However, the state of his forces after the bloodbath along Chickamauga Creek worried Longstreet more than anything else. The Army of Tennessee had suffered over 18,000 casualties. Twenty-five of the 33 brigades engaged had lost more than a third of their men. Division commanders John Bell Hood and Thomas Hindeman, plus eight brigade and nearly half of the regimental commanders had been killed or wounded in the fighting. Physically exhausted, the army now needed rest, replenishment and reorganization. He had some 46,000 troops to take on a Union army that, based on Bragg’s intelligence figures, outnumbered him.
Despite the losses, morale was high, especially with a new commander in charge. Longstreet had visited each of the divisions in the past two days and seen troops ready and willing to finish the fight. The army, used to seeing its top leaders dissolve into petty feuds and squabbles after each battle, felt they had a leader they could follow, but Longstreet had to find a plan to lead them and soon—already word had reached him of substantial Union reinforcements on their way to Rosecrans.
As he studied the Union positions below, he discarded the idea of a direct attack. He had witnessed such attacks virtually destroy the Union Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg and Pickett’s division at Gettysburg. He did not want to make the same mistake if he could avoid it. Logistics eliminated a large-scale move across the Tennessee. That left some sort of siege.
A static siege would be difficult. While the Union remained entrenched in a line some three miles long around Chattanooga, Confederate lines stretched across seven miles from the foot of Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge then north toward the river. Extending both flanks to the river pushed his lines out two miles further on both sides.
Cutting Rosecrans off from his supply would not be easy. According to his cavalry commanders, there were five routes that stretched from the Union supply depot at Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Two were already cut off: the burned bridge at Bridgeport cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and the Tennessee River itself remained too low for supply boats due to drought. The third route, a wagon route that ran parallel to the railroad on the south shore of the Tennessee, could be easily interdicted by Confederate troops and artillery. Sharpshooters and artillery could also interdict the fourth route, another wagon route on the north shore of the Tennessee. The final route was a trail that went up the Sequatchie Valley, then turned off to go over Walden’s Ridge. This 60-mile route had poor roads, little water and very little forage for mules, but it was open and currently out of reach of Confederate troops.
In thinking over his options, Longstreet drew back to the chokepoint of the Union system—Bridgeport, through which all of Rosecrans’s supplies had to pass. By the time he met with his corps commanders, his idea had gelled. To Polk and Hill, with their four divisions, fell the chore of keeping Rosecrans bottled up in Chattanooga. Simon Buckner, still the commander of the East Tennessee Department, was ordered to begin moving back toward Knoxville with Major General Alexander P Stewart’s and Brigadier General William Preston’s divisions, plus a division under Liddell. Buckner’s threat would keep Burnside pinned away from the siege. To Major General Lafayette McLaws, newly arrived from Virginia, Longstreet gave Wofford’s, Bryan’s and Jenkins’s fresh brigades, plus Humphreys’s from Hood’s division, and ordered him to move toward Bridgeport, screened by Forrest’s cavalry. Forrest would reconnoiter Bridgeport and determine if the supply depot could be captured, then cooperate with the infantry in doing so. Wheeler’s cavalry moved northeast with Buckner with orders to find a crossing point over the Tennessee and raid into the Union rear. Hood’s old division and a provisional division commanded by States Rights Gist,6 remained in reserve.
In Chattanooga, Rosecrans waited impatiently, worried and nearly overwhelmed by the disaster of Chickamauga. He had only some 35,000 effectives left in his army, and about ten days rations. His infantry’s morale remained high, despite the loss, and they were determined to hold the town. Union cavalry patrolled potential crossing points. Washington informed him that Joe Hooker and four divisions from XI and XII Corps, some 14,000 troops, would be sent immediately from the Army of the Potomac. In addition, four divisions from XV and XVII Corps, another 17,000 men, would be transferred under Major General William Sherman toward the town. Finally, Washington ordered Ambrose Burnside to leave Knoxville and combine with Rosecrans. Burnside telegraphed he would comply, but ultimately did not move from his headquarters.
Political wrangling behind the scenes added to the discomfiture of the Union forces. The key figure in this wrangling was Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana. Dana was acting as the eyes and ears in the field for Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Although his written introduction to Rosecrans stated he was there to improve communications with the War Department, most officers saw Dana as a spy out to destroy their general. His dispatches from the field and Chattanooga stirred up major discussion about the leaders of the Army of the Cumberland. Two of Dana’s targets were Alexander McCook and Thomas Crittenden, commanders of XX and XXI Corps who had retreated back to Chattanooga following Longstreet’s devastating charge at Chickamauga.7 But Rosecrans stood as Dana’s primary target. The Assistant Secretary warned Washington that Rosecrans would blame the administration for the defeat, and appeared “greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will.”8 Later his attacks became sharper; he called Rosecrans a “dazed and mazy commander [who] cannot perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us, nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it. I never saw anything which seemed so lamentable and hopeless.”9 However, Lincoln and his staff, though concerned about Dana’s reports, hesitated to remove Rosecrans for fear of a Peace Democratic backlash against one of Ohio’s favorite sons.
The Fall of Chattanooga
By September 28, Forrest’s reconnaissance of Bridgeport had been completed and he met McLaws’s infantry, who had marched to within five miles of the crossing. The cavalry leader judged that weaknesses in the Union defenses gave the attackers a fair chance of achieving surprise. Although the railroad trestle bridge had been destroyed, the Union had connected the Tennessee River’s north and south shore by two pontoon bridges. From the north shore the bridge crossed to Bridgeport Island, a three mile by half mile wooded isle in the middle of the river. A road crossed the island to the second portion of the bridge that finished the crossing onto the south shore. A small blockhouse, garrisoned by a single company of infantry, guarded the southern end of the bridge. A small number of cavalry vedettes were also present, but Forrest shrugged off their abilities. In Bridgeport itself, civilian sources informed him that three infantry regiments and three cavalry units, numbering 1,000–2,000 troops, garrisoned the town.10 Two more brigades, some 2,500 men, were stationed five miles southeast in Stevenson, Alabama.
Forrest suggested taking the blockhouse by surprise assault, then using the southern pontoon boats to ferry troops across the river to form a lodgment. A brigade could be stationed on the island itself before cutting the pontoons free to help with the assault on the town. McLaws liked the idea and assigned Brigadier General Micah Jenkins’s brigade to take the blockhouse and stand ready on the island. Brigadier General William T. Wofford’s brigade would cross first, followed by Brigadier General Benjamin G. Humphreys and Brigadier General Goode Bryan. Forrest’s cavalry would take care of the vedettes.
Just after midnight, September 30, 1863, Jenkins attacked. Rifles unloaded and bayonets fixed, he fell upon the small Union garrison, Company B, 10th Illinois, and in a brief struggle captured the post. The Union soldiers had no warning of the attack. Only a few shots were fired in defense of the post, but one was costly, striking Jenkins himself in the groin. While one regiment took care of their new prisoners, the rest of the brigade crossed to Bridgeport Island.
Some 41 boats were cut loose and made available for the crossing and, under cover of cloudy darkness, McLaws sent his troops to the north shore. Union security was abysmal and nearly all of Wofford’s brigade and most of Humphreys’s were a
cross before a Union courier, coming from Stevenson, blundered into the landing and escaped to Bridgeport. The alarm there sent the small garrison scrambling. Colonel R.F. Smith, commander of 1/2/RES and the commandant of the town, rousted his troops while a company of cavalry scouted out the enemy landing. They were driven off, but not before gaining a view of the force opposing them. Outnumbered, Smith sent cavalry in all directions to inform Rosecrans and other Union forces of the Confederate incursion. While some of his men worked with teamsters to get as much of the stockpiled supplies as possible away from the town, his other troops began barricading the streets. But the Rebels gave them precious little time.
Wofford, following the alarm, put his Georgians into line and advanced. Brushing aside the cavalry, he fell upon Smith’s troops as dawn broke. A sharp exchange of fire heralded the start of the small battle. Smith’s defenders held their ground for almost an hour, aided by a section of artillery, before more Confederates from the landing site arrived and began maneuvering onto his flank. His withdrawal became a rout when Jenkins’s brigade, howling the name of their fallen leader, crossed the bridge. By full light the town sat in Rebel hands, along with much of the Union supply dump and, more importantly, over 300 wagons that had not been able to escape.
Union Brigadier General James Morgan, brought the rest of 1/2/RES and his whole Third Brigade up from Stevenson, but found McLaws ready for him. The Rebel commander advanced with three of his brigades, leaving Jenkins’s men in Bridgeport to hold the town and rebuild the southern bridge. Morgan’s outnumbered troops put up a stiff fight for several hours; but with no reinforcements nearby, he finally withdrew back to Stevenson, then north after setting fires in the Union supply depot. McLaws let him go, deeming saving supplies to be more important.
In Chattanooga, an elated William Rosecrans had been celebrating the news that the advance troops from XI Corps were in Cincinnati and would be in Bridgeport in two days. Thus, the news of the town’s capture stunned him. More bad news followed. On October 1, his cavalry reported that Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry had crossed the Tennessee River north of the city. The same day he received a report from “reliable” spies that the Rebels under Longstreet now numbered 100,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry.11
Rosecrans received the final blow the following day as he and his commanders sat and discussed their options. Wheeler had attacked an 800-wagon train, destroying half and scattering the rest. Absorbing the news, Rosecrans told his commanders it was either retreat or surrender; with the scarce supplies on hand dwindling, their supply depot gone, and outnumbered 3:1, there were no other choices. McCook and Crittenden stayed quiet, but Thomas stated, “The Army will not surrender. We march.”12 Assistant Secretary Dana immediately protested, emphasizing the orders from Washington to hold Chattanooga. But the politician advanced no constructive suggestions and could not contact Washington for more instructions—Rebel cavalry had destroyed the telegraph lines into the town.
On the night of October 3, 1863, McCook and Crittenden led their two corps out of Chattanooga toward Waiden Ridge in the pouring rain. Thomas and the men of XIV Corps held the fortifications and endeavored to show the activity level of twice their number. The following night XIV Corps crossed the river. Thomas left Wilder and his brigade to hold the town as long as they could before withdrawing and destroying the bridge and the town.
Confederate reaction was slow. Longstreet had put Hood’s old division, now under Evander Law, in motion toward Bridgeport to reinforce that vital point and both D.H. Hill and Polk failed to recognize what had occurred in Chattanooga. It was nearing noon on October 5 when a civilian from the town reported that most of the Union troops had left. Hill ordered Major General Patrick Cleburne’s division to confirm the report. The Irishman’s advance triggered a short battle with Wilder’s troops. Wilder’s repeating rifles easily repulsed the first advance but Cleburne stretched his line to work around the troopers and Wilder decided he had done enough. By 3.00 p.m., explosions were roaring through Chattanooga as the bridge and buildings went up in smoke.
Pursuit and Regrouping
The march from Chattanooga became a nightmare for the Federal troops. Rain had turned the Waiden Ridge trail into a muddy quagmire. Although they took no wagons, starving animals had tremendous difficulty dragging the Army’s guns, forcing exhausted men to help. One survivor remembered being “wet to the skin and mud to the knees, while it was with difficulty I could lift my feet out of the deep mud. We prayed we would not fall and perish by the wayside.”13 The troops had endured a similar ordeal during the June Tullahoma campaign, but this mud march felt worse because they were retreating.
Aside from the weather and some cavalry, the Confederates did not pursue aggressively. Forrest’s men attacked the Union rearguard at Jasper, but the defenders put up a stout fight and Forrest withdrew his exhausted troopers. Wheeler continued his rampage ahead of the retreating Union Army, attacking McMinnville, then trying Murfreesboro. However, Union cavalry from Brigadier General George Crook’s division intervened, cutting up those Rebel cavalry units burdened by loot taken from destroyed wagon trains—looted liquor proved particularly effective in slowing down some of the Rebels. Wheeler finally recrossed the Tennessee on October 9, still hounded by Union horsemen. His raid had been a devastating success. In addition to convincing Rosecrans to evacuate Chattanooga, he had destroyed some 1,000 wagons, killed or captured hundreds of horses and mules, and destroyed various trains and bridges, all for the cost of under 200 men.
By October 10, the Army of the Cumberland had reached safety and its supplies. XX and XXI Corps stayed at McMinnville, while Rosecrans, Thomas and XIV Corps stood down at Manchester. Almost as soon as the exhausted troops collapsed into a brief rest, the political uproar stirred up by their retreat broke over them. Rosecrans was relieved of command, as were McCook and Crittenden. Their two corps were reorganized into a single formation, retitled IV Corps, under Gordon Granger. George Thomas was named interim Army Commander on the basis of Dana’s reports and his stalwart stand at Chickamauga.
For overall command Lincoln sent for Ulysses S. Grant, hero of Vicksburg, and gave him command of the Military Division of Mississippi, a field command encompassing Sherman’s Army of Mississippi, Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland and Burnside’s Army of Ohio. But even as Grant traveled to Nashville to take over, the Federal government received its second grievous shock.
Following the battle of Chickamauga, Ambrose Burnside had withdrawn his troops back from the Tennessee and dug in at Knoxville, ignoring all entreaties by Rosecrans, Halleck and Lincoln to move to Chattanooga’s aid. His cavalry kept him informed, however, of the forces moving against him. From Chattanooga, Buckner approached with four divisions; from Virginia, Sam Jones marched with 5,000 men. Knowing he would soon be surrounded, Burnside abandoned Knoxville—without orders—and pulled back through the Cumberland Gap. His retreat erased all of the Union gains of the past two months and dealt the Lincoln administration a severe political blow.
The Confederacy rejoiced in the sudden turn of its fortunes and sought to keep the initiative. In Virginia, Lee left his Rapidan River defenses and maneuvered to turn the Army of Potomac’s right flank the way he had done at Second Manassas. Meade’s troops responded rapidly and dealt Lee several sharp blows but the Union counterattack petered out when Meade refused to assault Lee’s new fortifications at Mine Run.
In Tennessee, Longstreet began pushing his rejuvenated troops forward in an effort to gain as much ground as possible. His two Virginia divisions probed the defenses at the Union depot at Decherd where Hooker stood with two of his divisions. Longstreet ordered Polk to bring up his troops to aid in a coordinated attack, but, in typical Polk fashion, the Bishop decided instead to dig in below Tracy City. Longstreet attacked alone and Hooker easily held him off, but in the fighting Major General O.O. Howard, commander of Hooker’s XI Corps, was killed.
In Nashville, Grant had arrived to assume his new command and was faced with som
e hard choices. Thomas’s army lay safe but exhausted and incapable of operations. Hooker’s troops remained fresh, but exposed to the encroaching Confederates. Sherman’s troops were still weeks away from joining up. Grant authorized Hooker to pull back from Decherd to Tullahoma after destroying the railroad and any supplies he could not get out. After further discussions, the pull back continued to Murfreesboro. At Thomas’s suggestion, entrenched Union divisions were left in the four gaps that breached the Highland Ridge to hold the positions.14 Longstreet moved into the vacated areas and went into winter quarters, with his primary goal the repair of his railroad supply line.
Winter Strategic Planning
For the South, the latter part of 1863 had seen a tremendous change in fortune. From the depths of despair resulting from Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg and the losses of Vicksburg, Knoxville and Chattanooga, the victory at Chickamauga and the retaking of East and Middle Tennessee brought the Confederacy back to life. For the army, the benefits were more than just higher morale—desertions fell off dramatically, especially in Mississippi. Initially, only some 11,000 of Vicksburg’s defenders (40 percent) had showed up in parole camps; by January 1864 that number had jumped to nearly 25,000.
Just after the New Year, Longstreet traveled to Richmond to meet with President Davis, Secretary of War James Seddon and General Lee to plan strategy for 1864. General Joe Johnston, although invited, declined to attend, citing new Union activity at his front.
Johnston’s position was one of the awkward situations that Davis had to resolve. Ostensibly, Johnston remained the theater commander and thus, Longstreet’s immediate superior. However, he had also been Bragg’s superior and had done nothing to wield his authority; in fact at one point he had informed Davis that he “had not considered himself commanding in Tennessee”15 after moving to Mississippi to lead the relief army to Vicksburg’s aid. The fall of the Mississippi fortress had initiated a sharp and divisive exchange of letters between Johnston and Davis that kept both men preoccupied to the detriment of their country. Johnston had answered the call for reinforcements to Bragg, but had added, “This is a loan to be promptly returned.”16 Longstreet’s success following Chickamauga had eclipsed Johnston’s protest. Davis decided to handle the sticky command situation by simply ignoring it. Johnston made it far easier by not requesting further clarification from his president and by not traveling to Chattanooga to assume command. He stayed in Mississippi and sulked.
Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War Page 24