King’s argument was pure rubbish. The English and the US had the experience and proof that convoys alone (without escorts) cut shipping losses tremendously. Every naval officer in WWI, in both the Royal and the US Navy, knew these facts. This is so because the submarine has problems locating ships. Locating one ship is about as hard as locating an entire convoy, because the convoy does not take up much more sea space. By sending ships out singly, it gives the submarine many targets. By sending out convoys the submarine has fewer targets because they are all concentrated in one relatively small area. After adopting convoys enemy submarines look at a lot of empty sea. Admiral King had to know this, but why did he block effective action while this Atlantic slaughter was going on? There is no answer to this question. There is no excuse for failing and refusing to adopt convoys immediately to prevent the loss of so many vital cargo ships and their crews. This situation grew so critical that General Marshall, the general in charge of the entire war effort, asked President Roosevelt to order Admiral King to start using convoys. Apparently, it never came to that because a strongly worded letter from Marshall to King turned the tide. King adopted convoys. Nonetheless, King’s actions cost the Allies dearly in lives and material.
All this causes one to wonder, how many men does a leader get to needlessly slaughter before being relieved of command? Admiral King slaughtered many, Generals MacArthur and Clark many more, and the Generals of World War I on the Allied side hundreds of thousands more. Somehow, these “leaders” literally get away with murder. It is easy to understand how ruthless dictators such as Hitler and Stalin can throw away lives, but how can military leaders of democracies get away with such dim-witted brutality?
As 1943 began the Battle of the Atlantic came to a head. Admiral Max Horton determined he could protect the convoys from German wolf packs, and he was ready to prove it.[288] The turning point came in April and May of 1943 with convoy ONS-5 that was made up of forty-three merchant ships. ONS-5 was attacked by thirty U-boats in a coordinated wolf pack assault. After the battle’s end thirteen merchant ships were gone, but six U-boats were lost. Such losses were unacceptable to Donitz, but it would get even worse for the U-boats. In May of 1943 these Allied efforts paid off with the sinking of thirty German submarines in one month with the corresponding loss of only a few Allied cargo ships. Admiral Donitz would continue to send his submarines out to fight, but these would increasingly become suicide missions. The German submarine branch suffered a higher percentage loss rate than any branch of any other service of any warring nation (over 70 percent).
Some argue the German submarines failed as a strategic threat because the vast majority of supplies and troops crossed the Atlantic without a problem (about 98 percent), and the Germans never came close to sinking even the tonnage they calculated in 1939 as necessary to win the war at sea. However, this overlooks one important point: the Allies themselves at the Casablanca Conference designated the defeat of the German submarines as the number 1 priority. Thus, the submarines were a strategic threat because the leaders of the Allied nations thought so. The U-boat defeat in 1943 is traceable to the Allied decision assigning the Atlantic victory top priority, followed by the dedication of vast resources to achieve the goal. Germany’s top priorities vacillated with Hitler’s whim, and he failed to assign a high priority to the submarine fleet and its Atlantic struggle. Because the Allies decided to defeat the submarines first and the Germans adopted dissimilar priorities, there were far different end results. These decisions, one to give the fight top priority and the other to give the fight a much lower priority, shows what a difference alternate decisions can make. Germany’s submarines failed in 1943 because of the different priorities set by the two warring sides.
The Allied commanders foresaw the potential for the submarines to restrict the flow of supplies to England. They realized the submarine threat could prevent the assets of the United States from reaching Europe in quantity. The projection of US power across the Atlantic was the most important logistic factor for winning the war in Western Europe. Knowing the submarines could impair this essential effort, their defeat won top priority.[289]
North Africa
Allied Victory—1943
As Rommel retreated toward Tunisia after El Alamein, American and English landed on the west coast of Africa in Morocco, and began moving east, along with French forces that joined the Allies. The German and Italian formations were soon crushed, and in May of 1943 the Axis force in Africa capitulated. The conquest of North Africa was an epic victory. The scale of the conquest was beyond all expectations. Along with the capture of approximately 275,000 Axis soldiers, one-half of which were German, (equal to10 divisions or more, which is on a par with the debacle at Stalingrad in January 1943) the Western Allies had captured the initiative in the Mediterranean. Once the Axis lost the strategic initiative in the West their lack of manpower began to damage their ability to resist the next Allied moves. Everything was turning in favor of the Allies.[290]
Sicily and Italy
The Western Allies decided Sicily, a large island near the boot of Italy, was their next Mediterranean objective. It was an unpopular decision in the American military. The British, at the Casablanca Conference, convinced President Roosevelt that action was required in the Mediterranean; however, American military commanders wanted to invade the continent (France) at once. The English successfully argued that American strategy was much too ambitious; moreover, while the Allies built up their forces they could move against what Churchill called the “soft underbelly of Europe.” Good sounding phrase, but a total misconception. Anyone looking at a map could easily tell the soft underbelly was really a tough old gut. Finding good ground for defense is not always easy, but here in Southern Europe the ground was tailor made for defensive fighting. Why Churchill failed to recognize this is often debated, and it is another reason the Americans thought he was more interested in protecting the British Empire than winning the war quickly.
Figure 62 Invasion of Italy 1943
The American military voiced at least two objections to invading Sicily: First, Sicily and Italy’s terrain were ideal for defense. There were rugged mountains throughout, the river valleys were steep, the rivers were fast flowing, and they cut across the line of advance. Second, such an undertaking was secondary to the goal of destroying the German Army. Americans believed, as US Grant demonstrated against Lee in the American Civil War, the key to victory was the destruction of the enemy army (Clausewitz would have agreed). Britain wanted to whittle down the Nazi army before an all or nothing confrontation.
US military experts distrusted Churchill, whom they thought might be more interested in protecting the English empire than in defeating Germany. Churchill, for his part, was already worrying about the postwar world and the escalating power of the USSR. He was trying to convince the Americans that a move through the Balkans (the area north of Greece) might cut off the Soviet advance in that area preserving more free territory in Europe.
The Americans refused to wait around worrying about postwar Europe. They wanted to engage the Nazis, defeat them as soon as possible, and then go home. In the event, the Americans folded at Casablanca because Roosevelt insisted the United States immediately get into the ground action and stay in it. Waiting around to build up forces in England for six months to a year, while doing little else, was political suicide. Thus, the United States and England invaded Sicily after the conquest of North Africa and then moved on to Italy. Originally, the invasion agreement only included Sicily with the decision on Italy coming later. However, the conquest of Sicily went faster than expected making the invasion of Italy automatic.
The invasion of Sicily went well considering how new everyone was at massive amphibious operations. The true problem with the capture of Sicily was the escape of the Axis divisions across the strait to Italy with their supplies and equipment. With the Allies having local air control and total control of the sea allowing the Axis escape was a paramount blunder. To this day it
is unclear how the Allies allowed this to happen. It was crucial to trap and destroy the Axis armies on Sicily. Apparently, the capture of the German and Italian armies on Sicily was not foreseen or planned. The Germans who escaped from Sicily played key roles in holding up the Allied advance up the Italian boot.[291]
With Sicily seized, the Allies quickly invaded Italy at the bottom of the boot and at the beaches of Salerno just south of Naples on the west coast. (See Figure 62) Montgomery proceeded to land at the toe of Italy’s boot and at the east near the top of the heel, while the Americans went ashore at Salerno. At Salerno, Kesselring’s troops put up a stiff defense from the heights overlooking the beaches. Following up with effective counterattacks, Kesselring nearly drove the Americans into the sea. Luftwaffe attacks on the fleet damaged several ships while German tanks drove within shouting range of the beach; nevertheless, naval gunfire broke the Nazi offensives, and Allied air power soon captured the sky over the beaches. After securing the beaches, the Americans struggled to expand the pocket and requested Montgomery hurry his advance; however, Montgomery did no such thing. When Montgomery did arrive the Germans were already pulling back to new and very well prepared lines of defense south of Rome—the Gustov line.
Figure 63 Italy—Allied Assaults on Gustov Line and Anzio 1943-4
Advancing past Salerno, the Allies ran into exceptionally well-chosen and prepared German positions on the Gustov line south of Rome. Kesselring and his German engineers chose this mountainous area because of its ideal defensive terrain features. After numerous bloody attempts to breach the line had failed, the Allies mounted an amphibious assault behind the Gustov line at Anzio on the western side of Italy just north of the Gustov Line and south of Rome. (See Figure 63) Unfortunately, the invasion’s commander was under specific orders from General Clark to attain the beach and then dig in. Following these orders doomed the Allied invasion to bloody stagnation. If the troops had moved inland at once, behind the Gustov line, a forced German retreat was axiomatic. This is one of the best ways to wage war, force your enemy out of superb positions without an assault as Sherman consistently accomplished on his march to Atlanta (see the US Civil War). Kesselring responded to Allied sluggishness by swiftly placing his men on the invaluable high ground above the beaches; thus, preventing a breakout and subjecting the trapped troops to monumental artillery poundings. It became clear that to get off those beaches help was necessary from the Allied troops along the Gustov line. The tables were turned, and the men originally assigned to get the help now had to give help if the Allies were going to hang on at Anzio.
The breakthrough came when the overall commander in Italy, British General Alexander, rejected General Mark Clark’s ideas, adopted his own direction, and mounted an offensive all along the Gustov line. The French colonial forces found that the Germans had severely thinned out of the center of their line to reinforce the troops fighting at Monty Casino itself. The Nazi line was quickly breached and the advance northward began. Then Mark Clark threw another monkey wrench into the gears. Alexander ordered Clark to take his forces, which were on the left flank of the advance, and turn right (east) to cut off the German retreat. Clark disobeyed these orders and instead made north for Rome and the glory of “liberating” the city. Rome fell on June 4, 1944, but the battle for Italy continued. The German forces escaped AGAIN to delay the Allied advance for additional months.
The problems in Italy were multiple, but poor leadership for the Allies is at the top of the list. Only after Alexander began to exercise more control over his subordinates did matters improve somewhat. General Clark disobeyed orders and moved on Rome rather than blocking the German retreat to a new defensive zone, but nothing was done to Clark. The fact that his actions would cost the lives of Allied troops assaulting yet another of Kesselring’s defensive lines to the north of Rome seems to have counted for little. All these years later it seems the original US thoughts were correct. The Italian campaign would continue until the end of the war with little to show for all the sacrifices of the troops involved on both sides.
Planning D-Day
With the Allies advancing up the Italian boot the Western Mediterranean was firmly in Allied hands, and planning for the invasion of Nazi occupied France could begin in earnest. General Eisenhower was appointed as overall commander, and Ike appointed British General Montgomery as ground unit commander. This was a massive undertaking and the largest amphibious assault ever mounted.[292]
The planning for Operation Overlord, as it would be termed, started long before the appointment of General Eisenhower. The pre-Eisenhower planners chose Normandy as the best area for invasion. They decided on May for the invasion because of the moon, tides, weather, and other considerations, and they called for three divisions to cross the channel supported by a large naval armada. Although the plan would undergo considerable change, the foundations were poured. The moment Eisenhower and Montgomery examined the plan they expanded the landing force to five divisions landing from the sea and three more airborne divisions airdropped behind the beaches on the first day. This expansion to well over one hundred thousand men increased the need for shipping, equipment, aircraft, and everything else by more than double. While it increased the chances for success it also increased the risk, because information leaks, increases in errors, and a host of other “friction of war” problems would naturally proliferate. The need for secrecy increased exponentially. If the Germans figured out the time and place of the landings the resulting slaughter would be indescribable. The raid on Dieppe was well remembered, and if the Germans could repeat that Allied disaster the consequences would be immense.[293] Allied failure at Normandy would mean, under reasonable presumptions, the Soviets would seek a separate peace with Hitler, which they had already tried. (Yes, we know about the A-bomb, but that discussion is too long and speculative for The Super Summary).
Midpoint in the Second World War—Pacific:
1943 & 1944
After the victory at Guadalcanal in 1943, US forces began to move up the Solomon island chain. In a series of bloody encounters the US Navy, Marines, and Army pushed north against fanatic Japanese resistance. On New Guinea, Australian forces pushed the Japanese back over the rugged Owen Stanley mountains in one of the most difficult campaigns of the war. American and Australian forces then began leapfrogging up the eastern coast, landing where the Japanese were not present, thus cutting off the Japanese garrisons they bypassed.[294]
At sea, Japan started feeling the full weight of American air power and innovation. In the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, a Japanese troop convoy sailing to New Guinea from Rabaul harbor on New Britain was located at sea and totally destroyed by air attacks. B-25 aircraft (same type that bombed Tokyo) with six .50-caliber machine guns mounted to the nose for strafing ships, tackled the convoy. The pilots also used new skip-bombing methods to slam the bombs into the sides of the transports. The attackers sank all the transport ships and most of the escorts. The US Army Air Force under General McKinney developed these new techniques.[295]
“Island hopping” was the key to US strategy in the Pacific. The idea was simple. The Allies did not have to conquer every island held by the Japanese. By taking only a few vital islands, and cutting off support for the rest, the Americans smashed the original Japanese assumptions about fighting the war. With each passing month the speed of the American advance increased. Japan faced an enemy with techniques of war undreamed of in 1941. Knocked off balance by Allied methods and technology Japan’s leadership never regained its footing.
By November of 1943 the US Navy was prepared to start an advance across the Central Pacific. This line of attack was in addition to MacArthur’s line of advance in the South Pacific. The first target was the Gilbert Islands, and the key to this group of island atolls was Tarawa (Betio). The island’s importance came from its air base. The Japanese anticipated an attack and studded the island with defensive fortifications, including a tremendous number of protected machine gun emplacement
s (pillboxes), large caliber cannons, huge bunkers, and barbed-wire entanglements defending every approach to the island.
Throughout the Pacific campaign, the islands seized had enemy air bases or land areas where the Americans could build air bases. Tactically, the Pacific War was fought over who held what air base. The airplane was the centerpiece of the Pacific War. The goal of the Central Pacific advance was winning islands within air range of Japan, and starting a bombing campaign to destroy Japan’s infrastructure. The goal of the South Pacific advance was winning back the Philippines, and cutting Japanese supply lines to the home islands.
We must talk about storming a defended beach for a moment. Before World War II, invaders avoided going ashore at a defended beach. From the Trojan War through the first part of World War II, the way one combatant invaded another’s territory from the sea entailed going ashore on an undefended beach away from the target and then advancing on the objective overland. In World War I, the British invasion of Turkey at Gallipoli proved the point that an amphibious operation against defended shores was suicide. The Japanese commanders knew the history of offensive actions against defended beaches, and they knew the assaults were usually failures. They noted that many small islands in the Central Pacific had no place for an unopposed landing. In addition, airstrips could be placed on the islands with ample aircraft to defend them. The Japanese believed an island was an unsinkable aircraft carrier endangering any fleet sailing within range of its aircraft. At first the US thought the same thing.
The Super Summary of World History Page 46