During the hellstorm that followed, veiled warnings were tossed our way: “If you guys try anything, keep it low-profile. And watch your asses. Because if you get grabbed inside Laos there won’t be anyone coming to get you. The American Vice-Consul from Chiang Mai dropped by and gave us the same big-brotherly warnings from on high. Suspiciously, his visit came only days after my in-depth Washington D.C. briefing to Admiral Alan Paulson, mentioned above, after which we were green-lighted to continue with our search for MIAs. Keeping Young on board was seemingly a necessity.
THE CIA AND U.S. EMBASSY: WARNINGS OR MANIPULATIONS?
We’d assumed since entering Thailand that the CIA had been tracking our movements. Since the Gritz missions of misfortune, Embassy-types were a trifle testy over independents roaming at will over Thai turf with the potential of inflicting diplomatic black-eyes or setting off nasty bloodlettings with neighboring dictatorships.
Untrained in diplomatic signal-watching, we were slow to pick up on gentle hints. Young clued us in. He’d heard, invented (or had been spoonfed) a vicious little rumor that the Shan National Army from over in Burma was planning to off several Americans, and that any round eyes who were venturing north out of Bangkok were apt to get themselves whacked.
Was our Embassy saying, “We have empathy for your objectives, but don’t get careless”? Or in other words: “You’re on your own boys. We never knew you.”
Lt. Colonel Denny Lane, at that time the Army Assistant Military Attaché in Thailand, summed up the official position, maybe:
“I didn’t know that you had built a camp inside Laos, let alone why the Thais went along with the project. Apropos the U.S. Government and SOF, all that I remember was getting a message saying something to the effect that I was to assist Robert K. Brown and SOF but not to get involved. I think that Dick Childress, who was then at the National Security Council, had something to do with that. Also, if I remember correctly, when Bo Gritz came out with his gaggle, we were told that Dick Childress drove him to the airport. Ergo we never really knew if Gritz had at least tacit backing from the NSC.”
With that he reconfirmed why Zabitosky and TR sensed mixed signals at the time. Had the Vice-Consul’s visit been to warn us off from bringing a POW back, or to simply alert us to a genuine danger posed by anti-American elements?
Several of our contacts advised us that there were numb nuts in the State Department, Pentagon, CIA and DIA who didn’t relish seeing any MIA Americans staggering out of the Laotian bush. Whether diplomatic maneuvering was a higher priority than locating live Americans, we hadn’t the foggiest. I suppose they were miffed that former Vietnam vets were attempting to pull off what American intelligence agencies and the American military should have carried out years before.
We became aware that certain elements of State and the intel agencies wanted us to pack our tent, leave Thailand and jet on home. Others we came to know covertly supported our efforts. Still we were always wondering who for sure was on which team.
The chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi for over a decade, Bill Bell, whom I met at the time, confirmed my suspicions. With four tours in Nam, he was a highly decorated Airborne-Ranger. In spite of the fact that he had endured enormous tragedy when he lost his wife and daughter in the first Babylift flight from Vietnam at the end of the war, which crashed, he returned to serve DOD in Thailand.
As Bell put it, “The Ambassador and senior staff appeared to be more concerned that your activities as private citizens might add to the number of missing Americans already listed, rather than effective efforts that might reduce the list. Almost all of the staff on the lower end of the diplomatic totem pole seemed to be supportive of your private efforts and they generally regarded the POW/MIA issue as being one of traditional mom and apple pie variety. I think it would be fair to say that regarding your private recovery efforts, most American expatriates, in both official and unofficial status, were in the bleachers rooting for what they perceived to be ‘the good guys.’
“Of course,” Bell continued, “there were a few diplomats in the Political Section who were proverbial ‘nervous nellies.’ These guys were primarily concerned that your activities, especially the cross-border forays from Thailand into Laos involving ‘resistance forces,’ might result in an even stronger level of animosity than the extant degree of mistrust between Thailand and the paranoid Lao Peoples Democratic Republic.
“Certain American officials stationed at remote camps throughout Thailand were also monitoring your efforts. Sometimes in a place like Thailand there are so many unilateral and bilateral operations being conducted that it is difficult to determine which are private, which are official and which are simply tourism. After all, that is the name of the spy game—use a cover op to hide an even more highly classified op. I recall that in my office we also submitted periodic reports on anyone we became aware of that intruded into our Area of Operations.”
So, SOF was being watched, monitored, followed and, in all likelihood, infiltrated. But the question remained: who was for and who was against us?
WE LAY PLANS TO GO TO MUONG SAI
I was never sure which team Young was on, other than his own. He seemed to say and do the right things. But we assumed that very few in actuality leave Agency employ or association. We fervently hoped he was one of the good guys, not a career suit who’d kiss off any confirmed POWs to garner points with higher-up puppet masters. At the time we needed him in the fold. If he were somebody’s inside man, we’d have to chance it.
Zabitosky repeatedly said that the Agency was highly interested in the Muong Sai area and had conceivably blinked its green lights to Young, allowing us to proceed with our missions.
China was still doing a bit of low-key, saber-rattling in regard to launching their Lao-led insurrection. It was imperative that we get to Muong Sai, obtain confirmation photos of Americans, and put into operation our project to snatch these guys. If we failed, they’d be relocated—or dead. We had seen that the People’s Republic was continuing in its attempt to create difficulties for the Vietnamese, especially in Laos, where we did confirm that Col. Bounleuth (who we found was worthless) and a cadre of Laotian troops not under his command then cooling their heels up in Liberty City, had indeed received formal military training near Kunming, China.
To hell with the warning that the PRC was expanding its sphere of influence; it was the thought of any Americans up there twisting in the wind that bothered us.
But meanwhile we were on hold, stuck in the “no sweat” world of Young, whose “Just hang in a bit longer, Bob” routine was wearing thin. But he was hardly the only barracuda circling the good ship SOF.
In the meantime our armed troops at Liberty City, many of whom had trekked down from China, were antsy to get on with the recon to Muong Sai. Young dragged on the waiting game, citing diplomatic difficulties in getting his official OK for us to launch the incursion.
With Coyne and I heading back to the U.S. to take care of other business, Zabitosky and TR settled in for the wait; two weeks stretching to nearly three months. Buni and Tor, and then Young, coughed up all sorts of excuses: monsoons, sick relatives, non-cooperative Thai border guards, and on and on.
I returned to Boulder, trying to line up some heavy-bread business-types to whom I was pitching this latest buyout proposal. There was a good deal of interest—but no forthcoming cash.
With Mingo’s, Buni’s, Tor’s and Young’s credibility sinking, only their two Muong Sai eyewitnesses could save them from being sacked and thrown off the gravy train. Young, I suppose in desperation, latched onto my support for the “ever-growing”—but thus far invisible, to us at least— Laotian resistance movement, which had now allegedly targeted Sayaboury Province as the kick-off place for their grand offensive.
Young continued to shift focus from the POW effort, saying that now was a bad time to perform our recon, since our Thai hosts were getting cold feet. But while we just waited, why not thrill the Supreme Command and move
up the Resistance to front-burner priority?
SHUTDOWN
In October, we heard rumors of a large number of Vietnamese troops moving into locations across the Mekong from Liberty City, which now contained more than 200 LULF freedom fighters.
In November 1981, high-ranking Thai officials pressured us to close the camp. We had no choice but to follow their directives as our only source of supply was across the Thai border.
Questions I had then and now will never be answered. Were “T” and “B” conning us with POW reports simply to fund their dream of returning to Laos? Were POWs in Muong Sai? Did “Ko” actually know the Pathet Lao governor? And, again, what was the Thai motive in letting us establish Liberty City in the first place?
We put austerity measures into quick effect: Our Chiang Rai safe house was closed and Young was placed in overall command of SOF’s operations. Zabitosky was understandably miffed at being replaced. But I thought, at the time, Young possessed the contacts and expertise to permanently weld the tribal coalition into a formidable military force, and keep his ear to the ground for any intelligence on POW intel.
Young assured us that all would again turn butterside-up with the Thais. He insisted on giving our boys up at Liberty City the bad news personally . . . with cash bonuses for their efforts. In light of what we found out about Young later, I question whether any “cash bonuses” were paid to the troops.
The SOF team reluctantly folded their tents and headed for the Don Muong Airport to board a JAL 747 to Tokyo’s Narita airport. “My thoughts raced back through the previous four months,” TR said. “We thought we’d made headway but it had cost more than $125,000 to do it. I should know; I picked up the money. In relative terms, though, we hadn’t seen nuttin’ yet.”
Four time zones away in Chiang Mai, Young was laying out his mother of all schemes: SOF’s solo financial takeover of the mysterious Laotian Resistance Movement!
15
DETOURING INTO A LAOTIAN REVOLUTION
I am sure you are wondering how I got bamboozled into wanting to support a Lao revolutionary force and how I allowed my head to spin with a whole roulette wheel of con artists who had been on the take. Right after I got back from Nam, in June 1975, after the communist defeat of South Vietnam and Cambodia, communist-sponsored riots ripped through the center of Vientiane, capital of Laos. U.S. dependents and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) staff were evacuated.
USAID had provided cover and support for clandestine military operations in which the U.S. had supported since 1961. General Vang Pao, commander of the U.S.-backed army of Hmong tribesmen, who had convinced us of this mission in the SOF office in Boulder, a few members of the Laotian royal family were the go-betweens. On 23 August 1975, the commies proclaimed Vientiane a “liberated” city. Kaysone Phoumvihane was named prime minister of the new Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR). Kaysone for years had been one of the leaders of Doan 959 (Group 959, the Laotian political infrastructure, which had a forward base in Sam Neua Province, Laos, but was headquartered four kilometers outside Hanoi).
He had his time in the sun, but darkness had descended on the people of Laos. Six years after the fall, when we were in Laos, it was the communist governments of Southeast Asia, particularly those in Laos and Cambodia, that faced growing problems of insurgency. Anti-communist resistance had increased and become more powerful and effective. Although factionalized by regional and ethnic differences, the anti-communist resistance in Laos had the broad-based support of all Lao peoples. The Vietnamese were considered as occupiers, not “friends of the revolution.” If a spare tire was stolen in Laos, the people blamed the Vietnamese for it, most often with justification, always with hate. The economy of Laos was a shambles, largely because of the high cost of garrisoning the Vietnamese occupation army. (The Vietnamese did not supply essential foodstuffs to their troops in the field; they were “provided for” by their “hosts.”) The baggage of monumental bureaucratic and economic mismanagement, which seems to follow closely behind every communist government, was about to destroy Laos. Defections among lower-ranking Pathet Lao troops were commonplace. Rumors floated that many high-ranking members of the government were looking for ways out, or were under virtual house arrest by their Vietnamese “friends.” People were becoming refugees for economic reasons.
PLANS TO TAKE OUT A HEROIN LAB
Bill Young kept TR and me abreast of alleged goings-on within the resistance via convincing cables, phone calls and elaborate MOPSUMS (Monthly Operational Summaries). Wishful thinking ruled, so there was a chance, however slim, that Young now was flying straight. I could not abandon the POWs, so I bit the bullet and continued forwarding monthly pay and expense checks (covering everything from new tires for Bill’s pick-up, down to the last bowl of rice and copy of Time).
SOF’s other financial obligations were formidable, but Young’s fledgling proposal of supporting the Resistance “on a very limited scale” to the tune of only $10,500 monthly (plus, of course, his salary and expenses). For the average 30-day period, I was laying out about $13,500 minimum.
From financing a POW hunt to backing construction of Liberty City and supporting more than 130 armed troops, to this new nest of snakes—the Lao Resistance Movement!
I sensed we were being shafted big time, but I opted to saddle us up for another Southeast Asian go-round. It’s hard to pull out of quicksand.
Young was very clever about coming up with some project or ploy to keep his hook in me if I became restless. For instance, on one occasion, he suggested we cross over the border into Burma with some of his Wa tribesman buddies, take out a bunch of druggies running a heroin lab, blow up the lab and turn the dope over to the DEA.
“Of course,” he continued in a conspiratorial voice, “We will need to buy half a dozen M-16s on the black market at $600 each.”
I gave him $3,000 to get the guns. We never saw the opium lab or the guns. Young should have been writing comic books, and I should have had my head examined. But it did sound like a great way to spend a sunny Sunday afternoon.
But I vetoed Young’s next “viable” backburner project percolating in the wings—the backing of a no-lie, sure-thing Wa tribal insurrection over in Burma. “My resources are limited,” I told him, “so I trust you’ll understand that I can finance only one fucking revolution at a time!”
Wanting to pursue to the nth degree all potential routes to information on living American POWs, I decided we would head to Bangkok for only a short period.
I had, indeed given our loyal Liberty City troops their “discharges,” placed Mingo on waivers and had him shipped out of country. I also gave Buni and Tor unceremonious heave-hos before expanding Young’s dual role as SOF liaison and gentleman schemer.
ZABITOSKY RETURNS
Unbeknownst to us, Fred Zabitosky, no longer on the SOF payroll due to downsizing and my being warned that he was on the take, as were most of the players by that time, had returned to Thailand, still in a snit over being replaced by Young, but more than eager to get things to a rolling boil up at what was left of Liberty City. He believed that Young and the Thais had orchestrated its demise.
Zabitosky was still hanging around with Tor, scrounging for hard MIA intel. This time he was being funded by PROJECT FREEDOM, another activist POW/MIA outfit I liked, and to which I from time to time contributed. SOF had its show to run and Zabitosky had his, both of us with Muong Sai still very much on our minds.
So again, Zabitosky trekked up to Liberty City, where, surprisingly, 20 to 30 troops were still hanging about. Talk of POW rescues and Lao insurrections was still thick in the air. However, Zab’s stay in Thailand was short-lived. After several weeks, Project Freedom opted to stand down his activities due to extreme financial pressures back in CONUS. Out of luck and ready cash, Zabitosky was forced to head home.
Before his departure, TR ran into Zabitosky at the Nana Hotel, where he sprang some new info on us: The previous summer, after I’d departed,
Zabitosky arranged/convinced the CIA to send over an interrogator, a “Dave Klaxton,” and a polygraph technician who did some studies on the hand-drawn maps produced by our two Lao. According to SR-71 aerial shots of Muong Sai, our witnesses’ diagrams were only one building off. If the CIA had already gotten hold of photos of Muong Sai, there had to be something hot up there—and our Laotian eyewitnesses had to have been there.
In addition, the previous winter, while leafing through some files at a member of Project Freedom’s New Mexico home, he discovered a 1969 CIA document pertaining to a Pathet Lao prisoner of war camp—at Muong Sai, Laos!
Why Zabitosky didn’t drop this on us before, we were not sure. We could only surmise that it was because he was bitter about being replaced as SOF’s in-country Project Director.
Zabitosky said that the Agency couldn’t get near Muong Sai during the Vietnam War; that it was completely controlled by the Red Chinese and that they had poured people into that vicinity. It was and still might be loaded with high tech communications and radar gear, and maybe some anti-aircraft systems.
The road north of Muong Sai leads into Yunnan Province, PRC, and was constructed completely by the Chinese. For some strange reason, it was put off-limits to American bombers during the war.
There had been one aircraft that went down right at Muong Sai, and the pilot had been a Taiwanese civilian, Chi-Yuen. His name appears on the Alpha Roster where he was listed as Category I (i.e. missing). What Zabitosky could not confirm—but strongly suspected—was that the crash sites within our 1981 area of operations were where aircraft with civilian crews only were downed (i.e. Air America planes).
Was there a possibility that we were secretly being utilized by the Agency to go after some of their missing personnel—something they hadn’t been able to do? Klaxton never insinuated that we’d been wasting our efforts in focusing on Muong Sai.
I Am Soldier of Fortune Page 20