• Tighten immigration laws. It is now well known that terrorists from the Middle East and elsewhere have made the United States, Germany, Italy, and other countries into terrorist havens because of laxity in immigration regulation. This era of immigration free-for-all should be brought to an end. An important aspect of taking control of the immigration situation is stricter background checks of potential immigrants, coupled with the real possibility of deportation. The possibility of expulsion must be a threat hovering over all terrorist and pro-terrorist activity in the democracies. The new Clinton administration initiative, for example, defines spokesmen and fund-raisers for terrorist organizations as liable to deportation, makes immigration files available to federal investigators, and establishes a special judicial process for deportations in which classified evidence may be brought without giving the terrorist organizations access to the materials.
• Require periodic legislative review to safeguard civil liberties . The concern of civil libertarians over possible infringements of the rights of innocent citizens is well placed, and all additional powers granted the security services should require annual renewal by the legislature, this in addition to judicial oversight of actions as they are taken in the field. Thus, hearings may be held to consider the record of possible abuses which have resulted from changes in police authority. If the abuses prove to be too frequent or the results inconclusive in terms of the citizens, the particular provisions in question can be jettisoned automatically.
The legal provisions suggested above constitute a roster of measures available to a democracy subjected to a sustained threat of terror. A lesser threat usually could require fewer measures. In some countries, these measures would necessarily mean shifting the legal balance between civil liberties and security. There is nothing easy in making this choice. But it is nevertheless crucial that the citizens of the West understand that such options are legitimately available to them, and that, judiciously applied, they may serve to put terrorism back on the defensive.
7. Actively pursue terrorists. Legal powers are of course meaningless if they are not accompanied by a commensurate mustering of will to act on the part of the executive branch and the security services. Rooting out terrorist groups must become a top priority for elected officials of all parties—and one that cannot be allowed to slide from political relevance after a few cases have been cracked. In an age in which the power of the weapons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal-security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Potential sources of terror must be studied and understood, groups preaching violence must be penetrated and catalogued, and groups actually preparing for it must be uprooted.
8. Do not release jailed terrorists. Among the most important policies which must be adopted in the face of terrorism is the refusal to release convicted terrorists from prisons. This is a mistake that Israel, once the leader in anti-terror techniques, has made over and over again. Release of convicted terrorists before they have served their full sentences seems like an easy and tempting way of defusing blackmail situations in which innocent people may lose their lives. But its utility is momentary at best. Prisoner releases only embolden terrorists by giving them the feeling that even if they are caught their punishment will be brief. Worse, by leading terrorists to think such demands are likely to be met, they encourage precisely the kind of terrorist blackmail which they are supposed to defuse: All that Timothy McVeigh’s compatriots need to know is that the United States government is susceptible to releasing him in exchange for the lives of innocent hostages in order to get the terrorists to make just such a demand; only the most unrelenting refusal to ever give in to such blackmail can prevent most such situations from arising.
9. Train special forces to fight terrorism. Greater emphasis must be placed on the training of special units equipped for anti-terror operations. In anti-terror training, law enforcers learn to fight a completely different kind of gun battle, in which the goal is to hold their fire rather than to unleash it. Operations against terrorists often involve the rescue of hostages or the possibility that innocent bystanders might be hurt. This necessarily means that the soldiers or policemen charged with fighting terrorism must learn to subdue the natural temptation to concentrate overwhelming fire on the enemy. Counter-terrorist operations usually require the barest minimum application of force necessary to overcome the terrorists, who often use hostages as a human shield.
While those branches of Western security services specializing in counter-intelligence and surveillance generally enjoy a high level of professionalism and training, this is often not the case with the forces that have to do the actual fighting against terrorists. It may be impossible to guarantee that there will be no more scenes such as the one in Waco, Texas, in which scores of cultists and four lawmen were killed. But the likelihood of avoiding such catastrophes is considerably increased if the forces involved are proficient in anti-terror techniques. Such units at the national or federal level are usually adequately trained for these missions, but in a crisis it may take them many hours to arrive on the scene. It is therefore important that units of local police forces be trained in anti-terror tactics as well.
Israel has had some spectacular successes in this area, including the rescue of 103 hostages at Entebbe. But it has also had its share of spectacular failures, the worst of which was the loss of twenty-six schoolchildren being held hostage in a school building in Maalot. Having specially trained troops that accumulate and refine anti-terror techniques reduces the probability of failure; it does not, of course, mean that terrorists may be fought and hostages rescued without risk. What is crucial to recognize is that the risk to society of not challenging the terrorists forcefully—that is, of negotiating with them and accepting their demands—is far greater than the risk involved in the use of special forces. For in negotiating, the government issues an open invitation for more terror, an invitation which puts at risk the safety of every citizen in society.
10. Educate the public. The terrorist uses violence to erode the resistance of the public and leaders alike to his political demands. But the resistance of a society to terrorist blackmail may likewise be strengthened by counter-terrorist education, which clearly puts forth what the terrorists are trying to achieve, elucidates the immorality of their methods, and explains the necessity of resisting them. Such education is usually unnecessary in the case of sporadic and isolated terrorist attacks, which are almost universally met with an appropriate and natural revulsion. But in the case of a prolonged and sustained campaign lasting months or years, the natural disgust of the public with the terrorist’s message begins to break down and is often replaced by a willingness to accommodate terrorist demands. By preparing terrorism-education programs for various age groups and including them in the school curriculum, the government can inoculate the population against the impulse to give in when faced with protracted terrorist pressure. Familiarity with terrorism and its complete rejection would create a citizenry which is capable of “living with terror”—not in the sense of accepting terror, but rather in the sense of understanding what is needed for society to survive its attacks with the least damage. And once the terrorists know that virtually the entire population will stand behind the government’s decision never to negotiate with them, the possibility of actually extracting political concessions will begin to look exceedingly remote to them.2
With such a program of steadfast resistance to the rising tide of terror, the United States may once again lead the West, as it did in the 1980s, in successfully fighting terrorism. Of course, much of this program is laced with obstacles that only purposeful determination may overcome. The leaders of Western countries may choose instead to avoid taking the tough decisions
and continue doing business as usual; they may adopt few or none of these measures, believing that the new wave of terrorism will somehow dissipate of its own accord. It will not. Terrorism has the unfortunate quality of expanding to fill the vacuum left to it by passivity or weakness. And it shrinks accordingly when confronted with resolute and decisive action. Terrorists may test this resolution a number of times before they draw back, and a government has to be prepared to sustain its anti-terror policies through shrill criticism, anxious calls to give in to terrorists’ demands, and even responses of panic. But it is a certainty that there is no way to fight terrorism—other than to fight it.
Undoubtedly the leaders of the United States in particular could be subjected to a barrage of criticism that they are curtailing civil freedoms and that they are overreacting. They should reject this criticism, responding, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, that “it is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation”3—and this includes unlimited civil liberties. Western democracy is strong enough to be able to monitor any added powers given its security services, especially if the technique of requiring periodic renewal of these powers is adopted. Moreover, the security of the democracies and their well-being cannot be governed by the ebb and flow of local political skirmishes. Leaders must have the courage to do what is required even in the face of the most stinging criticism. Courageous action is in itself the best answer to the inevitable slings that the small-minded heap upon the statesman facing great odds. And seldom has there been a menace that so called for the courage and resolve of the true statesman as the resurgent terror which threatens to rob us of the freedoms and values we so cherish.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My first vote of thanks must go to Dr. Yoram Hazony of the Shalem Center-National Policy Institute in Jerusalem, who, not for the first time, shouldered the burden of being my editor, my research director, and my all-around sounding board. It was with him that I discussed and tested all the ideas in this book, drawing especially on his expertise in political philosophy to sharpen and hone the legal and moral aspects of a democracy’s response to the dilemma of fighting terrorism while preserving civil liberties.
Colonel (res.) Yigal Carmon, a former adviser on terrorism to two Israeli prime ministers, deserves my heart-felt thanks for unstintingly making available to me his unique obervations on the operational methods of fighting terrorism. In this he drew not only from his own rich professional experience in Israel but also from his insights gleaned from a vast network of contacts with anti-terror authorities in many lands, examples of which I have used liberally throughout these pages.
I am grateful to Boaz Ganor, a specialist on terrorism at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, for having read the entire manuscript, offering important comments which served to clarify and amplify many passages.
I am much indebted to my publisher, Roger Straus, who with his boundless elan and unmatched nerve prodded me to write this book while in the throes of Israel’s less than genteel politics. Roger’s encouragement on the need to clearly state the fundamentals of fighting terrorism in the 1990s were as valuable to me as they were during our earlier collaboration on this subject in the 1980s. The form of the problem has changed, the need to address it has not.
My colleague and friend Ron Dermer has lately served as a much-valued intellectual gadfly. In the days following the terror bombings in America, his keen and critical intelligence helped focus my thoughts on the concepts necessary to wage battle against a resurgent terror at the beginning of a new century.
I owe my deepest appreciation to my wife, Sara. Her clear mind and compassionate heart helped see me through many difficult days. By reminding me always that behind the unfathomable numbers of terrorism’s victims lie the ruins of broken lives and shattered hopes, she renewed a decades-old conviction that I must do all in my power to help win the war against this unmitigated evil. That is what each of us is now asked to do.
EDITED BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
Terrorism: How the West Can Win
International Terrorism: Challenge and Response
BY BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World
NOTES
CHAPTER I
1 Broadcast of March 5, 1995.
2 See The Economist, May 5, 1995; Time, May 8, 1995; U.S. News & World Report, May 8, 1995; Newsweek, May 8, 1995.
3 See Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986).
CHAPTER II
1 Christian Lochte, “Fighting Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, p. 173.
2 Joseph W. Bishop, “Legal Measures to Control Terrorism in Democracies,” in Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., International Terrorism: Challenge and Response (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981), p. 301.
3 Yigal Carmon, former Prime Minister’s adviser on terrorism.
4 Bishop, pp. 302–4.
5 Quoted in Walter Berns, “Constitutional Power and the Defense of Free Government,” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win.
6 Ibid.
7 Benedict de Spinoza, A Theological-Political Treatise, R.H.M. Elwes, trans. (New York: Dover, 1951), pp. 258, 260.
CHAPTER III
1 Richard Pipes, “The Roots of the Involvement,” in International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, pp. 58–61.
2 Michael Ledeen, “Soviet Sponsorship: The Will to Disbelieve,” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, pp. 88–92.
3 Brian Crozier, “Soviet Support for International Terrorism,” in International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, pp. 66–68.
4 Ray Cline, “The Strategic Framework,” in International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, p. 94.
5 Ledeen, p. 91.
6 Ibid., p. 90. See also Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World (New York: Bantam, 1993), pp. 194–95. Documentation for the PLO’s relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as with other terrorist groups serving as proxy warriors in a host of countries, can be found in Uri Ra’anan, et al., Hydra of Carnage: International Links of Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1986), pp. 477–568, 609–20.
7 Crozier, p. 70.
8 The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1979.
9 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Defining Terrorism,” in Terrorism: How the West Can Win, pp. 16–17, 23.
10 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 790.
CHAPTER IV
1 Muhammad Nuwayhi, Towards a Revolution in Religious Thought (1907), excerpted in John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (New York: Oxford, 1982), pp. 167–68.
2 Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World, p. 122.
3 Arafat quoted in Saudi News Agency, January 2, 1989.
4 This discussion of the Muslim Arab view of history adapted from Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations, pp. 107–23.
5 Yediot Aharonot, June 27, 1995.
6 Source for militant Islamic activity in Europe, except where otherwise indicated: Yigal Carmon, formerly Adviser to the Prime Minister on Terror.
7 Jihad in America, pp. 13, 21, 7.
CHAPTER V
1 The Phased Plan was adopted by the Palestine National Council (PNC), the parent body of the PLO, on June 8, 1974. It declares that “the PLO is fighting by every means … to free the Palestinian land and establish a national, independent, and fighting government over every part of the soil of Palestine to be freed” [Section 2]. It continues: “After its establishment, the national Palestinian government will fight for the unity of the countries of confrontation, to complete the liberation of all the Palestinian land …” [Section 8]. The Phased Plan in its entirety was broadcast by Saut Falastin Radio, Egypt, on the day of its adoption and may be found reprinted in Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations, pp. 433–34.
3 Dan Polisar, Peace Watch monitoring group.
4 Interview with Yasir Arafat, Radio Monte Carlo, September 1, 1993. Cited in Jerusalem Post, December 12, 1993.
5 Jerusalem Post, March 22, 1994.
6 Amid Haj Ismail Jabar, Ha’aretz, May 15, 1994.
7 Ha’aretz, August 10, 1994.
8 Israel Television News, November 10, 1994.
9 Yediot Aharonot, November 17, 1994.
10 Ma’ariv, November 16, 1994.
11 Yediot Aharonot, November 17, 1994.
12 Dan Polisar, Peace Watch monitoring group.
13 Ma’ariv, July 22, 1995.
14 Hatzofeh, July 13, 1995.
15 The New York Times, January 29, 1939.
16 Arafat was quickly caught abusing this exemption. As Prime Minister Rabin put in a report to the Israeli cabinet, “Arafat smuggled into Gaza in his motorcade” several notorious terrorist killers, including Mamdouh Nufal, who organized the 1974 massacre at Maalot of twenty-six schoolchildren; Jihad al Giusi, who took part in planning the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes; and Mustafa Liftawi, who planned the 1974 massacre on Israel’s coastal road, which claimed thirty-five Israeli lives. In this case, Israel’s discovery of this flagrant violation of the Oslo accords forced Arafat to turn back these terrorists to Egypt.
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