132 “The Yemeni constitution prohibits”: “An Interview with President Ali Abdullah Saleh,” New York Times, June 28, 2008.
132 “dialogue council”: Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, January 2010, www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_YemenOnTheBrink.pdf.
132 “Yemeni state felt an urgent need”: Ane Skov Birk, “Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen,” Series Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, April 2009, http://icsr.info/2009/06/incredible-dialogues-religious-dialogue-as-a-means-of-counter-terrorism-in-yemen/.
132 “gross violations”: Ibid.
132 return to the struggle, discontinued: Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink?”
132 “After the Cole”: Author interview, former US counterterrorism official, January 2011.
132 escaped from prison: Associated Press, “Main Suspects in USS Cole Bombing Escape from Yemeni Prison,” FoxNews.com, April 11, 2003.
133 “Al-Qaeda intends”: Michael Sheuer, “Yemen Still Close to al-Qaeda’s Heart,” Asia Times Online, February 7, 2008.
133 “Our operations”: James L. Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations on Weapons Mass of Destruction (WMD) Programs, Written Statement for the Record, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, April 14, 2004.
12: “Never Trust a Nonbeliever”
134 give Britain another shot: Author interview, Nasser al Awlaki, September 2012.
134 among Awlaki’s sponsors: Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2011.
134 “they sought to co-opt”: Ibid. All quotations of Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens come from this paper. The author does not intend to suggest that the organizations named in this chapter in any way condoned or espoused the radical views held by Awlaki later in his life, particularly with regard to jihad. Their support for Awlaki in 2003 seems to have been based on his ability to preach a conservative religious message with charisma and cultural savvy. As former colleagues and family members have noted, this style of preaching was quite novel at the time.
134 “icons of Western Salafism”: Ibid.
134 “forced down the throats”: Anwar al Awlaki, “The Life of the Prophet Muhammad: Introduction [Makkan Period],” You-Tube video, 49:20, from a sixteen-CD lecture series produced by al-Bashir Audio, undated, posted by “Muslim Knight,” September 12, 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ts36mQfviE.
135 “never, ever trust a kuffar”: Anwar al Awlaki, “Never, Ever Trust the (Kuffar) Non-Believer—Anwar al-Awlaki,” You-Tube video, 13:12, from a series of lectures delivered by Awlaki called “The Life and Times of Umar bin Khattab,” at the East London Mosque in London, United Kingdom, December 2003, posted by “nevertrusttherkuffar,” October 9, 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SALh9tTvZ4.
136 “We are watching”: Anwar al Awlaki, “Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki: Stop Police Terror, Part 1 of 3,” YouTube video, 10:19, from an audio recording of a lecture delivered by Awlaki as part of a London-based campaign called “Stop Police Terror” at East London Mosque on December 26, 2003, posted by “Haqq13,” May 24, 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=3U6wGQkOLBc.
136 “We are arresting people”: “Police Question Terror Suspects,” BBC.co.uk, December 3, 2003.
136 “there is a Guantánamo Bay”: Anwar al Awlaki, “Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki: Stop Police Terror, Part 3 of 3,” from an audio recording of a lecture delivered by Awlaki as part of a London-based campaign called “Stop Police Terror” at East London Mosque on December 26, 2003, posted by “Haqq13,” May 24, 2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=T6JC4hzaTgY.
136 “He became a social figure”: Author interview, Nasser al Awlaki, January 2012.
137 “The Jews and the Christians”: Awlaki, “Never, Ever Trust the (Kuffar) Non-Believer.”
137 “I want to state”: Anwar al Awlaki, transcription of lecture from series, “The Story of Ibn al-Akwa: Sheikh Noor al-Din Shahaada,” produced by Dar Ibn al-Mubarak, 2003, transcription by Meleagrou-Hitchens, found in “As American as Apple Pie.”
137 unable to afford: Author interview, Nasser al Awlaki, September 2012.
137 “I’ve got a feeling”: Meleagrou-Hitchens, “As American as Apple Pie.”
13: “You Don’t Have to Prove to Anyone That You Did Right”
138 “tracking and then capturing”: Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Says a Covert Force Hunts Hussein,” New York Times, November 7, 2003.
138 run by McRaven: John Barry and Michael Hirsh, “The Hunt Heats Up,” Newsweek, March 14, 2004.
138 Special Activities Division, “the Activity”: “Agencies Unite to Find bin Laden,” Washington Times, March 15, 2004.
138 “tightening the sensor-to-shooter loop”: Ibid.
138 given a mission: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan—and the Path to Victory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), p. 192.
139 Able Danger: Ibid., p. 17.
139 Shaffer, colleagues claimed: Ibid., p. 178.
139 told the 9/11 Commission: Ibid., pp. 177–179.
139 “conducted clandestine,” “first DIA”: Ibid., pp. 18–19.
139 “Bush administration lunacy”: Ibid., p. 19.
139 “yielded nothing”: Ibid.
139 “more than two-thirds”: Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, October 22, 2004.
139 “nearly half”: Juan O. Tamayo, “Capture of Saddam Will Not Mean More Forces Available to Find bin Laden,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, December 14, 2003.
140 “Detainees captured by TF-121”: Josh White, “US Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds,” Washington Post, December 1, 2004.
140 “Everyone knows”: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, S. Prt. 110-54, p. 218 (2008).
140 “gratuitous enemies”: White, “US Generals in Iraq Were Told.”
140 former bodyguard: Details of the operation to capture Saddam Hussein come from Michael Smith, Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), pp. 261–263.
140 “Ladies and gentlemen”: Transcript, “Ambassador Bremer Briefing from Baghdad,” December 14, 2003.
140 $750,000 in hundred-dollar bills: Smith, Killer Elite, p. 262.
140 “I am Saddam Hussein,” “regards”: “‘President Bush Sends His Regards,’” CNN.com, December 15, 2003.
141 Saddam’s temporary home: Eric Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, “In Secret Unit’s ‘Black Room,’ a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse,” New York Times, March 19, 2006.
141 “look to the future”: Transcript, “Ambassador Bremer Briefing from Baghdad.”
141 “coalition special operations forces”: Ibid.
141 shared a cigar: Barton Gellman, “Person of the Year 2011; Runners-Up; William McRaven: The Admiral,” Time, December 14, 2011.
141 “begin to run out of gas”: Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004), p. 62.
141 “establishment of an insurgency”: Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), p. 266.
142 common cause: Jeffrey Gettleman, “Signs That Shiites and Sunnis Are Joining to Battle Americans,” New York Times, April 9, 2004.
142 “exacerbating the insurgency”: Author interview, Andrew Exum, March 2012. All quotations from Andrew Exum in this chapter come from the author’s interview.
142 barely give his command the courtesy: Author interview, General Ricardo Sa
nchez, June 2010.
142 The most serious thing”: Author interview, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, May 2011.
143 “tailored down”: Stanley A. McChrystal, “It Takes a Network: The New Front Line of Modern Warfare,” Foreign Policy (March–April 2011). All quotations from General McChrystal in this chapter come from this article.
144 four subunits: Sean D. Naylor, “Special Ops Unit Nearly Nabs Zarqawi,” Army Times, April 28, 2006. The article describes the task force after it has received a new code name, Task Force 145.
145 F3EA: McChrystal, “It Takes a Network.”
145 Copper Green, Matchbox: Marc Ambinder and D. B. Grady, The Command: Deep Inside the President’s Secret Army (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2012, Kindle edition).
145 Footprint: William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering US Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005), p. 369.
145 “weren’t getting anything substantive”: Seymour M. Hersh, “The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to Abu Ghraib,” New Yorker, May 24, 2004.
146 “Rumsfeld’s answer”: Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008), p. 243.
146 “‘Grab whom you must’”: Hersh, “The Gray Zone.”
146 “just wasn’t right”: Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, pp. 257–259.
14: “No Blood, No Foul”
147 in one of two structures: Eric Schmitt and Carolyn Marshall, “Task Force 6-26: Inside Camp Nama; in Secret Unit’s ‘Black Room,’ a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse,” New York Times, March 19, 2006.
147 “Nasty-Ass Military Area”: John H. Richardson, “Acts of Conscience,” Esquire, September 21, 2009, www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0806TERROR_102.
147 “don’t make them bleed”: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
147 “adopted the SOP”: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, S. Prt. 110-54, p. 158 (2008).
147 “included stress positions”: Ibid., pp. 158–159.
148 unlawful combatants: As John Sifton and Marc Garlasco note in a report for Human Rights Watch, in the period during which the task force operated out of Camp NAMA, “U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq were bound by various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as by customary international law.” The administration said publicly that the Geneva Conventions applied to the treatment of Iraqis in detention but could be suspended if the detainee was a foreign fighter. However, according to an internal DoD report cited by the Senate report, the standard operating procedure used by the task force in Iraq was “influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002...and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as ‘unlawful combatant.’” Military personnel who had worked with the task force told the Senate Armed Services Committee and Human Rights Watch that prisoners were denied protections under the Geneva Conventions, including Iraqi nationals. See John Sifton and Marc Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul: Soldiers’ Accounts of Detainee Abuse in Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2006, www.hrw.org/reports/2006/07/22/no-blood-no-foul. See also Terry Frieden, “Justice Dept.: Geneva Conventions Limited in Iraq,” CNN.com, October 26, 2004; and Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. 158.
148 would not see lawyers: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
148 ninety days: Spencer Ackerman, “How Special Ops Copied al-Qaida to Kill It,” Danger Room (blog), Wired.com, September 9, 2011, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/mcchrystal-network/.
148 often subjected to: John Sifton and Marc Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul: Soldiers’ Accounts of Detainee Abuse in Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2006, www.hrw.org/reports/2006/07/22/no-blood-no-foul. All information attributed to Human Rights Watch in this chapter comes from this report, unless otherwise noted.
148 “directly from General McChrystal”: Ibid.
148 set foot in Camp NAMA: Ibid.
148 “very necessary”: Ibid.
148 rebuffed: Ibid.
148 up the chain of command: Ibid.
148 special ID: Ibid.
148 “running a country club”: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p.191.
148 “GTMO-ize”: Ibid.
148 “fearful of dogs”: Ibid., pp. 196–197.
148 “can’t tell our chain of command”: Sifton and Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul.”
149 “This is the dark side”: Author interview, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, May 2011.
149 “no oversight”: Author interview, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, May 2011.
149 “very high levels”: Author interview, Scott Horton, September 2010. All statements attributed to Scott Horton in this chapter come from the author’s interview.
150 “two reasons”: Jonathan S. Landay, “Report: Abusive Tactics Used to Seek Iraq–al Qaida Link,” McClatchy Newspapers, April 21, 2009.
150 “tossed them back”: Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004), p. 48.
150 “You saw the French”: Author interview, Andrew Exum, March 2012. All quotations of Andrew Exum in this chapter come from the author’s interview.
151 withdrew its interrogators: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
151 voicing their warnings: Ibid.
151 arrived at Camp NAMA: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. 191.
151 “filtration site”: Author interview, Scott Horton, September 2010.
151 four interrogation rooms: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
152 “this is the treatment”: Sifton and Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul.” All quotations of “Jeff Perry” in this chapter come from this report.
152 interrogations there often incorporated: Ibid.
152 One former prisoner: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
152 described heinous acts: Brigadier General Richard P. Formica, “Article 15-6 Investigations of CJSOTF-AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations,” November 8, 2004, pp. 20–21, 30; declassified June 7, 2006, released by the Department of Defense on Friday, June 16, 2006, www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operationandplans/Detainee/OtherDetaineeRelatedDocuments.html.
152 beat prisoners with rifle butts, spit in their faces: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
152 “beating the shit out of”: Sifton and Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul.”
153 “pissed in a bottle”: “CID Report—Final—0016-04-CID343-69355,” Army Criminal Investigative Command Report into allegations of detainee abuse at Camp NAMA, Baghdad International Airport, August 4, 2004, obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union and other human rights groups via FOIA, www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/030705/9135_9166.pdf.
153 interrupt non-harsh interrogations: Sifton and Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul.”
153 “to leverage”: Ibid.
153 arrived at Camp NAMA: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. 173.
153 “fundamental systemic problems”: Ibid., p. 173.
153 They told Kleinman: Ibid.
153 described a chaotic situation: Ibid.
153 ordered to do so: Ibid., p. 181.
153 “I walked into the interrogation room”: Ibid., p. 176.
154 “cleared hot to use SERE methods”: Ibid., p. 179.
154 “unlawful order,” Kleinman was told: Ibid., p. 180.
154 trying to break: Ibid., pp. 181–182.
154 “Concept of Operations”: Ibid., p. 184.
154 “friction was developing”: Ibid.
154 “sleep lightly”: Ibid., p. 186.
155 special operators as interrogators: Ibid., p. 193.
155 “It’s just that simple”: Author interview, Malcolm Nance, May 2011
. All quotations of Malcolm Nance in this chapter come from the author’s interview.
155 “out of the hands of”: Human Rights Watch, “Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division,” September 23, 2005, www.hrw.org/node/11610/section/1.
155 complaining to Langley: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
156 “more aggressive”: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. 159.
156 unmarked helicopters, goggles: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
156 “harsh interrogation [was] approved”: Sifton and Garlasco, “No Blood, No Foul.”
156 nondisclosure agreements: Ibid.
157 “disaster waiting to happen”: Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees, p. 162.
157 Fashad Mohammad: Hina Shamsi, “Command’s Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Human Rights First, 2006, www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/we-can-end-torture-now/commands-responsibility-detainee-deaths-in-u-s-custody-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/. The Medical Examiner’s report cited was obtained by Human Rights First: Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Final Autopsy Report for Autopsy No. ME-04-309 (Fashad Mohammad), November 22, 2004.
157 Manadel al Jamadi: MG George R. Fay, “AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,” completed August 23, 2004, p. 53. The report states that “CIA representatives” brought a man to Abu Ghraib early on November 4, 2003. He had been “captured by Navy SEAL Team 7 during a joint-121/CIA mission.” The report goes on to describe the circumstances of the man’s death. Subsequent reporting revealed that the man’s name was Manadel al-Jamadi. See David Cloud, “Seal Officer Hears Charges in Court-Martial in Iraqi’s Death,” New York Times, May 25, 2005.
157 “needs to be reined in”: Josh White, “U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds,” Washington Post, December 1, 2004.
158 “pored over intelligence”: Schmitt and Marshall, “Task Force 6-26.”
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