by Nigel West
The lower and higher limits of the sums on which particulars were asked for were £9 (afterwards lowered to £5) to £160.
In July 1917 the Censor protested against the practice of the American Express Company which forwarded lists of PoWs receiving remittances from abroad and placed on the same lists the names of uninterned persons, also in receipt of regular payments, so as to make them appear to be PoWs. The Censor proposed that all incoming remittances to persons other than enemy subjects should also be referred for enquiry. Accordingly, in February 1918, the Censor was asked to send in weekly returns of all remittances of £10 and upwards for which no satisfactory reason or an unsatisfactory reason had been given.
Shortly after, the bureau rejected proposals for controlling by legislation remittances from enemy countries to uninterned aliens here on the grounds that the evidence pointed to there being few enemy agents in receipt of pay from abroad and that the proposals made were unworkable.
Meanwhile, since December 1917, a retrospective investigation of cases of remittances made from August 1914 onwards had been in progress without much result. Many of the recipients could not be traced, others seem to have come here on flimsy pretexts and for suspiciously short intervals and the drawback was specially noted that, in the early days of the war, letters could be kept at the post office and handed over the counter to the person who might call for them without his being required to give his address.
As regards the investigations made on the statistics supplied by the Deutsche Bank, Major Anson stated that they had merely resulted in the compilation of useful records, and that so far as he recollected, no case had been brought to light of money having been sent for improper purposes.
It was agreed that remittances to enemy agents would hardly be made through German banks and the tracing of agents through remittances from hostile countries via neutral banks was impossible; nevertheless, when definite suspicion existed against an individual it was of interest to know that payment had been made. Therefore this class of remittance was to be treated as a money order, and the names of the recipients of £10 and upwards to £100 were to be carded on the same index. This index was kept by G3(b). In a memorandum on the payment of German agents drawn up in October 1918, when the possible use of British notes was being considered, the following instances are given of how some of these payments were camouflaged:
– A Dutch workman in munitions received irregular payments of £8 to £15, the pretext being that they were the product of a legacy from an aunt.
– A traveller for a commercial house received £150 a month which was paid into a bank in Holland. He was informed of such payments by his father who referred to them as business connected with the coal trade. Occasionally the father drew money from the account and telegraphed it over to a bank in London.
– An agent received his salary in payments of irregular amounts made to the Zurich branch of a Swiss Bank. The head office of the bank would send notice of such payments having been made by Mr So-and-So of Zurich. The agent would draw a cheque and give it to a relation living in France: this man would cross the frontier to Switzerland, cash the cheque, and forward the proceeds in Swiss notes.
In each case an intermediary was involved and the system was so complicated that tracking through mere records was impossible. Nevertheless, as a preventive, the checking of such records had great value.
*
Many times the head of G Branch had called attention to the difficulty in dealing adequately with undesirables who could not be convicted of hostile origin or association. In April a new regulation was issued empowering the Admiralty, Army Council or Minister of Munitions to make rules for securing and preserving order and good behaviour in areas where bodies of HM Forces were located or munitions being manufactured. Under the regulation, persons convicted of any contravention of DRR etc. could be prohibited from residing or remaining in or entering such areas. Another regulation was drafted giving power to close premises altogether or impose restrictions on the use of premises suspected of being used for purposes prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom by persons of hostile origin or association or by fomenters of disaffection etc. among the troops and the civilian population.
In May it was known that the Germans were making great efforts to obtain information about the sailings of ships to and from this country. MI5 got the Home Office to send a circular to the Chief Constables calling for special watchfulness on the part of the police with regard to unauthorised persons who might be watching the movements of ships or making enquiries on that topic. A warning also issued as to the use of a special incendiary bomb made to look like a brand of corned beef.
In October 1917 it was known that the Russians were issuing diplomatic passports to unsuitable persons and it was suggested that visas in Petrograd should be refused to all persons not belonging to one of the following categories recognised by the French as persons to whom diplomatic privileges should be accorded:
1. Diplomatic and consular officials and attachés and their families.
2. Members of the government travelling on duty and their wives.
3. Persons on government missions.
4. Diplomatic couriers.
The question of curtailment of these categories, especially No. 3 was mooted by the Army Council.
The following table shows to a certain extent the work which chiefly affected the G Branch during 1917.
Statistics for 1917
Jan Dec Jan–June Totals June–Dec Year
Personal dossiers made 785 2,071 5,288 11,529 16,817
Telegrams submitted by Censor 494 1,167 5,415 5,996 9,411
Letters submitted by Censor 5,334 2,376 17,926 13,805 31,731
Peace letters 277 283 1,979 1822 3,801
Anti-military cases 270 640 1,818 3,461 5,379
Suspects circulated 279 293 1,781 1,747 3,529
Internments recommended 22 6 43 14 61
Internments sanctioned 17 5 32 11 43
Permit applications examined 2,709 1,557 11,719 12,409 24,188
Passport applications examined 1,836 706 6,760 7,324 14,084
Inland passes 12 13 104 130 234
Credentials examined
Postal Censor 363 233 1,212 1,786 2,998
Jan Dec Jan-June Totals June-Dec. Year
Red Cross and St John of Jerusalem 175 60 1,475 1,034 2,509
Anglo-French Hospitals 104 32 488 384 872
Ministry of Munitions 785 197 4,973 13,057 8,030
Intelligence Department 145 170 842 939 1,781
For licence to post parcels - - - - 662
Aliens previously employed in munitions allowed to leave UK 94 72 - 384
Missing aliens 576 153 1,451 708 2,159
Persons seen at Scotland Yard on behalf of MI5, the Home Office and the ports 232
CHAPTER V
1918
BY the New Year of 1918, MI5 had been responsible for the arrest and trial of twenty-one male spies, and two women. Of these twenty-three individuals, thirteen men had been executed, and seven had been imprisoned. Of the women, both had been convicted and imprisoned. One man, Anton Küpferle, had committed suicide while on trial. In addition, 136 men had been interned under DRR 14B, as had twenty-one women.
In 1918, G Branch underwent a further major reorganisation. Captain Radcliffe of G3 was made responsible for maintaining liaison between MI5 and Allied military missions, including military attachés, in the United Kingdom. To G3 also was entrusted the examination of Special Censorship documents which were passed to them from H3.
The collecting of ciphers and codes (D5) was handed over to D Branch as also the co-ordination of British Special Intelligence Missions in Allied countries (D4). In November 1918, a further sub-division of the branch took place. The duties assigned to MI5G, which were divided among nine sub-divisions, were defined as follows:
(i) Control of investigation of all cases of enemy espionage and sabotage in the United Kingdom.
(ii) Detection
, arrest and bringing to justice of offenders.
(iii) Counter-espionage and classification of the methods employed by enemy espionage and sabotage agents.
(iv) Co-operation with government departments, naval and military authorities and police for the above purposes.
(v) Control of intelligence police at headquarters.
(vi) Surveillance of suspicious characters.
(vii) Preparation of cases against persons arrested for prosecution by military and civil authorities in connection with espionage.
(viii) Examination of suspicious letters and cables as referred.
(ix) Investigation into evasions of censorship.
(x) Registration and records of Home Office Warrants and special Censorship checks as imposed.
(xi) Correspondence and communication with Allied military missions in the United Kingdom on matters affecting counter-espionage services.
(xii) Investigation into the activities, where detrimental to national interests, of persons of Russian, Finnish, Polish and Czechoslovak nationalities.
(xiii) Investigation of seditious and pacifist propaganda prejudicial to military security.
Certain restrictions due to the Armistice are noticeable in these clauses: on the other hand the progress of Bolshevism and the urgency of checking its propaganda is marked in the clauses relating both to persons of Russian nationality and to the censorship and Home Office Warrants. This is specially brought out in the very detailed instructions as to Distribution of Duties, which is quoted in full below.
G1
Investigations into cases of espionage and sabotage by foreign agency in the United Kingdom, also counter-espionage and classification of methods of espionage and sabotage.
G2
(i) General duties connected with enquiries into the bona-fides of persons in the United Kingdom (as previously).
(ii) Co-operation with government departments, naval and military authorities and police for above purposes.
G2(a)
(i) Examination of suspicious letters and cables referred by Postal and Cable Censors, commandants of PoW camps, or other government departments, for enquiry; and investigation connected therewith.
(ii) Investigation into irregular methods of correspondence and evasion of censorship.
(iii) Executive duties connected with enquiries into the bona-fides of persons in the United Kingdom.
(iv) Preliminary investigations into cases of suspected persons.
(v) Correspondence with police forces of the United Kingdom on the above subjects.
G3
(i) Correspondence and communication with Allied military missions in the United Kingdom affecting counter-espionage services, and the suitable distribution of information from these sources.
(ii) Special investigation into the cases of suspected persons in diplomatic, financial, and political circles.
G3(b)
(i) Liaison officer with Postal and Cable Censors.
(ii) Registration and control of records showing all bank and postal remittances sent to individuals in the United Kingdom from neutral European countries, and investigation in connection therewith.
(iii) Registration and records of Home Office Warrants and Postal and Cable Censorship checks as imposed.
G4
(i) Russian, Finish, Polish and Czechoslovak affairs.
(ii) Investigation of cases of the above nationalities and their activities in connection with Bolshevism, espionage, strikes, pacifism, etc. in the United Kingdom.
(iii) Investigation into the bona-fides of persons of the above nationalities entering or leaving the United Kingdom, or applying for permits to work on munitions; and of all persons travelling to or from Russia, together with those recommended by MIR for employment in Russia.
(iv) Investigation of cases of sedition and dissemination of peace propaganda, and of offences committed against DRR 27 and 42, otherwise than through the press.
(v) Collection of evidence and transmission to the Home and Scottish Offices of cases not directly affecting military security or arising from enemy activities.
(vi) Examination and preparation of reports and articles on sedition and peace propaganda as affecting military security.
GL
(i) Preparation of cases against persons arrested for prosecution by military and civil authorities in connection with espionage.
(ii) Investigation of reports on enemy agents in Allied and neutral countries, as referred.
GP
(i) Control of intelligence police at headquarters.
(ii) Surveillance of suspicious characters.
(iii) Special enquiries where secrecy and rapidity are desirable.
*
In April 1915, when various instances had occurred of the use of telegraphic business code for purposes of espionage, MI5 drafted an order for the competent military authority to seize and deposit with the Chief Censor the private code books of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank. Two years after the Deutsche Bank was raided by order of the War Trade Intelligence Department and MI5G asked that any documents suggestive of espionage should be handed over to the bureau. The examination of the documents had not been completed by September and there is no record of the transfer of any papers to MI5.
In February 1918, in connection with the Bolo revelations, arrangements were made for the officers of MI5 to see the deed-boxes and confidential matter belonging to the Deutsche Bank, the visit being carried out under an order from the competent military authority. The visit was made, but the task of going through the papers would have been so enormous and the result of such doubtful value that the matter was dropped. But a couple of months later, during the preparations for moving the Deutsche Bank to other premises, three codebooks were discovered. An order to seize them was made out on behalf of the bureau, which had meanwhile become possessed of circulars purporting to be of German origin and dealing with measures to be taken by German banks, firms, clubs, etc., for collecting information which would be of use to the Imperial Government.
Statistics for 1918
Jan Nov Jan/June June/Nov Total 11 months
Personal dossiers 2,290 1,867 10,107 10,998 21,189
Telegrams 1,034 1,147 6,742 5,941 12,693
Letters (note: the statistics no longer differentiate between different types of letter) 3,085 2,409 18,784 15,257 34,041
Anti-British cases 626 131 2,512 1,853 4,365
Suspects circulated 274 140 1,359 932 2,291
Internments under 14B 1 1 7 10 17
Permit and passport applications 2,862 2,107 16,911 12,305 20,216
Credentials examined 729 1,820 4,105 11,599 15,704
License to post parcels 1,491
For munitions work 278 250 1,716 1,440 3,156
Missing aliens 4,057
In 1918 it was suggested that Germans might try to use the passes and railway warrants of officers and men who had lost than on the retreat and so gain access to the United Kingdom. Germans were reported to be landing spies from aeroplanes behind the lines in France. The immense extension of munitions factories and dearth of native labour, and consequent importation of foreign labour, offered opportunities which the Germans did not neglect. Rasmussen, who was employed by Vickers, complained of the very inferior mechanics who had been engaged in Denmark for that firm and stated that, in order to gain admission into England, a man who was no mechanic at all had sought to pass as one and had offered him a bribe for his help. Lastly, through MI-1(c) news was received that six Swedish Reserve Fleet officers were to be placed as mates on vessels trading to England and America, and that Berlin looked upon this step as a sure coup.
All the ports were circularised and instructions issued to keep a look-out for these men; the port officer was to detain them and report their arrival by telephone.
One such person was detained and interviewed at Scotland Yard; his answers were unsatisfactory in some ways, but there was no evidence against him. He was not allowed to land in the U
nited Kingdom, as he was found on board the Mongolia, on which he was making three trips to France; the French ports were notified. The following ways of carrying messages were reported: in cigarettes, which were lit while the police were conducting the search; in cabochon rings and plaster bandages (seventeen circulars issued to ports, capitals of various organisations); concealed in bread, meat, etc. by a ship’s steward named Johan van Bystervelde; written on the paper rolled into rope, with which the Germans were replacing string; and tied round packages. (Ports, capitals, WTID, Home Office, etc., in all eighteen circularised.)
So, early as May 1916 a warrant had been obtained for censoring incoming mails from the French Departments adjoining the Swiss frontier, and a test censorship had been carried out with little result. In September 1916, MI5 had reason to believe that German agents were passing information to Germany via French towns on the Swiss border but, as the French were said to have organised a very careful censorship along their frontier, no action was taken by the British. At the end of 1917 three German agents caught in France confessed that their reports were to be sent to addresses (possibly postboxes only) in towns on the French border, where agents would collect them and convey them into Switzerland. MI5 was able to quote an instance in which a harmless Briton was communicating with the wife of a known German agent at Geneva.
The remedies suggested were the tightening of the frontier controls and the creation of a postal zone of some depth on the frontier with vigorous censorship of all letters sent to that zone and of all letters despatched from it to Switzerland. A test censorship carried out in April by the British Censorship was fruitless.
Special chemical tests were carried out without result on the Swiss, Dutch, Scandinavian and Spanish mails, and all applications for trade and technical publications were to be submitted to MI5G. The Censor proposed passing through all printed matter to persons on the General Black List but MI5G objected.