The new location wasn’t well suited to the society’s work. It was hard to reach, remote from clients and proved to be an unfriendly environment for staff. In lieu of purchasing a new building, the foundation had committed to pay rent for the North York Branch offices, an arrangement that continued throughout the 1990s, although in 1993 the offices were relocated to more suitable premises at 4211 Yonge Street.
The second source of conflict was the foundation’s decision to become a national fundraising organization. The society opposed this move, believing that the foundation would then distance itself from its obligations to fund programs supported by Metro CAS and the Metro Toronto community. There were also concerns that the foundation would begin to use the assets that had been transferred to it when it was established in 1979 to fund these national efforts. Despite these concerns of the society, the foundation established a parallel body, the Kidder Foundation, to begin national fundraising.
In an attempt to resolve the issues, the society and the foundation established a joint committee of their boards. When this committee failed to come to an agreement, the society exercised its rights under the foundation’s bylaws to move members of the society board onto the foundation board. This prompted the foundation’s board to resign en masse and move to establish the independent Invest In Kids Foundation. Shortly afterward, Sue Bochner left the CAS Foundation and was replaced in an interim capacity by its manager of grants and allocations, Lynne Slotek.
In 1995, there was a newly constituted foundation board, consisting of several former Metro CAS presidents and chaired by Chris Stringer, along with former and current members of the society’s board. It appointed Sheilagh Johnson as the foundation’s executive director. Johnson brought more than twenty-five years of public relations, administration and development experience to her new job. For the previous decade, she had been the director of public relations for the Catholic CAS and had established that agency’s own charitable foundation.
The foundation began to direct funds toward tutoring and special educational assistance, and an ambitious program to help young people through college and university was begun.
Johnson’s mandate was to stabilize the foundation and tie it closer to Metro CAS. In the meantime, corporate and individual donors were concerned about the issues that had triggered the resignation of the former board members. The viability of the foundation’s traditionally successful fundraising events came into question, and the large base of volunteers was confused by what was happening.
Johnson moved quickly to address these concerns, to bring focus to the organization and, with the participation of its board of directors, address what the foundation’s priorities should be. These would include a clear emphasis on funding the society’s programs and a commitment to the educational and recreational needs of children in care.
By 1998, the foundation was helping more than 100 former Crown wards to attend postsecondary institutions, with several of them pursuing graduate studies in law, medicine, social work and science.
Many of these children were lagging behind their peers in school, most did not finish high school and even fewer moved on to post-secondary education. The foundation began to direct funds toward tutoring and special educational assistance, and an ambitious program to help young people through college and university was begun. This work was supported by an education advocate, a staff position at the society that was funded by the foundation. By 1998, the foundation was helping more than 100 former Crown wards to attend postsecondary institutions, with several of them pursuing graduate studies in law, medicine, social work and science.
Corporations responded positively to the foundation’s focus on education and enrichment and several new partnerships developed. In 1998, CIBC World Markets established a $300,000 Miracle Fund within the foundation “to provide children with the small miracles that make a difference.” A Brownie uniform, a bicycle or the chance to go on the school trip were all possible thanks to this new fund. The same year, Nike P.L.A.Y. Canada, in conjunction with the Raptors Foundation, established a recreation fund. This additional source of income for Metro CAS programs was extremely valuable at a time when government funding priorities left little money for children to participate in sports and after-school activities.
CIBC World Markets established a $300,000 Miracle Fund within the foundation “to provide children with the small miracles that make a difference.”
The foundation also began to support the work of PARC, the transitional program for youth leaving CAS care. It did this not only by transferring money to the program but also by enlisting support for the program from the business community and individual donors.
Although the foundation had traditionally not funded the society’s core expenditures, by the mid-1990s budgetary restraints had become such that it was being called upon to support programs — including the primary prevention work undertaken by the society’s community workers and by its child welfare and education advocates — that in the past had been funded by government.
As the foundation’s fundraising efforts became more and more successful (tripling in the years between 1995 and 1999), the issue of allocating funds nationwide arose once again — many of the foundation’s new partners wanted their dollars to help disadvantaged children not only in Metro Toronto but also across the country. This time around, the society and the foundation agreed on a mutually acceptable strategy. Working through the Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies (OACAS) and the Child Welfare League of Canada, the foundation began to support education and prevention programs in Ontario and in several other provinces. In 1988, to reflect this new direction, the foundation changed its name from the Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto Foundation to the Children’s Aid Foundation.
At a time when government funding of many programs had decreased significantly, the foundation proved to be a lifeline to many small Metro CAS programs as well as community groups working to prevent the abuse of children. Its role was to walk the fine line between making a difference in the lives of these children without endorsing government efforts to divest themselves of their responsibilities for the well-being of young people and their families.
At a time when government funding of many programs had decreased significantly, the foundation proved to be a lifeline to many small Metro CAS programs as well as community groups working to prevent the abuse of children.
Child Mortality Task Force
As was described at the beginning of this book, in the early days of child welfare in Toronto the rate of infant mortality was very high, due to the susceptibility of children to life-threatening infections. The rate of mortality in children’s institutions such as the Infants’ Home was even higher as a result of the epidemics that constantly swept those residences.
The introduction of pasteurization, immunization and antibiotics, and the move away from institutional to boarding home care for children who were unable to live with their birth families, gradually reduced the death rate. Nevertheless, by the 1990s child welfare agencies across the country had once again come under increasing scrutiny as the result of some high-profile child deaths. The public, concerned that the systems established to protect children might have been failing to do so, was demanding answers.
The public, concerned that the systems established to protect children might have been failing to do so, was demanding answers.
It was for this reason that, in 1996, a Child Mortality Task Force was established by Mary McConville, the executive director of OACAS, and Jim Cairns, the province’s deputy chief coroner, along with Bruce Rivers and other leaders in the field. The task force was given the job of developing strategies to reduce the incidence of such deaths, and over a period of fourteen months it worked with MCSS and all fifty-five CASs across Ontario, as well as with experts in the fields of child welfare, social work education and research, medicine and the law.
The task force determined that, although the death rate among ch
ildren receiving services from a CAS was lower than for children in the general population, it was higher than average among those children known to CASs who died of accidents, suicides, homicides and undetermined causes.
The task force determined that, although the death rate among children receiving services from a CAS was lower than for children in the general population, it was higher than average among those children known to CASs who died of accidents, suicides, homicides and undetermined causes.
Over the two-year survey period, 100 children receiving services from an Ontario CAS had died. Thirty-one were in a foster home or other residential program, while the remaining sixty-nine had been living in the community with their families and were receiving supervision, support or investigation and assessment services from a CAS. Of the 100, six committed suicide and eleven were murdered, although none of the homicides occurred while a child was in a foster home or other residential program.
The work of the task force was the focus of intense media coverage, most notably in the Toronto Star, which tried to parallel the work of the task force through its own investigative reporting on page one. Most of the Star’s coverage was unbalanced and unfavourable toward CAS workers, despite the fact that Metro CAS had given the newspaper’s reporters unprecedented access to workers and foster parents. Although the society and OACAS attempted to make timely, appropriate responses, including a meeting with the paper’s editorial board, the daily barrage of criticism demoralized foster parents and staff, leaving some to wonder why they bothered to come to work in the mornings. The negative publicity was particularly devastating to children in care, several of whom expressed worries about their personal safety.
Most of the Toronto Star’s coverage was unbalanced and unfavourable toward CAS workers, despite the fact that Metro CAS had given the newspaper’s reporters unprecedented access to workers and foster parents. The daily barrage of criticism demoralized foster parents and staff, leaving some to wonder why they bothered to come to work in the mornings. The negative publicity was particularly devastating to children in care, several of whom expressed worries about their personal safety.
Nevertheless, the task force reports, published in March and July 1997, and the stories in the media did help focus the spotlight on the needs of vulnerable children and the child welfare system’s capacity to meet them. Among the task force’s recommendations — many of which were co-opted by the Star when it formulated its own prescription in its pages — were legislative amendments to better protect children (including a stronger focus on child neglect), public education about risks to young children, a provincewide interactive database of families and children receiving child protection services, and the use by CAS workers of a standardized risk-assessment tool.
The task force’s recommendations, many of which were co-opted by the Toronto Star when formulating its own prescriptions, included:
• legislative amendments to better protect children (including a stronger focus on child neglect);
• public education about risks to young children;
• a provincewide interactive database of families and children receiving child protection services; and
• the use by CAS workers of a standardized risk-assessment tool.
The deaths of Shanay Johnson and Jennifer Koval’s’kyj-England
In part to ensure that the Child Mortality Task Force’s recommendations were supported by MCSS and the field at large, the coroner’s office determined that inquests would be held into the deaths of six children known to CASs across the province.
These inquests, held in 1997 and 1998, described in graphic detail the tragedies that can befall children at risk when the child welfare system lacks the necessary tools and system supports to protect them adequately. They underscored the complexity of child protection services and the need for a diverse approach to strengthening the capacity of both the child welfare system and local communities to protect children.
The inquests underscored the complexity of child protection services and the need for a diverse approach to strengthening the capacity of both the child welfare system and local communities to protect children.
Two of the inquests were into the deaths of Shanay Johnson and Jennifer Koval’s’kyj-England, both of whom were known to Metro CAS. They focused on the role of the society and its decision making with respect to both children. In Jennifer’s case, the inquest also focused on the lengthy delays in establishing permanent plans for her future and highlighted the inadequacies of the Child and Family Services Act in ensuring that the child’s needs were placed ahead of those of the adults in her life.
Shanay Johnson and her two sisters were apprehended by Metro CAS in January 1992, when Shanay was one month old, because their mother, Teresa Johnson, appeared to be under the influence of drugs. The children were eventually made society wards and they remained in the agency’s care until June 1993, by which time the workers believed that Teresa had stopped abusing drugs and had sufficiently stabilized her life that her children could be returned to her under a supervision order. The family appeared to be doing well enough for the supervision order to be terminated in September of that year. Just over a month later, however, Shanay died. Her mother pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
Seven-year-old Jennifer Koval’s’kyj-England was killed by her stepfather, Ron England, early one morning in April 1996 after she had walked into her grandmother Marion Johnston’s bedroom to find him stabbing her. Ron England (Johnston’s adopted son) was a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who, at the time of the murders, was not taking his medication. Ron gave himself up to the police and the courts subsequently found him not to be criminally responsible because of his mental disorder.
Jennifer had originally been apprehended by the CAS because her mother was unable to care for her adequately. In due course there was a trial that resulted in a court order that placed Jennifer in Ron England’s care, under the supervision of Metro CAS. Because there were so many parties involved, the litigation continued and resulted in more than fifty-eight separate child welfare court hearings over the next five years. A final decision about which of a number of family members was to have custody of Jennifer was still pending at her death.
Together, the jurors in the Johnson and Koval’s’kyj-England inquests, along with those in the four other inquests held elsewhere in the province, made more than 400 recommendations to government, service providers and professionals.
The jurors in the six inquests combined to make more than 400 recommendations to government, service providers and professionals. They echoed those of the Child Mortality Task Force and put a human face on the need for changes to the child welfare system. The juries in the Johnson and Koval’s’kyj-England inquests endorsed most of the recommendations suggested to them by Metro CAS.
The jurors called for the Child and Family Services Act be updated, for information to be shared more freely among professionals, for improved training of CAS staff, and for the public — and other professionals — to be made more aware of child abuse and neglect. They also recommended that the province make more funds available to enable CASs to fulfil their mandates adequately, that workload standards for CAS staff be developed and that a standardized, provincewide risk-assessment system be introduced. In addition, they proposed that a comprehensive computerized database be developed for CASs across the province.
The media gave blanket coverage to Shanay Johnson’s inquest, the first in the series and the only one to be held in downtown Toronto, home base for many print, radio and television reporters. The society, its work, and its board, staff, foster parents and volunteers were thrust onto the evening television newscasts and the front pages of the morning newspapers.
To help workers deal with the stress of testifying at the inquests — and of doing so under the not-always-friendly glare of the media spotlight — the society designed a support plan. During both inquests, staff were not only given access to professional counselling under the agency’s
employee assistance program but they were also helped by a peer support team.
Coordinated by family services supervisor Phillip Howe, the peer support team had been established in 1997 to help staff deal with such traumatic events as the death of a child or an assault. This groundbreaking initiative was unique for a child welfare agency at the time, and has since been adapted by other not-for-profit social service organizations across North America.
A peer support team was established in 1997 to help staff deal with such traumatic events as the death of a child or an assault. This groundbreaking initiative was unique for a child welfare agency at the time.
In the meantime, executive director Bruce Rivers’ approach to the intense scrutiny was to be proactive rather than reactive:
As a public organization, funded by and accountable to the taxpayer, we have a responsibility, and a real interest, in helping to build a public understanding of the work we do and the challenges we face. So every contact with the media becomes a strategic opportunity to inform the public about the day-to-day realities of our work.
During the inquests, Rivers and other agency staff, notably chief counsel Kristina Reitmeier and executive assistant Cory Tuyl, gave frequent interviews to newspaper, radio and television reporters, openly acknowledging problems where they existed and identifying solutions. This helped ensure that journalists, and therefore the public, were educated about the complex issues affecting the child welfare system.
According to former board president Marjorie Perkins: “Bruce felt deeply about what happened to those children. He was shaken and grieving. But he was also able to explain and support his staff to describe what happened and what needed to be done to prevent a reoccurrence. There was no defensive shutting down.”
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