on ‘skirts’, concluded Balestre, would therefore stand, unless, within two months, the constructors could submit a unanimously agreed solution to reducing cornering speeds.
The constructors were incensed. They had agreed to abide by any ‘general agreement’ reached between the FISA and the tyre manufacturers. The FISA, they believed, hadn’t tried hard enough, and, in failing to find a solution, had given Balestre an excuse to throw out the entire package. He had given his word of honour that a set of proposals that had the unanimous support of the constructors and the manufacturers would be adopted by the FISA. Not without good reason, the constructors believed that they had been well and truly duped by Balestre to ensure the smooth running of the French Grand Prix.
During the eventful year of 1980 the FOCA claimed it had responded to more than half a dozen meetings proposed by Balestre in different parts of the world – South Africa, Monaco, Maranello, Nice, Madrid, Athens, Lausanne, Rio de Janeiro and Paris – to find a way of resolving their differences, but not one whit of progress had been made. Balestre, the constructors suspected, had simply been toying with them, like a cat with a mouse, as part of his personal power game.
Hopes of a rapprochement seemed as far away as ever. If the constructors were perceived as a motley crew of common arrivistes hell-bent on hijacking Formula One to their own avaricious ends, the FISA was seen as a bureaucratic administration more interested in political control and personalities than a more egalitarian division of power and authority. Balestre’s leadership, they argued, had done little more than increase the number of commissions, conference and meetings, which, in Balestre’s first full year of office, had resulted in a rise in FIA expenditure of 129 per cent. The constructors were also contemptuous of administrators and national sporting authority delegates who, with all expenses paid, would attend such glittering social occasions as the Monaco Grand Prix, yet could be relied upon to avoid the less attractive races.
Certainly Balestre, while supportive of all Grands Prix irrespective of their social allure, fully expected to be accorded the red-carpet treatment. Those who failed to rise to his expectations, said a former FIA colleague, did so at the risk of incurring his disfavour. ‘If you [an organiser] wanted to be on good terms with Balestre, you would personally invite him to your Grand Prix and you would send a Rolls-Royce or a Cadillac to pick him up at the airport. The car would have a police escort and display FIA flags. He was not there [in office] for the money, but he enjoyed the power and all the trappings that went with it.’
An increasing sense of self-importance also came to demand, said his former associate, ‘a whole suite of offices in a penthouse overlooking the racetrack. The smaller the country, the bigger the office, because every one of them was trying to impress him more than the next one.’ At a Hungarian Grand Prix, Balestre ‘went bananas’ when he discovered his office was situated next to the toilet, accommodation deliberately arranged by Ecclestone. He insisted that he be transferred to another office, which was situated at a more respectable distance. He had one other demand that attracted critical comment from the constructors – an increasing supply of free Grand Prix tickets for his friends and business associates.
Notes
1. Autocar, 23 November 1978.
2. Autocar, 11 November 1978.
3. Autocar, 10 March 1979.
4. Autocar, 27 October 1979.
5. Autocar, 23 November 1978.
6. Autocar, April 1980.
7. Autocar, 21 June 1980.
7
THE KEY TO RICHES – TELEVISION RIGHTS
As the 1981 season drew near, the relationship between the FOCA and the FISA progressed to one of entrenched hostility, with the rumblings of an all-out war becoming ever louder. While Ecclestone was advising one team boss, reluctant to proceed on the design of his car for the following season because of uncertainty over the regulations, to plan on ‘skirts’, Balestre was announcing in a press statement that teams wishing to compete in the following season’s World Championship series would be required to register with the FISA by 1 December – a month in advance of the first race of the season, the Argentine Grand Prix – and, the statement stressed, their compliance would confirm acceptance of the FISA’s ban on ‘skirts’.
He further attempted to encourage a split in the ranks of the FOCA by announcing a restructuring of the Formula One Commission, which had been set up to examine and decide all matters relating to Formula One. In its original form its membership was intended to comprise three representatives from the FOCA, the FISA and the race organisers; two representatives from the major sponsors; and one racing driver. It would be chaired in rotation by the FOCA and the FISA representatives. It had been all but ignored by the FOCA. Now, announced Balestre, membership was open to ‘all the Formula One constructors (without exception) who wish to be part of it’. The FOCA had, in fact, been looking for greater representation on the commission as part of the 11-point package agreed with the manufacturers to resolve the ‘skirts’ versus turbo dispute, but, given the way the constructors believed Balestre had sabotaged it, they had ignored the invitation to a man.
Of all Balestre’s attempts to defeat Ecclestone and the constructors, the most provocative and determined effort came in August 1980, at the end of the Dutch Grand Prix, and through the columns of L’Équipe, the French daily sports newspaper. At its plenary conference in Paris in October, he confidently predicted in the newspaper that the FISA would be given the authority to take responsibility for the ‘start’ and prize money paid by the organisers to the teams, and for its distribution. The FISA would also become responsible for negotiating five-year contracts with organisers which would contain an inflation-linked clause to avoid ‘excessive rises year after year’.1 Acknowledging that it could not interfere with existing contracts between the organisers and the FOCA, Balestre insisted, however, that as the contracts expired it would be through the FISA that the organisers would be negotiating their renewal. The new arrangements, he said, would lead to a policy of greater accountability, with information on how much teams were receiving being made public.
; There would also, he said, be more prize money available. It would come from abolishing what he described as the FOCA’s ‘black fund’, a secret account whose purpose, he said, was to help teams through financial crises and which, as a result, worked to maintain the stability of the Formula One circus and its leading names. The FISA, he continued, would also eventually impose a limit of 14 Grands Prix to ensure the highest competitive standards, a move intended to appease those manufacturers who believed that the number of races being arranged by Ecclestone – in 1977 there were as many as 17 – was, though more profitable for the constructors and the sponsors, too punishing. In return for its organisational services, said Balestre, the FISA would retain no more than two per cent of revenue – estimated at about £100,000 per season.
The FOCA, he added obligingly, ‘will still exist, if it wishes … we will simply be distributing them [the teams] the money’. He added that a new rule book covering the sporting, technical and ‘whole organisation’ of Formula One would also be put before the conference for its approval. ‘It is a real restoration of the sporting power, designed to forge a solid instrument. We want to take over full organisation of the World Championship and control the performance of the cars so that they do not exceed human capabilities – in short, to halt uncontrolled development. It is in no way breaking the imagination of the designers, but establishing a framework, setting limits.’ Some saw it more clearly as an attempt designed to break the FOCA.
To be sure of the support of the manufacturers – Ferrari, Alfa Romeo, Renault and Ligier – in the major confrontation that Balestre surely knew was coming – indeed that he had been planning for – he persuaded them to agree to a secret deal. It took place during the autumn of 1980, when he invited senior executives of the manufacturers to his home at St Cloud, overlooking the Seine near Paris, where, after dinner, he promised that the FISA would continue its ban on ‘skirts’ if, in return, the manufacturers would give their word to back him in the make-or-break conflict that lay ahead. A senior FISA official who was present at the dinner table recalled: ‘Balestre said, “Look, I am prepared to start this battle, but, before I do so, you have to guarantee me that you will support me throughout the war.” They all agreed to support him.’