by Jim Marrs
Asked to identify the Carcano, Boone would only say, “It looks like the same rifle. I have no way of being positive.” Weitzman, who managed a sporting-goods store and was considered an expert on rifles, had identified the gun as a Mauser. He testified to the Warren Commission only by affidavit and was not asked to identify the Carcano as the gun he held in the Depository.
Author Sylvia Meagher noted, “The failure to obtain such corroboration from Weitzman leaves open the possibility that a substitution of rifles took place, or that a second rifle may have been found at the Book Depository, but kept secret.”
Also consider that Lieutenant Day and another Dallas policeman mentioned writing contemporary descriptions of the rifle, yet neither of these documents was included in the mass of Warren Commission materials.
Even the CIA had doubts as to the true identity of the assassination rifle. Five days after the assassination, in an internal report transmitted from Italy to Langley headquarters, CIA officials noted that two different kinds of Italian-made carbines were being identified as the single murder weapon. The CIA document stated, “The weapon which appears to have been employed in this criminal attack is a Model 91 rifle, 7.35 caliber, 1938 modification. . . . The description of a ‘Mannlicher-Carcano’ rifle in the Italian and foreign press is in error.”
The possibility of a rifle substitution was even admitted by Dallas police chief Jesse Curry in 1976. In an interview with the Detroit News, Curry agreed “it’s more than possible” the rifle originally found in the Depository could have been exchanged for the gun now in the National Archives. Curry said anyone wanting to substitute one suspected murder weapon for another “could have gotten away with it at the time” because no special precautions were taken to isolate the weapon as historic evidence.
But even accepting that the Carcano was the assassination rifle, it is hard to envision a worse weapon. In testimony to the Warren Commission—conveniently left out of its report—FBI reports quoted firearms experts as calling the rifle “a cheap old weapon,” “a very cheap rifle [which] could have been purchased for $3 each in lots of 25,” and a “real cheap, common, real flimsy-looking [gun] . . . very easily knocked out of adjustment.”
The FBI also noted that the Carcano was part of a gun shipment that was the subject of “a legal proceeding by the Carlo Riva Machine Shop to collect payment for the shipment of rifles which Adam Consolidated Industries, Inc., claims were defective.” A defective gun managed to strike two men with three shots at a range of more than two hundred feet within six seconds?
There are many other questions concerning the rifle and its purchase.
The Warren Commission published a “duplicate” of the ad from which Oswald reportedly ordered the rifle from Klein’s Sporting Goods Co. of Chicago on March 13, 1963. According to Klein’s records, a rifle bearing serial number C2766 was shipped to one A. Hidell, Post Office Box 2915, Dallas, Texas, on March 20, 1963.
Why publish a duplicate ad? Why not publish the original ad? The order form reportedly came from the February 1963 issue of American Rifleman magazine. Yet the ad from that issue advertises a “36-inch overall” rifle. Perhaps that is why the Commission chose to present a “duplicate” ad, which depicts a forty-inch-long rifle—the same length as the weapon identified as Oswald’s.
Perhaps the discrepancy between rifle lengths had a logical explanation. But the manner in which the Commission tried to conceal this problem only further demonstrates manipulation of the evidence.
This problem is heightened by the fact that no record exists to show that either Oswald or A. Hidell actually took possession of the rifle. Despite postal regulations requiring that Form 1039, which lists those persons with access to a post office box, be kept a minimum of two years after a box is closed—the Commission was told Oswald’s form had been thrown away. Likewise, there are no official records to show that Oswald signed for the .38 caliber pistol that reportedly was shipped to him by Railway Express.
In fact, according to Warren Commission documents, Oswald told Captain Will Fritz “he had bought [the pistol] several months before in Fort Worth, Texas.”
It should also be noted that Kennedy’s death certificate, the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee on Assassinations and the Journal of the American Medical Association article all claimed Kennedy was killed by bullets from a “high-powered” or “high-velocity” rifle. Yet, the Warren Commission stated the 6.5 mm Carcano only reached a velocity of less than 1,779 feet per second while a high-velocity rifle exceeds 2,000 feet per second. Based on this discrepancy, the Oswald rifle could not be the death weapon.
But the strongest evidence that the Carcano was not the assassination weapon came from Ronald Simmons, chief of the Infantry Weapons Evaluation Branch of the Ballistics Research Laboratory of the Department of the Army, who headed the team evaluating the rifle. During testimony to the Warren Commission, Simmons was asked if his team had experienced any difficulties sighting in the rifle. He replied, “Well, they could not sight the weapon in using the telescope, and no attempt was made to sight it in using the iron sight. We did adjust the telescopic sight by the addition of two shims, one which tended to adjust the azimuth and one which adjusted an elevation.”
Moments later, the Warren Commission attorney stated, “For the record, Mr. Chairman, these shims were given to me by the FBI who told me that they removed them from the weapon after they had been placed there by Mr. Simmons’s laboratory.” There were, in fact, three metal shims, which the Warren Commission dutifully depicted in Commission Exhibits 567, 577, and 578.
What an astounding admission—the Oswald rifle needed three metal shims placed under the telescopic sight before the Army laboratory could test its accuracy. And this evidence was known to both the FBI and the Warren Commission, but never adequately relayed to the media or the public.
The experts also indicated that the telescopic sight was adjusted for a left-handed shooter, yet both Oswald’s wife and his brother told the Commission Oswald was right-handed. Robert Oswald said, “I would say without qualification . . . he [Lee] was instinctively a right-handed person.”
Added to the inferior quality and the inaccuracy of the rifle, recall Oswald’s well-documented inability to achieve marksmanship standards while in the Marines.
The Warren Commission stated authoritatively, “The number C2766 is the serial number. This rifle is the only one of its type bearing that serial number.” Yet an FBI report dated April 30, 1964, and signed by J. Edgar Hoover stated:
The Mannlicher-Carcano rifle was manufactured in Italy from 1891 until 1941; however, in the 1930’s Mussolini ordered all arms factories to manufacture the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. Since many concerns were manufacturing the same weapon, the same serial number appears on weapons manufactured by more than one concern. Some bear a letter prefix and some do not.
Plainly, there could be more Carcanos around with the serial number C2766—a fact that further weakens the case against Oswald.
Without going into minute details, it should be noted that the sling on Oswald’s rifle was not a standard rifle sling but instead seemed to come from a musical instrument or a camera carrying strap. No attempt was made to determine where this sling came from, although Commission experts, after explaining that the purpose of such a strap is to steady the aim, stated, “The sling on the rifle was too short to use in the normal way.”
Despite two massive federal investigations, not one bit of evidence has been brought forward as to where or when Oswald might have purchased ammunition or the ammunition clip for the rifle. Bear in mind that no gun oil or other cleaning materials, including ammunition, were found in Oswald’s belongings.
Another important piece of evidence involved a paraffin test made on Oswald the day of the assassination. The results of this test presented evidence that he may not have fired a rifle that day, yet these results were downplayed and even suppressed by the federal authorities.
In this test, layers of paraff
in are applied to a suspect’s skin and the sticky, warm wax opens the pores and then picks up any foreign material that may be present on the skin. When the wax cools, it forms a hard cast that is treated with chemicals that turn blue if nitrates are present. The idea is that the skin of someone who has recently fired a weapon will bear traces of nitrates. While the presence of nitrates is not conclusive evidence that a gun was fired—tobacco, urine, cosmetics, matches, soil, and certain drugs can cause a positive reaction—the absence of nitrates is compelling evidence that the person has not fired a weapon.
Oswald’s hands both reacted positively to the paraffin test, indicating the presence of nitrates but no gunpowder. A cast of his right cheek showed no reaction for either. Any competent defense attorney would have pointed to this test as evidence that his client had not fired a rifle.
However, in its report the Warren Commission termed this routine police test “completely unreliable,” adding that an FBI agent fired three rounds through the Oswald rifle in rapid succession and tested negative on both his hands and face afterward.
The odd part of this issue is that in publishing the Dallas police evidence sheet, the Commission deleted reference to the paraffin test at the bottom of the page. Why obscure this test result, which appeared to present evidence of Oswald’s innocence, if the test can be demonstrated to be faulty or unreliable?
In all criminal cases, police always hope for that most important piece of evidence linking the crime to the suspect—a fingerprint.
An Incriminating Palm Print
The sole piece of hard evidence linking Oswald to the Carcano rifle was a palm print reportedly found on the underside of the gun’s barrel when disassembled.
It seems strong evidence until inspected closely. To begin with, the palm print would never have been admitted as evidence in any courtroom trial because it lacked a chain of evidence—the unquestioned and documented path from discovery to presentation in court.
According to Dallas police lieutenant John Carl Day, he discovered the palm print shortly before turning the rifle over to the FBI about midnight on November 22, 1963. Yet, he mentioned it to no one and there is no record of his discovery. Day even admitted to the Warren Commission that “it was his customary practice to photograph fingerprints in most instances prior to lifting them.” Yet this was not done.
About midnight, the rifle was given to FBI agent Vincent Drain, who flew with the gun to Washington in an Air Force plane.
Early on November 23, 1963, the rifle was turned over to the FBI laboratory and examined for fingerprints. A report made that day and signed by J. Edgar Hoover reported, “No latent prints of value were developed on Oswald’s revolver, the cartridges cases, the unfired cartridge, the clip in the rifle or the inner parts of the rifle.”
The FBI had no indication of any useful print. Before the Warren Commission, FBI expert Sebastian Latona stated, “We had no personal knowledge of any palm print having been developed on the rifle. . . . Evidently the lifting had been so complete that there was nothing left to show any marking on the gun itself as to the existence of such—even an attempt on the part of anyone to process the rifle.”
On the morning of November 24, Oswald was killed in the basement of the Dallas police station and that afternoon the rifle was flown back to Dallas.
On Monday, following a competent autopsy, Oswald’s body was lying in Miller Funeral Home in Fort Worth when, according to the Fort Worth Press, “An FBI team, with a camera and a crime lab kit, spent a long time in the morgue.” Miller Funeral Home director Paul Groody told this author that the FBI fingerprinted Oswald’s corpse. Groody complained, “I had a heck of time getting the black fingerprint ink off of [Oswald’s] hands in time for burial.”
In 1978, FBI agent Harrison confirmed to researcher Gary Mack that he, along with Agent Drain, had personally driven the “Oswald” rifle to the Miller Funeral Home. Harrison said at the time he understood Drain intended to place Oswald’s palm print on the rifle “for comparison purposes.”
Oswald had been fingerprinted three times while in Dallas police custody. There has been no explanation for this postmortem fingerprinting.
Later that Monday, while talking to reporters, District Attorney Wade casually mentioned, “Let’s see . . . his fingerprints were found on the gun. Have I said that?” It was the first mention of any prints being found. By Monday evening, the news was all over the media. The Dallas Times Herald proclaimed: OSWALD’S PRINTS REVEALED ON RIFLE KILLING KENNEDY.
Asked about the strongest evidence of Oswald’s guilt, Wade responded, “If I had to single out any one thing, it would be the fingerprints found on the rifle and the book cartons which [Oswald] used to prop the weapon on.” On November 26, the rifle was again sent to Washington. But the incriminating palm print did not arrive at the FBI lab until November 29, three days after all other Dallas police evidence had been officially turned over to the bureau.
By this time, FBI officials were able to confirm that the palm print matched that of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Day continued to maintain he found the print and failed to mention it, photograph it, or send it to the FBI quickly because he believed that “sufficient traces of the print had been left on the rifle barrel.” Day told author Henry Hurt that he specifically pointed out the print to Agent Drain when he gave him the rifle. However, Drain denied this. According to Hurt, Drain told him, “I just don’t believe there ever was a print. . . . All I can figure is that it was some sort of cushion, because they were getting a lot of heat by Sunday night. You could take the print off Oswald’s [arrest] card and put it on the rifle. Something like that happened.”
Considering the movements of the rifle, some researchers believe Oswald’s dead hand was placed directly on the rifle barrel. Others believe Oswald’s palm print was taken either from jail records or the Depository and superimposed over marks from the rifle barrel.
No serious researcher today believes that Oswald’s palm print was legitimately lifted from the rifle barrel on November 22, 1963. Even the Warren Commission found this piece of evidence hard to swallow. An internal FBI memorandum made public only in 1978 disclosed that on August 28, 1964:
[Warren Commission general counsel J. Lee] Rankin advised because of the circumstances that now exist there was a serious question in the minds of the commission as to whether or not the palm impression that has been obtained from the Dallas Police Department is a legitimate latent palm impression removed from the rifle barrel or whether it was obtained from some other source and that for this reason this matter needs to be resolved.
Commission fingerprint experts admitted, “It was not possible to estimate the time which elapsed between the placing of the print on the rifle and the date of the lift.” The FBI then attempted to have Lieutenant Day certify a statement concerning his lifting of the palm print, but Day declined to sign it. One FBI fingerprint expert declined to answer researchers who merely asked if he could determine whether a fingerprint came from living or dead flesh.
The Commission apparently made no effort to resolve the matter. It instead presented the belated palm print as strong evidence of Oswald’s guilt. Like so much of the “hard” evidence in this case, the closer one looks, the softer it becomes.
After considering the rifle, the empty shells, and the palm print, one must again consider the “hero of the Warren Commission”—Commission Exhibit 399, the “magic bullet.”
The discovery of Commission Exhibit 399 has been dealt with earlier. Now consider the highly technical studies of this bullet and other bullet fragments involved in the assassination.
The Commission attempted to duplicate the feat of Commission Exhibit 399—passing through seven layers of skin and muscle, striking bones in two male adults, and emerging in near-perfect condition—but with no success. Similar ammunition fired into goat carcasses, human bodies, and gelatin blocks all showed more deformity than Commission Exhibit 399.
In an attempt to explain away the unscathed
condition of this bullet, members of the forensic pathology panel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations argued that other bullets had done similar damage and remained in pristine condition.
However, one member of the panel, Dr. Cyril Wecht, challenged the group to produce even one single bullet that had broken two human bones and remained unchanged. The forensics panel declined. Dr. Wecht concluded, “It is clear to me that their reluctance was based upon their knowledge that such studies would further destroy the single-bullet theory.”
Since neither the Warren Commission nor the House Select Committee on Assassinations was able to convincingly prove the feat ascribed to Commission Exhibit 399, the emission spectrography tests assume more importance. These spectrographic tests are a scientific means of determining whether the various bits of bullet metal taken from both Kennedy and Connally came from the same bullet. These tests could have provided what is missing from all Kennedy assassination investigations—clear, irrefutable proof that metal found in the victims could be traced to Commission Exhibit 399. The tests failed to do this and the handling of this evidence raised a great deal of suspicion toward federal authorities.
Under such testing it is a simple matter to determine whether two bits of metal have the same percentage of basic elements, such as lead, copper, and antimony. It is much more difficult to prove that such bits are from the same source.
Concerning the tests, the Warren Commission chose not to ask one single question of the spectrographic expert who conducted the tests. They were content to simply report that several bullet fragments were “similar in metallic composition,” which proved nothing.
In the years following the assassination, researcher Harold Weisberg sought unsuccessfully to obtain the spectrographic test results from the US government. Government attorneys argued that revealing the results was not in the “national interest,” although they would not explain why.