by Ted Widmer
military
PRESIDENTIAL DOODLES
Now that’s what makes our position so difficult. If we go in and take them out on a quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to the United States of these missiles being used, and we prevent a situation from arising, at least within Cuba, where the Cubans themselves have the means of exercising some degree of authority in this hemisphere. On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think—there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—of their just going in and taking Berlin by force. Which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—which is a hell of an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.
On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about, the chances are they will begin a blockade and say that we started it. And there’ll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. So that once again they will say that there will be this feeling in Europe that the Berlin blockade has been commenced by our blockade. So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives. Whether we balance off that, our problem is not merely Cuba, but it is also Berlin. And when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what has made this thing to be a dilemma for three days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.
quarantine
quarantine—how to describe
Letters to heads of state
What would have been the strategic effects
Announcement of test conclusion
Reexamination of our test agreement
Release of photographs
PRESIDENTIAL DOODLES
On the other hand, we’ve got to do something. Because if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin anyway. That was made clear last night. We’re going to have this knife stuck right in our guts, in about two months. And so we’ve got to do something. Now, the question really is what are we going to do?
It’s safe to say two of these missiles are operational now. They can be launched eighteen hours after the decision to fire has been reached. We’ve even seen—These missiles could be launched within eighteen hours after the decision to fire. [unclear]. They’d be ready in December of ’62. It depends on—intermediate range. Communication, targeting, and an integrated air-defense system are now gaining operational status.
MAXWELL TAYLOR: That means that we’re hearing electronic emissions now, suggesting that they have sectors for the air defense of Cuba. I believe this is the latest intelligence file.
JFK: I just wanted to say that these were some of the problems that we have been clearing up. Let’s hear from …
TAYLOR: Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over to General LeMay. We recognize these things, Mr. President. But I think we’d all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin, our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility is sacrificed.
JFK: That’s right. That’s right. So that’s why we’ve got to respond. Now the question is, what is our response?
GENERAL CURTIS LEMAY: Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has said. I’d emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don’t have any choice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that’s proposed, a political action, the first thing that’s going to happen is your missiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobile ones. Now we can’t find them, regardless of what we do, and then we’re going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.
JFK: Well, can’t they [put] some of these undercover new—now that they’ve been alerted?
LEMAY: There is a possibility of that. But the way they line these others up, I’ll have to say it’s a small possibility. If they were going to hide any of them, I would think they would have hid them all. I don’t think there are any hid. So the only danger is that we haven’t picked up some position in plain sight. This is possible. If we do low-altitude photography over them, this is going to be a tip-off, too.
Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don’t share your view that if we knock off Cuba, they’re going to knock off Berlin. We’ve got the Berlin problem staring us in the face anyway. If we don’t do anything to Cuba, then they’re going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they’ve got us on the run. If we take military action against Cuba, then I think that the …
JFK: What do you think their reply would be?
LEMAY: I don’t think they’re going to make any reply if we tell them that the Berlin situation is just like it’s always been. If they make a move, we’re going to fight. I don’t think it changes the Berlin situation at all, except you’ve got to make one more statement on it. So I see no other solution. The blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don’t see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.
Because if this whole blockade comes along, MiGs are going to fly. The IL-28s are going to fly against them. And we’re just going to gradually slip into a war under conditions that are at great disadvantage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out our airfields in the southeastern portions. And if they use nuclear weapons, it’s the population down there. We just drift into a war under conditions that we don’t like. I just don’t see any other solution, except direct military intervention right now.
GEORGE ANDERSON:9 Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course of action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view is the right one. I think it’s the best one from the political point of view. I’ll address myself to the alternative of the blockade. If we institute a blockade, from a military point of view, we can carry it out. It is easier for us and requires less force if we institute a complete blockade rather than a partial blockade, because instituting a partial blockade involves visit and search of all of these neutral ships, and taking them in, perhaps, to ports, which will certainly a great deal of [unclear], than if we go ahead and institute a complete blockade.
If we institute a complete blockade, we are immediately having a confrontation with the Soviet Union, because it’s the Soviet-bloc ships which are taking the materiel to Cuba. The blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba, and will provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles, to assemble the IL-28s, to get the MiGs in a contract-manner control system ready to go. And I feel that, as this goes on, I agree with General LeMay that this will escalate and then we will be required to take other military action at greater disadvantage to the United States, to our military forces, and probably would suffer far greater casualties within the United States if these fanatics do indeed intend to fire any missiles.
We certainly cannot guarantee under those circumstances that we could prevent damage and loss of life in the United States itself. I think we have a good chance of greatly minimizing any loss of life within the United States under the present conditions, if we act fairly soon, although we do not recognize that will be very fast. I do not see that, as long as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solution to the Cuban problem except a military solution.
On the other hand, we recognize fully the relationship to the Berlin situation. The Communists have got in this case a master situation, from their point of view, where every course of action posed to us is characterized by unpleasantries and disadvantages. It’s the same thing as Korea all over again, only on a grander scale.
We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I think, on balance, the taking of positive, prompt, affirmative action in Berlin demonstrated the competence, the ability, the resolution of the United States. On balance, I would judge it, would be to deter the Russians from more aggressive acts in Berlin, and if we didn’t take any action, they’d feel that we were weak. So I subscribe fully to the concept that [unclear].
JFK: It seems to me that we have to assume that just in order to, military … when we grabbed their two UN people and they threw two of ours out, we’ve got to assume that’s going to be an [unclear]. They may not do it, any more than we can let these go on without doing something. They can’t let us just take out, after all their statements, take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and not do anything. It’s quite obvious that what they think they can do is try to get Berlin. That may be a risk we have to take, but …
LEMAY: Well, history has been, I think the other way, Mr. President. Where we have taken a strong stand, they have backed off. In Lebanon, for instance.10
TAYLOR: I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of view of face that they’ll do something. But I think it will be considerably less, depending on the posture we show here. I can’t really see them putting the screws in. The dangers of hitting Berlin are just as great or greater after our action down here, because we have our [unclear].
JFK: They’ve got to wait for three months until they get these things all ready, and then squeeze us in Berlin. But I think at that point, for what it’s worth, it may not be worth much, but at least we’ll have the support of Europe.
TAYLOR: That is true.
JFK: This way we have to figure this [unclear] in Europe will regard this action, no matter what pictures we show afterwards of [missiles] having been …
EARLE WHEELER: Mr. President, in my judgment, from a military point of view, the lowest-risk course of action if you’re thinking of protecting the people of the United States against a possible strike is to go ahead with a surprise air strike, the blockade, and an invasion, because these series of actions progressively will give us increasing assurance that we really have gone after the offensive capability of the Cuban-Soviet corner. Now, admittedly, we can never be absolutely sure until and unless we actually occupy the island.
Now, I’ve also taken into consideration a couple of other things at the present time. To date, Khrushchev has not really confronted us with Soviet power. In other words, he has not declared Cuba a part of the Warsaw Pact. Nor has he made an announcement that this is a Soviet base, although I think that there is a chance that he may do that at any time, particularly later in November, when he comes to the United States. And this course of action would then immediately have us confronting the Soviets and not Cubans. And at that time Soviet prestige, world prestige, would be at stake, which it is not at the present time.
The effect of this base in Cuba, it seems to me, has at least two sizeable advantages from his point of view, and two sizeable disadvantages from our point of view. First, the announcement of a Soviet base in Cuba would immediately have a profound effect in all of Latin America at least, and probably worldwide, because the question would arise, is the United States incapable of doing something about it, or unwilling to do something about it? In other words, it would attack our prestige. Not only that, increasingly, they can achieve a sizeable increase in offensive Soviet strike capabilities against the United States, which they do not now have. They do have ICBMs that are targeted at us, but they are in limited numbers. Their air force is not by any manner of means of the magnitude and capability that they probably would desire. And this short-range missile course gives them a sort of quantum jump in their capability to inflict damage on the United States. And so as I say, from a military point of view, I feel that the lowest risk course of action is the full gamut of military action by us. That’s it.
JFK: Thank you, General.
DAVID SHOUP:11 Mr. President, there’s a question in my mind. Under what circumstances would Cuba want to inflict damage on the United States? The placing of the kind of weapons and the bombers that can do that certainly demand a hell of a lot of attention. There’s one feature of this that I’ve been unable to reconcile. And I wonder whether the American people and the other nations of the world can reconcile it, and that is that we are now so anxious or we’re discussing the anxiety of eliminating the possibility of damage to America from the Cuban air raid, whereas for a good many months the world has known, and we’ve known, that we have tremendously greater potential already aimed in on us from Russia, and it has been many months. We didn’t attack Russia. I think that’s a hard thing to reconcile, at least it is in my mind, and I would think it would be in the American public and other nations of the world. If it’s only a matter of distance, that it’s closer now, we know they have them in Russia. So if they want to inflict damage, it’s a question of whether Khrushchev wants to have them do it, and him keep out of it.
So if there’s a requirement to eliminate this threat of damage, then it’s going to take some forces, sizeable forces, to do it. And as we wait and wait and wait, then it will take greater forces to do it. And as long as it isn’t done, then those forces will increasingly require a greater force. We’ll be absolutely tied to that function. That means that they’re going to have to stand by and take care of that function. And you will then have a considerable force of troops, ships, aircraft tied to this requirement that someday may happen. I can’t conceive that they would attack us just for the fun of it. They might do it at the direction of Khrushchev. But I cannot see why they would attack us, because they couldn’t invade to take us. So there’s a question in my mind, in the political area, and as I say, the public and the people, what does this mean? Does it mean they’re getting ready to attack us, that little pipsqueak of a place? If so, Russia has a hell of a lot better way to attack us than to attack us from Cuba.
Then, in my mind, it all devolves upon the fact that they do matter. They can damage us increasingly every day. And each day that they increase, we have to have a more sizeable force tied to this problem, and then they’re not available in case something happens someplace else. And these guys either then have to take some new action in Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea. You would be degrading. You’d have to degrade your capability against this ever-increasing force in Cuba.
So, in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat that is now closer, but it’s not clearly the threat we’ve experienced all these months and months, if we want to eliminate it, then we’re going to have to go in there and do it as a fulltime job to eliminate the threat against us. Then if you want to take over the place and really put in a new government that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place. And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of a decisive success in as quick [?] as possible.
JFK: Well, it is a fact that the number of missiles there, I would say that no matter what they put in there, we could live today under. If they don’t have enough ICBMs today, they’re going to have them in a year. They obviously are putting in [unclear] missiles.
LEMAY: Plus increase their accuracy against the fifty targets that we know they could hit now. But the big thing is, if we leave them there, it’s a blackmail threat against not only us, but the other South American countries that they may decide to operate against.
There’s one other factor that I didn’t mention that’s not quite our field, [which] is the political factor. But you invited us to comment on this at one time. And that is, if we should talk about Cuba and the SAM sites down there. And we made pretty strong statements about the [unclear] Cuba, that we would take action against offensive weapons. I think that a blockade, and political talk, would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too. In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.
JFK: What did you say?
LEMAY: You’re in a pretty bad fix.
JFK: You’re in there with me. [laughter]
EAVESDROPPING ON THE JOINT CHIEFS, OCTOBER 19, 1962
As the tape kept rolling, JFK left the room, and then his closest military advisors, General Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, also left. That left several of the Joint Chiefs, unaware that the tape was rolling and recording their conversa
tion. There is no indication that JFK ever listened, but nevertheless, the very fact that their disrespectful conversation was captured constituted a chit for the President, well aware that the military had advised him disastrously during the Bay of Pigs.
DAVID SHOUP: You pulled the rug right out from under him.
CURTIS LEMAY: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?
SHOUP: I agree with that answer, General, I just agree with you, I just agree with you a hundred percent. Just agree with you a hundred percent. That’s the only goddamn … He finally got around to the word “escalation.” I just about [unclear]. That’s the only goddamn thing that’s in the whole trick. It’s been there in Laos, it’s been in every goddamn one. When he says escalation, that’s it. Somebody’s got to keep him from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal. That’s our problem. Go in there and frig around with the missiles. You’re screwed. You go in there and frig around with anything else, you’re screwed.
LEMAY: That’s right.
SHOUP: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing, some way, he could say, that they either do the son of a bitch and do it right, and quit frigging around. That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go take a missile out. [unclear] Goddamn, if he wants to do it, you can’t fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can’t fiddle around with hitting the missile site and then hitting the SAM sites. You got to go in and take out the goddamn thing that’s going to stop you from doing your job.
EARLE WHEELER: It was very apparent to me, though, from his earlier remarks, that the political action of a blind strike is really what he’s …
SHOUP: His speech about Berlin was the real …
WHEELER: He gave his speech about Berlin.
LEMAY: He equates the two.
WHEELER: If we smear Castro, Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt.12
CALL TO PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, OCTOBER 22, 1962