by Mark Felton
The lack of an American response to the Japanese shells was not helpful to the I-25’s gunners. Although there were lights ashore, the Japanese had little idea of what they were actually shooting at, and simply poured shells in the general direction of Fort Stevens. The attack was more psychological than military after all, demonstrating the impunity with which the Japanese could strike at the mainland United States. The I-25 fired seventeen shells, causing only superficial damage ashore, before quietly departing the area and heading for Yokosuka in Japan where she arrived on 11 July 1942. As for Fort Stevens, the antiquated nature of her armaments and a lack of radar demonstrated that the enormous potential firepower of the facility was in fact powerless, and was easily outsmarted by a single enemy warship. It was only by sheer luck that the Japanese gunners did not strike anything important on land with their wild barrage of random shells. If this little battle had occurred in daylight Fort Stevens would still have been unable to make a reply to the impudent Japanese intruder, and the Japanese gunners would have probably been able to target specific locations with ease. Nevertheless, as another demonstration of ‘hit and run’ tactics being employed to unsettle the American west coast it was very successful. On three separate occasions, 17 April, and 20 and 21 June Japanese submarines had come close enough to the coast of North America to land shells, and it was really a miracle that more serious damage had not been caused by the indiscriminate barrages. On all three occasions no response had been made to the Japanese raiders, no aircraft or anti-submarine ships had arrived at the scene, even though each submarine had remained at the surface for a considerable period of time as the crews busily fed shells into their gun. The impunity the Japanese evidently felt when striking at the mainland assisted them greatly in the planning of more audacious aerial attacks on the United States, stretching the offensive potential of their big I-boats to the full limit.
Notes
1. Colin Smith, Singapore Burning: Heroism and Surrender in World War II, (London: Viking), 2005
2. Donald J. Young, Phantom Raid on L.A., World War II, September 2003
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
6. Burt Webber, Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks against North America in World War II, (Fairfield: Ye Galleon), 1984
7. Steve Horn, The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K and Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America on World War II, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), 2005
8. Data derived from Bob Hackett & Sander Kingsepp’s HIJMS Submarine I-23: Tabular Record of Movement, http://www.combinedfleet.com/sensuikan.htm
9. Mark Felton, Yanagi: The Secret Underwater Trade between Germany and Japan, 1942–1945, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd.), 2005, p.20
10. Horn, op. cit.
11. Attack on the SS Coast Trader, California State History Museum, California State Military Department, http://www.militarymuseum.org
12. Donald J. Young, ‘West Coast War Zone’ World War II, http://histo-rynet.com
13. Edmonton Journal, 2 April 2004
14. ibid.
15. ibid.
16. ibid.
17. ibid.
18. ibid.
19. Lord Russell of Liverpool, The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes, (London: Greenhill Books), 2005, p.71
20. Harbor Defenses of the Columbia River During the Second World War, http://www.csus.edu
21. ibid.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
24. ibid.
Chapter 6
Target Sydney
When you receive this letter you will know that I was killed in the Australian area on 31 May. I have nothing to regret. Today I will enter [censored] harbour in order to strike an enemy battleship. Take care of my parents and sisters.
Petty Officer Masao Tsujuku, midget submarine navigator,
Sydney attack
A man may journey to a place he knows, but it takes men of rare courage to go to a place from which there is little hope of return.
Tatsuo Kawai, former Japanese Minister to Australia,
June 19421
Japan knew little of Australia when she started her war with the United States and the British Commonwealth. The Japanese rapidly conquered vast stretches of south-east Asia and the Pacific, perhaps beyond even their own expectations, and before long Australia was virtually on the southern frontline of the new Japanese Empire. Australia was an important member of the British Commonwealth, and she had immediately joined Britain in declaring war against Germany in September 1939, and then Italy and Japan as each new foe appeared and the war in Europe spread to the entire globe. The Japanese Navy saw that Australia held the potential to become a vast base and staging area for Anglo-American armies that could directly threaten the Japanese possessions in south-east Asia. On 10 January 1942 the Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference in Tokyo concluded in its report with two important points of policy to be applied to the threat posed by Australia. Firstly, the Japanese Navy would have to isolate Australia by cutting her lines of communication with India, Britain and the United States.2 Such a confinement would require Japanese submarines to actively interdict the seaways used by Australia to communicate and trade with the rest of the world; a serious undertaking when one considers the size of the Australian continent and the small submarine force available to the Japanese. Secondly, the navy would have to seal Australia off from the other Allied powers, and prevent troops and ships from making it to Australia in the first place.
The Japanese planned three actions in accordance with their outlined general plans concerning Australia, utilizing both air and sea power. Firstly, air attacks were to be directed against the closest large Australian city that could be reached by Japanese planes: Darwin. Secondly, air and ground attacks would be launched against Port Moresby in New Guinea, and thirdly, midget submarine attacks were to be launched against the important Allied naval base in Sydney Harbour. Japanese submarines would also support this operation by conducting shore bombardments and the interdiction of coastal merchant ships. This chapter deals with the submarine element of the overall Japanese strategy enacted against Australia in 1942, the midget and I-class submarine attacks on Sydney, Newcastle and inshore commerce. Before the Japanese launched the daring midget submarine raid into Sydney Harbour, submarine-borne Japanese spotter planes took to the skies over Australia searching for enticing targets for the fleet.
Kwajalein in the recently captured Marshall Islands had become the base for the Japanese 6th Fleet, the Imperial Navy’s submarine force. Vice-Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu, based aboard the flagship Katori, a light cruiser, commanded the 6th Fleet. The fleet was subdivided into six squadrons, each under the command of a rear-admiral. Each submarine squadron consisted of several submarine divisions, totalling twenty-one in all. In each submarine squadron a light cruiser acted as a flagship, and each submarine division normally contained three or four submarines, a division being commanded by a captain. The I-25, which was to be engaged against the American mainland as well as Australasia, belonged to the 1st Submarine Squadron, along with the fleet boats I-9, I-15, I-17, I-19, I-23 and RO-61 and RO-62.
On 8 February 1942, a week after sustaining superficial damage in an American carrier plane strafing attack on the 6th Fleet anchorage, the I-25 departed on her second war patrol. Admiral Shimizu ordered Lieutenant-Commander Tagami to take his boat to the east coasts of Australia and New Zealand, and using the Yokosuka E14Y1 floatplane carried aboard, to launch a series of reconnaissance missions over important Allied naval bases and commercial shipping centres, such as Sydney and Melbourne, gathering intelligence for future Japanese attacks in the Antipodes. Conventional submarine hunting was not prohibited on this mission, and Tagami struck on 14 February close to the north-east coast of Australia, sinking the 5,104-ton British freighter Coldbrook with torpedoes.
One of the main civil defence problems confronting the officials responsible for the defence of Sydney was a ma
rked unwillingness of many of the inhabitants of the city to take air raid precautions seriously. For example, on 14 January 1942 an air raid alert and blackout was sounded throughout the city, and this led to 707 persons being discovered flouting the blackout. On 11 February a drill was sounded again, but this time the number of blackout offenders had grown to 822, indicating that all over Sydney lights remained burning fiercely, providing any incoming enemy aircraft with useful navigational and targeting points. As civil defence units attempted to deal with civic disobedience a very real threat materialized out to sea close to the city.
On the night of 14 February the Japanese submarine I-25 motored quietly on the surface in the swell, Commander Tagami and his officers watching searchlights play across the sky above the city, numerous pinpricks of light twinkling in the distance indicating uncovered windows and unshielded car headlights. Tagami ordered the I-25 to a new position 100 miles south of Sydney, a less conspicuous location where the planned aerial reconnaissance could be launched hopefully without interference. Arriving at the new location to find the sea pitching and rolling his submarine about, Tagami realized that it would prove impossible to safely launch and recover the Yokosuka floatplane to be piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Nobuo Fujita. Tagami would have to wait for the sea conditions to improve, and, in the meantime the I-25 would remain undetected by the Australians, only coming to the surface in the dead of night to replenish her air supply and charge her batteries. For several days the I-25 remained hidden beneath the waves during the hours of daylight, Tagami, his executive officer Lieutenant Tatsuo Tsukudo and Fujita poring over charts of the city, planning a daring flight over one of the Allies most important naval bases and commercial ports. By the evening of 16 February the sea had calmed sufficiently to allow Tagami to decide whether to launch Fujita on his reconnaissance mission over Sydney or abort the operation entirely. An hour after dark the I-25 rose to periscope depth. Tagami completed a full sweep of the horizon, and satisfied that there was nothing out there except calm waters ordered his XO, Lieutenant Tsukudo, to surface the boat. The conning tower hatch was opened, allowing cool fresh air into the stale submarine, and officers and enlisted men scrambled topside to complete a further scan of the horizon with binoculars for any potential threats. The engineering officer was detailed to begin recharging the I-25’s batteries, using one of the large diesel engines, and to recharge the compressed air bottles. Both of these tasks were completed by midnight. In the meantime, Tsukudo took charge of the assembly of the E14Y1 floatplane, a job that normally took an hour to an hour and a half to complete. The timing of the mission was a crucial factor determining whether Fujita and his observer, Petty Officer Second Class Shoji Okuda, would regain the submarine following their sortie over enemy territory. If Fujita and Okuda were sent off too early they would return from their mission in the dark, making locating the I-25 virtually impossible with the naked eye. Therefore, Tsukudo’s mission plan gave Fujita one hour over Sydney, coupled with an hour’s flying time to and from the target. Tsukudo decided that the floatplane would begin heading back to the I-25 shortly after sunrise at 6.32 a.m. Although the submarine was vulnerable to attack when sitting on the surface in daylight, it remained the best chance for Fujita to pilot his aircraft back to the submarine and be successfully recovered. The aircraft, in several parts, was carefully removed from the I-25’ s watertight hangar by a team of ten mechanics at 3.30 a.m. on 17 February. Under Tsukudo’s expert supervision the mechanics assembled the floatplane ready for flight, scheduled to commence in one hour.
Fujita and Okuda boarded their assembled and fuelled floatplane and stared pointedly ahead at the sixty feet of catapult rail welded onto the submarine’s deck that would serve as their runway. Commander Tagami turned his submarine into the wind and maintained a steady 18 knots, designed to assist the light floatplane into the air by providing extra lift as the catapult provided rapid acceleration.
Once airborne Fujita cruised the E14Y1 at a conservative 90 knots, and set course for Sydney Harbour. The Japanese aircraft crossed Botany Bay at about 7,500 feet, then banked to the northwest and crossed Parramatta. Dropping through low clouds to 5,000 feet, Sydney Harbour Bridge loomed out of the gloom below, whole sections of the harbour, despite repeated warnings concerning enemy air raids, well lit up. In particular, the powerful Macquarie Lighthouse remained operational, as well as the Garden Island naval base, including the large graving docks. In the glare of many lights across the harbour, Okuda was able to observe twenty-three Allied ships moored in the harbour or tied up alongside the docks, and among this number he discerned several large warships and five submarines.
Fujita and Okuda had seen enough, especially as light was beginning to filter into the sky around them, and their white fuselage and wings with blood red hinomaru rising sun roundels painted on them would soon attract attention from the ground as visibility improved. Although it was almost fully light by the time Fujita banked away towards North Head and the open sea, the Australian authorities had not registered the presence of a Japanese spotter plane over such a sensitive area. Fujita expected, at any moment, that a hail of anti-aircraft shells would fill the air around his plane, but there was no response from the ground at all. After passing over North Head Fujita dropped the floatplane down to about 150 feet above the surface of the sea and skimming the waves he set a course for his rendezvous with the I-25. As Fujita and Okuda flew slowly across the sea they spotted two merchant ships moving down the Australian east coast that would have made juicy targets for Tagami and his submarine, Okuda noting their position and course to pass on to his skipper when they returned.
Although Fujita arrived at the designated rendezvous point on time, the I-25 was nowhere to be seen. Fujita was under strict instructions concerning maintaining radio silence, lest the Australians intercepted any Japanese transmissions and sent forces to hunt for the I-25. Fujita need not have worried, for when Okuda attempted to send a short radio message to the I-25 he discovered that the radio was not working properly anyway. Low on fuel, Fujita had one option remaining before landing his plane in the sea: to conduct a limited grid search of the area in the hope of locating the I-25. Running practically on fumes, Fujita suddenly spied the Japanese submarine on the surface. To prevent a ‘blue-on-blue’, or so-called ‘friendly fire’ incident, as the aircraft approached the I-25 Fujita waggled his wings to identify himself to the lookouts on the submarine’s conning tower. In reply they released a yellow flare indicating the wind direction and requesting that Fujita land. Fujita executed a good landing into the sea and taxied alongside the I-25, where a retractable crane was used to haul the plane aboard for disassembly. Fujita and Okuda immediately briefed Tagami and Tsukudo on their mission, and by 7.30 a.m. the mechanics had successfully stowed the floatplane back in its hanger. Tagami ordered the I-25 to proceed south on the surface at 14 knots, as Fujita and Okuda rested below after their challenging mission.
After successfully penetrating the airspace above Sydney Harbour, and remaining undetected and unchallenged by the Australians, Tagami’s next task was to take his submarine to Melbourne and allow Fujita to conduct a similar reconnaissance sortie over the harbour. Entering the Bass Strait between Victoria and Tasmania on 18 February, Tagami would decide to launch Fujita from Cape Wickham, close to Melbourne’s Port Phillip Bay. The Melbourne mission would prove to be a close run thing for Fujita and Okuda.
Throughout the morning of 19 February the I-25 travelled on the surface some 200 miles east of the huge island of Tasmania, then the Japanese submarine turned south-east, taking the I-25 to a position about eighty miles off the Cape Bruny lighthouse. During the afternoon the submarine battled through a major storm, pushing through heavy seas while heading west below Tasmania. By the following day the storm had begun to abate, allowing Tagami a moment to conduct his own reconnaissance before launching the floatplane on its mission. The I-25 crossed the Bass Strait to Cape Otway, and, running at periscope depth ten miles off the coast, Tagam
i had a good view of the coastline of south-west Victoria. After making several sweeps of the Australian coast Tagami ordered the I-25’s periscope retracted, and the boat re-crossed the Bass Strait to Cape Wickham to prepare for the coming aerial mission. However, the sea conditions were still too choppy to risk launching the delicate floatplane, and in a repeat of the Sydney operation, the I-25 was forced to wait out the bad weather until conditions improved.