The Atlanta Constitution
The formalities began on the morning of December 11, 1941, when German and Italian diplomats paid a call on Secretary of State Cordell Hull to advise him of their governments’ decision to declare war on the United States of America, something Hull and the world already knew. Now the whole world would be completely aflame.
After declaring war on America, Adolf Hitler and his fascist factotum, Benito Mussolini, gave ranting speeches in their respective capitals to appreciative and cheering audiences.1 Hitler announced that “the war would determine the history of the world for the next 500 to 1,000 years. This,” he said, “has become the greatest year of decision by the German people.” The Japanese ambassador was seated at the Hitler speech; their fates were now joined.2
The führer elaborated his reason for war with America, saying, “If anyone said the cultural values have been brought back from America to Europe, it was only the invention of a decayed Jewish mixture.”3 Hitler viewed America as too decadent and lazy to fight a global war effectively—certainly too weak to go up against the so-far unbeatable Wehrmacht. In Hitler’s febrile mind, American society was rotted from within by a mongrel Jewish-Negroid race that was addicted to pleasure and the sort of jazz music that was now banned in Germany. Unbeknownst to him, German youth surreptitiously gathered in jazz-listening clubs at great personal risk to savor that same music in still-urbane places such as Berlin.
America was a paper tiger poised to fall; that was apparent to Hitler, who declared that Italy and Germany were now bound to Japan in a “death pact.”4 The strutting and hyper-macho Mussolini, in addressing a crowd of 150,000, simply called it a “steel pact.”5 Like Hitler, Mussolini also went after FDR. “One man, one man only, a real tyrannical Democrat, through a series of infantile provocations, betraying with a supreme fraud the population of his own country, wanted the war and had prepared for it day by day with diabolical obstinacy.”6 Hitler also threw back in Washington’s face the leaked War Department document of several days before, which had claimed that the U.S. government was mobilizing for a conflict against Germany to begin in 1943.7 Secretary of War Henry Stimson had prepared a document at FDR’s request, outlining what it would take in terms of money, manpower, and materiel if the United States entered the war, but it was certainly not a declaration of war.8
Concluding, Hitler modestly remarked, “I am now the head of the strongest military force in the world, of the strongest air force and the most gallant navy. Behind me is the National Socialist Party with which I grew great and which grew great with me and by me. I thank the President and I thank God for the opportunity given me and the German nation that our generation, too, may write a page in the book of honor of German history.”9
None of this was news to either Franklin Roosevelt or Cordell Hull. The speeches themselves happened about thirty minutes before the nations’ diplomats arrived—and news, even then, traveled fast. Roosevelt and Hull had known this was in the offing and even wanted to get into the war to help Britain. In Our Country, Michael Barone wrote, “The United States entered 1941 with a president who was determined to bring the country to the defense of Britain. . . .”10
So, it was not surprising that Hull took the whole matter with a bit of nonchalance. He didn’t even bother meeting with German first secretary Herbert von Strempel (who was suspected of funneling money to pro-Nazi groups in America)11 and Chargé d’Affaires Hans Thomsen. They arrived at 8:30 a.m., thirty minutes after Hitler’s announcement. Hull was not there, and the two diplomats waited an hour before meeting with Ray Atherton, chief of the European Division. Atherton took the note and said his acceptance of it was only the formalization of the undeclared war that had existed between the two countries since 1939—in retrospect, an astonishing statement. Hull then arrived, but through an aide he informed the two Germans that he was “too busy with important matters to see them.”12 Hull was frostier than the Washington weather, which was only in the low twenties. The New York Times reported the only excitement generated at the State Department was from the “correspondents and photographers seeking information and pictures.”13
The message Hull refused to accept came from Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, via their ambassador to America, the same as which von Ribbentrop had given personally in Berlin to the American representative, Leland Morris,14 and Chargé d’Affaires George L. Brandt around the same time. America had not had an ambassador to Germany since 1938, when Hugh Wilson had been recalled for discussions and never returned.15
Like the Japanese declaration, the German avowal accused the United States of all manner of things including “having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever-increasing measure all rules of neutrality in favor of the adversaries of Germany.” The missive elaborated, saying, “Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules of international law in her relations with the United States during every period of the present war, the Government of the United States from initial violations of neutrality had finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. The Government of the United States has thereby virtually created a state of war.” The statement concluded by breaking off diplomatic relations between the two countries and “as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America.”16
The situation between Washington and Berlin had been deteriorating for several years, at least since the Munich Conference in 1938, when Roosevelt had publicly urged Hitler not to seek any more territory. In April 1939, FDR had actually offered Hitler economic assistance in exchange for Germany to abide by “10-year[s] of peace and disarmament.”17 By the fall of 1941, the two countries were at war in nearly all respects, at least on the high seas, with Hitler’s “unrestricted warfare” directive on all American vessels,18 both military and commercial.
Some slow-learning observers complained that Germany was in complete violation of the Versailles Treaty ending the Great War, but it was beyond moot at this point. A war machine of terrifying abilities had been assembled and was being led by a madman.
Later that morning, around 10:40 a.m., Italian Ambassador Prince Colonna arrived at the State Department but only delivered a verbal message of the Italian pronouncement of war on America. This time, only the lowly political adviser to Hull, James Dunn, granted an audience to the Italian. Dunn told Colonna, with all the contempt he could muster, that the United States “fully anticipated that Italy would follow obediently along” the lead of Germany.19 Apparently Colonna had to be roused for the meeting. Earlier, reporters had banged on the door of the Italian embassy in Washington, only to be greeted by a servant wearing an apron who replied, “The boss is still in bed.”20 Following the formalities, all representatives agreed to surrender their diplomatic credentials, and all parties agreed to the safe and speedy passage of nationals to their respective countries as proscribed by the rules of international law.
Hard as it was to comprehend, the goal of the Geneva Conventions had been to civilize war.
That afternoon, Roosevelt sent a communiqué to the Hill, along with a request for resolutions of war against Germany and Italy. It said:
“On the morning of December 11, the Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest, declared war against the United States,” he said. “The long-known and long-expected has thus taken place. The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere. Never before has there been a greater challenge to life, liberty and civilization. Delay invites great danger. Rapid and united effort by all the peoples of the world who are determined to remain free will insure a world victory of the forces of justice and of righteousness over the forces of savagery and of barbarism.” Then concluding, FDR wrote, “Italy also has declared war against the United States. I therefore request the Congress to recognize a state of war between the United States and Germany and between the United States and Italy.”21
The New York Times noted that while “all over th
e city the Stars and Stripes flew proudly from public buildings,”22 the vote in Congress came amid a “grim mood.”23 But it was also a determined mood. Unlike the vote on war with Japan, Congress this time passed the declarations without opposition, as Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin squeakily voted, “present.”24 The people of Montana had been apoplectic over Rankin’s vote several days earlier against war with Japan.25 This time, the Senate voted 88–0 for war with Germany and 90-0 for war with Italy. Two members had been in abstentia but apparently in town for the vote on Germany but made it back in time for the vote on Italy. Those two were Democrats William Smathers of New Jersey and Charles Andrews of Florida who both “arrived in the Senate chamber just too late to vote for war against Germany, but were recorded in the Italian count.”26 Again, as with the vote on Japan, some members were missing but sent messages indicating they would have voted in the affirmative.
The silent galleries in the House were not filled to capacity as they were on the eighth, but present were British ambassador Lord Halifax and Archduke Otto of Austria.27 Halifax had recently journeyed to Detroit, only to be pelted with eggs by isolationists there. He took it in stride at the time saying, “My, those people certainly were good shots.”28
While there was nearly 100 percent unanimity in the country to going to war with the hated Japanese, Americans were somewhat more ambivalent about going to war with Germany and Italy, even as the Third Reich had just sneakily torpedoed American military and commercial vessels, much the same as the Japanese had at Pearl Harbor. There were many German Americans and many others who saw Hitler as anti-communist (but pro-socialist) and that knew he had revived the German country. This made some Americans more dubious about the European War. And by and large, Americans had never had anything against Italy. What’s more, the East Coast cities of America teemed with their own “Little Italy” sections. Still, despite the ambivalence, not one newspaper of record editorialized against the declarations of war. From Chicago to Minneapolis to Seattle to New Orleans, all praised FDR, all condemned the Axis, and all exhorted Americans to do their utmost to win.
With the two war resolutions in hand, the president first balanced his cigarette holder on the edge of his desk and then signed them, muttering, “Everything seems to come in threes.” He then asked Senator Tom Connally for the time, and “with lips drawn back from clenched teeth,” Roosevelt scribbled it on each piece of historic paper, along with his distinctive signature.29 About a dozen members of Congress were there in the Oval Office, and the room was deadly silent. He signed the declaration of war against Germany at 3:05 p.m. and the declaration of war against Italy at 3:06 p.m. From the time his message had been read to Congress at 12:21 p.m. until he signed the resolutions passed by both houses of Congress, America had gone to war with two more countries in less than three hours.30
Congress also voted to take the handcuffs off the President. Quickly, they voted to allow U.S. troops to go beyond the constraints of the previous law that barred them from leaving the Western Hemisphere.31 The House that morning had opened with a prayer by the chaplain, Rev. James S. Montgomery, “with an appeal for divine aid for the nation.”32
Calls for a formal investigation into the attack on Pearl Harbor were growing louder. Senator Charles Tobey, Republican of New Hampshire, having earned headlines for himself the previous day with his unremitting attacks on the military and his near-leaking of sensitive military information to the press, called yet again for an inquiry and again let the world in on confidential information. “Senator Tobey asserted that the fleet’s listening devices ‘weren’t working,’ that the ships ‘lay at anchor and no steam up’ and that more ships were sunk than had been disclosed by Roosevelt.” When asked by a colleague where he’d gotten his information, Tobey replied he’d gotten it from two other colleagues. Tobey told reporters, “I wouldn’t want to tell all I’ve heard on the floor of the Senate.” He blasted the navy for allowing a “disaster that’s almost unspeakable.”33
Democratic Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois rose to angrily challenge Tobey, warning him that it was “a serious thing to indict anyone until you know what you are talking about.” He said Tobey “does not know what he is talking about and he admits he does not. You, Mr. Senator from New Hampshire, are no naval strategist.” Lucas was just warming up, furiously and repeatedly attacking Tobey. When Tobey asked Lucas to yield—a cherished and time-honored senatorial privilege—Lucas refused to give him the floor.34 Tobey was one of the most unpopular men in Washington.
Yet Tobey was not the only senator raising hell. It was bipartisan. Senator Frederick Van Nuys, Democrat of Indiana, charged the military with “criminal negligence.” He said it was the responsibility of Congress to get to the bottom of the matter. But Van Nuys himself also trafficked in rumors, as he told reporters “he had heard reports the British military intelligence service had warned the American forces that an attack by the Japanese might be imminent.”35 Meanwhile, Frank Knox and Admiral Stark had still not appeared before any congressional committees.
In his syndicated column, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Drew Pearson tsk-tsked, “Alibis cannot very well explain away how both Army and Navy Intelligence had their guard down so carelessly when Japanese planes swooped down out of the early morning sky at Hawaii on Monday.” He then eviscerated navy intelligence as being dominated by “royalty,” where family connections, breeding, and good table manners were more important than skills and, well, intelligence. Navy intelligence, Pearson charged, was dominated by “wealthy young blue-bloods. Only members of the best families can qualify for Military Intelligence, and how much they know about the life around a Japanese waterfront is questionable.”36
Following Tobey’s tirade, another Republican, Minority Leader Charles McNary, who had been Wendell Willkie’s running mate in 1940, offered into the record a resolution of unanimous support for FDR by the GOP members.37 Later that day, the chairmen of Republican and Democratic parties, Joseph Martin and Edward Flynn, respectively, exchanged telegrams in which they pledged to set aside partisan differences for the duration of the war. They also sent a telegram to the president, indicating their peace accord and then suggested that the headquarters for both parties in Washington be turned over to non-partisan activities to support the war effort. Roosevelt accepted their pledge and suggested the facilities be converted to civil defense.38 Martin, said “Republicans will not permit politics to enter into national defense.”39 It would remain to be seen how durable this peace would be.
As politicians were making accusations and conjectures and suppositions about the attack on Pearl Harbor, other individuals were pointing out that the navy’s patrol planes in the days leading up to December 7 went out each day, at exactly the same time and followed the same route, each day. The theory was the Japanese could have timed their approach and attack when the patrol planes were not in the area. One officer said, “You could set your watch by those flights.”40 Given the fact that the Japanese consulate was a stone’s throw from the harbor on Oahu, and from which there was a considerable amount of spying going on, it was one of the saner theories.41 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, much esteemed by all in Washington, stepped into the fray when he asked Congress not to investigate any dereliction of duty at Pearl Harbor and instead leave it to Roosevelt to get to the bottom of it and take action if deemed necessary. “We don’t even know yet all the details of the fight in Hawaii,” he sagely pointed out.42
Naval officers were still marveling at the accuracy of the Japanese attack at Pearl, but with little photographic evidence and shaky firsthand evidence, some guesstimated that the Japanese must have flown planes into the American and British ships. Another theory was the Japanese had developed some horrific new bombing technology, possibly based on a “magnetic principle” to account for their uncanny accuracy at Pearl.43 Worse, the New York Herald-Tribune reported that “said “an informed source” said the Japanese were making plans to launch suicide bombers at the West Coast.44
Stimson would only concede that there had been a “heavy loss of planes” in Hawaii and then said oddly that the loss “is being made good at the present time.”46 The United States and Great Britain had adopted radically different methods in alerting the civilian population as to military reversals. Whereas Washington was under a near-standing order to stay mum on specifics of losses, Winston Churchill believed instead in hitting the British subjects right between the eyes, withholding nothing, reasoning this would rally the civilian population to greater resistance, as opposed to obfuscating. “No one can underrate the gravity of losses inflicted on the United States nor underrate the length of time it will take to marshall the great forces necessary in the Far East for victory,” said the prime minister.47 With the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, Churchill immediately went to Parliament to tell the members in person and in detail.48 With the loss of the two ships came the deaths of nearly 600 men and officers49 including a personal favorite of the prime minister, Admiral Sir T. S. V. Phillips.50
Churchill was also forthcoming about reversals in North Africa. “The Libyan offensive did not take the course its authors expected, although it will reach the end at which they aimed,” he said. Of course, England had several more years of experience in these matters than did the U.S., and it was harder to explain away German airplanes overhead bombing London than it was an attack 6,000 miles away in the middle of an ocean. Still, Churchill was stricken over the twin losses, according to correspondence with Roosevelt.51 A survivor of the sinking of the Repulse was Cecil Brown of CBS, who’d been embedded on the ship.52 Another embedded journalist, O.D. Gallagher of the International News Service, was on the Prince of Wales and found himself bobbing in a life preserver in shark-infested waters. Of the attack and his long hours waiting to be picked up, Gallagher wrote, “The physical hell created by the Japanese attack was matched by a psychological hell.”53 The British so embraced the hard truths that even the Christmas card put out by the Admiralty reflected on the loss of the two ships.54
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