by Carol Berkin
On June 17, 1793, Washington called his cabinet together to discuss the question of French privateers. A letter from British minister George Hammond lent the meeting an air of urgency, for Hammond pointedly asked whether two privateers were going to be allowed to return to a US port or send their prizes to American ports for sale. Hammond complained that one of the ships, the Sans Culottes, still remained at Baltimore, watching for any movement of a British ship that was also there. The cabinet reassured Hammond that these vessels had been ordered to return to French territory and that the government expected their speedy departure.50
Jefferson turned to the task of explaining to Genet the differences between vessels armed for defense against the aggression of an enemy and those armed, equipped, and manned in the United States “for the purpose of committing hostilities on nations at peace with the United States.” It was this latter practice that prompted the administration to issue orders to all the states and ports to ban the arming of privateers. He reminded Genet that he had addressed this matter in an earlier letter of June 5, in which he had clearly stated the opinion of the president. Washington’s opinion, Jefferson added, was not, as Genet continued to insist, contrary to the principles of natural law, the usage of nations, the engagements which unite the two people, nor the president’s own Proclamation of Neutrality.51
The following day, Genet returned to the topic of money—and the hardships caused by the administration’s refusal to pay the debt in full. Because the United States had not met his demands, his only option was to refuse to pay his American creditors. The US government would have to do so. This time, Hamilton drafted the curt reply for Jefferson: pay your debts. When Genet refused, the cabinet took it upon itself to do the only thing it could to remedy the situation: it approved Hamilton’s proposal that the federal Treasury pay all the suspended bills out of the September 1793 installment on the debt due to France. Hamilton had stared down Genet—and won.52
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“[Genet] has threatened to appeal from The President of The United States to the People.”
—Alexander Dallas reporting to Thomas Mifflin, July 6, 1793
GENET WAS CONVINCED that the president was intentionally thwarting his mission, and he did not have to look far to discover Washington’s motive: jealousy. Writing to Paris on June 19, he complained that “the old man Washington, who differs greatly from the one whose name history has recorded, does not forgive my success and the enthusiasm with which the whole city precipitated itself after me.” Consumed with envy, Washington had determined to “hinder my business in a thousand ways and forces me secretly to urge the assembly of Congress.”53
But the French minister was undaunted. Three days after Jefferson had essentially warned him to abandon his course of retaliatory action, Genet once again expressed his disappointment and anger over the behavior of the American government in the matter of two of the detained privateers. “Let us explain ourselves as republicans,” he urged Jefferson. “Let us not lower ourselves as ancient politicks by diplomatic subtleties.” In his mind, the secretary had resorted to sophistry in the interpretation of French rights in the treaties of 1778. Jefferson’s reasoning was “extremely ingenious” but unacceptable, because arguments based on what he insisted on calling “the private or publick opinions of the President of the United States,” or the opinions of such experts on international law as the Swiss philosopher Emer de Vattel, were no excuse for ignoring the obligations set by those treaties. The Washington administration showed no gratitude for France’s generosity and no respect for its own Constitution. Washington had not waited until Congress—the branch of government that expressed the people’s sovereign will—could make its decision on the nature of Franco-American relations. As Genet saw it, Washington and his cabinet had done little but present him with “multiplied difficulties and embarrassments” at every turn. Was this what the American people desired? Genet was certain it was not. Jefferson chose not to respond to Genet’s tirade with yet another defense of American neutrality.54
IT WAS AS clear to the French and the British ministers as it was to the beleaguered secretary of state that America simply did not have the ability to enforce its rules. Although France was the greater offender, Britain too continued to capture enemy vessels in American territorial waters and fit them out as privateers in American ports. Sometimes this was done surreptitiously, sometimes it was done in open defiance of American policy. Sometimes ships belonging to both countries escaped seizure by the US authorities by sailing away before action could be taken. Thus, despite the repeated declarations to Hammond and Genet that the US government did not allow the commissioning, equipping, or manning of vessels in American ports to cruise against any of the belligerents in the European war the practice continued. It was proving easier for the American government to establish rules than to enforce them when the bureaucracy was cumbersome, the personnel inadequate, and the belligerents sneaky.
Matters came to a head in early July. On April 17, a British merchant ship, the Little Sarah, had been captured in American waters by Genet’s old flagship, the Embuscade, and brought into port at Philadelphia. Despite clear warnings against arming a privateer in an American port, the French minister allowed the Little Sarah to be transformed into the Petite Democrate, arming it so that it could accompany the Embuscade to New Orleans as naval support for Genet’s planned offensive against the Spanish territory of Louisiana. The administration had not learned of the Little Sarah affair until late June. On June 22, Governor Thomas Mifflin forwarded to the president a report by the port’s master warden, who suspected the ship was being outfitted as a French privateer. At Washington’s behest, Henry Knox asked Mifflin to inform the president promptly of any armaments being added to the vessel. But Mifflin, who was often loath to cooperate with the Federalist president and his administration, soon reported that nothing at all suspicious was occurring. At the time, the president was at Mount Vernon, and no one in the administration replied to the governor. Hearing nothing, Mifflin was content to let the matter drop. But, on July 5, Alexander Hamilton informed Jefferson and Knox that the outfitting of the Little Sarah was, in fact, well advanced. Faced with Hamilton’s implicit criticism, Mifflin decided not to deny this was true. Instead, he asked whether he should detain the vessel.55
Before the cabinet had time to reply, the situation took on crisis proportions. On the evening of July 6, Alexander Dallas, a loyal supporter of the Republican opposition and secretary of the state of Pennsylvania, learned that the Little Sarah was preparing to sail the next morning. Mifflin decided to call out a militia detachment to prevent the ship’s departure, even at the risk of hostilities between the ship’s crew and the militiamen. Dallas persuaded the governor to wait until he met with Genet; perhaps he could persuade the French minister to keep the ship in port until the president had time to rule on whether American neutrality had been violated.
The late-night meeting between Dallas and Genet went badly. From the beginning, Genet was combative and uncooperative. He defended his right to transform the Little Sarah into a privateer and refused to delay its sailing. He denounced the federal government’s hostility toward the French Republic and swore to meet force with force if the militia tried to prevent the ship’s departure. And, in a dramatic escalation of his defiance, Genet announced he would vindicate his actions by appealing directly to the American people over the head of the president. Dallas reported the conversation to Mifflin. The governor was, of course, no friend to Washington or the Federalists, but he was not willing to aid a foreigner in breaking federal law. He sent out the call to a unit of the militia. He then conveyed an urgent message to Jefferson and Knox, explaining the situation and asking for their guidance.56
Haunted by the vision of a violent confrontation on the docks of Philadelphia, Jefferson decided to meet with Genet himself. On July 7, the two men talked, and Jefferson walked away believing that Genet had pledged the ship would not sail until the president returned to Philade
lphia and considered the case. No doubt relieved, Mifflin disbanded the militia unit. But the incident persuaded Jefferson of the futility of establishing or sustaining a reasonable relationship with Citizen Genet. On the same day as his meeting with the Frenchman, he vented his anger—and frank amazement—at Genet’s behavior. “Never in my opinion,” he wrote to James Madison, “was so calamitous an appointment made, as that of the present minister of F. here. Hotheaded, all imagination, no judgment, passionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the P. in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the most unreasonable & groundless propositions, & in the most dictatorial style.” He added that Genet “renders my position immensely difficult.”57
Washington did not return to the capital until July 11, but Knox, Hamilton, and Jefferson considered it necessary to meet on July 8. In preparation for this rump cabinet meeting, Hamilton and Knox had composed a long memorandum on the Little Sarah crisis. It was, in effect, an indictment of Edmond Genet, laid out in thirteen sections. The president, they noted, had made it clear that the fitting out of privateers in US ports was not permitted. Thus, the French representatives in America who defied the president’s policy had committed a “gross outrage upon and an undisguised contempt of the Government of the US.” They saw Genet’s continued noncompliance as a tactic to force the United States into the war and as a concerted effort to control the American government itself. They were appalled by Genet’s memorial of June 22, calling it “the most offensive paper, perhaps, that ever was offered by a foreign Minister to a friendly power with which he resided.” They resented his imputation that the president harbored ill will toward France and was “under the instigation of foreign influence.” They were insulted by his suggestion that the president had gone beyond his authority. And they were shocked by Genet’s audacity in threatening to appeal to Congress, if not to the people themselves. He had, they now knew, declared this as his intent in his meeting with Alexander Dallas. Genet’s refusal to firmly assure that the Little Sarah/Petite Democrate would not sail until the president had made his determination was, in their view, “an additional high-handed contempt of the Government.”
In this memorandum, Hamilton and Knox insisted that the government must act immediately. Indecision would sacrifice the dignity and the essential interests of the nation, but more than this it would “destroy, both at home and abroad, a due respect for the government… and ultimately… put the country in the condition of being dictated to by that foreign Agent.” Would there be repercussions from France if the US government acted decisively to enforce its policy? The two cabinet members insisted that France could not reasonably complain about an action that was “merely a vindication of our own sovereignty.” The greater risk was that inaction would make the United States “an instrument of the hostilities of France” and thus an enemy of Britain.58
Hamilton made clear he would not hesitate to use military force to sustain the federal government’s authority and sovereignty in the face of French contempt. At the cabinet meeting, he pressed for the creation of a battery on Mud Island, which sits on the Delaware River below Philadelphia. The battery was to be manned by militia who would be under orders to arrest and prevent the Little Sarah from departing American territorial waters. When Secretary of War Henry Knox quickly concurred with Hamilton, the decision was made. The time for firm action had arrived.59
Jefferson demurred, however. In a minority opinion written that day, he explained his opposition to the creation of the Mud Island battery. He remained convinced that Genet would keep the ship in harbor until the president returned to the capital. But if construction of the battery began, the French minister might change his mind. And if the crew of the vessel found guns ready to fire on it, it was “morally certain that bloody consequences would follow.” This would be catastrophic, especially because twenty French warships, along with more than one hundred privateers, were expected to arrive momentarily in New York harbor. Better to allow the ship to leave port than to risk war with France.
Jefferson’s reasoned argument could not mask his fierce opposition to any action that would aid Britain, which he still saw as a more serious threat to American sovereignty. He offered the standard Republican argument: the English, he argued, have armed their ships with far more of our guns than the two cannon allegedly added to the Little Sarah. If the rumor was true that fifteen to twenty Americans have joined the crew of this privateer “with their own consent,” it was also true, he contended, that the English had forcibly taken ten times that number from American merchant ships at sea. He described the situation in broad terms: “It is inconsistent, for a nation which has been patiently bearing for ten years the grossest insults and injuries from their late enemies, to rise at a feather against their friends and benefactors.” He would not—could not—agree to “gratify the combination of kings with the spectacle of the two only republics on earth destroying each other for two cannon.” France could commit no abuse of neutrality great enough to justify American support for England. The United States must not “turn the scale of contest, and let it be from our hands that the hopes of man receive their last stab.”60
Two days later, Jefferson reconstructed the conversation he had with Genet on the evening of July 7. In edited form, this account was ultimately sent to the president. In it he reported Genet’s outbursts to Dallas and to him but stopped short of reporting any threat by Genet to go directly to the people with his complaints. He had taken the opportunity to patiently explain the structure of the federal government to Genet. The executive branch conducted all diplomacy, and although Congress was sovereign in making laws, the executive was sovereign in the execution of those laws. When Genet insisted that Congress was responsible for seeing that treaties were observed, Jefferson had corrected him. This was the president’s responsibility and the Constitution made the president the court of final appeal. Genet was astonished. He said he had “never before… had such an idea.” Jefferson had continued with his lesson in sovereignty—and diplomacy. Each party to a treaty had the right, he told Genet, to interpret the terms of that treaty as it saw fit. If Genet disagreed with America’s interpretation, his only recourse was to raise the issue with his own government. In the meantime, he must acquiesce in the administration’s decisions. Finally, Jefferson had warned Genet that it would be a serious offense if the vessel in question departed before the president’s return. Genet appeared to understand, Jefferson told the president, and agreed to keep the ship in port.61
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“Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance—with impunity?”
—George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, July 11, 1793
JEFFERSON’S EFFORTS TO educate Genet were in vain. On July 9, the French minister sent the secretary of state a brief note on the Little Sarah. He made no effort to deny arming the vessel, nor did he attempt to justify the decision to do so. The ship was solidly built; it was a “swift sailer”; it would be an advantageous addition to the French naval force. Therefore, he had ordered it repaired, completed its armament with cannon he claimed to have found on board four French vessels, manned it with French sailors—and readied a commission for it. There were no grounds for further discussion, Genet added, for “when treaties speak, the agents of nations have but to obey.”62
A second letter followed on the same day. Ignoring the possibility that an aggressive stance might not aid his cause—or simply blind to the consequences—Genet went on the offensive. The consul at Philadelphia, he informed Jefferson, had requested that the governor of Pennsylvania order out of port a British ship, the Jane, on the grounds that it had shown no signs of distress to justify its docking there. The governor, however, replied that he could take no action during the president’s absence from the city. Genet disagreed. Citing article XXII of the Treaty of Amity, he insisted that it was not necessary to await a decision of the president. The Ameri
can people, he declared, consider these treaties “as the most sacred laws.” He was therefore requesting that Jefferson order the governor to perform the duties “our treaties impose on him.”63
On Washington’s return to Philadelphia two days later, he learned that the cabinet decision to build a battery was moot. Genet had ordered the Little Sarah relocated south of the capital, out of range of Mud Island. Washington read the correspondence forwarded to him, including reports from others that Genet had threatened to appeal over the president’s head to the people. Washington’s response was to fire off an angry note to his secretary of state. “What,” the president demanded, “is to be done in the case of the Little Sarah, now at Chester? Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance—with impunity? And then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the People. What must the world think of such conduct, and of the Government of the U. States in submitting to it?” Washington’s anger and frustration were directed as much at Jefferson as at Genet. He demanded Jefferson’s opinion on how to proceed before the next day.64
Genet was not the only minister registering complaints. Hammond had written, reporting French infractions regarding the outfitting of privateers. Faced with a variety of charges and countercharges from the ministers of France and England, the president and his cabinet decided to seek the opinion of the judiciary. Until the justices tendered their opinion, Washington expected both Genet and Hammond to refrain from sending any of the ships in dispute out to sea. The Little Sarah, the Jane and the William, the Citoyen Genet and its two prizes, the Lovely Lass and Prince William Henry, along with the brig Fanny were to remain in port until “persons learned in the law” had advised the president.65