“So what are you doing here? And why do you have to go back right away?”
“There was a conference in Washington,” Cecilia said, having decided, with her fiancé on the train from Washington, that it probably would not be a good idea to tell their parents that they had spent two days at Camp David, where, among other things, they had had dinner with the President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson. “Just a quick trip. We have to go back to work.”
“Why don’t we open the champagne?” Major Lunsford suggested.
“Good idea,” Dr. Lunsford said.
The waiter began to open one of the bottles of champagne.
“You’re stationed in the Congo?” Mr. Taylor asked of Major Lunsford. “I didn’t know we had troops in the Congo.”
“I’m an adviser to the Congolese Army,” Major Lunsford said.
“He’s a Green Beret,” Dr. Miller said. It sounded like an accusation.
“Are you really?” Mr. Taylor asked.
“It’s supposed to be a secret, but the word is out,” Dr. Miller said. “We’re training the fascist army of Kasavubu to wipe out the liberation movement.”
“Put a lid on it, Charley,” Major Lunsford said.
“It’s a disgrace, our being there,” Dr. Miller continued.
“Well, somebody had to show them how to bayonet babies, Charley,” Major Lunsford said.
“George!” Mrs. Lunsford said warningly.
“George, shut up,” Cecilia said in Swahili.
“What language is that?” Dr. Lunsford asked.
“Swahili,” Major Lunsford and Miss Taylor said in unison.
“And what is it, if you don’t mind my asking, Cecilia, that you do in the Congo?” Dr. Miller asked.
“I’m attached to the Office of Cultural Affairs,” Cecilia said.
“And what does that entail?” Mrs. Lunsford asked.
“Well, a number of things,” Cecilia said. “We arrange for American symphony orchestras to visit the Congo, for example.”
“And right now,” Major Lunsford said, “Cecilia is pushing hard to get a troupe of Tutsi folksingers over here.”
Mrs. Lunsford wondered why that earned George a dirty look from Cecilia. It sounded like an innocent remark.
Everyone was now holding a champagne glass.
“This isn’t quite what I had in mind for Cecilia’s engagement party,” Mr. Taylor said, “but may I suggest we toast the engaged couple?”
“Here, here,” Dr. Lunsford said.
Everyone took a sip of champagne.
“Did you propose in Swahili, George?” Dr. Lunsford asked. “And how did you two meet, incidentally? At the embassy?”
“I think I proposed in English,” Major Lunsford said.
“We met at the embassy,” Cecilia said.
“So you know what he’s doing over there? And you approve?” Dr. Miller challenged.
“We don’t talk much about our work,” Cecilia said quickly.
“And when do you plan to be married? And where?” Mr. Taylor asked.
“We thought we would wait until we come home,” Cecilia said.
“Oh, good!” Mrs. Taylor said.
“And when will that be, when you come home?”
“We talked about that in Washington,” Cecilia said. “It shouldn’t be long now. Maybe eight months, maybe six, maybe even less.”
The President of the United States: How long will it take before Guevara throws in the towel, Lunsford? Off the top of your head?
Major G. W. Lunsford: Sir, presuming we can continue to successfully interdict his replacement stream, and that Colonel Supo’s plans to gradually take control of the area now under insurgent control are successful, a matter of months.
The President of the United States: How many months, Lunsford?
Major G. W. Lunsford: Eight at the outside, Mr. President. Possibly no more than four or five.
The President of the United States: Is there anything I can get you to speed that up any?
Major G. W. Lunsford: I don’t believe so, Mr. President.
The President of the United States: You don’t want anything at all?
Major G. W. Lunsford: Sir, I’d like to get one of my men promoted.
The President of the United States: Oh?
Major G. W. Lunsford: Master Sergeant Thomas, sir. He’s really doing more than a master sergeant should.
The President of the United States: See to it, Felter.
Colonel Sanford T. Felter: Yes, sir.
“Anytime you’re ready, sir,” the waiter said to Major Lunsford.
“Now,” Major Lunsford said.
“We’re having steamed clams first and then lobster,” Cecilia said. “I hope that’s all right. George and I talked about having clams and lobster here in Bookbinder’s when we first met in the Congo.”
“That sounds fine,” Mr. Taylor said.
“Great! There’s no such thing as too much lobster,” Dr. Lunsford said.
“I can’t eat any crustacean,” Dr. Miller said.
“No problem, Charley,” Major Lunsford said. “I’ll eat yours, and you can have a hamburger or something.”
[ THREE ]
TOP SECRET
1905 GREENWICH 14 JULY 1965
00074
FROM STATION CHIEF, LÉOPOLDVILLE
TO DIRECTOR, CIA, LANGLEY
COPIES TO SOUTH AMERICAN DESK
MR SANFORD T FELTER, COUNSELOR TO
THE PRESIDENT
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON
1. INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FROM GUEVARA IN LULUPLAT TO CUBAN EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM REPORTS THAT OVER GUEVARA’S OBJECTIONS THREE (3) RWANDAN TROOPS INCLUDING MAJOR (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN) MITCHELL SENIOR RAWAN-DAN PRESENT AT BENDERA WERE EXECUTED FOR COWARDICE AT BENDERA.
2. INTEL FROM SUPO’S AGENTS RELAYED VIA HELPER INDICATES THAT THERE HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY FORTY (40) TUTSI AND RWANDAN DESERTIONS FROM LULUPLAT.
C.R. TAYLOR
STATION CHIEF LÉOPOLDVILLE
TOP SECRET
[ FOUR ]
TOP SECRET
1020 GREENWICH 7 AUGUST 1965
FROM STATION CHIEF, BUENOS AIRES
TO DIRECTOR, CIA, LANGLEY
COPIES TO SOUTH AMERICAN DESK
MR SANFORD T FELTER, COUNSELOR TO
THE PRESIDENT
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON
THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM US ARMY OFFICER ASSIGNED US EMBASSY BELIEVED TO BE CONTROLLED BY MR. FELTER. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INTELLIGENCE FOLLOWING BE REGARDED AS THE EQUIVALENT OF CIA RELIABILITY SCALE FIVE. IT IS TRANSMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND VERBATIM.
START
DEAR FRIENDS:
AT 0630 6 AUGUST 1965, THE RUSSIAN FLAGGED VESSEL “FELIX ZDHERSINSKI” UNDER CHARTER TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT SAILED FROM MARIEL, CUBA FOR POINTE NEGRO, CONGO BRAZZAVILLE, WITH 200 CUBAN SOLDIERS FROM PITA CAMP 2 ON BOARD.
BEST REGARDS
END
J.P STEPHENS
STATION CHIEF BUENOS AIRES
TOP SECRET
[ FIVE ]
TOP SECRET
1905 GREENWICH 18 AUGUST 1965
00101
FROM STATION CHIEF, LÉOPOLDVILLE
TO DIRECTOR, CIA, LANGLEY
COPIES TO SOUTH AMERICAN DESK
MR SANFORD T FELTER, COUNSELOR TO
THE PRESIDENT
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON
1. INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FROM GUEVARA IN LULUPLAT TO CUBAN EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM REPORTS THAT CUBAN LED INSURGENT FORCES AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 GREENWICH 17 AUGUST 1965 SUCCESSFULLY AMBUSHED A CONGOLESE ARMY CONVOY ON ROUTE NATIONALE 16 APPROXIMATELY 25 KILOMETERS FROM ALBERTVILLE.
2. REPORT STATES THAT CONVOY CONSISTED OF A LIGHT TANK, AN ARMORED TRUCK AND A JEEP WITH TRAILER; THAT SEVEN (7) PERSONNEL IN CONVOY WERE KILLED, AND ALL VEHICLES SET ON FIRE; AND THAT OTHER CONVOY PERSONNEL ESCAPED INTO BUSH.
3. REPORT
STATES THAT ALL KIA WERE WHITE MERCENAIRES AND ALL WERE BELIEVED TO BE U.S. CITIZENS.
4. INFORMATION FROM COLONEL SUPO REPORTS THAT MAJOR HOARE’S MERCENARY FORCE REPORTS AN OVERDUE CONVOY IN THAT AREA CONSISITNG OF A FRENCH PANHARD ARMORED CAR (NOT A TANK); A STAKE BODY TRUCK WITH METAL REINFORCEMENT; AND A JEEP WITH A TRAILER. HOARE STATES NO REPEAT NO U.S. CITIZENS IN HIS MERCENARY FORCE.
5. MAJOR LUNSFORD REPORTS THAT ALL REPEAT ALL OF SPECIAL FORCES DETACHMENT 17 PERSONNEL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR AND THAT NONE REPEAT NONE OF HIS MEN WERE ANYWHERE NEAR THE SITE OF THIS INCIDENT.
6. A CONGOLESE REACTION FORCE IS EN ROUTE TO THE SITE OF THE REPORTED INCIDENT.
C.R. TAYLOR
STATION CHIEF LÉOPOLDVILLE
TOP SECRET
[ SIX ]
SECRET
HELP0073 2220 ZULU 27 AUGUST 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: HELPER SIX
TO: EARNEST SIX
AFTER ACTION REPORT #14
REFERENCE MAP BAKER 11
1. REFERENCE MY AFTER-ACTION REPORT #5
2. HAVING BEEN ADVISED BY MATA HARI THAT APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED (200) CUBANS WHO HAD DEBARKED FROM RUSSIAN VESSEL “FELIX ZD-HERSINSKI” IN POINTE NOIRE, CONGO BRAZZAVILLE 21 AUGUST 1965 HAD SURREPTITIOUSLY CROSSED CONGO RIVER INTO THE CONGO IN GROUPS OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY (20) DURING THE PERIOD 22-24 AUGUST, AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF ROUTE 39 WAS BEGUN AS OF 0001 ZULU 24 AUGUST.
3. AT APPROXIMATELY 0900 ZULU 25 AUGUST 1965 1LT GEOFFREY CRAIG FLYING RECONNAISSANCE IN AN L19 NEAR SURINO, KATANGA PROVINCE, CONGO OBSERVED A FOUR TRUCK CONVOY ON ROUTE NATIONAL 39 SUSPECTED TO BE THE CUBANS EN ROUTE TO JOIN GUEVARA IN LULUPLAT.
4. THIS INTEL WAS FURNISHED TO THE CONGOLESE REACTION FORCE AT KAMINA, ADVISED BY MSGT WILLIAM THOMAS, AND AT APPROXIMATELY 1210 ZULU 25 AUGUST 1965 THE CONVOY WAS INTERDICTED APPROXIMATELY 35 MILES EAST OF SURINO, IN THE SAME LOCATION AS THE INTERDICTION REPORTED IN AFTER ACTION REPORT #5.
5. ONE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN (197) CUBANS AND A SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITY OF SMALL ARMS AND OTHER MATÉRIEL WERE SEIZED BY THE REACTION FORCE. THE CUBANS WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AND IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THAT THEY HAD BEEN STOPPED TO EITHER LULUPLAT OR CONGO BRAZZAVILLE.
6. CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES HAVE INFORMED THE UNDERSIGNED THAT IF INVESTIGATION REVEALS THE ALLEGED CUBANS ARE IN FACT ARMED FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE CONGO WITH THE INTENT OF OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT BY FORCE, THEY WILL BE DEALT WITH UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND CONGOLESE MILITARY LAW, WITH APPROPRIATE REPORTS TO BE MADE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT THE TERMINATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.
CRAIG FOR HELPER SIX
SECRET
[ SEVEN ]
TOP SECRET
1035 GREENWICH 2 SEPTEMBER 1965
FROM STATION CHIEF, BUENOS AIRES
TO DIRECTOR, CIA, LANGLEY
COPIES TO SOUTH AMERICAN DESK
MR SANFORD T FELTER, COUNSELOR TO
THE PRESIDENT
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON
THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM US ARMY OFFICER ASSIGNED US EMBASSY BELIEVED TO BE CONTROLLED BY MR. FELTER. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INTELLIGENCE FOLLOWING BE REGARDED AS THE EQUIVALENT OF CIA RELIABILITY SCALE FIVE. IT IS TRANSMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND VERBATIM.
START
DEAR FRIENDS:
A DELEGATION FROM THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION OF THE CONGO, HEADED BY PRESIDENT GASTON SOUMIALOT, ARRIVED IN HAVANA 1600 HAVANA TIME 1 SEPTEMBER AND AT 1900 MET WITH RAUL CASTRO AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS (NOT FIDEL).
IN A SOMEWHAT HEATED CONFRONTATION SOUMIALOT ACCUSED CUBANS OF NOT MAKING GOOD ON THEIR PROMISE TO SEND “SEVERAL HUNDRED, AS MANY AS FIVE HUNDRED” TRAINED SOLDIERS TO HELP WITH THE REVOLUTION. RAUL CASTRO REPLIED THAT THEY HAD SENT ALMOST 400 SOLDIERS SO FAR, AND HAD RECEIVED WORD THAT A COLUMN OF 200 CUBAN SOLDIERS HAD LANDED IN PUNTA NEGRE CONGO BRAZZAVILLE 21 AUGUST AND THAT THE CUBANS COULD NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM THEREAFTER; GETTING THEM TO THE WAR ZONE WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF CONGOLESE.
RAUL CASTRO ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF FAILURE OF ATTACK ON (UNIDENTIFIED) HYDROELECTRIC PLANT, STATING HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY CAPTAIN DREKE THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF REVOLUTIONARIES HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT. SOUMIALOT STATED THAT DREKE WAS A LIAR, WHEREUPON CASTRO TERMINATED CONFERENCE.
BEST REGARDS
END
J.P STEPHENS
STATION CHIEF BUENOS AIRES
TOP SECRET
[ EIGHT ]
SECRET
HELP0099 2220 ZULU 18 SEPTEMBER 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: HELPER SIX
TO: EARNEST SIX
INTELL REPORT #19
1. ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1965 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CONGO PUBLISHED A NOTICE TO MARINERS THAT ANY VESSEL ENTERING CONGOLESE WATERS OF LAKE TANGANYIKA WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE WILL BE PRESUMED TO HAVE HOSTILE INTENT AND WILL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE SEVEN (7) LAUNCHES HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE HAD HOSTILE INTENTION AND WERE SUNK BY CONGOLESE COAST GUARD VESSELS AND/OR AIRCRAFT.
2. ON 14 SEPTEMBER MATA HARI ADVISED UNDERSIGNED THAT THREE HIGH-RANKING CUBAN OFFICIALS, (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN) PADILLA; (FNU) COLMAN; AND DIONOSIO OLIVA HAD ARRIVED IN DAR ES SALAAM VIA AIR FRANCE FROM CAIRO AND WERE TAKEN TO THE FARM AT MOROGORO.
3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER ASA INTERCEPTED AND DECRYPTED RADIOTELETYPE MESSAGE FROM MOROGORO TO “TATU” (GUEVARA) SIGNED OLIVA STATING HE AND COLMAN AND PADILLA WERE LEAVING FOR KIGOMA IN MORNING AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.
4. ON 17 SEPTEMBER ASA INTERCEPTED AND DECRYPTED MESSAGE SIGNED BY OLIVA, SENT BY LANDLINE FROM KIGOMA TO MOROGORO AND RELAYED TO TATU AS RADIOTELETYPE. PERTINENT EXTRACT “HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS THAT TRANSITING LAKE TANGANYIKA IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF FASCIST AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. CAN YOU COME TO KIGOMA?”
5. ON 17 SEPTEMBER ASA INTERCEPTED AND DECRYPTED MESSAGE FROM LULUPLAT TO CUBAN EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM SIGNED TATU. PERTINENT EXTRACT “ADVISE OLIVA (1) TATU CANNOT COME TO KIGOMA (2) THERE IS ALWAYS AN ELEMENT OF RISK IN A WAR OF LIBERATION.”
CRAIG FOR HELPER SIX
SECRET
[ NINE ]
TOP SECRET
1035 GREENWICH 4 OCTOBER 1965
FROM STATION CHIEF, BUENOS AIRES
TO DIRECTOR, CIA, LANGLEY
COPIES TO SOUTH AMERICAN DESK
MR SANFORD T FELTER, COUNSELOR TO
THE PRESIDENT
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON
THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM US ARMY OFFICER ASSIGNED US EMBASSY BELIEVED TO BE CONTROLLED BY MR. FELTER. IT IS TRANSMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND VERBATIM.
START
DEAR FRIENDS:
BY NOW I’M SURE YOU ARE AWARE THAT DR. FIDEL CASTRO HAS READ TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE DR. ERNESTO GUEVARA’S LETTER TO HIM, ANNOUNCING HIS RESIGNATION, IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS: “I FORMALLY RESIGN MY POSITIONS IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, MY POST AS MINISTER, MY RANK OF COMMANDER, AND MY CUBAN CITIZENSHIP. NOTHING LEGAL BINDS ME TO CUBA.”
WE HAVE BEEN WONDERING HERE IF THIS, ESPECIALLY THE LAST SENTENCE, SUGGESTS THERE IS CONCERN THAT DR. GUEVARA’S ACTIVITIES IN THE CONGO WILL FAIL, POSSIBLY SOON, AND THAT DR. CASTRO WANTS TO DISTANCE HIMSELF AND CUBA FROM DR. GUEVERA, AND HAVE WONDERED IF YOU ALSO HAVE BEEN THINKING ALONG THESE LINES.
ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY SUGGEST THAT DR. GUEVERA WISHES TO DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM A CUBAN FAILURE IN AFRICA AND RETURN TO THIS CONTINENT AS AN ARGENTINE WHO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN AIDING DR. CASTRO, AND NOW WISHES TO LIBERATE THE REST OF SOUTH AMERICA.
BEST REGARDS
END
J.P. STEPHENS
STATION CHIEF BUENOS AIRES
TOP SECRET
[ TEN ]
SECRET
HELP0111 2005 ZULU 10 OCTOBER 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: HELPER SIX
TO: EARNEST SIX
INTELL REPORT #22
1. AT 0900 ZULU 10 OCT
OBER 1965 ASA INTERCEPTED AND DECRYPTED THE FOLLOWING RADIO MESSAGE FROM “SIKI” (CAPTAIN OSCAR FERNANDEZ MELI) BELIEVED TO BE IN VICINITY OF FIZI, KATANGA PROVINCE TO “MOJA” (CAPTAIN VICTOR DREKE) IN LULUPLAT:
BEGIN
FOR MOJA: THE SOLDIERS ARE ADVANCING ON FIZI AND THERE’S NOTHING TO STOP OR EVEN DELAY THEM. WE ARE MOVING FROM FIZI TO LUBONDJA. I WILL TRY TO DESTROY THE BRIDGES. TELL TATU MY TRIP WAS A FAILURE. SIKI.
END
2. COLONEL SUPO HAS ADVISED THE UNDERSIGNED THAT A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM OF FIVE (5) CONGOLESE PARATROOPS (ADVISED BY SSGT LEANDER KNOWLES) MOUNTED IN TWO JEEPS ARMED WITH .30 CALIBER BROWNING MACHINE GUNS ENTERED THE VILLAGE OF FIZI AT APPROXIMATELY 1115 ZULU 10 OCTOBER 1965, AGAINST NEGLIGIBLE RESISTANCE, AND THAT AS OF 1210 ZULU THE VILLAGE IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF CONVENTIONAL CONGOLESE TROOPS.
3. AT 1205 ZULU THE RECON FORCE BEING ADVISED BY SSGT KNOWLES CAME UPON A GROUP OF INSURGENTS ATTEMPTING TO PLACE DEMOLITIONS CHARGES ON THE BRIDGE ACROSS THE LUVIDJO RIVER. THE INSURGENTS FLED ON SEEING THE RECON SQUAD APPROACHING.
PORTET FOR HELPER SIX
SECRET
[ ELEVEN ]
SECRET
HELP0114 1905 ZULU 12 OCTOBER 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: HELPER SIX
TO: EARNEST SIX
INTELL REPORT #24
1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM SSGT LEANDER KNOWLES 1605 ZULU 12 OCTOBER 1965. KNOWLES IS ADVISING RECONNAISSANCE TEAM OF CONGOLESE PARATROOPS IN VICINITY OF LUBONJA, KATANGA PROVINCE.
BEGIN
FOR HUNTER SIX: PATROL ENTERED LUBONJA UNOPPOSED 1530 ZULU. AWAITING SUPO’S TROOPS TO OCCUPY. INSURGENTS AND CUBAN ALLIES ABANDONED SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS, INCLUDING MORTARS, AND ONE HIGHLY INTOXICATED CUBAN CORPORAL, AS THEY WITHDREW. KNOWLES, SSGT.
END
CRAIG FOR HELPER SIX
SECRET
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