The roads supplying the base were cut, trapping the French forces in Dien Bien Phu. Airdrops achieved some reinforcement and resupply to the trapped men, but the situation for the well-shelled troops inside the fragmenting underground citadel was anything but happy. As massive artillery barrages collapsed French positions, heavy infantry attacks engulfed their outlying strong points one by one. As always, the Foreign Legion fought bravely and savaged the Reds as they rushed forward. The communist casualties will never be known, but thousands upon thousands died in the assaults. Incredible Legion bravery and large enemy casualties made no difference as the fanatic Reds swarmed over shattered French bunkers.
Eisenhower Stays Out
The French had been asking for more American help all along, but now they increased their pleas. The French foreign minister flew to Washington to meet with President Eisenhower. The problem was that the French wanted massive American intervention, far more than an increase in the aid already being given. They needed American troops, materials, and anything and everything the United States could send in mass. To Eisenhower this sounded like another Korea, and he had just managed to end the fighting in that place. Plus, the French were asking the Americans to fight so France could keep a colony. Eisenhower thought Americans would balk at this idea.[371] Finally, the French asked the Americans to use the atomic bomb or give it to them so they could use it. Eisenhower once more demurred, and the French went home empty-handed. I think this decision hurt American relations with the French for decades to come. America had helped Korea why not help France, our old ally?
The real reason behind Eisenhower’s refusal was his good sense for foreign affairs. Eisenhower did not want to commit America unless there was a vital national interest. This concept is critically important to understanding how a nation decides when and where to use its resources. A nation needs to closely define its VITAL national interests. Such vital interests may be military, economic, or whatever; but it must be agreed by the leadership and the people that these interests are so critical they are worth going to war over. Nations should commit their blood and treasure only on interests where national survival is at stake. At this point, we should note that totalitarian regimes do not have to consult the people on anything, so these kinds of definitions only apply to democracies (although dictatorships would be well served by following this rule).
Nations often fail to analyze their vital national interests properly. Note the problem with the Japanese analysis of their vital national interest prior to World War II. Japan decided China must be conquered as a vital national interest; therefore, the military must be supplied and oil and other resources must be obtained for military conquest. The US was standing in the way of Japan obtaining oil and other military supplies, and telling Japan to back off China; thus, America must be attacked as they were thwarting Japan’s achieving a vital national interest. Do you see the flaw? The conquest of China, or not, would not affect the survival of Japan. Japan had decided the conquest of China was a vital national interest, but why? In fact, they just wanted to conquer China. Japan could have chosen to stop at taking Manchuria and Korea and they would have survived just fine. One might decide to attack a nation that threatened them, but China was no threat to Japan in the 1930s. As such, war with the West was not justified in terms of Japan’s vital national interest. The Japanese leadership determined Japan was a “have not” nation and must acquire territory to become a “have” nation. They further concluded Japan would always be under the thumb of America and Britain without the conquest of China. Oddly, after WWII, Japan was totally under control of the United State and it prospered as never before. It should have been clear in 1930 that Japan’s move on China was unwise, and no challenge to America or the United Kingdom was necessary to remain a viable, prosperous country. Thus, the analysis of vital national interests must be competent if a nation is to expend its blood and treasure wisely.
Eisenhower clearly discerned that Vietnam was not a vital national interest of the United States. Protecting France from humiliation was not in that category either. Giving France the atomic bomb, or using it himself, could lead to worldwide complications—something Eisenhower wanted to avoid. The result was that France was getting no additional assistance from the United States.
Eisenhower had applied the correct formula for intervention abroad. The presidents that followed him would not be so wise because the philosophy changed when the men holding the top office changed. Eisenhower wanted to stay with the vital national interest analysis because it kept the United States out of foreign entanglements unless they had supreme importance. Nixon, Eisenhower’s vice president who lost the race for the presidency in 1960, felt the same way. Presidents after Eisenhower decided when to send troops based on other concepts, and the results have been less than ideal as shown by public disenchantment with their policies.
The Fall of Dien Bien Phu
1954
With their backs to the wall, the French Foreign Legion at Dien Bien Phu fought on. Waves of artillery and enemy troops broke over the beleaguered fort and its exhausted defenders as French resistance bled away. Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954, and the communists captured about 16,500 tattered Frenchmen. The Reds paid a high price for the base (their casualties are unknown but thought to be thirty to fifty thousand), but they had it. They also had the French public. The people of France wanted out of the endless war in Southeast Asia.
At the peace talks the French gave the North to the communists while the South was to have elections to decide who would rule there. But the South did not hold elections, and a quasi-dictator, Diem, took the reins of power setting up the Republic of South Vietnam. The war was on again, but the nation of South Vietnam was weak and would fall quickly fighting against the experienced communist troops flooding down from the North.
America Steps In (it)
1964
1962—Military Advisors
John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in 1960. Kennedy ran against Richard M. Nixon, the vice president under Eisenhower. As history weirdly turned out, Kennedy would start the American involvement in Vietnam and Nixon would end it many years later. In between these two men a series of incompetent decision makers created national angst over the involvement.
During the presidential race between Kennedy and Nixon they held, for the first time, a series of televised debates. These debates were critical in determining the winner of a very close contest between the two men. One significant issue was whether or not the United States should defend two small islands off the coast of Red China, Quemoy and Matsu, controlled by the Nationalist Chinese. These islands had been shelled by the communists, but no invasion had been attempted. If such an attempt did come, should the United States commit troops to defend these two small islands? Nixon, taking the approach of a seasoned diplomat’s evaluation of vital national interest, said no. They were not a vital national interest because the survival of the US did not depend upon them, so no blood and treasure should be spent for the islands. Kennedy took the position that not one foot of free soil should be surrendered to the communists. Polls showed Kennedy had won on that issue. Somehow, the larger implications of this “fight for every foot of free soil” doctrine were not appreciated. This was an open commitment to fight communism anywhere and everywhere at any time. It constituted a total rejection of the vital national interest analysis. No one discerned that this idea could lead the United States into wearisome and unnecessary conflicts.
John F. Kennedy won a close election. After taking office, he began a new and far reaching foreign policy change which required a more active role for the United States in foreign affairs. The Cold War with the communists was running full blast, and Kennedy decided (along with his entire administration—including his brother Bobby Kennedy who was appointed the US Attorney General) that the United States would enact regime change if necessary to achieve victories over communism. An active role in the internal operations of foreign governments had rare
ly been tried before by American presidents,[372] but Kennedy wanted to do even more. It was a radical departure with the past, and it set an unfortunate precedent for the future.[373]
It was Kennedy who decided that the current president of South Vietnam (Diem) must go, and he helped coordinate a military coup that deposed and murdered Diem on November 1, 1963. It was also Kennedy who decided to commit American combat troops to Vietnam, although at the time they were called advisors and not many were sent. But the United States was in the war, and its involvement would intensify significantly.
In the United States another election was drawing near in 1964, and the debate over Vietnam had deepened. There were those in the US government who wanted a large commitment of US troops to Vietnam with the goal of achieving victory over the communists. Others were advising no increase in troops and perhaps a withdrawal of those who were there. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staffs for the US military were saying the war was unwinnable without a massive intervention, which no one wanted. According to some advisors close to President Kennedy at the time (1963), the president was planning a drawdown of troops to start right after the election in November of 1964 and a complete withdrawal was planned within a year or so thereafter. Was this true? It is very difficult to tell. The men close to Kennedy were loyalists and wanted to present him in a favorable light. The idea of an early withdrawal by Kennedy would add to his legend. The truth will never be known because the two men who knew what was next on the Kennedy agenda for Vietnam were both assassinated. The president was murdered on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and his brother Bobby died by assassination on June 5, 1968, in Los Angeles, California. Robert F. Kennedy (Bobby) had campaigned on withdrawal from Vietnam, so there is no doubt what he was going to do if elected; however, this campaign was taking place for the election of 1968, and what changed in those intervening years was the mood of the American public. Support for the Vietnam War had badly waned, and the democrats were running on a platform of ending the war. What President Kennedy would have done after 1964, assuming he won the election, is unknown.
Johnson Commits US Troops—1964
Lyndon B. Johnson took over as president after President Kennedy’s death, and won the presidency in his own right in 1964.[374] Immediately after assuming the presidency Johnson began to increase the troop levels in Vietnam. After the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident, Johnson gained plenary power to commit troops to the war, and he did so in spades. Before Johnson left office he had placed 500,000 Americans into Vietnam. It is widely thought that Johnson lied about the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin to gain congressional authorization to widen the war.[375] By 1967, the war was not going well for the United States of America. Although American units were consistently defeating both North Vietnamese regular army units and the local Vietcong, nothing was resolved. In the few all-out battles against US troops, such as in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the communists learned US firepower was potent, and the US won total victories. With control of the air over South Vietnam, and lots of artillery, the US forces decimated the communists in anything like a set peace engagement. But the infiltration from North Vietnam, the ambushes, and the limited assaults went on; thus, control of the countryside and the road system was constantly in flux. Like the French, the United States and the South Vietnam military tried to protect all vital points and thereby spread their combat power. Without the support of the peasants the government of South Vietnam, even with massive American help, was not winning.
Figure 80 Vietnam & Ho Chi Minh Trail
General Westmoreland, commander of US forces in South Vietnam, was aggressive in his pursuit of the Red forces. He ordered “search and destroy” missions to sweep rural areas and keep the pressure on the communists. He rejected the strategy of establishing a line from DMZ across South Vietnam and Laos to stop enemy troops and supplies from moving south. Such aggressive search and destroy tactics put US troops at high risk because the communists knew, through spies ensconced in every corner of the South Vietnamese government, when the US patrols were going out and by what routes. The communist units could avoid the search and destroy operations whenever they wanted, but in many instances US troops were ambushed and had to fight against long odds to escape without being destroyed. US firepower, plus close air and artillery support, saved the day many times. The American problem was that no matter how many communists they managed to kill more would come down from the North. Casualties were meaningless to Ho (or his backers, China and the USSR). He had murdered hundreds of thousands after he came into power in the North, hence added deaths had no meaning to the communist leadership.
The real need was for a new kind of US strategy that would cut North Vietnam’s ability to move troops and supplies south, thereby isolating the battlefield in South Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos were not neutral countries, and the US allowing this fiction to exist doomed all other efforts. South Vietnam was being invaded from North Vietnam, and the US needed to deploy its troops from the coast of South Vietnam along the DMZ through Laos to Thailand in order to cut the Ho Chie Minh trail. This would allow the ARVIN (South Vietnam’s army) to pacify its own nation as the US had done in South Korea. During the Korean War, North Korea had tried to start problems in the south with guerrilla units, but the US let the South Korean Army handle that problem and concentrated on stopping the invasion from the North. At the outset of the conflict in Vietnam, President Kennedy had determined this was a new kind of war and must be fought on new terms; however, Clausewitz was not out of date and his precepts clearly told military commanders how to win this type of war (see: American Strategy in Vietnam, by H. G. Summers, Dover Publications, 2007). By isolating the battlefield in the south winning was at least possible. Without it the war would never end because North Vietnam would never stop sending troops south.
Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, played a key role in confusing US military goals. He implemented a complex budgeting and progress measurement system that completely disregarded the strategy and basic military principles of war (Clausewitz again) needed to focus US strategy and tactics on striking at the enemy’s center of gravity, its movement of forces south.
Figure 81 US Helicopters lift off
Another problem for the Americans was corruption in the South Vietnamese government.[376] The peasants did not want to fight for such a government making recruitment of good soldiers hard. In addition, the government was rife with communist spies. Every American operation had to be cleared through the South Vietnamese; thus, every operation was known to the Reds. In spite of these numerous disadvantages, the Americans were still “winning” in the traditional sense. More and more areas in South Vietnam were free of communist domination. The Americans also protected the harvest from communist theft and taxation, and this had impacts on the ability of the Reds to maintain control of the countryside. Nonetheless, the murders, ambushes, and coercion went on so the countryside was never secure.
American air power was having a negative impact on the communists. [377]From carriers offshore and airbases in Vietnam and Thailand, the United States could apply air power quickly and effectively at any point in the South. In addition, the United States used air power to try and cut the communist supply lines from North Vietnam to the South. The Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed the area of Laos and Cambodia[378] all the way to the southern tip of South Vietnam. The United States tried to interdict this supply route with air power all through the war; however, even though tons of supplies were destroyed, the trail was never cut. In spite of the bombing attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the other efforts to cut supply lines from North Vietnam, the communists in the South remained well supplied throughout the war. This again demonstrates the critical nature of the loss of China to the Reds. If the United States could have cut the supply lines to the battlefields in South Vietnam the communists may have lost. It was the endless movement of supplies from Russia through Red China to North Vietnam and then, after the addi
tion of numerous men, to South Vietnam that determined the outcome of the war as much as any other factor.
President Johnson wanted the war to end, and after being rebuffed by the North in his call for negotiations he began bombing North Vietnam with the goal of forcing them to the negotiation table. Unfortunately for the United States, Johnson insisted on a list of politically correct targets that hamstrung the ability of the US Air Force and US Navy to successfully destroy the North’s war-making ability. Their main harbor, Haiphong, was allowed to operate without any interference during the Johnson years. Russia, China, and other nations brought supplies openly to North Vietnam through this harbor, which made US Airmen furious. Because of US Bombing restrictions the communists soon developed, again without interference (American airmen could see the facilities being constructed), a sophisticated air-defense system in the North. The US attacks on ground targets became predictable (because of White House interference), so the communists had a simple time arranging their air defenses. Surface to air missiles (SAMs) and triple canopy flack brought down many US pilots. In addition, the North was flying excellent MIGs with good pilots against US airmen. The resulting air war over North Vietnam was intense. The United States was losing aircraft, and the results of the bombing were less than satisfactory. The Johnson White House restrictions allowed prime military targets to go untouched. Oil storage, hydroelectric power plants, harbor equipment (cranes, piers, etc.), and other vital installations were not bombed.
Not only was the United States not using the atomic bomb, it was not using its conventional war-making ability to its full potential. Somehow, using all the military power available was unpopular in the Johnson administration. Even though the war was costing American lives at the rate of five hundred per month (at the peak), President Johnson seemed to believe world opinion would turn against him if he bombed the “off target” areas. In fact, all he did was drag out a brutal war. The air force wanted an early all-out bombing effort with no restraint, and they wanted the effort continued unabated until the North stopped sending troops and supplies south. Johnson’s restrictions were a grave error, and it set another dreadful precedent for the future. When America later decided how to use its war-making potential the idea of a limited conventional response was adopted over and over again. It seems American military lives were less important than looking good to the international community.
The Super Summary of World History Page 58