NOBODY WILL GET THROUGH!
SOLDIERS of the Klessin garrison!
You are now sitting in your pocket waiting for help.
Forget it! Help is not coming any more!
The attempts to break through to you have cost the German command several dozen tanks and armoured personnel carriers.
Tanks and armoured personnel carriers will not get through!
No one will get through!
You may hold on for another day or two, perhaps even a week – that changes nothing.
Sometime during the course of the fighting it was discovered from prisoner of war interrogations that the Soviet attacking division so outnumbered the German defence that, although all their mortar resources were kept in action, they were only fielding one regiment at a time out of three on a three-day exchange system of one in the line, one in reserve and one resting!
During the night of 14/15 March Klessin reported hearing the enemy digging in either side of the Podelzig road and called for heavy artillery fire on that area. The garrison suffered no casualties during the night.
That afternoon Regiment announced the mounting of a second relief operation and in the evening some tense signalling began in which a forward observer with the relief force, ‘M’, reported progress as recorded in the radio log. (I and II denote the 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively.)
To II 1940 Watch out! Our own relief operation. Pull back. Illuminate battlefield.
M 2002 Strong anti-tank fire. Tanks rolling forward. Strong anti-tank fire right of road to KLESSIN.
M 2012 Own tanks rolling forward.
M 2018 Tanks continuing to advance. No sign of own troops at the moment.
M 2033 Tanks 300-400m before position. Remainder on high position.
To II 2035 What is the situation?
M 2036 Fire from big mortars could be laid down in front of tanks.
M 2038 Infantry right of road advancing well.
From I What is the situation?
To I Head of advance has reached KLESSIN. Wing companies advancing.
M 2041 Own troops left of road advancing.
M 2047 Heavy artillery fire on own troops right of road.
M 2051 Lieutenant Wilken wounded. Coming back.
M 2055 Sounds of fighting quieter.
To I 2100 An officer to immediately go forward and clarify situation.
M 2100 Groups of our own troops are coming back right of road 200m from the position.
M 2105 Tanks still advancing. No sign of own troops.
From I 2107 Some tanks now behind village. No infantry companies to be seen. Where is artillery fire?
M 2110 Tanks now in hollow 400m from own positions. 3 tanks going further forward on right.
M 2120 Have some elements gone back?
To I Second Lieutenant Lehner to take over 3 Company and attack.
M 2118 Since last report at 2054 hours no returning troops seen.
From I 2125 KLESSIN reports via 8 Company: We are free.
M 2126 One tank returning.
M 2130 KLESSIN reports: We are free.
M 2137 Up to 8 men seen returning.
To I 2215 Breakthrough must be forced with tanks under all circumstances. Tanks have orders to this effect.
To I 2220 Has an officer gone forward from 1st Battalion to clarify situation?
From I 2223 Attack on the hollow stalled. Tanks partly ahead of own infantry companies without contact to the platoons. Partly covered by considerable mortar fire.
From II 2236 Contact to right re-established, to the left still unclear. Still enemy on the road.
From I 2238 Remove 7 wounded from 8 Company Command Post. 4 stretcher cases.
To II 2250 Urgently need to know whether contact to southern front has been completed.
From II If 1 Company/1242 left PODELZIG-KLESSIN road is not going to advance, fire on DROSSEL[23] from all artillery resources requested.
To II Report immediately when armoured personnel carriers arrive.
From I 7 Company has contact with KLESSIN. If a frontal advance not possible, 3 Company is to drive forward to the Russian trenches that 7 Company has blocked off and roll them up to north. Brief the tanks and let them support us from you.
From I 7 Company has contact with KLESSIN. If a frontal advance not possible, 3 Company is to drive forward to the Russian trenches that 7 Company has blocked off and roll them up to north. Brief the tanks and let them support us from you. Report immediately whether attack frontal or from south.
From II 6 Company has contact with left platoon 7 Company, not with right of 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers not yet arrived.
To I 0025 Prepare Engineer Platoon immediately. Platoon to roll up trenches from south to north. Lieutenant Rossmann to command platoon.
From II 0045 What is the situation?
To II 0105 Frontal thrust along the road now stalled. Engineer Platoon tasked with clearing enemy trenches from south to north. 2nd Battalion is to send an assault troop along 7 Company’s front from 6 Company to re-establish firm contact with 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers are on their way.
From I 0125 Engineer Platoon briefed and already under way.
To I 0135 As soon as the Engineer Platoon is there, roll up the position from south to north. Also commit 3 and 1 Companies. The enemy must be chased out of these trenches.
M 0135 Wounded transport to here.
From I 0135 Wounded transport to 8 Company. Numerous wounded there.
From II 0150 2 Company on right at the moment including No. 1 Platoon of 7 Company at Grid Reference 69660/14000. Request closure of still open gap by rest of Feldherrnhalle or 7 Company. Note coordinates.
From II 0045 What is the situation?
To II 0158 Query: have the armoured personnel carriers arrived yet?
To II Request Hopp to establish:
a) How many pack radios in KLESSIN?
b) How many of these intact?
Reply immediately. Baier.
From II From Feldherrnhalle: One armoured personnel carrier and 2 heavy armoured personnel carriers driven on mines in renewed attack, also strong infantry fire.
To II 0745 Lieutenant Schöne: Undertaking failed due to enemy anti-tank mines. Recognition of your steadfastness and that of your men. I will personally not rest until we are reunited.
From II 0732 Request yet today another drop of ammunition, Verey lights, hand grenades, water, food, lead and nickel batteries, anodes, tetanus, bandages.
From II 0920 Situation Report: Battalion is holding KLESSIN in old positions. One platoon 7 Company in battalion reserve broke back through to us after a short fight after being cut off. Right wing of battalion about 150m north of shot-up Russian tank. Gap to 7 Company about 500m. Also possible to close the gap with specific bombardment of the intervening hollow without putting tanks on stand-by.
From Div For Combat Team Klessin: Report approximate casualties immediately. Have you a doctor in KLESSIN?
To II 1153 Report immediately for Division: fighting strength, casualties and whether you have a doctor in KLESSIN.
From II 1230 In KLESSIN there are in all five pack radios and one unreliable Sender/Receiver. Four of the sets are on their last batteries. Regimental set has still duration of 24 hours in receiving mode. 2 Company cannot communicate with 1st Battalion, but I have secured their batteries. We will only transmit when we need you. Please note.
From II 1327 Fighting strength 5/182. Casualties: 15 (6 dead, 9 wounded). Doctor best possible.
To II 1740 Expected supply drop 1745-1815 hrs. Shoot white and green. Mark drop zone SCHLOSS yard.
From II 1902 To Commander: Re your message of 1730 hours. Messages that through encoding cannot be acted on in time are pointless and endanger confidence in the leadership. Drop zone not SCHLOSS but village street.
To II 1940 Supply bombs coming tomorrow morning. Timing will be passed on to you.
Thus another attempt at relieving Klessin had failed. Helmut Jurisch with
the Panthers reported that, although two of their tanks managed to break through the Soviet lines, they were both soon brought to a standstill in a hail of fire. Attempts to recover them and their baled-out crews were equally unsuccessful because of the volume of fire. Even though there were some dead and wounded among the crews, the majority were captured alive.
However, two Panthers commanded by Second Lieutenant Eimer and Sergeant Stephen had got through to the garrison, although they were not included in the strength return until the 19th. Most importantly, they brought with them a useful addition to the radio link for directing artillery fire.
Early next day, 17 March, Klessin reported visible signs of deterioration in the state of the men as a result of the failure to resupply. The supply drop by Luftwaffe aircraft at 1600 hours coming in from the direction of Podelzig in the face of considerable anti-aircraft fire from the ample Soviet resources resulted in all the supply containers falling east of the Schloss into the Soviet positions. That evening Klessin reported: ‘Visible drop in physical capacity of men after six days without resupply. Already two men have collapsed from physical exhaustion in 6 Company. Today three wounded. Totals 19 severely and 30 lightly wounded. Fighting strength 184.’
On 18 March the radio log continued:
To II I promote with effect from 1 Mar 45 all officer cadet sergeants to officer cadet staff sergeants, Sergeant Lippmann to staff sergeant, Corporals Hopp and Herbert to sergeant. Those unqualified are not to be informed.
To II The Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group and the General Officer Commanding have announced their special recognition of Officer Cadet Grenadier Regiment 1242 for exemplary fortitude at WUHDEN and KLESSIN. From Div
1630 Combat Team Klessin! How much longer can your radios function?
From II 1833 Another 2 days on ‘Receive’.
To Div Another 2 days on ‘Receive’. However, when traffic continues like today and yesterday, only one more day on constant ‘Receive’.
To II 1910 Division wants to know whether there were 2 pigs in KLESSIN when it was surrounded and whether the potato store there has been entered. Reply immediately.
From II 2045 2 pigs destroyed by enemy action before encirclement. Potatoes available have diminished. Amount consumed as rations will be accounted for upon relief.
From II 2130 Situation unchanged. Day-long harassing fire from mortars and anti-tank guns. Last night a storm troop was repulsed by 5 Company and papers captured. Enemy constantly reinforcing encirclement positions.
Fighting strength 178.
Casualties: 3 dead, 3 wounded,
8 severely wounded have died so far.
Resupply urgent: ammunition, Verey cartridges, hand grenades, food, flares, bandages, medicines, tetanus.
Emergency water supply re-established.
Later Wolfgang Schöne was to comment: ‘The tactical radio, partly through my fault, was loaded with unnecessary traffic (i.e. recommendations for medals and promotions, detailed strength returns for routine traffic, the especially grotesque questions from Division about Herr von Albedyll’s two pigs and my ironically intended reply).’
On 19 March the Luftwaffe succeeded in dropping thirteen containers on the village street at a cost of two aircraft shot down, but the containers could only be recovered at night due to the heavy enemy machine gun and anti-tank gun fire. These containers brought welcome relief to the garrison and proved a considerable boost to morale, as the radio log shows:
From II 0512 Attack on 5 Company. Barrage requested.
To II 0540 Supply bombs again today.
From II 0652 Strong movement and noise during the night, apparently in preparation for attack on 5 Company. Quiet in front of 6 Company. Watch out for green flares. Where is the resupply?
From II 0823 Enemy has dug his way in during the night to hand grenade throwing distance on the boundary between 5 and 2 Companies and close east of the WUHDEN-KLESSIN road. Expecting attack today from several directions.
From II 0845 To 13 Company: Request from 0900 hours onwards harassing fire on TONI during the morning.
From II 0925 To 13 Company: Harassing fire on TONI falling too short. Up 50m.
From II 0942 To 13 Company: Request irregular harassing fire on TONI until noon with up 50m.
To II 0950 Can barrages on MÜHLE-MARS be thickened up? If so by how much?
To II 1016 Please report daily fighting strength and casualties from 18 Mar onwards.
From II Reply to 0955 hours. 13 Company: MARS and MÜHLE cannot be drawn in closer. Command MÜHLE unchanged. Command MARS up 50m. Combine fire.
To II 1042 How is the fire on MÜHLE-MARS?
To II 1150 Expected supply drop 1400-1430 hours. Fire Verey lights as per last time. Hopefully it will work.
From II 1342 Checked fighting strength of 18 Mar 45: 5 officers, 55 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 121 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews. Casualties: 2 officer cadets, 1 other rank wounded. 1 officer cadet, 2 other ranks dead.
To II 1448 There has been a delay. Exact time is coming through.
To II 1520 Delicacies arriving 1630 hours. 24 aircraft. Light signals. Mark drop zone.
From II 1605 Enemy attacking. 1 salvo on MARS.
From II 1620 Query: Has barrage on MARS been fired?
From II 1625 Request barrages on MARS and TONI up 25m.
From II 1655 Own bombs here. Detailed report follows.
From II We thank you for the help. Detailed report follows.
From II 1719 Beaten off in front of 5 Company.
To II 1722 Well done, Schöne.
From II Forward Observer 13 Company to 13 Company: Guns on bearing 190 more WUHDEN one shot.
To II Report immediately how many supply bombs on target.
From II 10 bombs on target.
To II Query: Was shooting down of two of our aircraft observed?
From II Yes, in the direction PODELZIG.
From II 1745 Without prejudice to further commendations, request award of Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class to Second Lieutenant Heinrich of 5 Company. From the first days of the encirclement he has beaten back numerous attacks, some severe, with his company, held his position steadfastly and on 10 Mar personally led a counterattack to restore the old front line.
To II Lieutenant Schöne: On the instructions of the Divisional Commander Second Lieutenant Heinrich is awarded the Iron Cross First Class. Heartiest congratulations.
From II 2047 Fighting strength: 5 officers, 54 officer cadets, 18 senior NCOs, 115 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.
Casualties: Wounded 5 officer cadets, 5 other ranks.
Dead 3 other ranks.
7 light wounded back on duty.
To II 2245 Lieutenant Schöne: How did the food taste?
From II Lovely, we thank you!
The resources of the Panzergrenadier Division ‘Kurmark’ being recognised as inadequate to break the deadlock at Klessin, Grenadier Regiment 300, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Helmut Weber, was detached from the 303rd Infantry Division ‘Döberitz’ and given two or three days to prepare. Its task was both to relieve the Klessin garrison and re-establish firm defensive lines back to Grenadier Regiment 1242, at the same time apparently taking over control of this sector from the depleted 1242nd. Then, at the last minute, the promised armoured support was withdrawn.
The regiment advanced behind a heavy artillery barrage at 0515 hours on 20 March, only to find themselves heavily shelled in turn. However, moving fast, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, Captain Böge, managed to break through along the track to the hamlet with some of his men and some sappers of the Armoured Engineer Battalion ‘Kurmark’ within fifteen minutes. Losses among the attacking force were considerable and only 45 men eventually got through to Klessin, where Lieutenant Schöne handed over command of the garrison to Captain Böge, but was instructed by Regiment to continue reporting as before. The Soviets followed up their counter-bombardment with attacks from both north and south and soon regained their blocking positions as they s
ystematically destroyed the 300th’s troops in their path.
At about 0900 hours a Volkssturm man of 7 Company who had been captured in the previous day’s fighting appeared with a Soviet demand for the garrison to surrender by 1400 hours. This demand. signed ‘The High Command of the Red Army’, was set out in proper German and promised, should they surrender, immediate attention to the wounded and immediate release to their homes once the war was over. It was ignored and the Volkssturm man rearmed and put back into the line, only to be killed later on. The radio log continues:
From II 1545 Request immediate recce along road to here whether trenches are free of enemy. Green flares if trenches free of enemy, otherwise red.
From II 1615 From 6 and Assault Companies. Trenches reoccupied by enemy. One to one and a half companies. An energetic attack with supporting fire could still regain these trenches today. Reserves close by. After break-in, strong protection to right and left.
To II 1656 Immediate radio silence except for urgent matters.
To II Request strengths of Böge elements there.
From II 1800 To Commanding Officer 300: Strength of 2nd Battalion 300:
HQ 2/3/10, 5 Company 1/2/7, 6 Company 0/1/7, Engineers 0/0/4, Storm Company 0/0/4, 2 Company 1/4/4.
From II 1948 Request running harassing fire on SPERBER during the night.
To II 2025 Where is your strength and casualty report?
To II 2055 We are trying again. Time 2300 hours.
From II To Regiment: Fighting strength 5 officers, 56 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 110 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.
Casualties: 3 other ranks wounded, 1 officer cadet dead.
Total wounded 64.
Air supply tomorrow necessary with batteries, food, flares, Verey cartridges, machine gun ammunition and hand grenades.
The 300th launched a second attack at 2330 hours with its greatly diminished resources, but this again was stalled by Soviet artillery fire with heavy loss. Attempts at relief involving some heavy fighting resumed on the 21st, as these extracts from the radio log show:
From II 0832 To Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: from Forward Observer, 2nd Battery. Possibility exists that codes have been blown. Use new codes.
With Our Backs to Berlin Page 9