The United Nations entered the war on a fluke. Normally, the Security Council of the United Nations must act before intervention in a war, and any member of the Security Council could veto such an intervention. The Soviet Union was a member of the Security Council and would have vetoed any action aimed at North Korea, but they were absent. The Soviets walked out of the United Nations in protest of another problem and were unavailable to file their veto when the war broke out. Thus, the United Nations could, and did, vote to intervene in Korea in accordance with the UN Charter to protect a nation from invasion. This was the first time the United Nations had acted with significant armed force to protect a nation invaded for the purpose of conquest. It was the best of “collective security” dreamed about by President Wilson after WWI. Unfortunately, it would also be the last until 1990.[350] For the most part, the responders were the Western Democracies. The United States of America, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom sent the most troops, but numerous other nations helped as well. Once again, even though it looked like the world was responding, it was the Western Democracies against the totalitarians of the East. So it had been since Marathon, so it was again.
The US Military was a shadow of its World War II self. The Truman administration had dismantled the world’s best invasion forces after the war. Ships were decommissioned and entire units were disbanded as soon as the war ended. President Truman and his secretary of defense Louis Johnson tried to eliminate the US Marine Corps. After they were through, the US Marines had 27,000 men and a few World War II landing craft. The Marine Corps had to call up its veteran reserve units to build an amphibious force, but they responded at once. These men were experienced warriors and well able to fight and win land battles in Asia. After the problems at Tarawa, the US Marines put large amounts of firepower at the squad level to repel the Japanese human wave suicide assaults (Bonsai attacks) and dig them out of caves and other well placed defensive positions. This additional firepower at the squad level would be critical in the fight for Korea. In addition, naval gunfire and close air support were familiar additions to marine operations. The marines were the first units at Pusan to have extensive previous combat experience in Asia which served them well as they were shifted from one hot spot to another to repulse North Korean assaults on the fragile perimeter.
The US Army also dissipated after WWII, and the men who had destroyed Hitler and Tojo were in civilian jobs by 1950. Many who remained in the army were garrison troops without combat experience or training for a land war in Asia. US equipment was in storage, much of it out of date, and it would take time to assemble. Somehow, against all odds, the US Army managed to get good units to Korea in time to save Pusan. But it was close, and the communists were on the verge of overrunning Korea.
The problems with the US ground and amphibious forces could be traced to the development of the atomic bomb, coupled with the arrogance of the US Air Force, plus the folly of decision makers in Congress and the Truman administration. The Air Force had become a separate service in 1947, and they decided ground and sea forces were no longer necessary because the atomic bomb made them obsolete. They made this pitch to Congress and the Truman administration. They believed it; thus, non-Air Force budgets were gutted so the new US Air Force could have the needed aircraft and atomic bombs necessary for mid 20th century warfare.
Since late in World War I, the air forces of the world wanted a new strategic role not a tactical role. Airmen did not fancy being “flying artillery” under control of ground units. The air forces even chafed at the reconnaissance role which had proved vital in both World Wars because it entailed assignments from ground units. The attitude of the US Navy airmen was poles apart. They felt bombing a ship or enemy units ashore was vital to the fleet, and finding the enemy fleet was accepted as critical to victory. This difference in attitude is explained by the differing corporate cultures and equipment of the two services. The main difference was that naval aviation was small compared to the Air Force, and naval aviation did not stress large bombers because they could not take off from aircraft carriers. In the naval aviation services sinking ships, reconnaissance, and close air support for marines ashore were the primary roles; thus, they did not have the equipment or the numbers to be a decisive factor in crushing a nation from the air. The Air Force thought they did have the equipment and numbers to defeat an enemy from the air.
Using theories developed in the 1920s, air force proponents claimed air units could bomb an enemy nation into submission. This was attempted in World War II, first by the Germans, then by the English in partnership with the United States. Thousand plane raids against the Third Reich and the Japanese empire did not deliver victory. The US Bombing Survey conducted after the war admitted that the bombing raids did not have the desired impact of causing the enemy to quit the war. Before the war, air theorists had opined that civilian morale would collapse under bombing raids and they would demand their government to stop the war at any cost rather than suffer the bombings that would shatter their lives and cities.[351] In fact, civilian morale did not fail and often the bombings stiffened the resolve of the nation to fight on against the heartless villains who destroyed their lives from the sky. Then the atomic bomb was developed and used for the destruction of two Japanese cities. Japan surrendered and millions of lives were spared. Now the US Air Force had its war-winning combination. If wars could be won with the A-bomb, why fund the other services? The US ground and naval forces were dramatically cut. Saving money after the worst war in the history of the world was important to the Western Democracies.
History has a way of bringing irrational hopes to an end rather quickly. The A-bomb was not going to end wars where it was not used, and the A-bomb did not end the need for ground troops or naval units. After the Soviets developed their own A-bomb, new worries about a nuclear war popped up to further dilute the concept that the atomic bomb had ended conventional wars. If no one could use the bomb then wars would go on. After all, who would risk the destruction of the world over a place like Korea? The Western Democracies had cut their militaries too much, and now their soldiers, sailors, and marines were going to pay the piper for the shortsighted decisions of their leaders (again, just like WWII).
General MacArthur had been put in charge of the UN forces after the invasion, and he hatched a brilliant but risky plan to change the course of the conflict.
The fighting around Pusan was as hard as any in history. General MacArthur realized trying to attack up the Korean peninsula from Pusan would be World War I all over again. A frontal assault on a numerically superior dug-in enemy in mountainous terrain would be costly, and winter was on the way. Take too much time moving north and the harsh Korean winter and rough terrain would make offensive action daunting. By using the amphibious ability of the US Navy and Marine Corps (or what was left of it), General MacArthur thought he could dramatically change the course of the war with a landing behind the enemy lines about half way up the west Korean coast near Seoul, the nation’s capital. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the plan too risky and wanted to land farther south; however, MacArthur pointed out such a landing would accomplish little. By landing at Inchon near Seoul the Allies could deal the invaders a lethal blow and force a North Korean retreat without attacking at Pusan. President Truman sided with MacArthur, and the invasion was on. Both the Joint Chiefs and the president had missed one critical point in MacArthur’s plan. He clearly said that after the capture of Seoul the troops would move north. This aspect of his plan should have been thoroughly discussed, however, because of the focus on the risk of landing at Inchon the other major risk—moving north of the thirty-eighth parallel—was ignored.
Inchon The UN Allies Strike Back
September 15, 1950
Far up the west side of the mountainous Korean peninsula was a port just to the west of Seoul. The port was Inchon, a very unusual place. The harbor’s tides were very high and mud flats appeared for hours every day when the tide went out, and these mud flats
prevented ship movement. As the tide came back to cover the mud flats ships could once more move up Flying Fish Channel. MacArthur wanted to go ashore there and drive east to Seoul. Seoul was the road and rail junction for everything going south; thus, control of Seoul equaled control of all supplies trying to move south. Acute obstacles faced an amphibious assault at Inchon, and one severe problem was the condition of the once-mighty amphibious arm of the US Navy. Most of the assault craft and naval gunfire support ships were gone, and those that remained were in poor shape. Nonetheless, the navy and marines thought they could do it.
MacArthur’s plan was brilliant. Risky as it was, if it worked the achievement would be colossal. The war could be won in a month rather than years. The communist army to the south would be cut off by the invasion and then destroyed by an attack out of Pusan that would push them against the waiting army at Seoul. It was a classic hammer and anvil move which could totally destroy the foe. The problem was winning on the beach and pushing quickly to Seoul. If the communists could thwart the amphibious landing, the UN forces would face a devolving military and political situation.[352]
The US Marines landed at Inchon at 6:30 a.m. on September 15, 1950. Wolmi-Do Island at the center beachhead had to be taken, and the marines took Wolmi-Do in less than two hours. The soldiers of the sea held on while the tide was out, and after it rose once again other US Marine units landed on beaches to either side of the island. The landings were a complete surprise and a complete success. The US Marines and army units moved inland toward Seoul. Far to the south, UN units at Pusan simultaneously attacked the communist lines and broke through. The resulting rout was one of the greatest military victories of modern times. The Inchon landings with the coinciding counterattacks at Pusan eradicated the North Korean army.
UN forces quickly drove to the thirty-eighth parallel and then kept going. If they would have stopped at or near the thirty-eighth parallel, the war may have ended right there and then; however, MacArthur pressed on with the idea of punishing the communist north for its invasion. The US Government and the UN approved the push north, but they did not fully consider the reaction of the Chinese communists who would not stand by and let a client state be conquered (especially when they had agreed to the invasion), and the United States was devoid of accurate intelligence on the Chinese and their intentions.[353]
Figure 77 MacArthur’s Advance North
China Enters the War
October 1950
Now MacArthur matched his horrific errors in defending the Philippines during World War II. The advance north was haphazard. His advance was in four widely separated columns with a lot of space for infiltration, plus the columns were not mutually supporting. In addition, he ignored the fact that the Chinese were in the war even after his troops had captured numerous Chinese communist troops as they approached the Yalu River which separated China from North Korea. Chairman Mao, the tyrant leader of communist China, warned the United States through neutral nations that he would intervene if the United Nations approached the Yalu River. The nationalist regime on Taiwan warned the United States of Chinese intervention. All these warnings were ignored.
US Intelligence failed to recognize the potential entry of the Red China into the war.[354] The massive Chinese assault caught MacArthur completely by surprise. MacArthur would go from genius to idiot overnight. The UN forces absorbed a massive blow as Chinese forces rolled back the defenders of democracy like waves running up a California beach (so much for MacArthur’s concept of winter offensives being difficult). As the United Nations retreated below the thirty-eighth parallel, Seoul fell into communist hands again.[355]
Prior to the communist assault, the First Marine Division had landed near the Chosin Reservoir far above the thirty-eighth parallel, and when the Chinese offensive began they were trapped in the mountains by seven or more communist divisions intent on destroying them. In freezing weather, against thousands of fresh Chinese troops, the marines attacked toward the coastal port of Hungnam and deliverance.
Figure 78 US Marine March from Chosen
Clear weather, at least clear enough at times, allowed US Navy and air force planes to bomb, napalm, and strafe communist belligerents attacking the marines. Air control and tough men were the key to getting the marines out. Chinese troops threw massed assaults at marine positions, but the extra firepower placed at the squad level by the marines paid off as Chinese attacks were repelled with staggering communist losses. The First Marine Division made it to Hungnam and embarked with their wounded, their KIAs, and their serviceable equipment. The Chinese communists subtracted nearly seven divisions from their order of battle because of casualties sustained trying to destroy the surrounded US Marines. For the rest of the war the Chinese would not frontally assault a US Marine position.
The UN line stabilized well south of the thirty-eighth parallel as the Chinese assault ran out of steam. It was impossible for the Chinese to keep their troops supplied since they were moving by foot and bicycle over mountainous terrain in the winter, mostly at night, and getting hit with constant air attacks. Nonetheless, they had recaptured the South Korean capitol and pushed the UN forces about two-thirds of the way down the snow-covered peninsula. The Chinese success centered on night assaults using infiltration tactics to disrupt the UN units’ group cohesiveness. Using this method, large groups of Chinese soldiers would get past UN front lines and attack at night from the flanks using submachine guns with large capacity magazines to spray the UN positions with rounds[356] while other units assaulted the front of the UN positions with submachine guns, grenades, and mortars. The frontal attack held the defenders in place while the flank attacks surprised the defenders, forcing them to guard several axes of advance at once. These tactics confused the troops and small units lost cohesion, often scattering under fire or hunkering down lessening the defensive firepower of the unit. At the same time these attacks on the front lines were proceeding, other Chinese troops got past the UN lines and placed themselves on routes used by reinforcements; thus, as the reinforcements moved forward they would be ambushed and have to fight their way to the unit they were supposed to be saving. It took some time for the UN soldiers to adapt to these tactics; however, once they did the communists had a far harder time achieving success.
After the stunning defeat, MacArthur began publicly calling for bombing Manchuria and perhaps going to war with China. President Truman loathed this because he wanted to limit the war, and he did not want his military commander publicly demanding different strategies. Truman also thought MacArthur had sabotaged a possible peace deal presented by the Chinese. After some acrimonious exchanges Truman fired MacArthur and eventually appointed General Ridgeway as the overall commander of the UN forces in Korea. This turn of events caused a public outcry in America. MacArthur was a favorite general, and many in America thought he was correct to question Truman’s strategy of limited war even if it did mean war with China.
MacArthur had blundered intolerably in defending the Philippines, costing the lives of thousands of men. For his efforts, he was given command of the Army’s Pacific Theater. He stumbled again in his defense and his original offensive actions in New Guinea, once more killing troops unnecessarily. Then he blundered in Korea by ignoring the warning of a Chinese offensive and failing to advance with mutually supporting formations, again costing thousands of lives. In spite of these egregious errors in judgment he remained in command. Only when he openly disagreed with the president was he dismissed. It would appear that slaughtering thousands of your troops isn’t much of a problem, but disagreeing with a politician is a titanic problem.[357]
After General Ridgeway took command of the UN forces he investigated the disaster. General Ridgeway was disappointed in the performance of US Army troops during the Chinese communist offensive. After some study solutions surfaced. Communist tactics were dissected and ways were fashioned to counteract their effectiveness through new training. Once the troops were told what the Reds were doing, and how to th
wart enemy efforts, UN combat capability increased dramatically. Another problem was firepower at the squad level, so firepower was improved for the US Army squads. Once these flaws were remedied, the US Army performed well against the experienced Chinese troops who were veterans of the wars with the Nationalist Chinese. Other adjustments in artillery and air support also enabled outnumbered UN units to survive the Chinese and North Korean assaults as well as advance against fanatic resistance.
The New Air War
For the last years of WWII, the Allies dominated the skies, but Allied air superiority was challenged in Korea. The United States was not prepared for another war just five years after the end of WWII, and its equipment illustrated that lack of readiness. In the skies over Korea, the United States was at first flying World War II aircraft like B-29 bombers and P-51 mustangs. Out of nowhere, the communists showed up with jet aircraft that blew the propeller aircraft and jets of the United States out of the sky. The MIG 15, which first appeared over Korea, was an excellent aircraft.[358] The United States had jets (the F-80 Shooting Star, Panther, etc.), but they were no match for this communist jet. In addition, the MIGs were being flown by veteran Soviet pilots and well-trained Chinese pilots. The United States rushed to produce an aircraft to match the MIG 15 and quickly concocted the North American F-86 saber jet. This aircraft was a lucky combination of components that flew wonderfully and proved to be an excellent answer to the MIG 15. In the hands of US Air Force veterans it soon achieved a remarkable kill ratio (10:1 or better) against the MIGs. The challenge for control of the sky above Korea had been answered, and the US Air Force had won (on behalf of the United Nations, of course).
The Super Summary of World History Page 56