by Nigel West
The interview at Cuxhaven took place between 13 and 17 May, and by Steinhauer’s influence Gould was taken on trial for four to six months at the rate of £15 a month. He was to obtain confidential books in use from 1908 up to date and to receive special rates for these. But he was no longer under Steinhauer’s orders and henceforward Steinhauer’s role was to be that of the friend and adviser who accepts presents from, and might possibly enter upon profitable private business with Gould, but who has nothing to do with espionage.
Gould was put under the orders of F. Schmidt, a so-called banker’s agent, whose agent in Berlin directed him to send fortnightly reports under cover to Mme Duller, rue du Theatre 33, Brussels. Schmidt informed Gould that they would both of them be working on their own responsibility and at their own risks. Schmidt would supply funds out of his own pocket, but as he would be paid only by results, he depended upon Gould to furnish material that would bring in good return. He asked whether the letters were to be sent to Gould from Germany, Belgium or England. Concerning the personality of Schmidt, Gould stated afterwards that the name stood for Steinhauer, but he made this statement only after circumstances of his trial had made it obvious that the name was known to our police. It may have been a true statement, but Gould’s tone in addressing Schmidt, and Steinhauer’s tone in referring to Schmidt, is one of respect. But Schmidt too is a subordinate, who experiences some difficulty in dealing with the Generalstab. It is possible that Steinhauer was playing a double game with Gould, which Gould afterwards discovered.
The correspondence was punctuated by visits abroad and on these occasions Gould seems to have met ‘Herr P’ or ‘Petersen’, and not his employer, Schmidt. Only once, in January 1914, did Gould push on to see Schmidt at Cologne after interviewing ‘Herr P’ at Brussels, and then Schmidt objected. ‘Herr P’ was identified by the French Sureté Generale as Pierre Theisen, a Belgian in German pay who had done much work in France in the early 1890s, and who may have been connected with Gould then.
He was afterwards made head of the German Secret Service in Brussels and, in 1908, he was said to be directing operations in England and to be coming to England to look for a good agent. He is the Robert Tornow or ‘T’ of other spy cases, notably the Karl Hentschel case. It is possible that ‘Mme Mueller’, through whom Gould’s reports were to be transmitted to Schmidt, was one of P’s numerous aliases. The point is one of importance for Gould objected strongly to cover addresses as delaying matters when immediate action was necessary, and when his very first letter to Schmidt via the Brussels address miscarried (there is no evidence to show that we stopped this letter), he insisted that the agent was untrustworthy, and that the name and address must be altered, and he carried his point by writing direct to Berlin. But whether Mme Mueller stands for Theisen or not, Gould used to meet ‘Herr P’ at Rotterdam or Brussels, when ‘Herr P’ would inspect the documents brought, have them photographed, and transmit the photographs to Berlin together with a report of Gould’s plans. C. F. Schmidt would then submit them to the authorities, and send to Gould the resulting criticisms and orders.
Other methods of eluding observation were the use of vague general terms and of a cipher code. For specific comments or questions Schmidt would write the significant word in cipher. Gould had accepted the code but was never at pains to use it. Yet he showed considerable nervousness; for his first telegrams he used a false name and address; he refused to notify the despatch of his reports by sending a picture postcard to Brussels, on the ground that this would arouse the suspicion of the postal authorities; when going abroad he repeatedly took steps to conceal his destination from the police. Thus, on his very first journey, he told a policeman he was going to town to sell some whinny, but he was seen directly after on the down platform with luggage labelled for Dover. Acting on the request of MO5, the Rochester police immediately sent warning of Gould’s departure and described his appearance; on 17 May they reported his return home.
Meanwhile preventive action went hand in hand with investigation. By reference to the Admiralty, to whom a list of Gould’s sons was sent, a report that he had a son serving in the navy was proved to be unfounded. The Rochester police supplied the information that he was with an engineering firm in London.
Concerning Joseph Gould, of the Royal Engineers, MO5 made inquiry of his commanding officer at Chatham, and learned that the man could do no harm where he was but that an early opportunity would be taken to get rid of him. In September 1912 Joseph was moved to Bulford Camp and after his father’s arrest he was placed in the reserve. His origin was known in the regiment and, although he had never given any real cause for suspicion, when war broke out he was left at home and eventually sent out of harm’s way to the Gold Coast, and MI5 was informed of his return in July 1918.
Special observation was kept upon Gould, and one of MO5’s agents, J. Regan, succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Gould and reported from time to time items of interest; for instance, that Gould was employing one of his sons, aged fifteen, to reproduce drawings obtained from Rotterdam, or that Gould was talking freely about the sums of money spent by Germany in fomenting revolution here.
Gould’s first letter to Schmidt was lost in the post, and he wished to write direct to Berlin instead of Brussels. He was ordered to send letters to Paris, but this he declined to do as the delay would be too great. His reports began at the end of June. They were posted to the new cover address: C. Roland, Hotel Stadt Konigsberg, Potsdam, and at CR’s request he used for alternate letters 1/2 Brauerstrasse, Potsdam, which was merely another version of the same address. His reports were of a general nature describing the existing discontent and the shortage of men in the navy, as well as incidents in the manoeuvres, and in August CR complained of receiving only newspaper information and threatened to break off relations unless Gould adopted better methods; he must go to Portsmouth as he had suggested (letter of 20 August). Gould replied that he was going to Portsmouth about 7 September. He hoped to obtain full particulars of the new fire director, and the latest gunnery book and he was also in touch with a wireless operator at the Admiralty.
Some letters of Gould’s then passed through unnoticed giving particulars of a signals book that he was trying to obtain. Schmidt refused the 1908 Boat and Vocabulary Signals Book and anything not marked ‘secret and confidential’, he asked for the other part of the book and even wired definitely refusing the part of which Gould had sent details. But Gould carried the day by pointing out that when once he had paid his agent £50 for this book he could ‘make him deliver others’.
MO5 noted, incidentally, that the required signal books would all have been kept in the captain’s steel safe on a ship, but as they were in constant use on the bridge, access to them was fairly easy. The other part of the book required by Schmidt was no doubt the addenda issued in 1911.
Schmidt at last accepted the book provided it were marked ‘secret and confidential’ and appointed a meeting in Rotterdam. Accordingly on 10 October Gould wired from Dover Pier arranging for this to take place on Saturday 12 October. The wire was despatched, but a notification of non-delivery was received from Berlin by the office at Dover, and Gould, anxiously waiting in the Hotel Leygraaff at Rotterdam, on the one hand telegraphed to his wife to repeat all messages, on the other hand got into communication with Steinhauer by telephone.
Steinhauer, with difficulty, found C. Roland, who sent £80. Gould apparently submitted the ‘sample’ for photography and returned home on 17 October. Police Sergeant Andrews identified him as he stepped from the packet at Dover. On the same day CR wrote bitterly disappointed at his purchase: a few pages torn from a book had been foisted on him and the whole thing was worthless. In future Gould must state definitely whether he was offering a whole book or merely a fragment. Rotterdam must remain the place of meeting, as there was no photographic apparatus at Ostend; telegrams must be confirmed and the name Roland must be changed, as it was easily mis-spelt, Gould must write to Paul Beck, Brauerstrasse 1/2
, Potsdam.
On 25 October Gould retorted that owing to the delay at Rotterdam immense difficulty had been experienced in returning the sample – but soothingly he added that he hoped to secure from Portsmouth the Torpedo and Gunnery Manual. Schmidt then offered £200 for the Gunnery and Torpedo Manual of 1909 with addenda and £200 for the Annual Report of Torpedo School for the current year. This was afterwards corrected by Steinhauer to ‘Theodor Beck’.
Meanwhile, MO5 kept the Admiralty informed of each important point of Gould’s progress in September. A list of the staff employed at the Admiralty Wireless Station was obtained and in October the Commander-in-Chief at the Nore was warned that Gould was trying to obtain a confidential book of naval signals. He replied that the necessary precautions would be taken.
On receipt of Schmidt’s letter of 26 August, Captain Drake wrote warning the Rochester police that Gould would be going to Portsmouth for ten days and, in order that he might be shadowed while there, they were sending Inspector Savage of Portsmouth Dockyard to Rochester to ‘become acquainted with the spy’s features’. Inspector Savage went to Rochester, but did not find the police there very helpful, ostensibly because inquiry and observation were impeded by their being so small a body that Gould knew them all by sight. However, Mr Arnold promised to let MO5 know when Gould left the town. Then the Chatham police were asked to help by watching the railway station and the Rochester police were specially warned that Gould might be leaving on 6 September. In spite of these precautions Gould contrived to slip away unobserved; he was missed on the 6th and many anxious messages as to his whereabouts passed between MO5 and Rochester and Portsmouth Dockyard. He was lost – but late in the evening of the 6th he returned and, it was thought, not from Portsmouth, but from Sheerness. Next day he inquired about the Sunday passage via Folkestone and Arnold begged that the Folkestone boat should be watched, but on 10 September Gould was still at home. The police at Folkestone and Dover were directed to give Captain Drake any assistance in their power, and any message they sent to the Central Office was to be telephoned on at once to MO5. Still Gould did not move. On the 30th observation was discontinued by the Rochester police. It was resumed by an agent of MO5 in the first week of October. Arnold, being anxious about Gould’s intimacy with the mayor of Chatham on account of the persons whom he might meet at official receptions, consulted MO5 as to the advisability of warning the mayor. MO5 left the Chief Constable to act on his own discretion, but suggested taking no action unless it were absolutely necessary.
Investigation was also started at Chatham since Gould seemed to draw his information from that quarter. The Metropolitan Police were informed that Gould was trying to procure a book of naval signals and the help of superintendent Tett of Chatham Dockyard was asked for particularly with a view to discovering his naval friends there and to watching their movements. Mr Quinn therefore directed Superintendent Tett to give MO5’s agent all possible assistance. The Admiralty also were warned of Gould’s intentions.
The events of 10, 11 and 12 October are not recorded in Gould’s file, and the narrative that follows has been compiled from the papers of the Metropolitan Police. On 10 October, Captain Drake with the Chief Constable of Folkestone called upon Sergeant Everest at the port of Folkestone, and gave him a description of Gould, who might be leaving for Germany and was supposed to be intending to convey abroad a confidential torpedo signals book. The same day, at 4 p.m., Gould’s wire to Potsdam appointing a meeting for 12 October, was signalled to the GPO from Dover Pier and next day, Captain Drake with Detective Sergeant Andrews ‘from the Secret Service Department’ saw the telegraphist to whom Gould had handed the telegram and begged him to take particular note of the sender’s appearance with a view to subsequent identification if necessary. (Owing to special circumstances this wire was not included in the evidence against Gould, but at first Captain Drake had intended to call the telegraphist as witness, and had found it advisable to warn the man to avoid any reference to himself and the Secret Service). On 12 October, Captain Drake called at Scotland Yard at 10.30 a.m. to say his agent at Rochester had reported Gould’s departure for Folkestone or Dover and he was going to those ports at once to speak to the officers there. At 2 p.m. Captain Stanley Clarke called to ask for the assistance of the police at those ports, as Gould had left Rochester with important documents which he was conveying to a foreign state. Superintendent Patrick Quinn of Special Branch directed the police at Dover and Folkestone to stop and search the man as he was about to embark. But Gould escaped. Regarding this the police records merely say: ‘The man was not picked up’. It appears that MO5’s agent had seen Gould leave Rochester by rail for Dover on the 11th, and Mrs Gould circulated the story that he had taken one of the children to Dover and had then gone to Leith via Chatham, a story which Captain Drake was able to contradict. It seems probable that Gould suspected he was being watched and contrived to get away in the morning before the police arrangements for his arrest could he completed. Arrangements were made with the Customs to search Gould’s baggage (and possibly person) thoroughly on his return but in the interval something must have become known to MO5 about the nature of the book he was conveying abroad, for, on 14 October, Captain Drake wrote to the police that, from information received, Gould would probably have parted with the book he was conveying abroad; he was expecting to return not before Thursday, and it would be better for the Customs not to examine his luggage too closely lest they should arouse his suspicions; but the police were to look at him well so as to recognise him, should he attempt to go abroad again. Sergeant Andrews, however, reported that he had seen Gould disembark at Dover on 17 October, and that Customs examined his baggage closely.
This episode led to a reconsideration of the procedure to be followed in arresting on suspicion. Such arrests would have to be effected by the police, on whom would lie the responsibility of justifying their action, Under Section 6 of the Official Secrets Act, any person reasonably suspected of having committed, or having attempted to commit, or being about to commit, an offence under the Act might be apprehended and detained. It had become apparent by Captain Drake’s letter of 14 October that Gould was not carrying valuable information and a doubt arose in Superindendent Quinn’s mind as to the validity of police action in such a case. His view was that, by the requirements of the Act, reasonable suspicion must be based on evidence which could be produced in court, and that, failing such evidence, if nothing incriminating were found on the person arrested, a successful action for damages or assault might be brought against the police. Captain Drake’s view was that in such a case when the evidence, although not producible in the court, showed that action was imperative in the interests of the state, the police might plead privilege of information supplied by the War Office which it was not to the public interest to disclose. On 24 October the Chief Commissioner decided that he could not give directions to the Commission or police to arrest and search without warrant, persons who were supposed to be carrying some paper or thing which might not be regarded as important by the military authorities, since, in that case, no defence could be put forward in a court of law. But he would, after consultation, take the risks, provided he were satisfied that a particular person were conveying to the agent of some foreign power an instrument or drawing of a highly secret and important nature. In consultation with the Secretary of the Admiralty, the Secretary of the War Office, and the Secretary of the Home Office, MO5 drew up a letter, which should be sent to the DPP whenever circumstances demanded the arrest of some person suspected of conveying information abroad. This letter signed by Sir Graham Greene was first used on 31 October, and in the case of Gould.
The policy of shadowing and arresting Gould could be more easily carried out because on 10 October the Rochester police had at length secured six photographs of him. These MO5 asked Superintendent Quinn to have circulated to the naval ports in case Gould should go there in search of information and the Rochester police were informed that there was no longer any doubt as
to the business upon which Gould was engaged.
Following up Sir Graham Greene’s letter demanding Gould’s arrest, the photograph was also sent to the ports of Queenborough, Dover, Folkestone and Harwich with the information that Gould might shortly attempt to convey abroad secret documents about torpedoes, and in that case, the port to which he was travelling would be notified by a wire signed ‘R’; he was to be minutely searched on suspicion of contravening the Official Secrets Act, and if any incriminating documents were found on him, he was to be taken to the local police station; the officer in charge was to be acquainted with the circumstances; the facts were to be telegraphed to headquarters and instructions as to the charge would be sent; special precautions were to be taken that Gould did not destroy any document or piece of paper however small. If nothing incriminating were found, he was to be discharged with an apology, and if he asked any questions, he was to be told that the charge originated with the police.
This was followed by a memorandum to the effect that Gould might succeed in slipping away from his house unobserved and the police must therefore keep a sharp look-out for him and act on their own initiative in carrying out the instructions already received. Evidence against the man might also be found at his house. Mr Melville was therefore sent to Rochester to arrange with the Chief Constable for a search of Gould’s premises, which was to be carried out as soon as intimation had been received of his arrest. The search could be made either under a warrant signed by a Justice of the Peace or, in extreme urgency, under an order signed by the police authority report. Three days later Mr Melville reported that these arrangements had been made, that police officers from Queensborough, Folkestone and Harwich had been to Rochester to look at Gould and P. S. Andrews of Dover had also seen him. The importance of the matter had been impressed upon all these officers. In reply Captain Kell sent to the Chief Constable at Rochester a copy of the telegram upon which he would have to take action. Meanwhile, following up clues supplied by the Rochester police, efforts to establish Gould’s identity had been made in London, but no trace of the name of Gould or Guldenstein was found on the special register of the Criminal Investigation Department or on the General Register of the Home Office, nor could either name be found in the Naturalisation Lists.