by Nigel West
In January 1917 the press called attention to the smuggling abroad of peace propaganda literature, the circulation of which was prohibited in this country. Two pacifist Members of Parliament and others in high places were suspected of being concerned and the press insinuated that there was one law for the powerful and another for the humble. But the whole question was a very difficult one.
Since July 1916 passengers leaving the United Kingdom had been warned that any papers passengers other than those required for identification purposes were liable to seizure at the ports, but in practice it was found that much inconvenience was caused to the travellers by their being deprived at the ports of their personal documents. An attempt to limit the inconvenience was made by posting large notices warning travellers of the regulations and requesting them to despatch all those documents other than identification papers which they required abroad, by post abroad under cover to the Censorship. These notices of course were directed to honest people who had no motive for smuggling. There remained the other class of traveller to deal with.
The officers of MI5 pointed out that in practice it was impossible to use the full powers of search conferred under DRR 54, and therefore evidence against offenders was difficult to procure except by some happy accident. In certain cases it might be inadvisable to use powers of interrogation under DRR 53 but it might be possible where there was suspicion of smuggling for the competent military authority to order a search of the premises of the suspect under DRR 51.
In this sense, however, nothing was done, for the Home Secretary pointed out that there was no evidence that the smuggling had been carried out with the connivance of the authors of the pamphlets. But in November DRR 51 was amended to cover search of premises in cases where a leaflet had been printed in contravention of any regulation.
The case of Mrs Smith provided an illustration of two further dangers not met by the regulations. Mrs Smith was smuggling prohibited pro-German literature to a PoW in a colony. When taxed with the offence she pointed out the newspapers of which she had sent cuttings had been passed into this country through the Press Censorship.
With regard to this point, the import into this country of literature of a dangerous character, both the Censor and the India Office had been pressing for legislation on account of the dangerous spread of Indian seditious or revolutionary publications, which were pouring into the country from America, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland. In June 1917 DRR 27B was issued prohibiting the importation of publications containing dangerous matter of which the publication and circulation in this country was forbidden under DRR 27.
On the same date, DRR 24 and 24B were redrafted: to DRR 24 was added a clause forbidding evasion of the Censorship with regard to printed or written matter, pictures, photographs; to DRR 4B a clause making it an offence to evade censorship through the post by sending letters by devious routes through countries where mails were not usually censored or by secreting letters in newspapers, parcels etc. and throwing on any person contravening the order the onus of proving that such letters were not intended for himself.
In July regulation 54 was amended so as to make it an offence to answer falsely a question with regard to the carrying of letters.
Another favourite method of evasion was by abuse of diplomatic and consular privilege. Between September 1916 and December 1918 129 cases of abuse of privilege were counted in the transit mails, and up until June 1918 eleven cases in the terminal mails. Practically every neutral country was at fault. The Censorship referred these cases to the Foreign Office but MI5G noted three of them (Rosenow, Pedro and Merry del Val; Patrocinio also furnishes an instance in point) and instituted an inquiry into the export of Gaelic League pamphlets from the United States to Switzerland via the United States embassy in Rome.
The consuls were the chief offenders; thirty one neutral consuls in neutral and enemy countries acted as intermediaries for commercial and private correspondence belonging to the enemy, whose custom it was to send four of every letter each by a different route. Their privilege was withdrawn from the consuls; it was ordered that the official correspondence of embassies and legations be sent under cover to the Chief Censor with a guarantee as to the official nature of the contents of the bag signed by the ambassador, minister or his deputy; private letters written by the ambassador, minister or secretary were to bear on the cover the signature of the writer. Later on, MI5 again considered the withdrawal of privilege from neutral missions but the Foreign Office ruled that the only course possible was to take official note of every case of abuse detected.
Another point with regard to correspondence by legation bag was raised by the fact that Germans sometimes paid their spies through a neutral legation. In such cases it was likely that the money would come by cable, the instructions with the name of the payee by letter, with the result that such payments could not be traced by the Censor or the GPO.
In 1916 GHQ I(b) had asked for the list of Dutch intermediaries suspected of being German agents, the names and addresses, however, changed incessantly, but few of the checks imposed were productive. Subsequently de Bueger, a Belgian official in the Remount Service attracted attention by forwarding letters to four different agencies, one of which was situated at Lille. At that time the Germans connived at smuggling letters, provided they saw the contents first, a system of which de Bueger would certainly have been aware, and our agents abroad pressed for the total abolition of intermediary letters. An attempt was made accordingly to restrict the traffic to one firm, Thomas Cook & Sons. A clamour arose from the Belgians in England; some modification was made but the problem was never satisfactorily solved.
With a view to detecting spies MI5 obtained returns of the names of persons corresponding daily with Holland, Denmark and Norway, but these were unproductive; on a list of thirty-nine persons writing to Norway, for instance, only one enquiry was made and that led to no action.
Equally fruitless were special tests of all correspondence written in red ink and an immense number of tests of letters on paper suitable for secret writing. Reference to the time of sailing of Dutch colliers was added to the list of indiscreet utterances.
In 1917 a series of questions regarding the respective delimitations and rights of MI5 and the Postal Censorship received solution. These concerned: the proper authority to deal with cases of evasion of censorship at the ports; the right to see and; the right to retain the originals of telegrams and letters.
The case of Sir Richard Cooper, head of a big chemical works at Berkhamsted, gave rise to important decisions about inter-departmental and intersectional procedure and also about interpretation. Cooper wrote to Dr Stokes in America explaining the unfair working of the Excess Profits Tax and propounding a scheme of evasion by setting up works in America.
He sent a copy of this letter to America in a sealed envelope carried by McKillop, an employee of the firm. McKillop, who was challenged at Liverpool, at first denied that he was carrying any letters and when the letter was discovered gave a false account of its contents. He was handed over to the police who did not immediately charge him; the letters were also given to the police.
The case was referred first to G and then to E Branch and both took action independently and in ignorance of each other’s interest in the case. But under a previous ruling the originals of letters seized at the ports had to be sent to MI9. E’s policy in dealing with such cases had been to treat them as summary offences and hand them over to the civil authorities; G Branch however, declared they were not summary offences and must therefore be referred to the competent military authority. Therefore the question arose as to which department and which branch was the proper authority to deal with a prosecution. The DPP ruled that a copy only of the letters seized on letter carriers should be submitted to the Censor; that the local competent military authority alone could decide on prosecution and settle the nature of the offence and that if he required the decision of a higher authority, he must refer to MI5 and G Branch would advise in the questio
n of prosecution and category of the offence.
G Branch determined to prosecute and were frustrated by the Law Officers of the Crown on a question of interpretation. The Law Officers declared that in all previous decisions with regard to prosecution under DRR 34 the answer to the question whether or not the terms of the letter itself constituted an offence had been the determining principle and they declined to prosecute Sir Richard Cooper on the grounds that the terms of his letter did not constitute an offence.
The DSI protested against such a principle pointing out the probable consequences should it become generally known that a person might defy the regulations with impunity provided he wrote an innocent letter and that the Home Secretary took a grave view of the case under discussion. As a result, Regulation 54 was amended so as to make a false declaration about the carrying of letters an offence. Consequently the allocation of letters in cases of evasion was altered. Sixty-five cases of contravention had occurred in some four months, the greater number proving trivial offences. It was arranged, therefore, that the original letters should be sent to MI5G only in cases of evasion when there was evidence of sinister intent and in cases of intended evasion if there were already evidence incriminating the writer.
These cases were treated on their own merits: no action, a warning, circulation to the ports for thorough search and interrogation with check on the writer’s correspondence are examples of the treatment accorded. Portuguese labourers returning home after being employed in the camps were specially warned, thoroughly searched and all letters had to be taken from them. When it was known that letters were being carried on small coasting steamers plying between Holland and Leith, rigorous search was carried out on board ship and all letters posted within a mile of the docks were examined.
The importance of seeing originals of telegrams and letters and the reluctance of other departments to submit them appears from the episodes connected with WT1D and the Postal Censorship. Early in 1917 the Admiralty wished to prohibit the despatch of foreign telegrams from any place north of Inverness and to restrict it from important ports in England and Wales to persons doing genuine business. But as both F and G Branch concurred in thinking that an enemy would always find means of sending a message through some licence-holder, the Admiralty accepted the existing arrangement whereby all outgoing telegrams were delayed for eighteen hours.
Then the WTID revived the question. Any commercial letters or cable which the Censor regarded as suspicious was submitted to the WTID and the chairman of that body expressed the belief that it was possible to convey military, naval and other information to the enemy in words pertinent to any genuine business in such a way as to defy detection; as existing safeguards ignored the character of the trader he suggested that the use of posts and cables should be restricted to alien traders holding permits whose bona-fides had been carefully scrutinised. No change however was made in the policy but Major Carter, after a vain attempt to get from the WTID the originals of suspect letters and telegrams, procured a list of small traders disliked indeed, but against whom that department had no definite suspicions.
Regarding trade letters, Major Drake had encountered difficulties since 1915, when testing for secret ink was transferred to the Censor’s Department; the spies were using commercial code and secret ink and both were difficult of detection and in order to settle whether or not a letter should be tested it was necessary to handle the original. Certain letters, however, the Censor submitted in photograph under the impression that they were harmless trade letters and it was necessary to emphasise the fact that, of the firm on the General Black List, four were fraudulent and six were using genuine business as a cover for espionage. The question recurred in 1916 when the new chemical ink and re-agent were discovered. Thenceforward there were two possible tests, the Minor and the Major test. The Minor test was of little use for up-to-date German methods and its employment in the first instance prejudiced success in a subsequent Major test. On the other hand, the Major test destroyed the document and the Censor therefore hesitated to apply it in the case of a possibly harmless commercial letter and on other grounds. Major Drake pointed out that Frank Greite had made £1,000 in business, and that after many of Leopoldo Vieyra’s letters containing secret ink had passed unscathed through the Minor test he was detected on the single original letter submitted to MI5 and subjected by their direction to the Major test.
The Major test indeed proved so valuable that in March 1917 all letters in the files of a date earlier than October 1916 were ordered to be subjected to it. Finally, it was arranged that letters not connected with persons on the General Black List but suspect because of the text or paper used should be submitted before testing to MI5G, which could then have a photograph made before the destructive process was carried out.
The Censor desired to retain the originals of stopped letters for his records, but MI5G successfully vindicated its title on the grounds that such letters might afford valuable evidence. If a personal file existed the letter was filed in it; if there was no personal file the original might yet serve to trace a suspect or change of address through identification of handwritings.
The linking-up of records was as important to the Censor as to MI5, hence it was arranged that when a new check was imposed on a person concerning whom Censor slips had already been received, the number of the last slip received should be quoted.
In 1917 the DSI laid down that whereas the Postal Censor acted as the agent of MI5, in regard to the messages of spies written in arbitrary language code or secret writing, MI5 was responsible for taking all necessary measures of counter-espionage. Although the list of checks supplied to the GPO and Censor were not identical, there was overlapping; accordingly certain classes of foreign mail letters formerly opened by the GPO were transferred to the Censor and the post office servants were instructed to act on the checks only after reference to MI5 unless the matter were urgent, in which case a special report was to be sent. Subsequently, in spite of the preponderating role of the Censor, the GPO check on foreign letters was retained and use of its great advantage in the matter of speed.
Arrangements were made, however, to keep the GPO and Censorship mutually informed as to the progress of their respective checks. In December MI5 agreed to forward to the Trade Censor all trade letters submitted by the GPO.
The GPO was accustomed to furnish monthly returns of such checks, but if they produced nothing lapsed automatically, at the end of three months or six months unless renewed by MI5. Early in 1917, MI5 asked for monthly returns of the names and addresses of persons corresponding with suspects, and a fortnight’s notice of those checks that were made to lapse automatically. In June 1918, fortnightly returns were by the local postmasters of checks that had been quite unproductive during that time; weekly returns were now sent in by the London offices.
*
In October 1917, MI5 began to consider steps to procure the help of banks in checking possible remittances for propaganda, and chiefly that form of peace propaganda in Europe, known as Boloism. The history of Bolo as recorded in our files has an important bearing on the action of MI5 in this respect. In January 1915, information had been received through the Remount Department at Bayonne that a man named Paul Bolo, who styled himself counsellor and financier to the ex-Khedive, was living at Biarritz and appeared to have plenty of money, and that through some connection with the French politician, Joseph Caillaux, he had access to French government circles. As it was felt that Bolo should be watched the information was forwarded to GHQ France. Subsequently, the BCI reported that in 1916, the German government had financed peace intrigues, employing as their chief agent the ex-Khedive, who had appointed Bolo to organise the work. Bolo, however, had pocketed the two million entrusted to him but had done nothing in return. (In 1918 it became known that the Khedive had broken with Bolo in August 1916.) Meanwhile, on account of the ex-Khedive’s negotiations with Germany and Austria with regard to the subsidising of the French press, a report from Sir Horace Rumb
old emerged giving details of the money supplied to Bolo and connecting Cavallini with the affair. Rumbold declared moreover that Cavallini had acted as intermediary between the ex-Khedive and Joseph Caillaux, who was preparing to launch pacifist agitation on a big scale in France.
News of the arrest of Bolo appeared in the press on 5 September 1917 and, shortly after, it was stated that the arrest had taken place in consequence of the discovery made by the American police that during the course of 1916, Paul Bolo being then in Paris, had had sums amounting to £400,000 paid in his name into various American banks, and had had the greater part of the money remitted to him by transfers on French banks.
In October the bureau enquired whether any payments connected with Bolo Pasha had been found in the books of the Deutsche Bank, but Sir William Plender pointed out that no new business had been undertaken since the war and that he as Controller had had access only to pre-war books and records.
On 12 November, by direction of the Home Secretary and Secretary of State for War, a joint committee was appointed to investigate the activities of pacifist societies in Great Britain and to enquire to what extent, if at all, they were being financed by enemy money. During the month of November the work developed like a snowball. Between 12 and 23 November 1917 five pacifist centres were raided for the purpose of discovering how they received and disbursed their funds. A circular was sent through the Treasury to the Bankers’ Clearing House for distribution to banks requiring monthly returns of all payments of sums of money of £800 or over made to private individuals since 15 October 1917 by order of Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Spanish or Danish clients; and any payments of £25 or over to a private individual since 15 October 1917 by order of the above mentioned clients ‘if these orders appear to come with regularity, e.g. once a month or twice a quarter’.