by Nigel West
Outside:
1. Private informer.
2. Military or Naval.
3. Government Offices.
4. Police.
5. Chance: a returned letter or a letter picked up and submitted, a conversation overheard and reported.
Sources of detection in time of war
Inside:
1. General check on the transmission of money orders, telegraphic orders, cheques, drafts.
2. General check on telegrams.
3. General check on passenger traffic at ports and certain areas, Home Office Warrants and special checks.
4. British Intelligence services at home and abroad.
5. Foreign Office.
NOTE: The first of the Inside Sources does not seem to have led to the detection of any proved spy but it supplied information which was of great value during the war. The second and third sources frequently overlap and the second is the most important source of detection in time of peace.
Outside:
1. Special Departments.
2. Censorship.
3. Passport Office.
4. Military Permit Office.
5. Allied Services.
6. Police.
7. Private informers, both British and foreign.
Of all these sources by far the most important are the agents employed by British officials in touch with MI-1(c). The action taken depends upon the class of spy and the source and nature of the information received.
If it be a case of information lodged against an alien or civilian by a private person the first step will be probably verification of the details through police enquiry; if the accused be a serviceman or a government official the enquiry will begin in the department to which he belongs.
If the existence of a spy be known, but his personality in doubt, the first step will be identification. The means of identification most successfully used was the comparison of handwritings. The best way of procuring a specimen of handwriting was by securing it from the local post office’s receipt signed by the suspect, but this of course presupposed that the enquiry had reached a point at which suspicion is directed against a definite person. For especially interesting identifications, the case of Armgaard Graves, Fred Ireland and Frederick Gould before the war, and the case of Carl Muller and John Hahn and that of Kenneth de Rysbach during the war, are worth special study.
Sometimes the bureau employed its own special agents in this difficult work, as happened in the cases of Alfred Hagn and Eva de Bournonville.
The second stage of investigation, i.e. the collection of evidence, shows important differences in peace and war. In peace it might be a long and tedious process involving the repeated shadowing of an agent and the postponement of arrest until, by a series of measures elaborated between the bureau, the police and the post office, it became known that certain incriminating documents would be found on the criminal or in his house. In war, the spy’s movements might be known beforehand and he would be invited or taken to Scotland Yard on arrival, duly cautioned and interrogated, and if he failed to extricate himself, would be arrested. His interrogation might be put in evidence against him. The difference of procedure is due to the difference in the authority sanctioning proceedings; in time of peace it is in the hands of the law officers of the Crown. In time of war it is in the hands of the Competent Military Authority.
There are thus two stages in the collection of evidence: (1) before and evidence to justify arrest (2) after arrest and to prepare the case. Both stages consist of a series of verifications: the man’s civil status, movements, business, money affairs and receipts, communications, friends and associations both in England and abroad form the object of enquiry. In addition, in every spy case in which information was sent to the enemy, verification of its truth and value was given in open court.
The preparation of the case took place under legal direction. One principle governs in both peace and war, and that is secrecy. In peace the trial takes place in open court and is fully reported, therefore it is essential to conceal counter-espionage methods. Both for this reason and for reasons of evidence, much damning information against the criminal cannot be produced in court in time of war; with control of the press and trial by court martial, there is less risk of exposing the methods of counter-espionage, moreover the special preventive measures are necessarily known to the enemy. Secrecy therefore bears upon another aspect of the case; the enemy must be kept in the dark as long as possible as to the actual arrest of his agent and the nature of the charge.
There is, however, one difficulty in wartime, the spies may be neutrals and as a matter of courtesy and prudence, an official, whether of the embassy or consulate of that neutral country is present at the trial. He is of course held to secrecy – but presumably he furnishes a report to his government. By whatever means, whether by a process of inference or by leakage, the record of the spy cases shows that the Germans arrived at pretty accurate results as to the fate of their spies and the weak points in the tactics which led to their arrest, and in searching for fresh methods they laid bare the weak points of our defence.
It is the business of the investigator to note these results and to offer suggestions for strengthening prevention to those persons who deal with that side of counter-espionage i.e. originally F Branch, now renamed A Branch.
In conclusion: the pre-war possible suspect list was the means of educating the police in certain aspects of a work that to all was novel and the police were inclined to consider that if a man was outwardly respectable and clear of any criminal suspicion, he could not be a spy. The county constabulary worked on the whole very well with the Metropolitan Police, who had not had the same opportunities in peace, worked well on the outbreak of war but not so well later. The German view was that the police could be moulded to suit their ideas by treating and bribes, and this suspicion does not appear to be entirely unfounded. The war itself may partly have educated the public but the lessons would soon be forgotten. It is impossible for the general public to have any idea of the extent of an enemy’s espionage attack, and the majority are still found to discredit the allegations against the Bolshevists. The best security of all might be a contented and well-informed general public.
It is as well to emphasise strongly here the limitation of this report, and the large area of the uninvestigated field. Much has been done in the time available, but much has been omitted, and the report though apparently voluminous, necessarily omits much that should be included. Most historical reports are more or less misleading for it is very difficult to write down the truth very satisfactorily. It is so often not only difficult but impossible to know what is the truth.
CHAPTER I
MI5 Pre-War
THE Special Intelligence Bureau was started in October 1909 by the Committee of Imperial Defence, at the insistance of the Imperial General Staff, with the object of counteracting the efforts of the German government to establish a spy organisation in the United Kingdom. The work, and consequently the organisation of such a bureau, is naturally divided into two main branches:
1. The investigation of particular cases involving a definite suspicion of espionage.
2. The construction of legal and administrative machinery calculated to embarrass, penalise and, if possible, to frustrate attempts in general and for the future.
On 1 October 1909, Captain Vernon G. W. Kell took up the duties as above and from the inception of MO5 (later MI5) as a bureau and with only the one officer to carry on the work, the duties tended to fall under the two heads mentioned above and then a third dealing with the administrative work as a whole. By 1913, the bureau consisted of three branches eventually known as F, G and H, each with its own special functions.
As far back as 1908, the DMO had drafted a memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff regarding the unsatisfactory position the country was in as regards the matter of German espionage and point out that there was no staff to watch suspicious cases even when reported and at best they could
only be superficially investigated and then dropped. Co-operation by other government departments was almost impossible to obtain.
During the early days of the bureau’s existence the ‘G’ or Investigation work had to be done by the one or only officer who was in charge of Captain (now Colonel) Kell, which necessitated his constant absence from the headquarters in London to make personal enquiries into cases and to get in touch with local naval, military and police authorities to assist him. In March 1910 he was given a secretary and later, on 1 January 1911, Captain Kell obtained the services of another officer Captain P. L. Stanley Clarke of the Suffolk Regiment, and the division of the work of the bureau began to divide itself more definitely into the Passive (Preventive) and Active (Detective) Branches, though as a matter of fact both officers functioned on the two duties.
At the commencement of the bureau’s existence, Captain Kell in his G Branch capacity had to investigate some interesting and curious cases of which those known as the Frant and Rusper cases are typical. In the first case a German who gave the name of De Corina took a farm in the neighbourhood of Frant in Sussex, Here he went in ostensibly for poultry farming but it was noticeable that the farm at Bartley Mill was a great rendezvous for Germans, most of whom seemed to spend the greater part of the time cycling and motoring all over the country. De Corina himself was a typical German and it was quite obvious that he could not be making his living from the proceeds of the farm. Although nothing was ever discovered which could definitely connect this man with espionage the whole circumstances of the case were very peculiar and suspicious and the extremely secluded position chosen for the scene of their operations as well as the difficulty of watching it lends colour to the belief that it was used as a centre for espionage.
The Rusper case was similar. Two Germans appeared at considerable intervals of time, each furnished with a recommendation to a gentleman living in the village of Rusper, from a certain baroness whom this gentleman declared he had never heard of before. Those German pretended to know nothing of one another but rapidly struck up an acquaintance, and it is evident that whether they knew one another or not each had a very intimate knowledge of the other’s concerns.
William Melville MVO OBE who, since his retirement from Scotland Yard in 1903 had been employed by the War Office, was sent down to investigate the case, put up in the same house and caused these gentlemen some perturbation. They cross-questioned the landlord closely about him, being especially anxious to know if he understood or spoke any foreign language, and were visibly relieved when the landlord assured them he did not. Shortly after Mr Melville’s arrival the two gentlemen quarrelled (it was evidently a put-up job) and refused to speak to each other during the remainder of Mr Melville’s foray. They were constantly moving about the village of Rusper. In this case too there was no definite proof of espionage but the circumstances were very suspicious.
In November 1909 MO5 sent Melville to investigate one Karl Hentschel who advertised a school at Sheerness and who stated he would also visit Sittingboume and other places. Melville, after enquiries, concluded he was in the German Navy and a spy. This investigation, which also brought into the case George Parrott and the Rileys, was continued during 1910.
So far the bureau in its G capacity had only two detectives, Melville and Herbert Dale Long. The former, however, was too old for such work as constant observation and the talents of the latter lay in rather a specialised direction which rendered him in some ways unsuitable for this class of work. It was, therefore, felt necessary to add to the staff of detectives and Captain Kell applied to be allowed to engage two suitable men. Captain Kell got in touch with the head of the Military Police at Aldershot as a very possible aid in certain cases that might occur in any army centre.
It was becoming daily more evident that it was necessary to have a staff of special detectives as those belonging to the ordinary police force of the country, however excellent they might be as regards crime, had not got the necessary degree of tact to carry out the delicate enquiries involved in espionage cases.
In July 1910 Melville had been sent over to Ireland to investigate the O’Brien case. It appeared that a certain Kate O’Brien, who had a brother in the Royal Artillery at Portsmouth, had written to say that she had plans of the Portsmouth defences and considered them of value. There was some doubt as to whether this could be the case and Melville was sent to find out further information about the plans in the sister’s possession, it was however, found that it was an ordinary map of no military value so no further steps were taken.
On 5 September 1910, a telegram arrived from the GOC Portsmouth defences to say that some of the officers had arrested a Lieutenant Siegfried Helm of the 21st Pioneers (German Army) in the act of sketching Fort Widley. The next day Captain Bonham Carter came up with all the necessary evidence about Helm’s espionage. Then the unsatisfactory state of the law under the Official Secrets Act of 1889, came prominently to notice.
On calling on the Public Prosecutor in regard to the case he gave it as his opinion that the necessary evidence was at hand to apply for a fiat from the Attorney-General to prosecute Lieutenant Helm. As, however, that official was away on the Continent it was necessary to wire for his authority to carry out the arrest. In consequence it was necessary to detain Lieutenant Helm in military custody until 4 p.m. on 7 September at which time he was handed over to the civil power. The German officer was eventually tried and was bound over in his own recognisances of £250, to come up for trial if called upon to do so. As a matter of fact the fort he was sketching had been long out of date and could be of no possible interest to Germany, but the case is illustrative of the difficulty of taking proceedings against a suspected spy. This was one of the many cases that helped towards the framing and production of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
In August Franz Heinrich Lozel became a subject of the attention of MO5G also Walter E. Wilson at Portsmouth, about whom Melville was sent to make enquiries.
Early in 1911 Heinrich Christian Wilhelm Schutte became an object of suspicion and the attention of MO5 was called to the case of Dr Max Schultz at Plymouth whose actions and movements appeared suspicious, and Captain Kell took up the direction of the cases on 6 August 1911.
In April the Chief Constable of Kent forwarded a report about Lozel and he was placed on the Special War List (SWL) for Kent under the heading ‘Search’. A hairdresser, George Wittstruck, at Sheerness was also a subject for enquiries.
In order to obtain information at the ports from ships’ captains who were in a position to act in a certain measure as scouts on the high seas and in the enemy’s harbours, Captain Kell obtained the services of Lieutenant B. J. Ohlson of the Royal Naval Reserve as Mercantile Marine assistant on 10 May 1911. By the end of June 1911, Lieutenant Ohlson was doing regular work for G Branch and through him the names of those merchant shippers plying between London and the Continent who were discreet and willing to keep their eyes open and report useful information were received.
In August, the consent of the Home Secretary to grant warrants in suspected cases of espionage for the opening of letters in the post provided MO5 with a much needed form of assistance in their duties. About this time, one Charles Wagener at Plymouth became an object of suspicion to MO5 who placed him on the SWL under the heading ‘Arrest’.
On 18 August a warrant for the arrest of Max Schultz was issued under Section 1, sub-section 2 of Official Secrets Act 1889 and he eventually went for trial to the Exeter Assizes on 3 November, found guilty and sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. This case also introduced a German agent named Gustav Neumann, of whom we knew, and also Edmund Ahlers and Francis L. Holstein.
On 22 August 1911, the new Official Secrets Act was passed into law and the work of counter-espionage was thereby greatly facilitated.
The Home Office Warrant (HOW) on Otto Kruger brought proof that one Johann Engel of Falmouth was in receipt of a subsidy of £40 a year from the German Secret Service fund. He was placed und
er observation in September but nothing suspicious was noted. He was placed on the SWL heading ‘Arrest’ and arrested on 4 August 1914.
By the end of September much work had been done by the bureau to assist and simplify G Branch’s future activities. The registration of aliens in the areas under the jurisdiction of Chief Constables of counties had made considerable progress, returns having been received from twenty-eight. Eight counties were already furnishing regular reports on the arrivals, departures and change of address of aliens, mostly along the coast, and other counties were preparing to furnish similar returns. Returns of aliens, in all government establishments, under the Admiralty, were received and registered. Lists of possible suspects to be reported on every three months had been started by some twenty Chief Constables and the first installments of reports had been received from four counties.
The case of one Heinrich Grosse who had established himself at Portsmouth during the crisis of 1911 (the Agadir incident), in the name of Captain Hugh Grant had been engaging the attention of the bureau during the year and the man was finally arrested on 4 December. He was indicted on five counts under the OSA 1911 and eventually brought to trial on 9 February 1913, found guilty and condemned to three years’ imprisonment. Mixed up with the case we find Heddy Glauer who though probably not a spy was possibly a political agent and a friend of Joseph King MP who played an active anti-British part both before and during the war.
Towards the end of the year suspicion fell on a Second Class Stoker, Frederick Ireland, and his uncle Otto Kruger, and a warrant was taken out for all correspondence to the latter’s address.
The check on Steinhauer brought the name of Walter Reimann of Hull to notice as a German agent engaged particularly in obtaining information about the Humber defences.
Early in January 1912, steps had been taken to extend the work of the bureau by getting in touch with the police of the boroughs and cities, and in April the Home Secretary’s letter of introduction had been sent to Alfred Arnold, the Chief Constable of Rochester. He had replied stating his willingness to help and asking for an interview and in May, Captain Drake went to Rochester and laid before the Chief Constable, the bureau’s suspicions concerning one Frederick Gould.