Producing all these aircraft and engines required a large and sophisticated aircraft and engine industry and these industries quickly evolved from small operations building aircraft by hand in 1914 to large aircraft factories often using mass-production techniques. Despite the much larger size of the German economy and Germany’s ability to produce some revolutionary aircraft designs, the German aircraft industry consistently failed to produce aircraft in the numbers the General Staff had planned for, and would consequently lose the attrition battle in the air. The German High Command’s aircraft mass-production plan, called the ‘Amerika Plan’, required production of more than 2,000 aircraft a month in 1918, a number that the German aviation companies consistently failed to meet. Germany produced 48,000 aircraft during the war and 43,486 engines, but these numbers were not enough to keep the Luftstreitkräfte at full strength through the 1918 battles.18 In contrast, the Allied aviation industries outperformed the German in every respect. The Allies’ winning advantage in the air war was the French aviation industry, which produced 52,000 aircraft during the war as well as 88,000 aircraft engines.19 Indeed, from 1914 to 1917 the British were heavily reliant on French-made aircraft and engines. The French supplied 24,000 aircraft engines to their allies and 9,500 aircraft. The American Air Service was only able to enter combat because it received 4,800 aircraft (SPAD and Nieuport fighters, Breguet XIV bombers, and Salmson observation planes) from French industry.20
The French managed to master the techniques of mass production of aircraft and engines before the other powers. The French efficiently managed their aircraft industry and ruthlessly standardized their aircraft for large production runs. In 1918 the French aircraft industry had standardized with 13 aircraft models. The Germans were at the other extreme. Germany’s 30 aircraft companies produced some wonderful advanced designs, but suffered from poor management decisions by the high command and air service staffs. In the last year of the war Germany’s aircraft manufacturers were producing a dozen different fighter models, usually in small production runs. The Fokker D7 was the only German fighter to see a production run of more than 2,000. This stands in contrast to the British and French manufacturers that produced the Sopwith Camel, SE 5A, and SPAD XIII by the thousands.21
But as the aircraft industries (especially the French) managed to master the methods of mass production of aircraft, none of the powers applied any principles of quality control in manufacturing aircraft and engines. Many aircraft and engines were quickly designed and put into production without proper testing or consideration for ease of mass production. This process resulted in some rapid advances in aircraft technology, but also the production of a lot of bad aeroplanes. Pilots of 1918 had almost as much to fear from their own aircraft as from the enemy, and 15 years after the invention of the aeroplane flying was still intrinsically dangerous. The air service reports and pilot memoirs are filled with accounts of propellers breaking in the middle of combat, engines failing at critical moments, and the upper wing fabric simply shredding away in mid-flight (the German Fokker Triplane and French Nieuport 17 were notorious for this). Deaths from operational accidents ran almost as high as deaths from combat in 1918, and some of the top aces from each air service died due to mechanical or aircraft structural failure far from combat. For example, one of the RAF’s top aces, Captain James McCudden, died when his engine failed on take-off. But these are the deadly accidents that are well recorded. In most cases pilots whose aircraft failed them managed to crash-land their crippled aircraft and walk away from the wreck. Landing accidents on wet and muddy airfields were almost a daily event, especially as none of the World War I aircraft had brakes on their landing wheels. The fragile aircraft of the era were often not worth the trouble to repair, although efforts would be made to salvage engines.
What this all meant for the air war is an enormous weekly wastage of aircraft, mostly from non-combat causes. This also explains why, despite production of aircraft reaching over 3,000 a month for the French and British in 1918, it still took a long time to increase the air forces at the front as large-scale production mainly went to replacing the constant aircraft wastage.22 As for the Germans, their aircraft production of 1918 (the best production year of the war) failed to keep up with aircraft losses during the 1918 battles even though the Germans began the 1918 Spring Offensive with a reserve of 1,600 replacement aircraft in depots behind the front.
The great offensives – March to November 1918
In an interesting example of parallel development British artillery commanders by mid-1917 had developed a new artillery doctrine that was basically the same as the one von Hutier and Bruchmüller had developed on the Eastern Front. The British artillery doctrine relied on surprise, calibrating each gun, firing from map coordinates, massive but short preparations, and targeting the enemy artillery.23 The German success at Riga provided ample proof that these methods worked, so on 30 November 1917 the British Army launched a surprise attack on the Germans at Cambrai. The British added 400 tanks to the plan to break through the Germans on a nine-mile front. The initial attack was very successful, much more than the British High Command had expected, and gaps smashed open in the German lines were not fully exploited. The German counter-attacks a week later drove back the British Army, but the Cambrai attack proved that even a well-prepared defence line could be readily broken by the new methods. As with the Germans at Riga, aircraft at Cambrai played a major role, not just in obtaining detailed information on the German defences, but in supporting the lead tank and infantry with squadrons assigned to ground attack roles. Observer aircraft were assigned to support the artillery and identify German artillery and German reserves after the attack started. The Royal Flying Corps massed 400 aircraft to support the attack and ensure British air superiority.
While Cambrai made the British believers in the new artillery and infantry tactics, the French took some time to accept these views. The French Army’s new operational doctrine was issued in October 1917 and, while emphasizing air/ground cooperation, it still supported an extensive artillery preparation. However, when the French saw the new artillery and surprise tactics used against the British and themselves, they dramatically changed their views. In June 1918, in preparation for a series of major Allied offensives, the French High Command wholeheartedly adopted the tactical and artillery support system now commonly used by the Germans and British and based the plans for their upcoming offensives on attaining surprise, using a short and violent artillery preparation, and firing without prior registration. In their offensives from July onwards the French would prove to be quite proficient in the new tactics and would train the Americans in their use (the Americans simply adopted the French doctrine as the best solution for employing their inexperienced army).24
The great Spring Offensive
The Germans saw an attack in the spring of 1918 as their best chance to win the war. Through the winter the Germans trained and prepared their army and air service for the offensive operations to come. Airpower would play a key role in the German plans. By March, the Luftstreitkräfte had massed 3,668 front-line aircraft on the Western Front. The Germans had created 40 new fighter squadrons and 17 new observation detachments to support the Spring Offensive.25 The Germans had about 1,000 combat aircraft fewer than the Allies but, in order to gain air superiority for the offensive, the Luftstreitkräfte concentrated a powerful force of 35 fighter squadrons, 22 ground attack squadrons, 49 observation detachments, and four bomber wings to support the three ground armies mounting the attack on the British Fifth and Second Army fronts.26 When the offensive opened the Germans had 730 aircraft concentrated on the offensive front versus 579 British aircraft.27
The Germans strove to keep their point of attack secret and quietly moved up troops and air squadrons at the last moment. The attack by the German Army on 21 March again demonstrated the effectiveness of the new offensive doctrine. The attack by three German armies took the British by surprise as 6,000 German guns, in a short and intensive bomb
ardment based on careful aerial reconnaissance, efficiently neutralized the British artillery. Aeroplanes played an important role in the German attack plans and the assault divisions were supported by masses of fighters and ground attack planes. The offensive plan detailed the ground attack units to attack British front-line positions and then to concentrate efforts on the British troop reserves and artillery. Some fighter squadrons were detailed to fly top cover for the observation and ground attack craft and to aggressively engage Allied fighters. The German bombers were tasked to carry out night attacks on Allied headquarters and airfields. In the first days of the offensive the ground attack units successfully pounded the British reserves strung out on the open roads and caused considerable British casualties.28 The Germans kept some ground attack squadrons in reserve to support the ground troops and could attack enemy positions 30 minutes after receiving a call for air support.29
The preparatory aerial reconnaissance was just as important for the infantry as for the artillery in ensuring success in the initial breakthrough. The first wave infantry units in 1918 counted on suppressing and outflanking the enemy strongpoints and aerial photography provided the attacking infantry with precise information about the defences they faced.
The violence of the attack and the accurate artillery fire dislocated and disorganized the British forces. Royal Flying Corps airfields came under fire from German long-range guns and the British squadrons evacuated airfields close to the front. They would also have to evacuate and relocate to the rear, major depots, and repair installations. Yet many British aircraft got into the battle immediately and British artillery aircraft located lucrative targets for the British guns as the Germans moved vast columns of reinforcements and supplies behind the first wave divisions. However, the British artillery could not be used effectively as the British Fifth Army guns that survived the German opening barrage retreated swiftly, often leaving the 30-foot tall radio masts (a cumbersome piece of equipment that took time to set up) behind and putting the British artillery out of radio contact with their supporting aircraft. The carefully prepared German plan came close to success in its early stages.
However, German air superiority over the attack front did not last for long. The Allied air services were far better prepared to fight an air campaign in 1918 than in 1917. The Royal Flying Corps had reorganized its training programme in late 1917 and the new British pilots were better-trained than before.30 The Allied fighters were of high quality and the Allies had far greater reserves of aircraft as the air war became an attrition war. Even as the British Army retreated, the Royal Flying Corps rushed additional units to the Fifth Army front and the French deployed ground and air reinforcements to support the British flank. Even if the British artillery could not effectively respond in the first days of the Spring Offensive, French and British fighters flying in large formations aggressively struck the advancing German columns and artillery positions. In the first five days of the German offensive the Royal Flying Corps and the Aéronautique Militaire lost 189 aircraft, but the relentless air attacks helped blunt the German advance.31 By 28 March the German advance was halted before Amiens as the French and British had managed to put together a defensive line. In places the German advance had reached a depth of 40 miles. But the main chance for a decisive victory was lost.
During the Spring Offensive and subsequent campaigns the Germans and Allies used their airpower in similar manner in some cases and in others took divergent paths. Both the Germans and the British set aside most of their heavy bomber forces in 1918 to provide support to the ground campaigns. In early 1918 the Germans had eight wings of heavy bombers on the Western Front and the British had created a special long-range bomber force. Both the British and Germans used strategic heavy bomber forces to attack the enemy homeland in 1918 – the Germans bombed London and French industrial cities while the British Independent Air Force (the British strategic bombers) struck cities in Western Germany. However, once the major ground offensive began most of the bomber missions of both sides were allocated to attacking enemy airfields and key rail yards behind the front.32 With only rare exceptions, these missions had little effect as the accuracy of 1918 bombers at a few thousand feet was abysmal. Even if a target was hit the small size of most bombs (50kg, or 110 pounds, was normal) ensured no major damage.
However, the Germans and British took different approaches to using the aircraft in close support of the ground battle. The Germans preferred to use their ground attack planes and fighters at low level to support their most forward units in the attack. This use of aircraft as ‘flying artillery’ was effective and also important for the morale of the assault troops. The British preferred to send their fighters and light bombers to carry out low-level attacks well behind the German lines to strike at the artillery and infantry columns reinforcing the offensive. Strung out for miles on the roads, they made excellent targets for low-level attacks with machine guns and light 25-pound (11kg) bombs. The British tactics had more operational effect and the German accounts constantly refer to damaging low-level attacks by British fighters in the German rear. The German Air Service missed the chance to seriously damage the British in the first days of the March offensives by not sending most of their battle planes and fighters deep into the British rear while the Royal Flying Corps was still in some disarray. The roads behind the British front were packed with units being rushed to set up a new defensive line and would have been easy prey for massed low-level air attacks.
In March 1918, the British could draw a considerable air reinforcement from other sectors of the front and, after quickly reorganizing their forces, were able to restore communications for their artillery aircraft and get the artillery back into the fight. Royal Flying Corps fighter and light bomber aircraft rushed to reinforce the threatened sector and carried out low-level attacks with bombs and machine guns on the advancing Germans. However, it was also very costly in men and aeroplanes. The Royal Flying Corps lost 245 aircrew dead or missing before the end of the month.33
The Germans attacked again in April and May in different sectors of the front, but never again with the same number of divisions and artillery firepower, never with the frontage as in March. But the Allies managed to counter these smaller offensives and create sound defensive lines after yielding ground. Throughout these weeks the air forces were in the thick of combat and taking heavy losses. But the British and French could readily replace lost aircraft and men and the Germans could not.
The Allied offensives – July–November 1918
The time had come for the Allies to mount major offensives of their own using all the techniques of offensive warfare with the addition of a large tank force – an advantage the Germans lacked. The first major Allied counter-offensive was the French attack at Soissons on 18 July. Intensive aerial reconnaissance gave the French an accurate picture of German positions and defences and the French planned the attack carefully and chose the ground well. The French ensured full surprise by moving the attacking divisions up to the front under cover of darkness and more than 1,000 aircraft supported the French attack while the French artillery efficiently suppressed the German guns. The French Tenth Army, with two US divisions playing a key role, quickly eliminated the salient along the Marne that the Germans had won in May.
By now, the Germans had lost air superiority and the Luftstreitkräfte was now fighting a desperate defensive battle. By the summer of 1918 the aerial attrition war moved sharply in the Allies’ favour. Where the Germans had 3,668 combat aircraft on the Western Front in March, by November 1918 the Luftstreitkräfte had 2,709 aircraft available.34 In the summer of 1918 the Allied air forces, despite heavy losses, had a total of more than 6,000 combat aircraft on the Western Front and the Allied airpower was steadily increasing.35
One of the great moments for airpower in World War I was the British offensive at Amiens on 8 August. RAF aerial reconnaissance had been thorough and before the battle the British fliers had located 504 of the 530 artillery pieces supportin
g the German Second Army.36 To ensure complete surprise the British opened the attack without any preparatory bombardment and instead began the battle with an infantry advance behind a rolling barrage. At that moment the British heavy guns unleashed massive suppressive fires against all the German gun batteries previously identified by the RAF.
Amiens was a masterpiece of camouflage and deception before the battle. Detailed staff plans required the British and French forces to maintain cover to ensure that German aerial reconnaissance would not spot the massive build-up of the assault forces. The 1,000 extra British guns and seven additional British divisions with nine tank battalions were moved at night in order to arrive at the front just in time to attack. The plan included some imaginative new methods of using airpower to gain surprise. RAF heavy bombers flew over the German front lines all night before the attack, dropping the occasional bomb to harass the Germans – but their real mission was to have the aircraft engines drown out the noise of the tanks arriving in the forward positions.
The army and RAF plans ensured air superiority for the Amiens attack. The RAF deployed two brigades – 800 aircraft of all types – to support the attack, while the Germans had only 300 aircraft in the sector. The squadrons deployed were all given specific missions in the detailed operational plan. Eight squadrons (150 planes) were to do close support on the front line. A squadron of two-seater observation planes was assigned to work with the tanks and specifically tasked to look for German anti-tank guns. Two squadrons of light bombers were used to drop smoke bombs to cover the first wave’s advance and later in the day these squadrons would drop machine-gun ammunition to the most forward units. Heavy bombers attacked the German airfields and major rail yards behind the front. Artillery observation squadrons flew patrols up to ten miles behind the German lines and half the fighter force flew escort for the bombers and observers. However, squadrons were also available to fly into the German rear to carry out low-level attacks against German reserves.37
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