by Terry Lovell
‘It is totally untrue to suggest that our organization has defaulted on payments owed for the past three years. It is true that we have a commercial disagreement regarding our monetary obligations, but only for 2008. This is the result of an historical difference within the contractual understanding between the two parties. We were working hard to resolve the matter in order to meet our 2008 obligations when Mr Ecclestone, without notice, surprised everyone by dropping the Canadian Grand Prix from the 2009 FIA schedule last 7 October. We believe that it is important to shed the light on this matter and to clarify any allegations that could tarnish the reputation of our organization.’
It can sometimes be difficult to understand Ecclestone’s rationale simply on the evidence of his statements. Would he really ensure that a grand prix was dropped because – to him – of a relatively small amount of money? Was this a statement made purely for effect, intended as a warning to others not to mess with him, or simply an opportunity to provocatively disparage the GPC?
It is not unusual for Ecclestone to justify his position with some peculiar, if not mischievous, logic. For example, when Luca di Montezelomo, the president of Ferrari and chairman of the Formula One Teams Association (FOTA), which was formed in July 2008 to represent the teams in negotiations with Ecclestone and Max Mosley, criticised Ecclestone for the loss of the Canadian Grand Prix, he replied: ‘What he could do, what they [FOTA] could do, if North America is so important, they could race there for less money, for sure. If they want races in these places, they should make contributions towards them. It’s them that want to race in North America, particularly Luca because it’s a good market for Ferrari. They should get together and say, “What’s the shortfall?” across the board for everybody and they should make it up.’
Ecclestone recognises the value of an F1 profile in North America and is keen to get back to Gilles Villeneuve Circuit, particularly since the global economic downturn seriously threatens the profitability of grands prix elsewhere. In April 2009, Ecclestone returned to the table to re-open negotiations with Tremblay, Blanchard and Paradis. In a local CJAD radio station interview, Blanchard confirmed that Ecclestone had been in touch. ‘He called us back… he brought back a proposal, we commented, he’s rethinking.’
At the time of writing, Ecclestone has confirmed that a long-term contract could be agreed to put the Canadian Grand Prix back on the calendar for 2010.
Ecclestone’s thwarting of the Royal Automobile Club (RAC), Britain’s national sporting authority and arbiter of the venue of the British Grand Prix, is no less fascinating, not least for the example it provides of his controlling influence over Balestre as the president of the FISA. It all began around mid-1985 when Ecclestone made it known that he wanted to bring to an end the practice of alternating the British Grand Prix between Brands Hatch and Silverstone. He believed it was necessary in order for the selected circuit to generate the level of profits required to fund the major track, media and spectator improvements that the standards of Formula One demanded. But, as events unfolded, it was a plan that suited well Ecclestone’s commercial ambitions towards the British Grand Prix.
The only other countries to have alternating venues – France and Belgium – had already fallen into line. Balestre, as president of the French national sporting authority, the Fédération Française du Sport Automobile (FFSA), had agreed that the French Grand Prix, which since 1973 had alternated between the Paul Ricard circuit at Le Castellet, near Marseilles, and Dijon, south-east of Paris, would be held for the last time at Dijon in 1984. It remained at Paul Ricard for six years, until President Mitterand intervened to have the event switched to the Nevers Magny-Cours circuit, some 160 miles south-east of Paris and in the heart of his political powerbase. During the eighties the one-time club racing circuit underwent a series of extensions to double its length. Mitterand decided that the region would be regenerated with a highway from the centre of Paris to the circuit, along with the construction of hotels and an airport.
In 1996 the FFSA wanted the French Grand Prix returned to Dijon, a request that, with Ecclestone’s support, was refused by the FIA because the circuit failed to comply with Formula One safety standards. (Three years later, incidentally, Ecclestone added the Paul Ricard circuit, complete with airport and hotel, to his portfolio for £11.5 million.) The Belgian national sporting authority, the Royal Automobile Club de Belgique, was similarly compliant. The introduction of Zolder in 1982 as an alternating venue was short-lived – it, too, came to an end in 1984. Spa-Francorchamps, where Ecclestone had substantial commercial interests, became the chosen circuit.
But Ecclestone’s proposal was received less submissively by the RAC, whose Motor Sports Association had been responsible since 1964 for organising the British Grand Prix alternately between Brands Hatch and Silverstone. It insisted that the well-established practice of rotational venues was in the best interests of British motor sport and preferred, in particular, by Formula One fans. It was made clear that the RAC would firmly oppose efforts to bring it to an end. As for Brands Hatch, its senior management was puzzled by Ecclestone’s claim that his proposals were necessary to finance improved circuit facilities – there was access to virtually unlimited funds provided there was adequate security of tenure.
Far from wanting a monopoly, the RAC’s Motor Sports Association’s management committee was actually keen to see the number increased. In 1983 building company boss Tom Wheatcroft, the millionaire owner of the Donington Park circuit in Leicestershire, was given an indication that he could stage the 1988 British Grand Prix. On the strength of that understanding he proceeded to spend £850,000 on track improvements in order to obtain a Formula One track licence from the FISA. The Motor Sports Association had good reason to believe that it was in a strong position to win the day. It not only had ownership of the British Grand Prix title but also the comfort of a long-standing relationship with Silverstone and Brands Hatch in organising the event. It was a united force, it was confidently believed, that would see the status quo maintained. It had yet another, weightier reason for presuming a favourable outcome – the support of Balestre, whose authority at that time was still widely considered to be greater than Ecclestone’s.
It was given following a series of inconclusive meetings between Balestre and Jeffrey Rose, the chairman of the RAC, who was leading the discussions with the support and approval of the Motor Sports Association, at the FIA’s headquarters in Paris. At the Italian Grand Prix at Monza in September 1985, Balestre finally agreed with Rose that, subject to the approval of the World Motor Sport Council, the British Grand Prix could continue to alternate between Brands Hatch and Silverstone. A letter was drafted by Yvon Léon, the general secretary of the FISA, signed by Balestre and delivered to Rose at the RAC in London. It seemed that, bar the formality of the council meeting – it was hardly likely to vote against its president’s recommendation – the RAC had triumphed. But Balestre had erred. He had failed to consult Ecclestone.
Shortly before the opening of the World Motor Sport Council in December, Ecclestone, without explaining his reasons, made it clear that he couldn’t accept Balestre’s recommendation. Balestre, who was present, said nothing. When the time came to discuss the resolution to allow the British Grand Prix to be staged at alternating venues, Balestre, with reference to his recommendation, said he could speak only as the representative of the Fédération Française du Sport Automobile. With an obvious lack of enthusiasm for his own recommendation, the resolution failed to attract a majority vote. It was subsequently announced that from January 1986 there would be a policy of one country one circuit. The RAC came in for considerable flak from the UK motor sport media, which accused the motoring organisation of failing to do enough to block the move.
As Brands Hatch dominated the motor sport scene and homologation fees were a major source of income for the RAC, John Webb, the managing director of Motor Circuit Developments Ltd (MCD), which ran Brands Hatch, was in a position to urge the Motor Sports Associa
tion to throw its weight behind Brands Hatch as its choice of circuit for the British Grand Prix, which it duly did. But whatever influence it might have once wielded within the FISA, it was now of little force. As the Canadian Automobile Sports Club was also to learn, it was Ecclestone’s view alone that mattered. It would be he who would decide which circuit would get the British Grand Prix. The precedent had been established: the authority of the Royal Automobile Club as Britain’s national sporting authority, which had been considered one of the strongest and most influential in Formula One, was now subject to Ecclestone’s wishes.
Around this time Webb had other pressing matters on his mind – he was busy looking for heavyweight investors to back a rescue of MCD, a quest that would come to involve the omnipresent Ecclestone, and which may have explained his enthusiasm for the introduction of a one-country-one-circuit ruling. Webb, who had joined Brands Hatch as a contracted press officer in 1954, was perfectly suited to the task before him. He had played a leading role, at the request of the then managing director, in the sale of Brands Hatch to Grovewood Securities, an investment company, in 1961, which led to his appointment to its board as a director. He began negotiations with the RAC that led in 1964 to the circuit staging, on alternate years with Silverstone, the British Grand Prix, and was also responsible for the acquisition of Mallory Park, Snetterton and Oulton Park. MCD was formed as a centralised operational company to run the circuits.
Grovewood Securities was taken over in 1972 by Eagle Star Holdings, a financial investments company which, in turn, was bought by British American Tobacco (BAT) in the early eighties. By late 1985 BAT decided that motor sport no longer suited its long-term group business activities and made it known that it wanted to sell its assets, possibly to property developers interested in developing, for example, Brands Hatch as a supermarket complex. Webb, president of the Association Internationale des Circuits Permanents (Circuits International), the organisation representing the interests of circuit owners worldwide and which Rainer Mertel would subsequently lead, was a muchrespected figure in British motor sport and became determined that Brands Hatch should remain a major motor sport circuit. He wrote to Patrick Sheahy, chairman of BAT, requesting first option on Grovewood’s motor-racing interests.
Sheahy agreed, and Webb, aided by his wife, Angela, who had been appointed a director of MCD by Grovewood Securities in 1976 and its deputy managing director in the early eighties, put together a buy-out plan, which required considerable capital investment. By February 1986 – a month after the one-country-one-circuit ruling had been introduced – Webb had found two interested parties. The first was 38-year-old John Foulston, multi-millionaire founder of Atlantic Computers, a computer leasing company, whom Webb knew well as a sponsor and a participant in Historic Sports Car Club championships at Brands Hatch. The other was Ecclestone.
In either late March or early April, following a preliminary round of discussions, Foulston, Ecclestone and the Webbs met at Fairoaks Aerodrome, Surrey, where the Webbs’ proposal was verbally agreed. Foulston and Ecclestone would go 50-50 to buy the circuit’s freehold through a holding company, later to be known as Brands Hatch Leisure Plc, while the Webbs would have a 20 per cent stake in an operational company, which would come to be known as Brands Hatch Circuits Ltd, and which they would be left to run. The sum involved, or so Webb confidently believed at the time, was about £3.5 million. Both Foulston and Webb proceeded with some confidence. At that meeting Ecclestone had reassured Foulston and the Webbs that the Grand Prix would be going to Brands Hatch.
Webb informed Eagle Star that his act was in place and it was informally confirmed that the price would be about £3.5 million, although Webb was informed that, to protect shareholders’ interests, a consultant would be engaged to revalue the assets. From that point, he noted, another party became interested in buying the company. That party was British Car Auctions (BCA). Its involvement hiked up the price dramatically. Then, shortly after the Monaco Grand Prix on 11 May, Webb received a phone call from Ecclestone. He’d gone cold on the deal, would he mind explaining to Foulston? Webb declined, and told Ecclestone to tell Foulston himself. Foulston later called Webb to say that he had heard from Ecclestone but was prepared to go it alone. However, due to the intervention of British Car Auctions, the price of MCD soon reached £5.25 million – £1.75 million more than the initial valuation. If it went any higher, said Foulston, he would pull out. It didn’t – and he got the company.
At a board meeting of Brands Hatch Leisure Plc, which included Tory MP Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith and Sir Jack Brabham, Foulston was asked how he had reacted to Ecclestone’s call. His answer, which was not minuted, was that Ecclestone said he was prepared to go with the latest increased figure – it had yet to get to £5.25 million – only if he, Foulston, loaned him his 50 per cent. Foulston said that he would, but at some rate of interest. Ecclestone said no, he wanted it interest-free. Foulston replied that there could be no deal on that basis. After that, Foulston reported, ‘Bernie threw his toys out of the pram.’ Their business association came to a sudden end.
Given his wealth and his usual method of business, Ecclestone’s request was implausibly out of character, as if he were deliberately creating a reason to pull out of the agreement with Foulston, which was more than likely. For unknown to Foulston, Ecclestone had also been talking to David Wickins, founder and chairman of BCA. Ecclestone had come to an ‘understanding’ with Wickins: if BCA’s bid was successful, the company would lease the track to him. Ecclestone, as ever, had done his sums and had doubtless found this proposition more appealing, not least because, without the hindrance of a partner, particularly one as potentially troublesome as Foulston, he would be in complete control.
Commenting on the ‘understanding’ with Ecclestone, Wickins, who headed BCA from its founding in February 1946 to his retirement in 1988, said: ‘I am not sure there was anything firm or fixed about it, but when you gave your word, you’d given it. We were only interested in Brands Hatch as a site for an auction centre. It wouldn’t have interfered with the racing. I was certainly not interested in running Formula One. I tried never to get involved in things outside my particular knowledge.’ BCA, he recalled, had bid £250,000 more than Foulston but it was conditional on planning permission being granted for the construction of offices. ‘I don’t know what happened after that. I went to America and started buying auctions there.’ Ecclestone, he said, had had no personal stake in BCA’s bid, nor did he do anything to promote it.
With Foulston’s successful acquisition of Brands Hatch, Ecclestone’s interest switched to Silverstone, the former military bomber base in Northamptonshire whose original x-shaped circuit hosted the first British Grand Prix in 1950, and which was owned by the British Racing Drivers’ Club, a mutual organisation of some 800 members. He had secret talks with managing director Jimmy Brown, and, on 21 May, within weeks of the partnership with Foulston breaking down, a contract was signed between Ecclestone, on behalf of the FOCA, Balestre, on behalf of the FISA, and Brown, which led to Silverstone getting the British Grand Prix for the next five years. With few aware of what had been going on behind the scenes – as well as the RAC, as the national sporting authority, whose senior officials were livid at being kept in the dark – Ecclestone explained that the contract had gone to Silverstone ‘because there is room to build the kind of facilities necessary’. In an off-the-record comment, which he refused to enlarge, he said he had been involved in ‘the early stages’ of the sale negotiations of Brands Hatch.1 The news was announced by Balestre during the Belgian Grand Prix at Spa-Francorchamps. It was relayed to Webb in a phone call from the motor sport correspondent of the British daily newspaper The Guardian at 9 a.m. on Saturday 24 May. He was stunned, at least briefly.
Six days earlier, on 18 May, a statement had been issued announcing the change of ownership of Brands Hatch through the acquisition of Motor Circuit Developments Ltd by Foulston, with the Webbs in operational control. The future of the British G
rand Prix at Brands Hatch was secure, Webb had declared. But if Foulston was deeply concerned by the news about Silverstone, he appeared unperturbed. ‘In a financial sense there was no reason why he should be,’ said Webb, ‘because in those days one made very little money out of a Grand Prix. He took it very well, and simply got on with business.’ The 1986 British Grand Prix, won by Nigel Mansell in a Williams-Honda, was the last one to be staged at Brands Hatch. Foulston later added Cadwell Park – Mallory Park was sold in 1983 – to his stable of circuits, which underwent extensive improvement programmes. ‘In fact, we went on to make some of our best profits,’ added Webb. ‘If anything, a Grand Prix can cloud one’s mind and distract attention from other opportunities. So when we had to start thinking hard, it went well.’
In blithe ignorance of all that had been going on between Ecclestone, Brands Hatch and Silverstone was the RAC’s Motor Sports Association, and the hapless Tom Wheatcroft, who had spent a fortune on his hopes for a Grand Prix at Donington. The general reaction of senior RAC management, as reported at the time by the motor sport media, was one of disquiet, although Peter Cooper, the then chairman of the Motor Sports Association, claims today that he had not been surprised by the news. ‘I was not surprised by anything that Bernie did.’
Wheatcroft issued a High Court writ against the RAC for damages of £1.25 million, a legal action which progressed no further. But he finally got his Grand Prix, even though he incurred heavy losses. It took place in 1993 – 50 years after the Leicestershire circuit, a one-time pre-war motorcycle track, held its first Grand Prix – after Ecclestone backed his application to the FISA to stage a one-off European Grand Prix following the cancellation of the Asian Grand Prix in Japan. Given just 12 weeks’ notification, Wheatcroft, then aged 71, worked furiously to get everything ready for the Easter weekend event.