by Andrew Cook
The following is the full, unedited version of the statement which Reilly made to Styrne, taken from his OGPU file:
During the 1914 war, I joined the army as a volunteer in 1916, until 1915 I lived in New York where I was engaged in military supplies, including supplies to the Russian government. After joining the British Army as a volunteer, I was appointed to serve in the Royal Flying Corps (from 1910 I was engaged in aviation and can regard myself as one of the aviation pioneers in Russia; I was one of the founders of ‘Krylia’, the first aviation society in Russia), where I worked until January 1918. In January 1918 I joined a secret political service, where I worked until 1921, after which I set up a private business of a financial nature (loans, stock companies and so on). During my service in the Royal Flying Corps I had no occasion to come to Russia... In March 1918, being on ‘Secret Service’, I was sent to Russia as a member of the British mission as an expert to report on the current situation (I held the rank of lieutenant at the time). I arrived in Petrograd through Murmansk, then proceeded to Vologda, and subsequently came to Moscow, where I stayed until 11 September 1918, spending most of my time on numerous trips between Moscow, Petrograd and Vologda.
From passive intelligence work, I, like other members of the British mission, gradually switched to a more-or-less active fight against Soviet power, which I did for the following reasons:
The signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty on terms very profitable to Germany naturally aroused concerns about joint actions the Soviet powers and the Germans would take against the Allied powers, to which I should add the existence of numerous reports (which ultimately proved to be mendacious) on the movement of German prisoners from Russia back to Germany, and finally, the anger caused by the oppression of the Allied missions by the Soviet power. I believe that the Soviet government at that time pursued the wrong policy towards at least the British mission, for Lockhart, up to the end of June, in his reports to the British government, recommended that it should pursue a soft line towards the Soviet power. At that time, as far as I remember, the Soviet Government was especially concerned about establishing a regular army, and Trotsky many times discussed this issue with Lockhart, stressing the importance of sympathies for this cause on the part of the Allied governments. The situation radically changed after Mirback’s arrival and the continuous concessions of the Soviet power to his demands (the demands of the German government).
Mirbach’s death triggered an immediate repression against us. We had anticipated that the Germans, apart from other claims, would demand the expulsion of all Allied missions, which did actually happen. Right after that, searches were made of the consulates and some mission members were arrested, but soon released. Also, the order was made banning all Allied officers to travel. From this very moment, I started my fight against Soviet power, which manifested itself mostly in military and political intelligence and in identification of the active elements that could be used in the fight against the Soviet government. For this purpose, I went underground and obtained documents from various persons; for some period of time, for example, I was a commissar in charge of transporting spare vehicle parts during the evacuation from Petrograd, which provided me with a good opportunity to travel between Moscow and Petrograd without any restrictions, even in the commissar’s coach. At this time, I resided mostly in Moscow, changing flats nearly every day. The culmination of my work was my talks with Colonel Burzin, whom I met at Lockhart’s. The essence of the matter you would know from the proceedings records. At the time I passed on to the patriarch a considerable amount of money allocated for the needs of the clergy which was in distressful circumstances then. I want to stress that I never discussed with the patriarch or his entourage any counter-revolutionary affairs, and my intentions were unknown to the patriarch and to his inner circle. The money was allocated from the funds I had received; I had in my possession considerable amounts of money, which, in view of my special status (total financial independence and exclusive confidence due to my ties with highly placed persons) were provided me unaccountably. These very funds I spent on my fight against Soviet power.
I believe that the persons that were brought to the Lockhart trial had nothing to do with me, or in some cases, had a very remote relation to me; as for those who were closely associated with me, they fled to the Ukraine after the discovery of the plot. Meanwhile, I had a very vast net of informers, which I also immediately dissolved right after the discovery of the Lockhart case. I financed their flee to the Ukraine.
Reilly then related the story of his escape from Petrograd (reproduced in Chapter Ten), before moving on to recount:
I was then appointed a political officer in the south of Russia and left for Denikin’s headquarters in the Crimea, in the south-east and in Odessa. In Odessa I stayed until the end of March 1919, and by the order of the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, I was dispatched to make a report on the current situation on the Denikin front and the political situation in the south to officials in London and to Britain’s representatives at the Peace Conference in Paris. In the course of the Peace Conference, I was a liaison in charge of Russian affairs with different departments in London and Paris; during that time, I met B.V. Savinkov. Through 1919 and 1920, I had close relations with different representatives of the Russian émigré parties (the SRs in Prague, the Savinkov organisation, commercial and industrial circles and so on). At that time, I was pressing my comprehensive plan through the British Government concerning support of Russian commercial and industrial circles, headed by Yaroshinsky, Bark and others. All this time, I served the secret service, my main responsibility being to make reports on Russian affairs for Britain’s higher echelon.
At the end of 1920, having become a rather close intimate of Savinkov’s, I went to Warsaw, where Savinkov was then organising a foray into Belorussia. I personally took part in the operation and was inside Soviet Russia. Ordered to return, I went back to London. In 1921 I continued to provide active support to Savinkov, took him to London and introduced him to government circles. The same year I took him to Prague, where I introduced him to government contacts. I also arranged his secret flight to Warsaw.
In 1922 my strategy changed. I was disappointed with intervention. I became increasingly inclined to the opinion that the most appropriate way of struggle would be to reach an agreement with the Soviet power such that would throw open the gates of British commerce and business to Russia. At that time I proposed a project for the establishment of an enormous international consortuim for the restoration of Russian currency and industry, this project was accepted by some in government circles. In charge of this project were the Marconi Company or, to be exact, Godfrey Isaacs, the company’s chairman and the brother of the Viceroy of India. This project was discussed with Krasin and eventually dropped, yet nearly all the elements of this project were taken as a base for the proposed international consortium that was established at the time the Genoa conference was held.
In 1923 and 1924 I was primarily preoccupied with my personal affairs. As for my fight against the Soviet power, I was less active here, although I wrote much about it in the papers (British) and supported Savinkov, consulting influential circles in England and America on Russian affairs.
In 1925 I resided in New York. In late September 1925 I illegally crossed the Finnish border and arrived in Leningrad and subsequently
Moscow where I was arrested.
[signed] Sidney Reilly3
Two days after making this statement, on 9 October, Reilly volunteered that:
I arrived in Soviet Russia on my own initiative, hearing from Bunakov of the existence of an apparently important anti-soviet group. I have always been actively engaged in anti-Bolshevik matters and to these I have given much time and my personal funds. I can state that the years 1920–24, for instance, cost me at a very minimum calculation £15,000-£20,000.4
Some weeks later Pepita received a further letter from Boyce in Helsingfors, dated 18 October, in which he broke t
he news to her that things had definitely gone wrong:
I am on my way to Paris via London and hope to be with you on Thursday or latest Friday. The position I am sorry to say is much worse than I had hoped from the information previously received. It appears that at the last moment just before they hoped to complete the whole business a party of four of them were prospecting in the forests near by and were suddenly attacked by brigands. They put up a fight with the result that two were killed outright. Mutt5 was seriously wounded and the fourth was taken captive.6
Promising to meet her in Paris when he would hopefully have more precise and up-to-date news, Boyce signed off. At this point it is clear that Pepita considered the possibility that Boyce might be an OGPU double agent who had entrapped her husband.7 This would not be the last time that such suspicions were to fall on Boyce.
From the OGPU interrogation records, it would appear that the information Reilly had thus far given about himself was as far as he was willing to go in terms of volunteering the information they were demanding. On 13 October Reilly responded to Styrne’s ultimatum, to co-operate fully or face the consequences, by categorically stating, ‘I am unable to agree’.8 On 17 October he again wrote to Styrne, emphasising that he would not provide the ‘detailed information’ they were seeking.9 Psychological methods were therefore brought to bear on him, which ultimately succeeded in persuading him to co-operate. Even when this point was reached on 30 October, it is clear that Reilly did his best to drag things out.
How then was he persuaded to talk and what did he tell them? Reilly himself left a trail of clues in the form of daily notes he made during his last week in cell 73. Using a pencil he made tiny handwritten notes on cigarette papers. These he hid in his clothing, in his bed and in cracks in the plasterwork of the cell walls. They were later found when the cell was searched, and photographic enhancements made by OGPU technicians.10 The handwriting in the daily diary is clearly identifiable as Reilly’s. The constructions, grammar and use of abbreviations are not only in keeping with his general written style, but are consistent with other examples of earlier diaries he kept.
In 1992 Robin Bruce Lockhart called into question the diary’s authenticity in a revised edition of his Ace of Spies book,11 dismissing it as ‘Soviet disinformation’. If it was an OGPU fabrication, however, created solely to mislead the West, why was it never used at any time during the following sixty-six years of Communist rule in the Soviet Union? On the contrary, it remained classified at the highest level and was kept securely in the archives of the OGPU and its successor organisations.
Why he wrote the diary is another question altogether. The most likely scenario is that he assumed, or at best hoped, that he would eventually be released to the British authorities. Had this happened, he would, no doubt, have tried to smuggle the diary out with him. Like the postcard he posted to Ernest Boyce shortly before his arrest, it was a testament or boast to the fact that he had entered the lion’s den and returned to tell the story. It was also a record of OGPU interrogation techniques, which he was sure would be of interest to SIS. The diary itself contains many abbreviations, and the following account reproduces only the text of which the meaning is clear and incontrovertible –
Friday 30 October 192512
Additional interrogation in late afternoon. Change into work clothes. All personal clothes taken away. Managed to conceal a second blanket. When called from sleep was ordered to take coat and cap. Room downstairs near bath. Always had premonition about this iron door. Present in the room are Styrne and his colleague, assistant warder, young fellow from Vladimir gubernia, executioner13 and possibly somebody else. Styrne’s colleague in chair. Informed that GPU Collegium had reconsidered sentence and that unless I agree to co-operate the execution will take place immediately. Said that this does not surprise me, that my decision remains the same and that I am ready to die. Was asked by Styrne whether I wished time for reflection. Answered that this is their affair. They gave me one hour. Taken back to cell by young man and assistant warder. Prayed inwardly for Pita,14 made small package of my personal things, smoked a couple of cigarettes and after fifteen to twenty minutes said I was ready. Executioner who was outside cell was sent to announce decision. Was kept in cell for full hour. Brought back to the same room. Styrne, his colleague and young fellow. In adjoining room executioner and assistant all heavily armed. Announced again my decision and asked to make written declaration in this spirit that I am glad I can show them how an Englishman and a Christian understands his duty.15 Refusal. Asked to have things sent to Pita. Refused. They said that no one will ever know about it after my death. Then began lengthy conversation – persuasion – same as usual. After three-quarters of an hour wrangling, a heated conversation for five minutes. Silence, then Styrne and colleague called the executioner and departed. Immediately handcuffed. Kept waiting about five minutes during which distinct loading of weapons in outer rooms and other preparations. Then led out to car. Inside were the executioner, his warder, young fellow, chauffeur and guard. Short drive to garage. During drive soldier squeezed his filthy hand between handcuffs and my wrist. Rain. Drizzle. Very cold. Endless wait in garage courtyard while executioner went into shed – guards filthy talk and jokes. Chauffeur said something wrong with radiator and pottered about. Finally start, short drive and arrival GPU by north – Styrne and colleague – informed post-ponement twenty hours was communicated. Terrible night. Nightmares.
According to OGPU reports, Reilly spent the night alternately crying and praying before a small picture of Pepita. It seemed that the classic ‘mock execution’ technique had finally shaken his resolve. The scenario he describes, the endless waiting, the uncertainty, followed by a postponement of the execution is typical of this psychological method of interrogation and no doubt induced the nightmares to which he refers.
Much controversy surrounds a letter written on the same date as the ‘mock execution’, 30 October. The full text of the letter, which is contained in the OGPU file on Reilly, is as follows:
To the Chairman of the OGPU
F.E. Dzerzhinsky
After the discussions that have taken place with V.A. Styrne, I express my agreement to co-operate in sincerely providing full evidence and information answering the questions of interest to the OGPU relating to the organisation and personnel of the British intelligence service and as far as it is known to me what information I have relating to the American intelligence and likewise about those persons in the Russian émigré organisations with whom I had dealings.
Moscow, the Inner Prison,
30 October 1925
[signed] Sidney Reilly16
Again, there have been suggestions that this too was an ‘OGPU fabrication’. Gordon Brook Shepherd, for example, asserts that:
… it is inconceivable that Reilly, who had throughout displayed defiance, would have failed to mention [in the diary] such a volte-face. It seems all the more probable therefore that the document was produced by the OGPU’s diligent factory of lies and forgery to make things look neat and pretty in their files.17
Edward Gazur, the FBI counter-intelligence officer who debriefed Alexander Orlov after his defection to the US, was even more emphatic: ‘there is no doubt in my mind that Orlov did not know of the existence of such a letter when he died in 1973 as he would have certainly addressed the matter with me’.18 He is firmly of the view that ‘the letter was a fabrication conceived and floated by the KGB [sic]’.19 Gazur takes his argument further by reasoning that ‘had Reilly confessed, he would have likewise been placed on trial if only for the Soviets to reap an extraordinarily bountiful harvest of propaganda’.20
On 30 October 1925, Reilly wrote to Cheka boss Felix Dzerzhinsky, in a last ditch effort to buy himself more time.
This scenario is a most unlikely one, however. There is no evidence that the Bolsheviks ever had any intention of subjecting Reilly to a show trail. Not only had he already been tried in absentia in 1918, and been sentenced to death, they had already
announced his death via the Moscow Trust Council meeting within days of his arrest. Clearly, they would have found it a little difficult to then bring him back to life in order to place him on trial. Furthermore, Reilly’s letter can in no way be described as a ‘confession’. It is purely a statement of intention that he is prepared to co-operate. Savinkov, on the other hand, certainly did ‘confess’ in every sense of the word, and the statement he made was a clear recanting of his opposition to the Bolsheviks:
I unconditionally recognise your right to govern Russia. I do not ask your mercy. I ask only to let your revolutionary conscience judge a man who has never sought anything for himself and who has devoted his whole life to the cause of the Russian people..21
Reilly, on the other hand, no doubt hoped that the letter would save his life or at least buy him time. In fact, his own handwritten notes testify to the fact that during the following five days he did exactly what he said he would do in the Dzerzhinsky letter. It is also clear, however, that what he told them was generally low-grade information, much of which they already knew. The one thing they were keen to learn more about, the identity of SIS agents currently working in Russia, he was unable to tell them, as he had had no connection with SIS for over four years.
Saturday 31 October 1925
Next morning called at 11. Spend day in Room 176 with Sergei Ivanovich and Dr Kushner.22 Apparently Styrne much impressed with his report – increased attention. At 8 p.m. drive dressed in GPU uniform. Walk in country at night. – Arrival Moscow apartment. Great spread. Tea. Ibrahim. Then conversation alone with Styrne – that protocole [sic] expressing my agreement. Ignorance of any agents here – object my trip. Appraisal of Winston Churchill and Spears. My unexpected decision in Wyborg. Styrne went with protocol to Dzerzhinsky, returned half an hour later. Informed sentence stopped and agreed in principle my plan. Return to cell slept, four solid hours, after Veronal.23 – Unfortunately my turn get up early. – Called at 11. Uniform, precautions that I not be seen. Devised programme with Styrne – 1) 1918, 2) SIS, 3) Political spheres England, 4) American Secret Service, 5) Politics and banks USA, 6) Russian émigré Source for information regarding 1918 – Main object German identification, scene at American Consulate24 – Cut off supplies untruth25 – Accused of provocation – 2a) Savinkov’s changed attitude, distrust, my conviction proven. My intentions if Savinkov returned. Rest. Ask whether knew Stark,26 Kurtz.27 Story of Operput,28 Yakushev.29 Then began on Number 2 – SIS. Only introduction. – finished 5 p.m. Retired to room 176. Rest, dinner. At 7 p.m. dictated Numbers 4 and 5. Then cell. Veronal did not act.