by Nigel West
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It was manifest that, by the middle of July 1915, British counter-espionage had smashed the German organisation painfully built up by the Admiralty Zweigstelle and their system of employing bogus commercial travellers had failed. Accordingly, between July 1915 and May 1916, three new types of travelling agent appear: as artistes, persons of better education with business experience and a social backing, and genuine businessmen or agents. These persons were chosen carefully with a view to the object of their mission. A new objective arose: in addition to naval and military espionage, information was required about the government offices, old and new, and semi-public services. There was besides, evidence of manipulation of commerce afforded by the mission of Jonkheer Calkoen and possibly also of Leopold Vieyra, and there were also signs of the existence of permanent agents stationed at the ports and in London.
Regarding the travelling agents there was abundant evidence that the information they could pick up en route was of first-class importance. Therefore they arranged to travel backwards and forwards as often as possible between Holland and England, and Copenhagen and England. Emil Brugman had to fetch samples from Holland which an ordinary man would have brought with him; Johan Lassen, for a very small amount of business, make two journeys and contemplated a third in the immediate future. Frank Greite, the cleverest of them all, travelled repeatedly between France and England and Holland.
The feeblest of these spies appear to be the circus-riders, Pauline Slager and Georgine Ulrich. They were travelling in search of employment, which, even in wartime, seems an unlikely pretext, at any rate as they carried it out. The Germans themselves realised this and sent over, for it is practically certain that Vittorio Corini was a spy, a whole unit of the Adolphe Carré troupe. Hans Eils states that a horse worth £500 was bought for Slager, who never came again: it is probable that Corini brought it over in December. The troupe stayed at Liverpool from December to February 1916. Those agents whose object it was either to gain access to or a footing in government departments travelled singly and came with excellent introductions from diplomatists or from accredited agents of well-known business firms. Eva de Bournonville, Lassen and Brugman were all connected in some way with diplomatists. In this work, Josef Marks was the forerunner. He invented the method, which characterises the men’s work, of giving information for cover and in order to obtain more. (It will be recalled that in January 1915 Trebitsch Lincoln had attempted to use this method, and had failed.)
Between them they obtained access to the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Censorship, the Department of Munitions, Woolwich Arsenal and the PoW Help Committee’s office. Lassen wired on his arrival in England, but to his wife; otherwise both he and Brugman made their journeys so short that there was no need to communicate with their base. In consequence there was no proof of communication against either man; Lassen had given some information to both the Home Office and Foreign Office, and although Brugman’s spy associations in Holland were well known, he had some authorisation for his action in the two genuine letters from the Ministry of Munitions, and could not be touched. This achievement reaches the high-water mark of cover for German agents.
De Bournonville’s method of writing to the address of a British or Belgian prisoner of war and putting a special mark on the envelope was also a good discovery, though she spoiled her work by the inanity of her letters.
Regarding the recruiting of these spies, de Bournonville had known the agent Schmidt since 1912, and Lassen’s whole behaviour gives some reason to think he returned from Panama for the purpose of espionage. Brugman seems to have been recruited by Alexander Blok, the regular agent in Holland of the Antwerp Zweigstelle.
In the third group of agents, a setback, perhaps more apparent than real, is to be noted in the engagement of Adolpho Guerrero. He was not really a journalist but was immersed in a disreputable world of dancers, and he knew no English. The event showed, however, that he had an accurate knowledge of German intentions: he predicted that they would be sending over demi-mondaines and Americans. The officers of G Branch believed that he was keeping back something. Guerrero declared that he had deceived the Germans by pretending he knew English. This is barely credible. Guerrero frequented the pro-German Spanish Club, his woman companion was a dancer. There is clear evidence that the Germans expected the two to come together for Guerrero actually wrote as if both were on the spot when Ramona Amondarain was still held up in Paris by the refusal of a visa. Hence it may be that the dancer was to be the spy and to get in touch with educated persons who knew foreign languages while Guerrero had some mission of manipulating commerce or sabotage among compatriots.
Greite and Vieyra were both businessmen: Greite being the accredited agent of American firms, and Vieyra having lived in England and become a dealer in second-hand films. Vieyra had a home and female friend established here as well as connections in the theatrical and business world. Greite brought over a mistress and good business introductions from France. Greite was probably the best agent the Germans sent over during the war, therefore, it is worth noting the strong and weak points of the methods employed by, and with regard to, him. These are the long and careful preparations for his work and the circuitous route to this country: he left Hamburg for America in 1915, by July he had become the representative of two well-known American firms, he landed at Bordeaux in September, did some business in France, and produced introductions to English firms from the American head of a good French firm; his use of genuine business as a cover to his movements and his correspondence; spy letters for him were addressed to the name of firms he represented and there is some suggestion that instructions were conveyed in secret-writing on business circulars. Greite’s own letters must have reached Philip Dikker through two intermediary addresses, the first of which was the address of a well-known Dutch firm; his domestic arrangements, which gave him a stable address and an aide in conducting correspondence while he himself was moving about the country. Moreover his nationality disarmed suspicion.
The weak points were Greite’s German accent and a personality that inspired distrust. The choice of oil-pressing machinery to travel in was not altogether happy because to offer it, as Greite did, in Holland was like carrying coals to Newcastle. Equally, the choice of films as an object of trade in Vieyra’s case was unfortunate if genuine business was to be carried through for cover.
Pauline Slager was stopped on her telegram to Holland for money which was sent by money order; accordingly, with Eva de Bournonville the Germans reverted to payment by bankers’ drafts, and, as in the case of Fernando Buschman, forwarded them through the legation of a neutral country. No doubt the country represented protested. Greite was paid also by bankers’ drafts which paid a great part in the enquiry in Holland and at the trial. The Germans took warning and Vieyra who came next received a month’s pay in advance and expenses for one month were sent by banker’s draft. The second month’s pay was kept in Holland. This system of pre-paying Dutch agents, together with raised rates of pay, led to a remarkable collapse in the summer of 1916. The risks being great and the pay good, many men took the work but never left the Dutch shores. The recruiting agents, Alexander Blok, G. Elte and others, levied commissions on the pay of recruits and finally, either winked at their not leaving the country, or contrived to make a further profit by causing the departing agent to be betrayed to the British authorities. Vieyra and Jacobus van Zurk (the latter was however a willing victim) are the classic instances of this combination. After this debacle of the German service, rumour told of some low haunt in Holland where spies of either camp bought and sold news with a view to their employers’ respective requirements.
With Jacobus van Zurk, we enter upon the group of spy cases in 1916. His importance as a spy was nil, but he and Elsie Scott contrived to hoodwink the British officer in charge of the case. By a put-up quarrel, Elsie Scott got off to Cardiff where she was in a position to get some of the information required, while van Zurk after remaining virtually a
prisoner in London, was shipped back to Holland where he also contrived to hoodwink the Germans. It was fatal to their scheme that he should have given away the Meisner-Denis address.
Regarding Mrs Albertine Stanaway, there is no certainty except that she seems to have really loved Pierre Rotheudt and risked much for him. But her power of communication with him in prison, the documents regarding his trial which she had either kept or disposed of, and her possession of Meisner-Denis’ address gave grounds for strong suspicion against her. In aiding a spy she did more than either Suzanne Dupont or Mrs Fletcher Pickard.
With George Bacon we come to a fourth type of German agent, the professional journalist, and to a great development of German policy with regard to Ireland. At the time when Bacon was under suspicion, proof came to the bureau that the Germans were well-satisfied about the results of their system of communication with Ireland. Bacon frequented Sinn Feiners and lied as to his instructions, which definitely included espionage in Ireland. This period, between June and December 1916, includes perhaps the highest achievement of G Branch, if the importance of results rather than the number of spies arrested be considered. And these results are due partly to some carelessness and lack of judgement on the part of the Germans, and partly to ill luck. After the Hilmar Dierks business it was careless to allow one spy address to run on from early June to late September, it was perhaps ill judged to recruit the spy [XXXXX] of British origin, without more precaution. It was a mistake to recruit the Dutchman Frederick Graff whose business depended on standing well with the British. But it was genuine ill luck that just the information given almost simultaneously by [XXXXX] and Graff should bear directly and in the most illuminating fashion upon the spy who was making use of that cover address, and the spy habit of giving information when in a really tight place did the rest. An organisation in New York, but subsidiary to the Antwerp centre, and in constant touch with it by means of messengers who carried instructions in secret-writing and materials for secret-writing from Europe to America, stood revealed. A new type of spy – the American journalist; new methods of spying and spy communication e.g. from the journalist in England to the cover-address of his ‘pair’ in Holland, and new forms of code, came to light. The information of many American subjects led the American authorities to take drastic action, with the result that the German centre in New York was destroyed. In course of the proceedings, a vast conspiracy under the leadership of A. Sander and Charles Wunnenberg, for the prosecution of espionage, sabotage of ships and buildings, and capture of Allied food-ships at sea was laid bare. This last object involved the cooperation of a very important Russian official.
Certain points in the Axel Grebst case raised some doubt as to whether he was not involved in the same business.
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The principles of the German system were summarised by the Special Intelligence Bureau as follows:
Each agent must act independently; he is not to know other agents in his locality, nor is he to look up old acquaintance in the service; he is to travel alone and keep to himself. From what has been said already on the evidence of German spy cases in England, the instructions as to travelling alone refer evidently to the actual journey in search of information.
On arrival at his destination he is to report to a Secret Service agent, who will direct him where to go next and will act as a link between him and the centre but will do no active work himself.
The agent is to write often and in detail and to confirm by a short resumé the information sent in a previous letter; he is to write in duplicate posting via different countries; he is to post as soon as the letter is written and in a different district from that in which he lives; he must use a false name and address and disguise his handwriting.
In letters containing interlinear notes the agent must choose an interesting subject for the text en clair (and, according to the Antwerp method, it must be a subject capable of development into a longish correspondence, such as a law-suit for instance).
The agent is to obtain information at first-hand, to frequent workmen and railway officials and, in the military zone, officers and men of the Army Service Corps, the wounded, bars and cafes frequented by soldiers, sailors and munitions workers. He must avoid cities like London and Paris, and take care not to get roped in as a soldier. He is to correspond if possible with soldiers at the Front and to note the movement of postal sectors. He is to travel as much as possible and to enlist the unconscious help of those he meets.
Having obtained anything of value he is to risk all in order to get back by one of several specified routes, but trivial information is to be sent in writing.
Before the agent starts on his mission he has committed everything to writing; at first he collects specified details which are pieced together abroad; then he may have to obtain plans, designs, etc-, and later on he may be given tiny wireless apparatus which will be sent to him piece-meal.
Agents sent to England are chosen from:
1. Persons already known in this country who will then escape suspicion.
2. Citizens of the United States of America who have a knowledge of English and business connections here.
3. Neutral sailors: e.g. Dutch and Danish sailors in Dutch ports.
Agents came to England via Holland, Scandinavia, Spain and America. A favourite cover was that of shipping agent out of work. In the winter of 1915-1916, German agents communicated with Peter Steunebrink in business code referring to oriental carpets, with Frank Greite in code referring to oil-press machinery. Peter Steunebrink was to use picture postcards when his messages referred to ships, their station being indicated by the place of posting. The code was as follows:
– ‘Postcard’ ‘letter’ ‘news’ = ‘There is not.’
– One number following mention of one of these words = ‘There are no First Class Ships but there are so many Second Class Ships.’
– One number without mention of ‘postcard’ = ‘There are so many First Class Ships.’
In January and February MI5’s investigations resulted in discovering a fruit code used between Spaniards in France and the Balearic Isles. A Spanish woman had been shot at Marseilles for having in her possession a code which, under guise of placing orders for fruit, would enable her to give information about French and British regiments drafted to the East. A check placed on letters to a fruitseller at Soller produced nothing. Very soon after, an agent wrote from Copenhagen declaring that code was being used in business and press telegrams addressed to Danish papers, which the Germans were buying up in order to control the messages of their foreign correspondents. As remedies he suggested copying German methods and holding up wires for two days or more when important movements were in progress, and limiting press telegrams to exact quotations or extracts from newspapers published in England.
During 1916 repeated use was made of a code supplied by MI5, and known as C code, from ports in the north of England, and the Censor’s fortnightly reports showed a growing number of undecipherable code messages. In March, a favourite method of code communication was by the despatch of cards of postage stamps sent openly and as though for the use of collectors. The message in return would be conveyed by stamps sent back as unsold. Ultimately the posting of stamps was limited to specially licensed firms.
Jacobus van Zurk was communicated with in a code in which the third syllable of lines containing an uneven number of words alone counted. Leopoldo Vieyra and Frederick Graff used variants of this form of code:
– Date = date of despatch or purchase.
– Time = time.
– The date and time = time cited.
– Degrees of longitude = the initials of the firm according to the fisheries chart.
– Minutes of longitude = number of herring barrels purchased.
– Minutes of latitude = purchase price in cents.
– Minutes of latitude = purchase price in gulden.
– Course = degrees of the compass card expressed in cases of eels reckoned from north r
ound to the right.
– If not in motion, particulars as to the state of the market e.g. market firm or dull etc.
Ship’s class:
– Dreadnought = cod with head
– Large cruiser = cod
– Light cruiser = haddock, large
– Auxiliary cruiser = haddock
– Destroyer = plaice
– Submarine = sole
– Monitor = smelt
– Troop transport = skate
– Net barrier = whiting
– Minefield = turbot
In November 1915 a secret ink was used which could be developed by perchloride of iron mixed with water so as to give a solution of the colour of cognac. ‘Gloy’, a preparation of gum, was also used.
The secret writing was frequently on tinted paper, and sometimes found inside envelopes lined with tissue paper, inside newspaper wrappers, under postage stamps and the folds of envelopes. The re-agents were heat; powdered oxide of copper; liquid colours, chief of these black ink; adhesive powders; gases or vapour, chiefly of iodine; tobacco smoke.