Young William James Thinking

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Young William James Thinking Page 32

by Paul J Croce


  concern with “the destiny of the individual” separated from scientific inquiry

  into “the constitution of the world.” Showing his own version of C. P. Snow’s

  later lament about the sharp separation of these “two cultures,” James added

  that the ancients showed that “they are not really so” separate after all,

  because they are “both sprouts of one stem.” Despite their common history

  and their common display of cosmic curiosity, modern differentiation of sci-

  ence and religion often make renewed realization that “one womb bore

  them” seem “vain.” 73 Living at a time when science and religion often ap-

  peared in conflict, and when many sought to compromise their assumed

  178  Young William James Thinking

  tension, the mingling of material and immaterial dimensions of life in

  ancient times encouraged James’s impulses to see these fields in relation

  before even any need to search for compromises. Ancient lessons reinforced

  his attitude of deference rather than adoption for religion, but also for sci-

  ence; he si mul ta neously respected traditional religion and endorsed mod-

  ern science, while also critiquing claims to certainty about either one. For

  young James, the ancients were a glowing lure depicting a way to achieve

  more harmony during the confusions of earthly existence, including his

  own. In his maturity, even when he did not mention Greek art, Roman Sto-

  icism, or Vedic religion, he was continually drawn to the circulation of spir-

  itual messages within the world.

  James’s fascination with ancient thought and culture was part of wide-

  spread nineteenth- century attention to history as a way to understand the

  identity of con temporary parts of life. This historical imagination mani-

  fested itself not only through interest in the origin of diverse species but

  also in study of primal forms of human languages, races, and cultures in an-

  cient times. By the middle of the century, within the cauldron of tension

  about racial difference and antebellum sectional antagonisms, many Ameri-

  cans used those insights about identity through origin to develop virulent

  theories of racial hierarchy, with Anglo- Saxons as the descendants of supe-

  rior ancient Aryan and Germanic people. In asserting this ancient golden

  age, these theories provided American whites (not all of whom were even

  Anglo- Saxon) with a lineage of superiority. The wistful depictions of ele-

  gant Tanagra figures show that ancient Greece was often incorporated into

  these hierarchies of historical descent. As James had exhibited in Brazil, by

  contrast with his own teacher Louis Agassiz, these hierarchical racial views

  held no attraction for him. When friends and colleagues made use of these

  ideas to promote racial supremacy, with primitive “Aryans standing highest

  in the scale,” he pointedly referred to the “aryan philosophy” in the lower

  case, demoting its privileged place, and insisted that the point of his inqui-

  ries was not to assert superiority or even differentiation but to find com-

  monalities in sources among diff er ent competing “morals[,] politics [and]

  religion.”74

  James’s awareness of history also served as a basis for still more of his

  philosophizing. In the mid-1870s, he observed that, according to conven-

  tional wisdom, “the meaning of an idea is that which it has grown from.”

  After becoming impatient with the countless claims to certainty that this

  The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace  179

  identification with origins encourages, he proposed that “the truth of a

  thing or idea is . . . its destiny, that which grow out of it.” But immersion in

  the ancients and reading Max Müller’s works and more in the history of

  religion brought awareness that “the modern historical method of research”

  can reinforce “skepticism,” with belief in “the relativity of all truth of

  opinion to its time.” He took this as a philosophical and cultural challenge:

  “[U]nless we find a way of conciliating the notion of truth and change, we

  must admit that there is no truth anywhere.” By the end of his youth, he was

  finding “conciliation” not in the origins of ideas, but in their future orienta-

  tion, their “line of development.” Well before his pragmatist declarations

  about real ity “in the making” and his pluralist attention to novelty, he was

  already identifying truth according to an idea’s “function of continuing

  thought in a certain direction.” His recent, hard- won readiness to accept life

  “without any guarantee” would support and reinforce this future- oriented

  philosophical outlook. 75

  James’s historical reflections and encounters with the ancients placed

  many of his quandaries about his beliefs and commitments into sharper

  focus. What had begun as informal recreation, with personal reading, mu-

  seum visits, and theatergoing, became an enthralling drama at the center

  of keen vocational and personal choices. The naturalistic science that he

  had been studying began to bother him by the middle of the 1860s because

  it dealt with nature largely “robbed of divinity,” in the potent phrase of

  Schiller, whose essays James read avidly during his scientific education.

  Meanwhile, throughout the Western world, he was surrounded by the social

  and economic changes of industrialism and the professional overturning

  of ecclesiastical privilege; he was aware of these tradition- challenging and

  antireligious trends, which supported the narrative of scientific hostility

  to religion, but he continued to regard religious belief as a source of human

  guidance alongside science— just as each also had its own shortcomings.

  Despite these tensions between science and religion in James’s time and

  ever since, revisionist scholarship has shown that the conventional wisdom

  and the per sis tently popu lar view of conflict between science and religion

  is at best a simplification: many scientists have been religious believers,

  many religious believers have not been antiscientific, and many religious be-

  liefs have influenced science; and even when conflicts have emerged, there

  have been vigorous efforts to reconcile the separate spheres. However, a

  counterrevisionism emphasizes that even in the midst of these interactions

  180  Young William James Thinking

  of science and religion, the practice of science, especially since the late nine-

  teenth century, has evolved toward naturalistic assumptions, making reli-

  gious beliefs irrelevant to the work of science, even if not necessarily an-

  tagonistic. In the modern scientific perspective, and even with tacit

  endorsement from many religious believers, the natu ral world is simply

  material stuff for scientists to study and manage, or for the divine to create

  and control directly (for orthodox religious believers) or indirectly (for the

  more liberal). Traditional Western religions maintain that the transcen-

  dental world is the super natural domain of God and immortality, with kin-

  ship to immaterial ideals in general; however, for science, the immaterial

  world is vocationally irrelevant, a set of human experiences for material

  analy sis, or
just a fantasy, although it may be part of personal beliefs and

  even serve to shape scientific ideologies.76 Mainstream science and religion,

  so often assumed to be in contrast, generally share the view that nature is

  inert: chemical and physical matter to be understood, predicted, and con-

  trolled, or mortal finitude that pales before the majesty of transcendent or

  ideal realms.

  From his young adulthood, and with the support of his thought about the

  ancients, James grew impatient with these modern assumptions about sci-

  ence and religion. He endorsed the scientists and religious believers who

  were ready to dialogue about their respective commitments. In addition,

  however, James emphasized that modern materialistic science and tradi-

  tional Western religion are not in glaring contrast, with consequent need

  for “laboriously attained” reconciliation—to apply his description of pre-

  dominant views since ancient times. Instead, he observed what came natu-

  rally to the ancients, and he experimented with ways to reduce the prevalent

  modern dualistic divide between nature and the transcendent. The ancients

  started with nature around them and found immaterial ingredients embod-

  ied in it. Like the ancients, James also took up the study of nature in his own

  time, namely, scientific inquiry; perhaps circulating within the complexi-

  ties of earth, life, and consciousness, he surmised, we can find some deep

  meanings to the human experience and, like the Stoics, use our inquiries for

  personal direction. Identification of depths of meaning would begin with

  his proposition that Western science and religion are kindred cosmic quests.

  The widespread dualism, depicting their conflict, separation, or contrast

  with need for reconciliation, has reflected the way modern sciences and re-

  ligions each pres ents a special case shaped by cultural formations; each has

  indeed developed with dramatically diff er ent intellectual affiliations and

  The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace  181

  social roles, and each has also evolved into specialized spheres for shedding

  light into vari ous parts of natu ral experience. But, in addition, each also of-

  fers alternative human attempts to answer the puzzlements of that

  experience— each indeed “a syllable in human nature’s total message. ”77

  After James found panentheist ideas about spiritual factors circulating

  in the natu ral world in the outlooks of the ancients, his ideas about the sub-

  liminal “more” would fill out those youthful impulses, as would his views of

  the pos si ble finitude of the divine as a participant in the universe rather

  than only its distant ruler. James also detected the tacit place of immaterial

  ingredients within scientific thinking, observing that positivism and scientific

  psy chol ogy, despite their materialist stance, “always pres ent . . . real ity . . .

  under two ‘aspects,’ . . . consciousness and . . . matter.” Just as he emphasized

  the kinship of science and religion, so he also thought beyond dualist divisions

  of mind and body, turning instead to panpsychic ideas of their relationship.

  He avoided both defiance and defense of per sis tent contrasts between sci-

  ence and religion, or between body and mind. With pragmatist thinking, he

  emphasized the respective usefulness of these ardent positions for empha-

  sizing material or immaterial dimensions of life as platforms for deeper

  learning, clues to the larger mysterious whole. His outlook left him com-

  fortable circulating with liberal religious believers, who, as historian Amy

  Kittelstrom explains, also offered extensions of Chris tian ity’s theologies of

  divine imminence into outlooks for “heeding inner divinity,” with media-

  tion of science and religion, and even endorsement of spirituality operating

  within humanity and the world. And he anticipated challenges to dualism

  in philosophy and psy chol ogy that would emerge more forcefully in the

  twentieth century.78

  Historian James Kloppenberg observes that James was in the vanguard

  of a generation of Eu ro pean and American phi los o phers, coalescing by the

  1890s, who “substituted an ac cep tance of contingency for the standard

  quest for certainty” through denial of dualism and the grounding of truth in

  human experience. Phi los o pher John Dewey, whose reading of James helped

  turn him toward pragmatism, admired his se nior colleague’s pioneering

  stance: in the 1870s, Dewey observed, James “stood practically alone” cri-

  tiquing the confidence of both “materialistic and idealist sides.” In 1925

  Dewey would express the nondualist commitment of the mature James’s

  radical empiricism with words that sound like phrasing from the young

  James’s commentary on modern “laboriously attained simplicity” in con-

  trast with Greek harmony: Dewey disparaged dualism for its “assumptions

  182  Young William James Thinking

  which first make a division where none exists, and then resort to an artifice

  to restore the connection which has been willfully destroyed.” James’s

  path to the “via media,” as Kloppenberg identifies widespread attempts

  at “an unsteady intellectual peace [between] religion and science,” involved

  both positivism and humanism, since he used both experimental naturalism

  and introspection on the mysteries of depth consciousness. James attended

  to these conventionally incongruous combinations at first with ambiva-

  lence, and in his youth he gradually developed his more decisive stance; in

  his maturity, he developed theories not just in compromise of science and

  religion, and of body and mind, but from perceiving their interaction. 79

  The panpsychic tendencies in James’s nondualist understanding of the

  relation between material and immaterial realms have fostered misunder-

  standing and even ridicule. With his focus on social thought, including

  pragmatist James’s contributions to deliberative democracy, Kloppenberg

  treats panpsychism as a slur by “James’s critics” about the “supposed ability

  of minds to commune with other minds.” Despite his own nondualist sym-

  pathies, Richard Rorty characterized James’s nondualism as an illegitimate

  panpsychic attempt to close the “gap between subject and object.” Rorty

  based his own pragmatism on the side of Dewey that was “naturalist with-

  out being . . . panpsychist,” and he criticized James for wandering “down

  the garden path” from Darwinian observations of continuity of human and

  nonhuman animals to impulses presenting experiences of a noncognitive

  sort as factors in thinking. James did, indeed, make just this turn, even as

  Rorty adapted pragmatism to the linguistic turn, with pragmatism tied to

  language rather than to experience; and Rorty set his pragmatism espe-

  cially in contrast with James’s radical empiricism, which portrays pure expe-

  rience as a seamless blend of objective and subjective ele ments. The garden

  path that Rorty found distasteful had its origins in James’s youth— and it

  may have begun as a jungle path, in his encounters with the spider monkey

  in the Amazon. James found a way to be pragmatist by making use of a

  nonmaterialis
t approach to science, a spiritualist hope for religion, and the

  nondualism of pure experience; and James’s path pres ents a challenge to

  pragmatism and other philosophies to attend to complex and mysterious

  parts of natu ral experience. Despite critiques of James, even among prag-

  matists, recent intellectual developments have supported nondualist in-

  sights, with students of both science and religion showing the abundant re-

  lations of these fields, continuities of humanity with other living things,

  The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace  183

  and phi los o phers and psychologists pointing to the embedding of mind in

  bodily pro cesses. 80

  While James’s mature work participated in these trends away from dual-

  ism, it also fulfilled his youthful impulse to show deference to traditional

  religion even without adoption of these beliefs; this was a major source of

  Rorty’s impatience with James’s nondualism since Rorty had almost no in-

  terest in religious beliefs and other such human sentiments that often sur-

  pass human linguistic expression. James was unusual among liberals and

  among intellectuals in general with the depth of his willingness to take

  seriously the nonintellectual convictions of passionate religious beliefs

  because of the added resources they provide for comprehending life’s myster-

  ies. In one of his first philosophical works, James evaluated the disagreements

  between religion and science and related ideological and values contrasts; he

  called each a distinct “sentiment of rationality,” each “but one of a thousand

  human purposes,” each with distinct assumptions, and each setting direction

  for par tic u lar philosophical orientations, but by no means all particularly

  intellectual. Each position, expressed with unarticulated conviction or with

  thorough sophistication, James maintained, begins with a sentiment of

  rationality giving primal orientation to the commitment. He was not just

  tolerating religious belief but also showing the role for its kind of thinking

  within intellectual life in general— just as he had already declared in 1862:

  “None succeed in leaving Faith entirely out.” 81 Ironically, James’s science

  with its goal for inquiry into the abundance of experience served as a major

  factor fostering his sympathy with nonintellectual beliefs, just as it was his

 

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