Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War

by Peter Tsouras

  The attack opened as planned with good weather aiding the marching Federals. Buford skirmished with Wheeler’s troopers, who fell back with delaying tactics. John Newton’s division (2/IV) moved in to McMinnville with almost no resistance. Further west T.J. Wood’s division (3/IV) led the demonstration against Hoover Gap, massing the divisional artillery for a bombardment. Wood made two small-scale probes of the lines but only halfheartedly—his men knew they were only a diversion. Brigadier General Edward C. Walthall’s brigade of Liddell’s division defended the line and easily stopped the probes. Brigadier General Patton Anderson’s brigade of Law’s division in Liberty held off similar probes from Hooker’s men.

  Sherman and Palmer opened up the main Union assault the following day. Sherman attacked Hindman and Stewart in the fortifications, while Cheatham’s division held the line against Palmer. Guy’s Gap only allowed a single division to deploy effectively, so Palmer could not bring the full weight of his corps against Cheatham. Sherman nearly overlapped Hardee’s line, but the timely arrival of Walker’s division, dispatched by Hood, shored up the defenses. By the end of June 23, little had been accomplished except casualties. Grant ordered the attacks to continue, with more strength against the gaps to pull troops away from in front of Sherman.

  Longstreet faced some hard choices on the night of June 23. His left flank had held but suffered for it. Since the gaps had held easily, he chose to mass his troops on the left to beat Sherman’s assault, leaving the gap defenders without backup. He ordered Hill to leave Liddell’s division to defend Hoover Gap and move his other two divisions west toward Wartrace. Hood would keep Anderson in Liberty Gap, but would assault with McLaws and the rest of Law’s division through Bell Buckle Gap along the rail line to take the Union troops at Guy’s Gap from the rear. Hardee’s three divisions, plus Walker, would defend in place.

  Hood’s attack went better than expected. Hooker had withdrawn all but one brigade, Brigadier General Thomas Ruger’s 2/1/XX, from Bell Buckle to support a stronger attack against Liberty. Ruger’s men were overwhelmed and, when dawn broke, Palmer’s rearmost division, Brigadier General Absalom Baird’s 3/XIV, found itself nearly surprised in its camps. A vicious fight broke out. Palmer withdrew Jeff Davis’s 2/XIV out of the Gap to help Baird’s hard pressed men. With Palmer fully involved with Hood, Sherman again went alone against Hardee and again suffered heavy casualties.

  Longstreet’s gamble at Bell Buckle seemed to mark the demise of Grant’s planned advance, but fate took a hand in a different direction. T.J. Wood’s men had been demonstrating against Walthall for two days, taking casualties for no apparent purpose. Frustrated by the casualties, and the emphasis Grant placed on Sherman’s troops, the Cumberlanders, without orders, began to assault forward. The surge caught the Confederates in the middle of switching out front-line regiments and the attack broke through the front line. Wood’s screaming men pursued the Rebels as they tried to withdraw to their second line, which could not open fire without hitting their own men. The Hoover Gap line collapsed as the Union overran Walthall’s brigade.

  Grose’s division came hard on the heels of Wood’s troops. They emerged from the Gap in time to see McNair’s and Wilson’s brigades scrambling to get into line. But Liddell’s remaining troops had little time to prepare for the onslaught and cracked under the Cumberland battle cry of “Chattanooga!”

  Liddell’s disaster placed Longstreet’s right flank in jeopardy and he had to send Hill’s troops back the way they had just marched to stem the tide. North of Bell Buckle, Hood’s attack had run its course by early afternoon, having savaged two of Palmer’s divisions. But the seven Confederate brigades had been hurt, too, and now faced fresh Union troops as Hooker’s divisions moved in from the east. Hood withdrew back through Bell Buckle.

  The two-day Battle of the Gaps had cost the Union some 19,000 casualties, mostly in Sherman’s army and Palmer’s XIV Corps. Longstreet had lost nearly 11,000 troops, including virtually all of Liddell’s division.24 While his defenses at Guy’s Gap and Shelbyville had bent, they remained strong; but he had lost his right and Grant could cut him off from Chattanooga. He fell back onto his supply line and centered his defenses on the fortifications at Tullahoma. Grant followed slowly while his forces regrouped from their battle.

  The Political Scene

  By mid-July, the military stalemate and heavy casualties had sparked intense debate in the North, just months before a presidential election. Meade and Grant had lost close to 80,000 men and had little to show for it. East Tennessee remained in Confederate hands after Early’s corps moved in from the Shenandoah to stop another drive by Schofield.

  In August, the Democratic Party held its presidential nominating convention. While the two wings of the party had many areas of disagreement, all could agree on one proposition: “After four years of failure to restore the Union by experiment of war, justice, humanity, liberty and public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for the cessation of hostilities.” The party nominated George B. McClellan, former General-in-Chief of the Union Armies, as its candidate.

  McClellan was an awkward choice to spearhead a peace platform. As a Union general, he remained as committed to restoring the Union as Lincoln, including doing so by war if necessary. But the two men differed in the details. Lincoln demanded emancipation of the slaves as part of the Union while McClellan believed such a requirement an impediment to peace and a social decision for states to make. Little Mac, as the army knew him, felt strongly that, without the emancipation issue, peace parties in the Confederacy would rise up and demand reunification. This left him uncomfortable and embarrassed with a policy that could only be described as peace at any price. His running mate, George H. Pendleton of Ohio, an ardent Copperhead, had less trouble with that policy. Together they ran a campaign that stressed the war’s failure, the unconstitutional attempt to free the slaves by what they termed abolitionist fanatics, the economic chaos war had created and, finally, the Lincoln Administration’s abuse of power, such as the suspension of Habeas Corpus, political arrests, and conscription.

  In the South, peace was a priority for Davis and his government as well—Union resources were exerting enormous pressure and, despite the successes of Lee, Longstreet and Buckner in holding off the blue tide, he knew it was just a matter of time. Peace feelers to the North had been made, but stumbled on the emancipation issue, as McClellan had thought. However, the Democratic candidate was wrong in thinking it was the only issue. The desire for independence remained strong in the South. Davis had, in fact, broached the subject of emancipation in return for foreign recognition of the Confederacy to both Britain and France.

  Lincoln and his Republican Party worried about the coming election. With the war stalemated, other issues generated bad party morale. Lincoln and the Congress were at odds about how to handle the South once the war had been won. The Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Chase, resigned from the Cabinet because of the economic mess the war created. Party officials met secretly to discuss not nominating Lincoln, but failed to reach an accord. As the election drew near and the news grew worse, Lincoln resigned himself to defeat and promised to support the new president immediately. The Republican campaign stayed a negative one, stressing McClellan’s war record and dedication to the Union. In the meantime, Lincoln pushed his generals to do something to show positive progress in the war effort. Meade suggested a version of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, moving the Army south by boat and attacking Petersburg to sever Richmond from the rest of the Confederacy. Halleck refused to consider it, believing Lee would simply move north and attack Washington. Grant put his armies in motion to try and flank Longstreet out of Tullahoma, but the Confederates held off each attempt. In October Forrest returned to create havoc along the Union supply lines.

  When the voters went to the polls that November, historians agreed that it was Lincoln who lost the election, rather than McClellan who won it.

  The Final Acts

  Although he ha
d several months in office left, Lincoln, as promised, chose to allow McClellan to take command of the country and its military immediately. McClellan ordered a cease fire in place and requested talks with Davis. He announced that the emancipation proclamation was void. This news caused some rioting among the colored troops in the Union Army as false rumors made them believe they were to be returned to slavery.

  The Confederate president, a crafty negotiator, replied that negotiations while Confederate territory remained occupied were fruitless. He hinted that a pullback would make it easier to convince his state governors that union was a good choice. President-elect McClellan began to realize the war had moved from the country to the conference table.

  The Reality

  In reality, Braxton Bragg did not fall wounded at Chickamauga and stayed in command of the Army of Tennessee while it invested Rosecrans in Chattanooga. However, as he had done after all his battles, Bragg’s attention turned toward his own commanders rather than the enemy, starting a feud that resulted in nothing getting done. President Jefferson Davis made a personal appearance to quell the dissension, but ultimately left Bragg in charge. Bragg drove both Polk and Hill out and the army was reorganized to break up anti-Bragg power bases, further demoralizing the rank and file. Longstreet, disgusted with Bragg—and with Davis for allowing the irascible commander to remain—did little constructive during the period. Ultimately, Bragg sent him off against Knoxville.

  While the Army of Tennessee disintegrated from within, the Union reinforced the Army of the Cumberland in and around Chattanooga. Grant took over as overall commander and he immediately sacked Rosecrans, installing Thomas in his place. In November 1863, after Sherman’s troops from Mississippi arrived, a massed assault broke Bragg’s line at Missionary Ridge, sending it reeling southward. The victory took Grant to Washington as the Union General-in-Chief and set the stage for Sherman’s march to Atlanta. The taking of that city in September 1864 sealed the re-election of Abraham Lincoln to a second term in the White House and the continuance of the war until the complete destruction of the Confederacy. The political discussion, except for the election’s outcome, is historical.

  Much has been made of Longstreet’s poor performance following Chickamauga and has led many historians to feel he was incapable of successful independent command. Such a view would make this alternate history seem beyond the realm of believability. Longstreet’s desire for a top command was his reason for pushing for a transfer to the West. His poor performance after not getting it was in part due to his disgust with Bragg and in part his disappointment at not getting what he wanted. In this version of history, he did, in fact getwhat he wanted, thus much of the reason for his historical sulky behavior is absent.

  Longstreet has also been considered more comfortable on tactical defense than on the attack; thus his actions at Second Murfreesboro and the Gaps may seem out of character, but his opponent has to be considered. Much of Robert E. Lee’s success was due to his out-generaling Northern opponents like McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker. Longstreet was facing Grant, someone he knew very well. His decisions would have taken Grant’s known aggressiveness and tenacity into consideration, thus I believe he would have attacked in Tennessee rather than stayed on the defensive.

  Two additional historical notes: first, Longstreet’s chief of artillery, E. Porter Alexander, was the real author of the plan for the attack on Bridgeport. Alexander reconnoitered the town himself in mid-October 1863 and recommended the plan, which his boss took to Bragg. Nothing came of it. Since Hooker’s two divisions of XI Corps had arrived there in early October, such an attack at that point would have probably failed. Second, the Longstreet counterattack through Bell Buckle Gap was actually Bragg’s plan to thwart any Union move against him at Tullahoma in June 1863. The plan came to naught due primarily to Polk’s refusal to consider the move.

  Bibliography

  Alexander, E. Porter, (ed. Gary Gallagher), Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1989).

  Cozzens, Peter, This Terrible Sound: the Battle of Chickamauga (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1992).

  Cozzens, Peter, The Shipwreck of their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1992).

  Laniers, William M., The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans, U.S.A. (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1961).

  Longstreet, James, From Manassas to Appomatox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, PA, 1896).

  McKenney, Francis, Education in Violence: The Life of George H. Thomas and the History of the Army of the Cumberland (Americana House, Chicago, 1991).

  Woodworth, Steven E., Jefferson Davis and his Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1990).

  The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Volumes XXX parts 1–4 and XXXII, Part 3. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1880–1901); cited below as OR.

  Notes

  1.

  Brigadier General St John R. Liddell was a division commander in Walker’s Reserve Corps of Polk’s Right Wing.

  2.

  Nathan Bedford Forrest was one of the South’s most celebrated cavalry leaders.

  *3.

  The description of Bragg’s meeting comes from General Payton Manning’s memoir With Longstreet (Neal Publishing Company, New York, 1905)

  4.

  OR, Volume XXX, Part 2, p. 148

  5.

  Union and Confederate nomenclature for military units differed. The Union used numbers for corps, the divisions within corps, and the brigades within the divisions. Thus the Second Brigade of the First Division of XIV Corps was designated 2/1/XIV The Confederates generally named units after their commanders (and occasionally after the original commanders). For example Brigadier Micah Jenkins commanded Jenkins’s Brigade of Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps. After the loss of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, however, General Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia and used numbers. Thus A.P. Hill’s Corps was also known as Third Corps.

  6.

  States Rights was his actual name—his father was making a strong political statement when his son was born.

  7.

  Ironically, Dana himself was part of the Chickamauga disaster. Shortly after Longstreet’s devastating attack, Dana intercepted Wilder’s Lightning Brigade and demanded escort back to Chattanooga. Wilder had just struck the exposed left flank of the Confederate charge, driven off one brigade, and could have easily disrupted the rest of the attack with the power of his repeating rifles.

  8.

  OR, Volume XXX, Part 1, p. 202

  9.

  Ibid., p. 217.

  10.

  The infantry units were the 10th Illinois, 16th Illinois and 60th Illinois Volunteers, all from 1/2/RES. The cavalry units were the 2d Indiana, 4th Indiana, and 1st Wisconsin cavalry.

  11.

  OR, Volume XXX, Part 4, pp. 13–14. The two spies, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Lumpkins, also reported that Wheeler would cross the Tennessee at Washington and raid into the Sequatchie Valley. Wheeler’s crossing convinced Rosecrans that the numerical report was accurate.

  *12.

  William M. Lamars, The Edge of Glory (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1961) p. 376.

  *13.

  Second Lieutenant Charles C. Briant, Company K, quoted in History of the 6th Indiana Volunteer Infantry: To Chattanooga and back with Rosy.

  14.

  Hoover, Liberty, Bell Buckle and Guy’s Gaps. It was through these poorly defended gaps that Rosecrans had maneuvered his troops to lever Bragg out of Tullahoma in June 1863.

  15.

  OR, Volume XXIV part 1, p. 226.

  16.

  OR, Volume XXX, part 4, p. 539.

  *17.

  Henry Hathaway a
nd Archibald Smith, How the North Lost, p. 260. The goals of the 1862 Kentucky invasion were to 1) draw Don Carlos Buell and his Union army away from Chattanooga, 2) defeat him in battle, and 3) “liberate” Kentucky into the Confederacy. It succeeded only in drawing Buell away. A southern tactical success between portions of the opposing armies at Perryville ended up negated by Bragg’s retreat back into Tennessee sans supplies and Kentucky recruits.

  *18.

  Manning, With Longstreet, p. 266.

  19.

  OR, Volume XXXII, Part 3, pp. 494–5.

  *20.

  Hathaway and Smith, How the North Lost, p. 486.

  21.

  Francis McKenney, Education in Violence, p. 273. Another factor that swayed Grant’s decision to keep Thomas was probably the letter that he carried from Union Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. The letter thanked Thomas for his magnificent behavior at Chickamauga and said in part, “You stood like a Rock and that stand gives you fame… You will be rewarded by the country and by the Department.”

  *22.

  Hathaway and Smith, How the North Lost, p. 426. The brigade, under Brigadier General W.C. Whitaker, suffered nearly 65 percent casualties in repulsing every attack Cleburne threw at it. The casualties included the survivors of the 35th Indiana under Major John P. Dufficy Jr., who acted as the rearguard as the brigade withdrew at dusk.