THEAETETUS: There definitely are both types that you’ve mentioned.
VISITOR: Shall we take one of these to be a sort of sincere imitator and the other to be an insincere one?
THEAETETUS: That seems right.
VISITOR: And are there one or two kinds of insincere ones?
THEAETETUS: You look and see.
[b] VISITOR: I’m looking, and there clearly appear to be two. I see that one sort can maintain his insincerity in long speeches to a crowd, and the other uses short speeches in private conversation to force the person talking with him to contradict himself.
THEAETETUS: You’re absolutely right.
VISITOR: How shall we show up the long-winded sort, as a statesman or as a demagogue?
THEAETETUS: A demagogue.
VISITOR: And what shall we call the other one? Wise, or a sophist?
THEAETETUS: We can’t call him wise, since we took him not to know [c] anything. But since he imitates the wise man he’ll obviously have a name derived from the wise man’s name. And now at last I see that we have to call him the person who is really and truly a sophist.
VISITOR: Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the way we did before?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not divine. [268d] Anyone who says the sophist is of this “blood and family“30 will be saying, it seems, the complete truth.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
1. See Odyssey ix.270–71.
2. See Odyssey xvii.483–87… . gods go from town to town disguised as visitors of varied appearance, just like Odysseus on this occasion, to observe the deeds of just and unjust people.
3. The reference is to the conversation in the Parmenides.
4. The word “sophist” (sophistēs) is etymologically related to the word “wise” (sophos), and so can be taken to connote knowledge and expertise.
5. In addition to the words bracketed by Burnet, we bracket doxopaideutikēs also.
6. The word here translated by “debating,” eristikon, is sometimes translated (or transliterated) “eristic.” It refers to a practice of competitive debating which the sophists made popular in Athens. Plato’s use of the term stigmatizes the practice as not directed at truth.
7. The text seems faulty here. The general sense, however, is clear.
8. See Parmenides, frg. 7, ll.1–2. The same lines reoccur, with one slight textual difference, at 258d.
9. Note that the Greek word for “nothing,” mēden, literally means something like “not even one” (mēde hen).
10. Accepting the conjecture to “to,” translated by “that which” on the view that it is part of the phrase to mē on, which is generally translated by “that which is not.” In Greek the form is singular (in contrast with ta, for example, “those which”).
11. I.e., 237a–238c, reinforced by 238d–239c.
12. This group includes Parmenides of Elea (the Visitor, of course, comes from there).
13. The reference here is to Heraclitus, who was Ionian. See frg. 51 (cf. Plato, Symp. 187a).
14. Here Plato refers to Empedocles, who lived in Sicily.
15. Accepting the emendation of allos eipēi for allothi pēi in b5.
16. Plato is relying on the thought that if the terms “one” and “name” designate one thing (in the sense that he assumes is relevant), then they are interchangeable, even to the point of generating the strange phrase “the one of the name.”
17. See Theogony, esp. 675–715.
18. Accepting the emendation of inserting pantōn after ontōn.
19. These thinkers were introduced at 242c–d, e–243a.
20. See Aristophanes, Wasps, 1017–20.
21. Alternatively, the two previous sentences can be translated: “So if a person can do that, he’ll adequately discriminate a single form spread out all through many, each of which stands separate from the others, and many forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that’s outside them; and another single form connected as a unit through many wholes, and many forms that are all marked off in separation.”
22. Cf. 255a.
23. At 251a–252c.
24. Alternatively: “Let’s continue, then:” (On this translation, the Visitor is here taking the next step in his plan announced at 255e8; he has said how change relates to rest and to the same, and now proceeds to say how it relates to the different—after which, c11 ff., he completes the plan by saying how it relates to being. Thus he is not repeating anything already said previously.)
25. See 234d–e.
26. This sentence is ambiguous. First, the Greek here uses an idiom which could mean either “says those that are, as they are” or “says those that are, that they are” (cf. 263d). Secondly, the additional explanatory phrase, “about you,” could be taken with “says,” with “are,” or with both.
27. See 256e5–6.
28. See 221c–225a.
29. See 219b.
30. See Iliad vi.211.
STATESMAN
Translated by C. J. Rowe.
This dialogue is a sequel to Sophist. Here the unnamed philosopher from Elea continues his project of expounding his own conceptions of the natures of sophistry and statesmanship, as intellectual capacities distinct both from one another and from that of the philosopher. Now, for his account of the statesman, he takes as his discussion partner—the respondent to the questions he asks in developing and displaying his views—Socrates’ namesake, a pupil, with Theaetetus, of the visiting geometer Theodorus, from Cyrene, an important Greek city on the North African coast. As in Sophist, neither Socrates nor Theodorus takes part in the discussion, except for the brief introductory conversation.
The ‘statesman’—in Greek the politikos, whence the Latinized title Politicus by which the dialogue is alternatively known—is understood from the outset as the possessor of the specialist, expert knowledge of how to rule justly and well—to the citizens’ best interests—in a ‘city’ or polis, directing all its public institutions and affairs. (It is assumed that such knowledge is not only possible, but that politics should be led by it—assumptions that could be questioned, of course.) In constructing his ‘divisions,’ the visitor looks simply to the demand for, and the demands of, this knowledge: he is not defining the capacities needed in their work by any actual persons whom we (or Greeks of the time) would ordinarily describe as ‘statesmen’. In fact, a central thesis of the visitor is that no current city is ruled by such expert statesmen at all. And since no actual person ruling in a city possesses this knowledge, the best current government could (paradoxically) only be that directed by an imitator—a ‘sophist’, one who as Sophist has explained is aware that he does not know the right thing to do, but makes it appear to others that he does; such a government would have good laws and would enforce them, under this ‘sophist’s’ direction, but the knowledge of statesmanship itself would only be weakly reflected in these laws and in the ‘sophist’s’ behavior—it would not actually reside anywhere in the community.
The visitor repeatedly makes plain that, in presenting his views on statesmanship, he is not concerned merely with questions of political theory. In fact, his chief concern is to teach us how to improve ourselves in philosophy itself— to become expert in precisely this ‘method of division’ that he is employing to make the statesman’s nature clear. So he pauses in his exposition several times to point up errors being made along the way, and say how to correct them, as well as to indicate special features of the method and the reasons why they are needed. Thus we are treated to excursuses on what it is to divide a class at places where there are real subclasses marked off by their own specific natures, not in some arbitrary and merely conventional way; on which sorts of things require the preliminary study of ‘models’ in order to under
stand them fully— and on the precise nature of such a ‘model’; on the often neglected but crucially important science of measuring things by reference to ‘due measure’ and not relatively to given other things exceeding or falling short of them in the relevant respect—length, weight, size, etc. And we get an elaborate and brilliant ‘myth’ about rule in a former era when gods were personally in charge of human affairs—necessarily different from the statesmanship we are trying to define, since that is an expertise possessed, if at all, by human beings. In their contribution to our understanding of Plato’s later metaphysics, these digressions can usefully be compared to the long digression in Sophist on the natures of being and not being.
Modern readers are often impatient with the visitor’s use of lengthy ‘divisions’ in expounding his views on the nature of statesmanship. Nonetheless, this brilliant dialogue presents a fascinating set of ideas about human affairs—‘second thoughts’ about politics quite different from the theory of philosopher-kings recommended in Republic, and looking forward to the system of laws, and government under them, set out in Laws. It richly repays any effort needed to read it.
J.M.C.
SOCRATES: I’m really much indebted to you, Theodorus, for introducing [257] me to Theaetetus, and also to our visitor.
THEODORUS: And perhaps,1 Socrates, your debt will be three times as great, when they complete both the statesman and the philosopher for you.
SOCRATES: Well, yes and no: shall we say, my dear Theodorus, that we’ve heard the best arithmetician and geometer putting it like that?
THEODORUS: How do you mean, Socrates? [b]
SOCRATES: Because you assumed that each of the three were to be assigned equal worth, when in fact they differ in value by more than can be expressed in terms of mathematical proportion.
THEODORUS: Well said, Socrates, by our god Ammon;2 a just rebuke—you’ve remembered your arithmetic very well,3 to bring me up on my mistake like that. As for you, I’ll get my own back for this on another occasion. But turning to our guest—don’t you give up at all on obliging [c] us, but, whether you choose the statesman first or the philosopher, make your choice and go through him in his turn.
VISITOR: That, Theodorus, is what we must do, since we have tried our hand once, and4 we must not desist until we come to the end of what we have in hand. But I have a question: what should I do about Theaetetus here?
THEODORUS: In what respect?
VISITOR: Should we give him a rest and substitute for him young Socrates here, who trains with him? Or what’s your advice?
THEODORUS: As you say, make the substitution; since they are young, they’ll put up with any sort of exertion more easily if they take a rest.
[d] [OLDER] SOCRATES: What’s more, my friend, both of them seem somehow to have a certain kinship with me. One of them you all say is like me in [258] the way he looks; as for the other, he is called and designated by the same name as I am, and that produces a certain relatedness. Well, we must always be eager to recognize those akin to us by talking to them. With Theaetetus I myself got together in discussion yesterday, and I have just now heard him5 answering questions, whereas neither applies in Socrates’ case; we must take a look at him too. He’ll answer me on another occasion; for now let him answer you.
VISITOR: I’ll go along with that. Socrates, do you hear what Socrates says?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: Then do you agree to it?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Absolutely.
[b] VISITOR: It seems there is no obstacle on your side, and perhaps there should be even less on mine. Well then, after the sophist, it seems to me that the two of us must search for the statesman.6 Now tell me: should we posit in the case of this person too that he is one of those who possess knowledge,7 or what assumption should we make?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That’s what we should assume.
VISITOR: In that case we must divide the various sorts of knowledge, as we did when we were considering the previous individual?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Perhaps so.
VISITOR: But it’s not in the same place, Socrates, that I think I see a cut.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
[c] VISITOR: It’s in a different place.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, apparently.
VISITOR: So in what direction will one discover the path that leads to the statesman? For we must discover it, and after having separated it from the rest we must impress one character on it; and having stamped a single different form on the other turnings we must make our minds think of all sorts of knowledge there are as falling into two classes.8
YOUNG SOCRATES: That, I think, is actually for you to do, visitor, not for me.
VISITOR: But, Socrates, it must also be a matter for you, when it becomes [d] clear to us what it is.
YOUNG SOCRATES: You’re right.
VISITOR: Well then: isn’t it the case that arithmetic and some other sorts of expertise that are akin to it don’t involve any practical actions, but simply provide knowledge?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That’s so.
VISITOR: Whereas for their part the sorts of expertise involved in carpentry and manufacture as a whole have their knowledge as it were naturally bound up with practical actions, and use it to complete those material [e] objects they cause to come into being from not having been before?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What of that?
VISITOR: Well, divide all cases of knowledge in this way, calling the one sort practical knowledge, the other purely theoretical.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I grant you these as two classes of that single thing, knowledge, taken as a whole.
VISITOR: Then shall we posit the statesman and king and slave-master, and the manager of a household as well, as one thing, when we refer to them by all these names, or are we to say that they are as many sorts of expertise as the names we use to refer to them? Or rather, let me take this way, and you follow me.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What way is that?
[259] VISITOR: This one. If someone who is himself in private practice is capable of advising a doctor in public employment, isn’t it necessary for him to be called by the same professional title as the person he advises?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: Well then, won’t we say that the person who is clever at giving advice to a king of a country, although he is himself a private individual, himself has the expert knowledge that the ruler himself ought to have possessed?
YOUNG SOCRATES: We will.
[b] VISITOR: But the knowledge that belongs to the true king is the knowledge of kingship?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: And isn’t it the case that the person who possesses this, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private citizen, in all circumstances, in virtue of his possession of the expertise itself, will correctly be addressed as an expert in kingship?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That’s fair.
VISITOR: Next, a household manager and a slave-master are the same thing.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: Well then, surely there won’t be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a large household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other?
YOUNG SOCRATES: None.
[c] VISITOR: So, in answer to the question we were asking ourselves just now, it’s clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of expertise in kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let’s not pick any quarrel with him.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree—why should we?
VISITOR: But this much is clear, that the power of any king to maintain his rule has little to do with the use of his hands or his body in general in comparison with the understanding and force of his mind.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
VISITOR: Then do you want us to assert that the king is more closely [d] related to the theoretical sort of knowledge than to the manual or generally practical sort?
; YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
VISITOR: In that case we shall put all these things together—the statesman’s knowledge and the statesman, the king’s knowledge and the king—as one, and regard them as the same?9
YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
VISITOR: Well, would we be proceeding in the right order, if after this we divided theoretical knowledge?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
VISITOR: So look closely to see if we can detect some break in it.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of what sort? Tell me.
VISITOR: Of this sort. We agreed, I think, that there is such a thing as an [e] art of calculation?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: And I suppose it belongs absolutely among the theoretical sorts of expertise.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite.
VISITOR: Because once it recognizes that there is a difference between numbers, there surely isn’t any further job we’ll assign to it than judging what it has recognized?
YOUNG SOCRATES: No, certainly not.
VISITOR: And all master-builders too10—they don’t act as workers themselves, but manage workers.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
VISITOR: In so far—I suppose—as what the master-builder provides is understanding rather than manual labor.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Just so.
VISITOR: It would be right to say, then, that he has a share in the theoretical [260] sort of knowledge?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
VISITOR: But it belongs to him, I think, once he has given his professional judgment, not to be finished or to take his leave, in the way that the expert in calculation took his, but to assign whatever is the appropriate task to each group of workers until they complete what has been assigned to them.
YOUNG SOCRATES: That’s correct.
VISITOR: So both all sorts of knowledge like this and all those that go along with the art of calculation are theoretical, but these two classes of [b] knowledge differ from each other in so far as one makes judgments, while the other directs?
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