by Nigel West
The knowledge of spy addresses was also put to a preventive use on 3 June. Orders were issued to the ports to arrest any traveller found carrying the address of Hilmar Dierks and similar orders were issued on the 10th with regard to Heinrich Flores, and at the end of the month with regard to Jan van Brandwijk.
All the spies carried Jane’s Fighting Fleets of the World; under DRR 18 recent editions of naval annuals were ordered to be withheld from sale.
It was evidently of the utmost importance to keep the German government in ignorance of the arrest of their spies for as long as possible. Not only therefore were the names of arrested spies kept secret, as well as all details of the cases, but steps were taken to continue furnishing reports to the German employers. The method followed seems to have been to copy the first letters intercepted, either altering or so writing the second reports as to render them harmless. The copies were then sent on and the originals kept. After the arrest of the writer, faked letters containing reports were sent abroad and were paid for by the Germans. As a result of the experience gained in the cases of these spies, the attempt to trace spies by means of remittances paid to them was renewed. Success had rewarded such efforts in the case of Irving Ries and from September onwards a watch was kept on all incoming telegraphic orders of £10 upwards emanating from Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden and Switzerland. The lists sent in by the GPO at regular intervals were carefully collated with the records; if there was a personal file of the recipient the remittance was noted in it. If there was no file, enquiry was made of the appropriate police authority, and, if necessary, the recipient himself was asked to explain. The same difficulty arose in these cases as has already been noted with regard to bank remittances; a number of persons could not be traced even by the Special Intelligence Police, and the enquiry stopped short just when it seemed most promising. Nevertheless, enquiries in both types of case acted as a useful check.
After the case of Fernando Buschman special measures were also taken with regard to incoming remittances made through banks and especially through the American Express Company, which was at that time receiving many payments for German clients.
Much of the secret writing was supposed to have been done in scent. Experience gained in testing this and certain specimens which were the work of submarine prisoners led to action being taken to deal specially with the letters of prisoners of war. As regards the secret writing done in scent, the methods of developing were then imperfect and produced results so uncertain as to be not always of value for purposes of trial. Hence where possible they were not emphasised in court.
In the preparation of the cases, great care was taken to keep the representatives of the government whose nationals were under accusation in touch with progress of the case and a representative was always present at the trial.
One result of the branch’s many successes was to rouse the Dutch government to take action to protect its subjects from the machinations of German recruiting agents. Dierks was arrested on 29 June but subsequently released; on the 8 August van Brandwijk ostensibly retired from business and in the end of the month the Dutch obtained proof of the connection of Dierks, van Brandwijk, Titzky, Hochenholz, and Vollrath with the German Secret Service, and of their meeting in conclave at 118a Claes de Voreslaan. Hochenholz and Dierks managed to escape; the others were arrested and the gang was broken up. Another result was that the Germans multiplied and incessantly changed their accommodation addresses in Holland. The measures taken by the German counter-espionage service during 1915 and 1916 give a criterion of the success of our methods.
In Holland the Germans were photographing Dutch travellers to England and refusing them passports for Belgium; they were shadowing persons going from Belgium to England and it was even said that they were snap-shotting the travellers on board the Zeeland boats with a view to identifying persons who had been granted passports from Belgium to Holland on condition they went no further. Such photography was strictly forbidden by the Dutch government and the Port Officer declared that it was not done on board tile boats.
The most careful steps also were taken at Antwerp to prevent recruited spies from meeting each other or from being seen on their way to and from the spy headquarters.
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Re-organisation of the Special Intelligence Bureau took place again in August 1915 when the name of MO5’s A Branch was changed to MO5G. The definition of duties marks an advance in the status of the Special Intelligence Bureau and G Branch, as well as closer co-operation with other departments and defence organisations. To Clause I were added the words: ‘Issue of orders to police, military and other authorities for arrest, search or observation of such persons (e.g. spies and suspects) and scrutiny of their correspondence’. Moreover, it was found convenient to appoint Mr Cousins of the GPO to act as a connecting link between MO5G and the GPO. He was given a post as Secretary in MO5G for the special purpose of examining letters stopped under the Home Office Warrants.
The fresh definition includes also the work of co-operating with the GOC’s GHQ and the Allies’ counter-espionage, and responsibility for the whole of the official and semi-official correspondence on all the subjects dealt with in the detection of espionage. Such an increase of duties involved an increase of staff: two section officers, Captain Carter and Lieutenant G. C. Peevor, with four secretaries, supported Major Drake in the general work. Three officers, Major V. Ferguson, R. of O., Commander Henderson RN, Mr P. W. Marsh, with three secretaries formed the personnel of G1 which took over the duties formerly alloted to A1.
Four officers, Mr R. Nathan CSI, CIE, Captain H. S. Gladstone, Major S. C. Welchman and Captain G. de C. Glover, both of the South Staffordshire regiment, and six secretaries formed the personnel of G2 which corresponded to the former A2. In G3 Major Hall with the help of one secretary continued the work he had done in A3 and added to it the examination of reports on enemy agents in foreign countries except Scandinavia, Holland and Denmark, and belligerent territory on the continent of Europe. A4 simply became G4 with no change of personnel or duty.
The G2(a) staff was Commander Henderson, Major F. S. Reeves, Mr P. W. Marsh, Lieutenant Taylor, Lieutenant G. N. Wakefield, and took over the work of the former G2, the preliminary investigation of cases of espionage in Great Britain. At G2(b) Mr H. L. Stephenson dealt with cases of sedition among Indians and Egyptians in the United Kingdom, and cooperated with police and counter-espionage services in India and Egypt in cases of all types falling under G1 and G2(a). G2 and the two sub-sections had a clerical staff of twelve. In G5 Major Hall, with the help of Major Welchman and two secretaries, conducted similar investigations with regard to Ireland, and co-operated with counter-espionage services in the Overseas Dominions, Crown Colonies and Protectorates, with the exception of Egypt. A third officer, Lieutenant M. Bremer, went to G4 which added to the examination of intercepted correspondence that of the documents of suspected persona after arrest.
To G5 Lieutenant G. C. Peevor and Mr B. Westell fell the preparation of cases of persons arrested at the instance of the bureau for prosecution by the military or civil authorities.
G Branch was then organised in five sections and two sub-sections and the distribution of duties was made on the two principles of geographical areas and race. Major Drake, with one section officer and four clerical staff, kept the general direction and dealt specially with methods of known or suspected enemy agents.
To G1 under Major V. Ferguson and Major H. B. Matthews, with two secretaries, was allotted the preliminary investigations of fomentation of strikes, sabotage and peace propaganda. G3 under Mr R. Nathan, dealt presumably with all cases of espionage, treachery and sedition arising in London, duties formerly allotted to G1.
In April 1916, a re-arrangement took place. G2 then absorbed the duties of the sub-section formerly known as G2(a), cases of espionage in Great Britain, which disappeared, and a fresh section, known as G6, Mr H. L. Stephenson and Mr S. Newey, with six secretaries, took over the work formerly allotted to G
2(b), cases of sedition among Indians and Egyptians, etc.
G2 then had a staff of seven officers, Mr H. B. Clayton, Commander Henderson RN, Mr P. Marsh, Major Welchman, Major Reeves, Major Anson, Captain Sassoon, and seven secretaries.
In September 1916 the work in Ireland and in the Dominions had grown to such dimensions that G3 was constituted into an independent branch known as D.
G5 dealing with the preparation of cases of persons arrested at the instance of the bureau, was absorbed presumably by the direction of G and G6, dealing with sedition among Indian and Egyptians in co-operation with Indian and Egyptian services, became known as G5.
In September 1916 by the formation of the Standing Advisory Committee closer contact between the branches was ensured. Besides the head of G Branch, ex-officio, Major Anson was nominated as one of the two extra members.
In November 1916 the photograph and handwriting books were given into the keeping of H2, and the work requiring translation was sent to the Military Translation Bureau, MI7(c). It was then arranged that, should it become necessary for a case to be transferred from one branch to another, any further action must be decided by consultation and agreement between the branch officers concerned in the investigation.
In December 1916 a fresh sub-division took place. The enquiries necessitated by intercepted correspondence (formerly G4) were delegated to G2(a) and the remaining work of G2. Other cases of espionage in Great Britain was allotted to sub-section G2(b). The change was effected on 18 December.
In dealing with the work within the branch, from time to time restrictions had to be made so as to ensure uniformity and discretion in the conduct of business. Officers were not to order arrests without reference to the head of the branch or his chief section officer, or the heads of H and F, or the Director of Intelligence Police. Moreover, cases which might become important were to be brought up in their early stages.
With regard to records and circulars, G officers were responsible for marking for inclusion on the Black List (remodeled in 1916) the names of all persons reasonably suspected of being enemy agents or in connection with such; for due care and restraint in circulating the names and addresses of suspects and information with regard to enemy methods, so as to ensure that the recipient of the circular had only such information as was of use to him, and that pending investigation was not compromised.
Major Drake reserved for himself or his section officer the decision in cases of suspected sabotage; ‘munitions offences’ and cases affecting munitions works and factories had to be referred to the Ministry of Munitions before any action could be taken; prosecution for press offences was left to MO7(a).
The immense extension of government services and consequent modification of methods due to the war appears in a memorandum instructing officers to start an investigation on the easiest line of enquiry by referring to the office or department likely to have precise knowledge of the suspect, rather than to ask for police enquiry.
It was also important to reserve the special agents for special work, and to avoid employing them in any way which would necessitate their appearance in court. The data concerning travellers as such which E Branch collected at the ports, permit offices and foreign controls, were of material assistance to the branch in tracing the journeys from the United Kingdom to find persons under suspicion.
On the other hand, it was the duty of G2 officers to bring to the notice of E officers new information entailing the amendment and cancellation of E Circulars, etc., the promulgation of new circulars, and also the return of suspects’ papers after they had been confiscated at the port of entry and passed to G3 for examination.
The list of offices to which the circulars of MO5 might be despatched shows the following connections in November 1915: Bureau Central Interallié, Paris; GHQ I(b), France; MO6(c); British vice-consul, Le Havre; Belgian Intelligence Service, Folkestone; French Intelligence Service, Folkestone; French consulate, London; Civil Permit Office, Downing Street; Military Permit Office; Assistant Commissioner, CID Scotland Yard; HM Inspector under Aliens Act; IO Edinburgh who communicated with Leith, Granton, Burntisland, Methilt Leven, Dysart, Kirkcaldy; IO Falmouth; MCO Folkestone, Hull, Bristol, Tilbury, Newcastle, Southampton, Liverpool; and Captain Lamb, Inspector-General of Communications at the British Expeditionary Force (IGC).
Late in September 1916 the scheme for the interchange of counter-espionage information between MI5 and GHQ Intelligence B on the one hand and between MI5 and IGC Intelligence on the other hand was carefully worked out and MI5 was to send two copies to GHQ Intelligence of all information concerning German espionage or counter-espionage methods which might be of utility to intelligence officers in France, and GHQ Intelligence and IGC Intelligence was to send to MI5 as well as to BCI all information about German methods other than that of purely local interest. Similarly, MI5 was to send a copy to GHQ I(b) and IGC Intelligence of reports dealing with suspects who might be likely to enter the Zone of the Armies in France or Belgium and with firms suspected of espionage who were likely to send agents into those zones. GHQ I(b) and IGC Intelligence were to notify MI5 of suspect individuals having dealings with the United Kingdom. An interchange of suspected addresses and letters agencies was also to take place. In forwarding information a list was also to be sent of the offices notified.
When the Bureau Central Interallié was omitted from the distribution list, the information sent by MI5 was to be regarded as undesirable for communication to the Allies. It was the duty of E Branch to notify the French Section of Control in London of suspects entering France.
In February 1915 officers had been appointed at Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais for special intelligence work with a view to stopping leakage of information. Similar appointments were made to the ports of Rouen, Marseilles and Dieppe in June of the same year. Subsequently correspondence between the Intelligence Service on the Line of CHQ, IGC, GHQ and the War Office was divided into Normal and Urgent. Urgent communication, telegrams or information about suspects and their movements was to be carried on directly between MO5 and the port officers on the Line of Communication and these would communicate with GHQ and UK ports.
In October 1915 it was laid down that intelligence officers of the Home Defence Directorate were to send in weekly summaries to their directorate; cases of action taken under Regulation 14, 14A, and all cases in which aliens as such were concerned were not to be included in the summary, but forwarded to the War Office as secret documents, the inner envelope being marked ‘MO5 Aliens’. Telegrams on such subjects were to be addressed to MO5’s telegraphic address. By this order G Branch was affected only in so far as these returns would call for further investigation of individual cases.
A further gap in the co-ordination of home defence was filled by the institution of district intelligence officers to link up the armies in the United Kingdom with the Directorate. These officers, who were trained by MO5G, received instructions with regard to alleged cases of espionage like those issued to intelligence officers in January. So early as January 1915 measures had been concerted by the French, Belgian and British representatives with regard to passports, letter-carrying, and the elimination of suspects from Red Cross organisations. Belgian and, as already reported, British officers had been attached to Northern French ports, and French officers to southern ports in England.
In the autumn of 1915 the co-ordination of Allied services engaged in counter-espionage was achieved by the formation of the Bureau Central Interallié which had its headquarters at Paris. The Bureau Central Interallié was to act as a clearing-house for intelligence other than that dealing with military operations.
The British Mission at first communicated directly with the Military Control Officers abroad and in cases of urgency would send the names of suspects to British representatives abroad and answer their enquiries. Soon after the institution of the BCI the Black List was remodeled and it became the duty of G officers to mark and pass to G Section all papers dealing with persons suitable for inclu
sion in this List; such were all persons reasonably suspected of being enemy agents or connected with any enemy activities. It was, however, expressly laid down that certain limitations should be observed in circulating lists of names to officers or bureaux outside MI5; the names on the lists were to be selected according to the interests and needs of the recipients and these names were not to ‘be circulated until the enquiries were completed; moreover some information regarding enemy methods or agents was not to IDS circulated at all and in these cases the papers were to be marked: “Hot to be circulated without reference to…”’
In the spring of 1916 the BCI complained of the roundabout way in which intelligence from MI5 (the name by which the bureau was then known) was reaching them. In May special arrangements were made to communicate all important counter-espionage news dealing with German espionage, and also the Black List which was communicated to the Bureau Central Interallié, to Captain Ladoux of the Ministere de la Guerre via Commandant Wallner at Folkestone. The British Mission in Paris then began active operations on its own account and this led to considerable confusion and difficulty of which Major Drake complained in July 1916. Hence in August the British Mission was restricted, except in cases of the utmost urgency, to direct communication with London, GHQ, BEF, and IGC, while MI5G undertook the distribution of counter-espionage lists to all other organisations.
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