The JASONs were mostly: Stark, Many Faces, Many Places, 114.
They did have ideas: JASON Summer Study, meeting minutes, “The Thailand Study Group,” June 26, 1967, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“ear cutting”: Finkbeiner, Jasons, 101–2.
This speech was a watershed: Daniel E. Harmon, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2005), 38.
“You helpless creature”: Translation of Khomeini’s speech, IRIB World Service, worldservice.irib.ir.
In December 1963: Norman H. Jones Jr., “Support Capabilities for Limited War in Iran,” study, Rand, Dec. 1963.
“Iran has been the primary”: John A. Reed Jr. to Colonel Jordan, memo, Aug. 11, 1967, RG 59, National Archives, College Park.
“in the mold of the New Jersey”: George J. Wren, Jersey Troopers II: The Next Thirty-Five Years (1971–2006) (Bloomington, Ind.: iUniverse, 2009), 34.
Schwarzkopf, whose son: It came out years later that Schwarzkopf leveraged his success with the gendarmerie to help the CIA facilitate its successful coup. J. Dana Stuster, “The Craziest Detail About the CIA’s 1953 Coup in Iran,” Passport (blog), Foreign Policy, Aug. 20, 2013.
“biggest challenge”: Herzfeld, interview with author.
ARPA demonstrated how: Ibid.
“gotten too close”: Herzfeld, Life at Full Speed, 153.
“trivial and floundering”: Gerald Sullivan, Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Brief on RDFO(ME) Activities,” Nov. 5, 1971, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“They gave us lots of insight”: Herzfeld, interview with author.
“Can you detect”: Ibid.
“We have recently completed”: Advanced Research Projects Agency, Report, “ARPA Research in Iran,” April 26, 1970, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park. Though the report focuses on Iran, it also covers ARPA’s “MEAFSA” program, or Middle East, Africa, and Southern Asia.
Herzfeld spent several years: In his memoir, Herzfeld recalls it was President Lyndon Johnson’s concerns about Pakistan-India tensions that killed the agreement. The Project AGILE files in the National Archives make oblique references to a controversy over ARPA’s India endeavor. It appears, based on other memos in the file, that the State Department was concerned about ARPA’s involving itself in diplomatic issues.
“We wanted to open another”: Hess, interview with author.
“We did a study”: Stark, interview with author.
“an impending insurgency”: Memorandum for Mr. Godel, “Subject: Insurgency-U.S. Style,” June 8, 1964, Project AGILE files, National Archives, College Park.
The closest AGILE ever got: Harold Brown’s Pentagon office issued a formal memo to ARPA on December 3, 1963.
“Operation Barn Door”: Frosch, interview with author. In correspondence with the author, Brown wrote, “I may well have made that remark, but it did not reflect a lack of seriousness in the effort.”
“We couldn’t possibly”: Sproull, interview with Williams/Gerard.
“The Defense Department has”: Herzfeld to Director of Defense Research and Engineering, memo, “Congressional Query Regarding Star,” Sept. 4, 1964, Project Star, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“need to know” basis: Although the code name “Star” was briefly acknowledged in a footnote in the 1975 history of ARPA, the records detailing ARPA’s contribution to presidential security were not released by the National Archives until November 2013, in response to a request from the author.
One proposal, for example: ARPA officials grew frustrated with the Secret Service’s lack of technical expertise, which often led them to propose weapons that sounded as if they were straight out of a Road Runner cartoon, like a nonlethal weapon that would immediately disable a potential assassin in a crowd. When ARPA officials did test some of the weapons the Treasury Department had in mind, like a ninja-inspired collapsible billy club with a stabbing end that projected out at high speed, they found it operationally useless. Either the club collapsed after several uses, or the users lost their grip.
“There also exists a need”: H. Morris and G. J. Zissis to H. Tabor, memo, “An Examination of a Few Protective Concepts,” March 9, 1964, Project Star, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“move about when in the car”: Unsigned memo submitted by “John” to Alyce (presumably Alyce Pekors, a longtime secretary for Project AGILE) on April 16, 1964, describing various ideas submitted by ARPA staff. Project Star, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
The nonlethal weapon: Other proposed weapons, like an aerosol gun that dispensed tear gas, risked disabling the agent using the weapon if he had not donned a protective mask ahead of time. The frustration went both ways, however. The Treasury Department accused ARPA of having its own James Bond–inspired suggestions, which were technically feasible, but operationally impractical, like electrifying chrome strips of the presidential limousine to prevent crowds from overturning the vehicle. An armored vehicle would be too heavy to overturn anyhow, the Treasury Department countered.
The liquid squirt gun: Colonel Harry Tabor to Dr. R. L. Sproull, memo, “Advice to Treasury Department on Non-lethal Weapons,” Jan. 21, 1965, Project Star, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
Though the squirt guns: Telegram sent by Harold Tabor in March 1967, Project Star, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“The rationale was that a waving flag”: Brown, correspondence with author.
common green bottle fly: H. A. Ells and R. E. Kay, “Applicability of Olfactory Transducers to the Detection of Human Beings: Final Report, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Feb. 1, 1965–July 31, 1966,” Project AGILE, RG330, National Archives, College Park.
“nonlethal decay mechanisms”: Hughes Aircraft Company, “Proposal for a Study of Non-lethal Decay Mechanisms, an Unsolicited Proposal to the Advanced Research Projects Agency,” June 23, 1964, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
the agency’s involvement with Agent Orange: In 1967, an agency directory still listed chemical defoliation as a program activity under AGILE.
“as a large scale countermeasure”: ARPA, “Excerpts from Recent Trip Report: For Follow-Up Action Where Indicated,” n.d., Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“high priority”: Author unknown, “Dr. Herzfeld’s Trip Actions,” n.d., Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“During my five years at ARPA”: Stark, Many Faces, Many Places, 93.
Back in 1964, Godel had laid out: ARPA, “Task Force ‘Isolation in South Vietnam.’ ” The report itself is undated, but an accompanying transmission letter written by the director of ARPA’s Remote Area Conflict program explains that it is a “study paper” written by ARPA for Harold Brown, the director of defense research and engineering. Major General R. H. Wienecke, “Memorandum for Brigadier General John Boles, director, JRATA (Subject: Border Security—S. Vietnam),” March 27, 1964, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
A handwritten list: Ibid. The handwritten list was attached to the task force report.
The border-sealing proposal: “I believe the cost has been far underestimated,” Seymour Deitchman, Harold Brown’s assistant for counterinsurgency, wrote after reviewing it. Deitchman, “Memorandum for the Director, ARPA,” March 24, 1964, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“one of the most unusual”: Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, “History of Strategic Air Command, Jan.–June 1966,” September 19, 1997, 118–19.
That was because the purpose: “Forest Fire as a Military Weapon, Final Report July 1970,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Remote Area Conflict, Defense Technical Information Center.
This time, ARPA claimed: “History of Strategic Air Command, Jan.–June 1966,” 118–19.
“The country doesn’t burn”: Deborah Shapely,
“Technology in Vietnam: Fire Storm Project Fizzled Out,” Science, July 21, 1972, 239–41.
“This was clearly one”: Ibid.
In 1966, Deitchman was working: Finkbeiner, Jasons, 62–89.
McNamara instead assigned: Ibid., 77.
“ARPA was cut out”: Lukasik, interview with author.
“A lot of what we called ‘dirty tricks’ ”: Tegnelia, interview with author.
“in the desperation”: Buhl, An Eye at the Keyhole.
“The barrier proved”: Tim Weiner, “Robert S. McNamara, Architect of a Futile War, Dies at 93,” New York Times, July 6, 2009, A1.
“network centric warfare”: Deitchman, “ ‘Electronic Battlefield’ in the Vietnam War.”
CHAPTER 10: BLAME IT ON THE SORCERERS
“Do you see anything”: Walter Slote, “Observations on Psychodynamic Structures in Vietnamese Personality: Initial Report on Psychological Study—Vietnam,” 1966, Simulmatics Corporation, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
“The Viet Cong member”: Ibid.
“It is my strong impression”: Ibid.
“started to twist my arm”: Deitchman to Peter Hayes, e-mail, Feb. 23, 2002.
With his growing expertise: When McNamara was tapped to lead the Defense Department in 1961, he brought operations research back with him to the Pentagon, along with a cadre of his “whiz kids” determined to reform how the military did business. See Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 256.
“artificial moon”: Deitchman, interview with Bob Sheldon, in Military Operations Research 15, no. 2 (2010).
“total solution of the problem”: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VII-21.
“mass polygraph for internal village security”: S. W. Upham to H. H. Hall, Aug. 25, 1965, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
ARPA managed to stay out: ARPA had typically stayed away from those sorts of proposals, sometimes because the ideas were impractical, sometimes because they were stupid, and often because Godel did not think they would work. At one point, Godel wrote that he preferred funding “a social science study on the mores and susceptibility” of Vietnamese to different “interrogation techniques” rather than the polygraph. Undated memo by Godel (attached to General Electric proposal on polygraph), Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“a collection of $25 to $30 million worth”: Deitchman, interview with author.
“Sy Deitchman was aghast”: Stark, interview with author.
That included, in one report: Herman Kahn and Garrett N. Scalera, Basic Issues and Potential Lessons of Vietnam: A Final Report to the Advanced Research Projects Agency, vol. 5, A Summary of Economic Development Projects That Might Have or Might Still Be Helpful in Vietnam (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, 1970), 50A. The idea was to build canals that would be used as “barriers” to protect hamlets. Kahn’s proposal, which seemed more appropriate to zombie defense than insurgent warfare, involved “using small dredges that could construct barrier canals around pacified hamlets in the Delta, cutting and blocking existing canals to create a perimeter enclosing hamlets and adjacent fields.” Considering that the strategic hamlet program was, by this point, a notable failure, it is unclear what barricading them off would have done, even if it were practical.
“Well, you could get Herman Kahn”: Lewis Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972 (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 201.
“What is Herman Kahn doing”: Deitchman, interview with author.
“had to do with anger”: Morell, interview with author.
“The new theme”: Elliott, RAND in Southeast Asia, 89.
“When the Air Force is paying”: Ibid., 103.
But Gouré’s new slant: Ibid., 125–26.
“I got hold of McNamara’s military assistant”: Deitchman, interview with author.
Project Camelot: The Camelot story is recounted in many places and is sometimes erroneously credited to ARPA. One contemporaneous account is by George E. Lowe, “The Camelot Affair,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1966.
“could easily attract”: Deitchman, Best-Laid Schemes, 312.
“As far as we in ARPA”: Ibid.
“This is the A-bomb”: Thomas B. Morgan, “The People-Machine,” Harper’s, Jan. 1961, 53.
“people machine”: The Simulmatics Corporation, Human Behavior and the Electronic Computer, information brochure, n.d., Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
Pool originally suggested: Pool to Warren Stark, draft letter, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Feb. 1, 1966, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
“My research work”: Hoc to Deitchman, Feb. 1, 1966, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
“It is possible to control”: Simulmatics Corporation, “Continuation of Psychological Warfare Weapons Project,” Feb. 14, 1968, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
By unfortunate coincidence: The Simulmatics report says the observers’ reports were translated into English, subject in some cases to classification, and then “statistical tabulations made of the frequency of various kinds of reactions and remarks.” No details of these results were given in the draft report.
“sorcerer’s project”: Joseph Hoc, “Testing New Psychological Warfare Weapons in Viet Nam,” Simulmatics Corporation, 1968, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
“variables were contaminated”: Quinn to Pool, Oct. 2, 1968, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
“Curse You, Red Baron”: Hoc to Pool, Oct. 19, 1968, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
To head the Simulmatics office: Alfred de Grazia, “A Brief Biography, 29 December 1919 to 31 August 2006,” Alfred de Grazia personal archive, grazian-archive.com.
“rank amateurishness”: Seymour Deitchman, Memorandum for the Record, “Subject: Simulmatics Corporation,” Nov. 29, 1967, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“someone had taken a book”: L. A. Newberry, Research Development Field Unit–Vietnam, “Memorandum for the Record: Meeting at Simulmatics Village with Mr. Los, Mr. Nhon, and Dr. Melhado About TV Study,” Dec. 17, 1967, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“Briefcase Directors”: Colonel William B. Arnold, “Memorandum for W. G. McMillan, Subject: Simulmatics Corporation,” Nov. 21, 1967, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“Hate the U.S.” banquet: Ibid.
“running around Vietnam”: Colonel John V. Patterson Jr. (director, ARPA Field Unit, Vietnam), “Memorandum for Garry L. Quinn, Program Manager. Subject: ARPA Contractors,” n.d., Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“Wonder what brand”: Ibid.
“If ARPA is to perform”: De Grazia to Deitchman, June 27, 1967, de Grazia archive.
“This Corporation has been operating”: McMillan to Deitchman, Dec. 9, 1967, “Termination of Simulmatics Research Activities in Republic of Vietnam,” Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
“One aspect of it may be”: Deitchman to Colonel W. B. Arnold, Sept. 8, 1967, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
Deitchman’s reaction was identical: Pool did use his political connections to appeal directly to the White House, lobbying officials there to set up a social science research center in Vietnam, ostensibly under the rubric of “Vietnamization.” Naturally, Simulmatics would be the lead contractor for the center; a handwritten budget drawn up by Pool showed that most of the costs would go toward overhead. To help their cause, Simulmatics had Father Hoc, the Vietnamese priest, ghostwrite a letter to be signed by President Thieu’s political adviser, requesting the center be set up. Even Greenfield, the company’s president, realized that was going too far. “They’ll see through the ruse because of the items which give away Hoc’s authorship,” Greenfield wrote to Pool. “It could backfire when they pick up the clues.” The contract never came through. Greenfield to Pool, Aug. 15, 1968, Pool Papers, MIT Archives.
gunrunning in Southeast Asia: The Landon Chronicles.
“Green
field told me Godel”: Deitchman to George Tanham, personal, May 14, 1968, Project AGILE, RG 330, National Archives, College Park.
If he refused a senior Thai official: Ibid.
“bureaucratic reasons”: Deitchman, Best-Laid Schemes, 319.
From start to finish: Rohde, “Last Stand of the Psychocultural Cold Warriors,” 233. Rohde’s article provides the most comprehensive account of Simulmatics’ misadventures in Vietnam.
“The fact and means of measurement”: Deitchman, Best-Laid Schemes, 447.
“As we thought about that”: Deitchman, interview with author.
“How does this get to be”: U.S. House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1968, 168.
Saigon’s once bustling: Hickey, Window on a War, 242.
Only Thailand managed to avoid: Herzfeld claims that ARPA “helped the Thais preserve the integrity of Thailand.” Lee Huff, who helped establish the program there, believed the Thai government was largely responsible for keeping the insurgency in check. American officials had “a tendency to underestimate the people that they were working with,” he said. Herzfeld and Huff, interviews with author.
“As to the reason”: Deitchman, correspondence with author.
“AGILE was an abysmal failure”: Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VIII-50. Herzfeld repeated the “glorious failure” in conversation with the author in 2013.
CHAPTER 11: MONKEY BUSINESS
On October 22, 1964: Adam Nossiter, “Are Mississippi Deaths Linked to N-Bomb Tests?,” Tuscaloosa News, May 17, 1990, 7B.
“bad roll”: Bates, interview with author.
“These were poor people”: Ibid.
“spoon into Jell-O”: U.S. House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1968. Part III, 143.
Its missile defense work: The radar supported the Pacific Range Electromagnetic Signature Study.
“first attempt to get in bed”: Lukasik, correspondence with author.
“some special projects”: Herzfeld, Life at Full Speed, 140.
“research in such fields”: Quoted in Huff and Sharp, Advanced Research Projects Agency, VIII-52.
The Imagineers of War Page 48